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Abstract 
 
The thesis is a philosophical analysis of the consumption based capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM), investigating in particular its epistemological and methodological foundations. 
Financial markets are integral parts of advanced and developing economies. They matter 
because they channel unspent household income into banks’ savings accounts and assets such as 
bonds and stocks. Financial economists have traditionally taken interest in the pricing mechanism 
that underlies this capital allocation. The consumption based capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM) is a prominent effort to describe, explain and predict such prices. It tells a story of 
investors’ trade-off between consumption now and later and which portfolio of assets to hold. 
The CCAPM based narrative intuitively makes sense, and the chosen methodology involving 
theoretical assumption, mathematical models and empirical tests follows the professions’ 
standards of good scientific practise. But does CCAPM’s research programme provide knowledge 
for use?  
My thesis seeks to answer this question in a novel way. Instead of embarking on yet 
another asset pricing research project, I let Philosophy of Science inform my analysis. Following 
a “primer” introducing essential CCAPM topics and notations, I discuss, in turn, its theoretical 
foundation, mathematical model, and empirical test results from a philosophy of science 
perspective. I find that a few fundamental principles and several auxiliary assumptions combine 
to develop a simplified, partial and idealized theory of investors, financial markets and assets. 
The model reflects and represents this theory but also makes narrow claims that are distances 
away from the real situations they target. Unsurprisingly, ideal model assertions fail standard 
statistical tests of significance.   
I conclude that mathematical deductive modelling rooted in orthodox, a priori based 
fundamental principles create ideal and fictional settings that limit their scope and portability. The 
development of even more granular models within this orthodox paradigm that searches for 
“event regularities” will not render the desired knowledge for use. The real situations are possibly 
too complex to be captured in simplified assumptions, ideal theories and mathematical structures. 
Novel methodological and ontological approaches to asset pricing are in demand. Hence, claims 
about tendencies in the real data might replace the current focus on point-forecasts. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction  
1. The fascination of financial markets 
Financial markets fascinate. They demand our full attention. Hardly a day goes by 
without a popular media news headline on price developments of financial assets traded 
in cash-, bond-, stock-, derivative- and currency-markets. It is often reported that the 
behaviour of such asset prices are related to the way market participants react to real or 
expected changes in economic variables such as growth, inflation, unemployment, or 
official monetary policy rates and fiscal measures. Globally interlinked financial markets 
and their tradable assets are, therefore, more than ever an integral part of our socio-
economic reality. 1 
 
1.1 Three groups of financial market participants 
Financial market participants are numerous. They are found in most geographical 
locations in the urban world. For simplicity, let me group these participants in three sets. 
The first contains individual and institutional investors, the second holds representatives 
from public sector entities such as central banks and regulating bodies, and, finally, the 
third is populated by academically minded financial economists.2 The members of the 
three sets have varied and different motivations for their engagement with financial 
markets. Let me in a stylized way review some of these motivations. Investors first. 
 
Economic theory tells us that household income can be either spent or saved, and those 
savings equal investments. Savings thus reduce the cash amount available for current 
1 At the time of writing, financial markets globally have gone through their most challenging times since 
the so-called “great depression” in the 1920’s. Banks have collapsed, some sovereign states have been 
unable to re-pay debt held by their creditors, economic growth has disappointed and unemployment rates 
are still above pre-crisis levels. My thesis does not explicitly address these issues. Nonetheless, asset 
pricing is of great interest to, for example, financial market regulators who are concerned about both micro- 
and macro-financial stability. In this context, asset price “bubbles” can dislocate financial markets and 
create negative spill-over effects to the real economic sector. 
2 As I proceed with my discussion, little hinges on this distinction between individual and institutional 
investors so I will use the term “investor”. 
10 
 
                                                          
expenditure. Households who choose to save may, therefore, be regarded as investors. 
Investors have traditionally held their unspent income in savings account at a local bank 
where it has earned a modest, but in most cases, safe return over time and through 
different economic states. Over the past three decades, the development of financial 
market instruments has drastically complemented this time-honoured offering. Today, 
investors can choose from a broad range of investable assets. We find subjects that were 
once the province of specialists such as stocks, commodity, real estate, hedge-, and 
private equity-funds have now become small-talk topics among well informed next door 
neighbours. Although many call this activity saving for the future, others denote it 
investments, liquidity provision or even outright speculation. Fact is that investments 
offer households the opportunity to increase, but also to reduce, and, in a worst case 
scenario, even lose all their savings. This influences their thinking and force decisions 
upon them about how much income to spend now, how much to save for later, as well as 
which financial assets to hold in their investment portfolio.  
 
Members of the second set, i.e. representatives of public sector entities are often called 
upon to protect less sophisticated investors against the lures of the financial markets. 
Policy makers, such as regulators and central bankers, therefore, keep a close watch on 
the activities in and around the financial markets. Such institutions are usually mandated 
to ensure orderly market conditions and to advance non-inflationary economic growth. Of 
late, public sector employees have been working over-time as they develop policy 
responses to counter the financial crisis which erupted during the summer of 2007 in the 
so-called “sub-prime” segment in the market for tradable US mortgaged backed 
securities. Since then this crisis has spilled over to the European sovereign debt markets 
and the commercial banking sector. Among the measures that highlight policy makers 
vigour are, for example, a plethora of new credit facilities provided to domestic and 
international banks by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, new capital, liquidity and 
leverage measures to make banks more resilient under the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision framework, and the set-up of a new special purpose vehicle by the European 
11 
 
Union, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism which could raise funds to support its 
members states in case of urgent financing needs.3 
 
Besides investors and public sector representatives, financial economists within the third 
set have also taken a keen interest in market-related topics. Their focus is often 
summarized under the label “Finance”, and its content is offered to students at academic 
institutions around the globe. Standard textbooks usually divide the subject into two; 
Corporate Finance and Investments.4 Corporate Finance concerns itself with financial 
decision-making at the corporate level and deals with topics such as a choice of projects 
to invest in, ways of financing them, and how much of the net profit generated from these 
investments should be returned to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock buy-
backs. Investments, by contrast, analyse decision-making at the household level. Here, as 
I alluded to earlier, decisions relate to how much of the current income should be 
consumed now or saved for later, and how the available savings could be allocated 
between investments into and within different asset classes such as cash, bonds and 
stocks. 
 
1.2 Demand for understanding 
The members of the three sets - investors, public policy makers and academics - have in 
common that they want to understand how financial markets work. With this 
understanding, they can all make more informed, and, hopefully, better decisions about 
investments, policy actions, and theory development.  
 
These demands for understanding do not seem unreasonable, and, at a first glance, it is 
certainly conceivable that they can be satisfied. After all, financial markets are man-made 
and have been purposefully designed in terms of their regulatory frameworks and 
operational procedures. Likewise, traded financial assets are mostly well understood and 
must, in most cases, fulfil specific minimum documentary requirements before they can 
be registered at the stock exchanges where they are subsequently offered to the public. 
3 Sources as of 20 October 2013: www.frbny.org , www.bis.org, www.esm.europa.eu 
4 Ross (2009). Bodie (2007), Brealey (2007). Copeland, Weston, Shastri (2005). 
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Furthermore, information created through financial market activities is transparent and 
readily available. Every day, prices of financial market assets are collected in real-time, 
placed in data-banks by market service providers, and made available through social and 
professional media. Not only are these various pricing quotes accessible and in many 
cases analysed by investors and public sector representatives, they are also the objects of 
more profound analysis by the academic profession. This analysis is frequently labelled 
“research”.  
 
1.3 Research 
The research approach adopted by financial market economists is not very different from 
that encountered in various other social and natural sciences. A worth-while topic is 
identified, concepts are formed, categories are established, data are collected, explanatory 
theories for their behaviour are developed, models are constructed, theoretical hypothesis 
are formed, predictions are compared with the available data, and evidence-based claims 
are made. If such hypothesis-based predictions are not rejected in standard statistical 
tests, the research project’s theories are, implicitly, viewed as “tentatively accepted” or 
even “confirmed”. A better understanding of the how’s and why’s of financial market 
activities can thus be achieved – or so it is claimed.  
 
Examples of such research activities can be found in Finance textbooks, leading 
academic journals and in papers published, for example, under the umbrella of the 
reputable National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) - a private, US based, non-
profit research organisation of economists. NBER thus promotes a better understanding 
of how the economy and financial markets work. Its web-site claims: “The NBER is 
committed to undertaking and disseminating unbiased economic research in a scientific 
manner, and without policy recommendations, among public policymakers, business 
professionals, and the academic community”. 5 The web-site also highlights that: 
 
“Twenty-four Nobel Prize winners in Economics and thirteen past chairs of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers have been researchers at the NBER. The more than 1,300 
5 Source as of 20 October 2013: www.nber.org 
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professors of economics and business now teaching at colleges and universities in North America 
who are NBER researchers are the leading scholars in their fields. (...)The research activities of the 
NBER are organized into a series of nineteen research programs and fourteen working groups”.  
 
In 1991, Asset Pricing was included as a separate NBER programme series with a credo 
to examine: “…the sources and nature of fluctuations in the prices of financial assets 
including stocks, bonds, and foreign currency. In addition, members of the program 
analyse the international transmission of fluctuations in asset prices”. 6  
 
In its first year, eight research papers were published. Twenty years later, at the end of 
2012, the number was close to 100. There are common red-lines in this population of 
asset pricing publications. I find that financial market economists mostly focus on the 
same key elements when approaching this topic. In fact, I identify five: data, models, 
theories, tests and claims. Data are widely regarded as an unproblematic given. Models, 
their supporting theories and empirical tests are tools in the hands of financial 
economists. Claims can be considered evidence based statements or assertions about the 
findings of the various research projects. 
 
Through their research, financial economists aspire to provide a different kind of 
understanding than that obtained from casual media reports. Their advantage, they claim, 
lies in a disciplined use of the so-called “scientific method” which in a systematic and 
rigorous way combines the five elements I identified. When correctly applied, the 
scientific method generates topic-relevant understanding which aspires to reach the 
highest level of objectivity, reliability and relevance. In academic circles, this type of 
understanding is often denoted “knowledge”. It is positioned as distinct, meritorious and 
scientific. As a proxy for measuring the success of this activity, the academic profession 
of financial economists has produced several Nobel Laureates – the most notable being 
Harry M. Markowitz, Merton H. Miller and William F. Sharpe in 1990, Robert C. Merton 
and Myron S. Scholes in 1997, Edward C. Prescott in 2004, as well as Eugene F. Fama, 
Lars Peter Hansen, and Robert J. Shiller in 2013. 7 
6 See footnote 5. 
7 Source as of 20 October 2013: www.nobelprize.org 
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 Academics, as a consequence, play a central role among the three main groups of 
partakers in financial markets. Should they be unable to live up to their own aspirations in 
terms of providing scientific knowledge, the consequences for both the users of such 
knowledge and the profession itself will indeed be serious. Investor’s savings could fail 
to perform according to their return expectations, public policy makers could fail to fulfil 
their mandates, and academics could fail to create a firm foundation from which others 
can work. Understandably, the search for certainty related to the price behaviour of 
financial market assets is high on the agenda for the various stakeholders. 
 
1.4 Asset Pricing Models  
A closer review of the asset pricing research endeavour reveals that of the five identified 
key topics, i.e. data, models, theories, tests and claims, most attention is given to the asset 
pricing models. This certainly does not diminish the role of the other research topics. In 
fact, data, theories, and, in particular empirical tests are crucial in the way they support 
the model-building effort. When comparing the model predictions against the real 
situations, for example, it is common to review both the data points and the theoretical 
assumptions in the effort to improve the accuracy of the results. 
 
So far, financial market economists have given us a multitude of asset pricing models. 
They are mostly developed with the same goal in mind; follow the NBER Asset Pricing 
research credo mentioned above in section 1.3 and investigate the sources and nature of 
fluctuations in asset prices. As a consequence, asset pricing is overwhelmingly empirical 
in nature. Only a few models are “just” theoretical explorations.  
 
Asset pricing models can, conveniently, be grouped into two broad categories. The first is 
often referred to as fundamental-, absolute-, or macro-models. Financial market 
economists who develop such models claim that the investor and his/her behaviour must 
be the focal point of any asset pricing research project. An elaborate development of a 
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multi-equation view of, first, the investors’ decision making with respect to consumption, 
savings and investments, second, the financial market structure, and, third, the financial 
market assets is regarded as necessary to explain asset price movements. For reasons I 
give in the introduction to Chapter Two, my personal interest is directed at a widely used 
macro-model, i.e. the Consumption Based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) and its 
most vocal advocate, John H. Cochrane’s substantial contributions (1991, 1997, 1999, 
1999a, 2000, 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2011a). In the following Chapter Two, 
section 4, I review its most relevant aspects and let the analysis be the basis for 
discussions in the final three chapters of my thesis. 
 
The models in the second group are usually referred to as “statistical- , time series-, 
relative-, or, factor-models. Financial market economists, who develop such models, 
mostly regress a single-equation on cross-sectional time series drawing on a host of 
specific macroeconomic or financial market related variables as arguments to explain the 
development of asset prices. Investors’ behaviour, financial market structure and their 
asset are, therefore, not explicitly accounted for and described. The most prominent 
representatives of this practice are Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French (1992, 1993, 
1995, 1996). Their statistical regression analysis show, for example, that stocks issued by 
small companies, have, over time, significantly outperformed those issued by larger 
companies. I have more to say about factor-models in Chapter Two, section 1.3, but my 
description will be kept at a minimum. Nonetheless, I will, from time to time, contrast 
them with the work done on the CCAPM.     
 
2. Complications ahead 
Despite the combined research effort undertaken by financial economists working with 
the two groups of asset pricing models, only modest empirical progress has been made 
with respect to improving the quality of the available knowledge upon which investors, 
policy makers and academics can draw. Going forward, I will refer to such knowledge as 
“knowledge for use” and address it in Chapter Two, section 1. Granted, the academic 
profession has provided plausible stories about stock price movements, elegant 
mathematical models and valid theoretical elaborations within a deductive framework 
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from an a-priori starting point. In particular, they have delivered a reliable track record in 
describing how stock prices behaved in past periods. Nonetheless, financial economists 
do not portray themselves as historians. They face a more difficult task when seeking 
explanations for the “sources and nature” of these price movements. Furthermore, they 
seem to be at a loss when seeking to forecast the level of and changes in stock prices over 
time. 
 
Within the academic profession, the challenges related to explaining and forecasting 
stock price movements are widely acknowledged and evidenced by numerous empirical 
studies in which most, if not all, asset pricing model-based claims have been formally 
rejected in standard empirical tests. Financial economists, however, are in general not 
prepared to question their methodological commitments. They continue to proceed within 
their traditional macro- and factor-based framework of theorizing and fitting theories to 
the data. Nonetheless, while the profession tries even harder, the practitioners are 
growing increasingly impatient. The lack of reliable and accurate knowledge for use has 
undermined stakeholder’s confidence when it comes to applying the advice as they are 
not systematically rewarded. It seems that insights so rendered seldom go beyond 
common sense understanding of financial market activities.  
 
In my thesis, I acknowledge the discrepancy between what the profession delivers and 
what the practitioner requests. I, therefore, ask why the academic profession of financial 
economists, and in particular Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM, has been unable to 
provide accurate epistemological value.  
 
3. Roadmap for resolution  
My starting point takes the NBER credo and its research project on the “sources and 
nature of fluctuations in the prices of financial assets” at face value. I, therefore, let 
financial economists describe how they model stock prices, craft accompanying theories, 
draw data into their models, test hypothesis against the real situations, and, finally, make 
statements about their findings at the end of their research process. 
17 
 
 A description of these crucial elements and their interaction along the research value 
chain is, however, not sufficient. It only provides a foundation for identifying the central 
issues related to each of these topics. I, therefore, need to advance my assessment. 
Consequently, I explore whether these elements and their connections contain 
complications which might stand in the way of a better explanation of stock price 
behaviour. I let this part of my analysis be informed by a second group of academics 
which is not necessary associated with the topics of finance, i.e. philosophers of science. 
They too have something to say about the key elements identified above, i.e. theorizing 
and modelling. While financial economists are takers of data, originators of models, 
developers of theories, conductors of tests, and makers of claims, the philosophers are 
questioning the very nature of these elements, and their proper applications. 
To my knowledge, my thesis is the first attempt of using philosophy of science to identify 
philosophical questions in the context of financial asset pricing. I, therefore, take a broad 
view of these topics and seek to identify which philosophical traditions can be applied to 
the consumption based asset pricing theorizing and modelling effort. In particular, I 
investigate how dominant themes in asset pricing can be conceptualized in the philosophy 
of science language. In my effort to connect these two academic traditions, “translation 
work” is warranted. This philosophically grounded analysis also helps me in structuring 
appropriate responses to the challenges facing the profession of financial economists. 
With respect to Cochrane’s consumption based capital asset pricing research effort on 
describing, explaining and forecasting the behaviour of asset prices, I make the following 
main assertions.  
First; the consumption based asset pricing model, i.e. the model “M” in CCAPM, is an 
applied mathematical model. It has been given a dual role; it is used for theorizing, i.e. 
“conceptual explorations” and for econometric analysis, i.e. fitting theories to the data.  
Second; in its first role, the model “M” is developed in a “process of isolation” which 
establishes “simplified”, “idealized” and even “fictional” versions of the investor, the 
18 
 
financial markets and the financial assets. This a priori starting point is used to deduce 
more granular models referred to as “analytically convenient special cases”.  
Third; in its second role, the model “M” extends its analytically convenient special cases 
towards the real situations. I draw on the much debated “equity risk premium puzzle” to 
demonstrate the model’s inability to develop what is referred to as “empirically useful 
representations”. Given the inadequacies of the model “M” with respect to representing 
the empirical world, Cochrane suggests incorporating “habit persistency” as a new 
argument into the model’s mathematical utility function.  
Fourth; I argue that the consumption based capital asset pricing effort, in Imre Lakatos’ 
sense, is a “research programme” that uses a few fundamental, “hard core”, principles, a 
large flexible set of auxiliary, “protective belt”, assumptions, methodological decision 
rules in the form of “positive and negative heuristic”, and an established form of 
assessing whether the research programme is “progressive” or “degenerating”. 
Cochrane’s “habit-persistency” argument is thus well within the heuristic of the 
programme, it modestly improves the programme’s predictability and contributes to its 
progression.  
Fifth; although the analytical convenient special cases are to some extent de-idealized and 
de-fictionalized versions of their a priori starting point, they remain tools for theorizing 
and find few methodologically sound bridges to the real situations they target. As a 
consequence, I do not expect the CCAPM research programme to progress by the 
construction of even more granular, lower-level models as they are too dependent upon 
the auxiliary, belt assumptions. Hence, these cases lack horizontal portability to situations 
different from those they are meant to represent.  
Sixth; given the research programme’s modest level of epistemic value, it’s advocates are 
well advised to move away from the model-based “point-forecasts” approach towards 
one that makes “tendency claims” with respect to empirical situations. This re-direction 
replaces Cochrane’s own suggestion to reduce the importance of standard statistical tests 
when evaluating the model-based claims, and, in addition, offer a sounder foundation for 
emitting knowledge for use to the various stakeholders. 
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 4. Overview of the thesis 
I now briefly turn to the structure of my thesis. Following this First Chapter which 
motivates my interest in the consumption based capital asset pricing research topic, I 
continue with Chapter Two on Asset Pricing Models, Theories, and their Assessment. 
The purpose is to introduce a few essential asset pricing related topics that are often 
found in the vast literature. My goal is to provide first time readers a foundation for easy 
reference as I proceed through the thesis. My review is directed towards three particular 
topics that will continue to stay with us; CCAPM’s theoretical foundation, the model “M” 
in CCAPM, and CCAPM’s application and assessment.  
Following the descriptive “primer” in Chapter Two which is free of specific criticism, I 
turn to the philosophical analysis of CCAPM’s theoretical basis in Chapter Three. The 
purpose is to assess the structure and content of the theories that Cochrane develops to 
support his explanation of asset price formation and fluctuation. My goal is to seek a 
better understanding of the individual assumptions, how they interactively connect, and 
what kind of investors, financial markets and financial assets they establish. I let my 
discussion be informed, primarily, by Imre Lakatos, and I report that the consumption 
based asset pricing effort can be characterized as a Lakatosian research programme. My 
analysis also draws on the insights of other philosophers of science, i.e. Uskali Maeki, 
Mary S. Morgan, Daniel M. Hausman and Nancy Cartwright.  
In Chapter Four, I shift my focus away from asset pricing theories to the model “M” in 
CCAPM. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what the model is, what it is used for, 
and what it represents. My goal is to identify possible problem areas that can be held 
responsible for the model’s inability to generate adequate knowledge for use beyond 
trivial “common-sense” advice. I primarily draw on Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann, 
Alan Gibbard and Hal R. Varian, Milton Friedman and Nancy Cartwright’s contributions 
to inform my discussion. I find that the model “M” is an applied mathematical model 
with a dual role; it’s analytically convenient special cases are, on one hand, used for 
theorizing, and, on the other, used for reaching out towards the empirical world. I 
demonstrate how the fundamental, core, principles in conjunction with the auxiliary, belt, 
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assumptions are used to develop such cases and why they mostly fail to also be 
empirically useful representations.  
Building upon the two previous chapters on asset pricing theories and models, I use 
Chapter Five to analyse the third central topic of my thesis, i.e. CCAPM’s application 
and assessment. I illustrate the main issues in the context of the so-called “equity risk 
premium puzzle”. The purpose is first to explore why the CCAPM fails to explain the 
puzzle and then to evaluate Cochrane’s response. My goal is threefold; show that 
forecastability, initially, is the accepted “litmus test” for assessing the progress of the 
CCAPM research programme, point towards the two main obstacles that the programme 
is confronted with, i.e. unrealistic assumptions and socio-economic complexities, and 
propose a solution for the programme to consider overcoming the double-trouble. The 
solution advises Cochrane to de-emphasize point forecasts and consider making claims 
about tendencies in the empirical situations. I let my analysis be informed by John Dupré, 
John Sutton, Tony Lawson, Milton Friedman, Alexander Rosenberg and Nancy 
Cartwright. 
 
   
 
  
21 
 
Chapter 2:  
Asset Pricing Models, Theories and 
Assessment 
Introduction 
In his book A History of the Theory of Investments (2006), Mark E. Rubinstein tells us 
that the foundation of investments was laid in what he called the “Ancient Period”, i.e. 
pre 1950. His first reference goes to the Italian number’s specialist Leonardo Fibonacci 
(1170-1240). Rubinstein tells us that Fibonacci not only helped disseminating the use of 
Arabic numbers in Europe but that he also brought us the calculation of the present and 
future value of an investment. This innovation is still with us today, and we will hear 
more about them later in this chapter. Nonetheless, from the 12th century to what 
Rubinstein denotes the “Classical” and “Modern” periods of investments, i.e. 1950-1980 
and post 1980 respectively, much changed, to say the least.  
 
In this focused review of how financial assets are priced, there is no need to uncover 
ancient manuscripts in an effort to trace the historical development of the topic. The 
archaeological effort is thus kept to a minimum. In fact, for the purpose of what I want to 
examine in my thesis, academic asset pricing research started in the mid 1950s with 
Harry M. Markowitz’ publication “Portfolio Selection” (1952) and continued when 
William F. Sharpe published “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
under Conditions of Risk” (1964). Since then, asset pricing research efforts have 
developed in two main directions. One path continues to build upon Sharpe’s theoretical 
market equilibrium foundation while the other focuses on statistical time series analysis 
of return movements. In Chapter One, section 1.4, I referred to the pricing models in the 
first group as macro-models and those in the second group as factor-models.  
 
Both directional developments, however, exemplify what the two asset pricing research 
efforts are all about: theories and assumptions, equation-based mathematical modelling, 
long historical cross sectional time series of asset prices, statistical test-techniques as well 
22 
 
as conclusions and claims. As I mentioned in Chapter One, section 1.3, these common 
elements possibly inspired the National Bureau for Economic Research’s (NBER) 
research credo to discover: “…the sources and nature of fluctuations in the prices of 
financial assets including stocks, bonds, and foreign currency”. 8  
 
My own interest is directed towards the macro models. Particularly, I concentrate on the 
so-called consumption based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). There are four main 
reasons for my choice; (1) the CCAPM is widely recognized and used; (2) the tradition 
claims it to be broad enough to encompass other asset pricing research efforts - including 
the factor models; (3) it brings to the forefront the investor and his/her rationale for 
investing in the financial market assets; and, (4) it is constructed in a multi-equation 
framework rooted in both micro- and macroeconomic theoretical reasoning. When 
discussing this specific type of macro-model, I let the analysis be informed by John H. 
Cochrane – a leading contributor to this field of research (1991, 1997, 1999, 1999a, 2000, 
2005, 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2011a). Throughout his publications, Cochrane often 
offers more economic explanatory insights than those rendered by other authors within 
the same tradition. This is most compelling in the context of the upcoming discussion. 
 
Chapter Two can be read as a “primer” on consumption based asset pricing research 
effort. It familiarizes the reader with a few very specific and selected financial market 
concepts and serves as a reference for my discussions in Chapter Three on CCAPMs 
underlying theories, Chapter Four on the model “M” in CCAPM, and, finally, in Chapter 
Five on its application and assessment.  
 
This chapter has six sections. The first section starts with a brief introduction to financial 
market data and jargon before it continues with a short description of the factor-based 
asset pricing model. In section two, I shift my focus towards the macro-based approach 
and review how Cochrane uses the asset pricing data to extract empirical facts and a 
story. The story is related to investors’ behaviour and their demand for financial market 
assets. The third section continues the analysis of Cochrane’s asset pricing research effort 
8Source as of 20 October 2013: www.nber.org  
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and focuses on main concepts and notations. In particular, I review three specific topics; 
the theory of the investor, his/her utility and risk preference. This section prepares the 
ground for my analysis of CCAPM’s theoretical framework in Chapter Three. In section 
four, I pull Cochrane’s facts, story, concepts and notations together and describe the 
consumption based capital asset pricing model in some detail. Now the focus is on the 
mathematical expressions and their interconnections. The fifth section extends the 
research effort’s tradition towards its final destination, i.e. the financial market 
equilibrium situation. For that to happen, simplification in three areas are necessary; the 
investor, the market and the assets. Sections four and five are the foundation for my 
discussions of the model “M” in CCAPM in Chapter Four. Finally, in section six, I 
review how the CCAPM is assessed against data originating in the real situations. In this 
discussion, I focus on how well the model can capture the notorious “equity risk premium 
puzzle”, which was first introduced by Mehra and Prescott (1985). It turns out that the 
CCAPM in its original form does not fit the data particularly well. In fact, the model-
based claims are statistically unsuccessful. Cochrane’s response is to “reverse-engineer” 
the model. This final section paves the way for my discussions in Chapter Five.   
 
1. Asset pricing data and models 
Cochrane’s asset pricing research effort is both empirical and theoretical. In fact, it starts 
with observations of financial market data. On the basis of these observations, he extracts 
statistical data-patterns and develops stories around them. Cochrane then tells us that 
these stories are made “explicit” with the help of theories and mathematical equations. 
The model’s hypothesis-based predictions are finally compared against time series of 
pricing data. Cochrane’s goal, following NBER’s credo alluded to previously, is to 
explain and predict the behaviour of the data points and make this knowledge available to 
the various stakeholders for them to use.  
 
Throughout my thesis, I will often refer to this expression, i.e. “knowledge for use”. A 
brief review thereof is warranted. I let Cartwright (2007) inform my reflections. 
Cartwright puts claims in the context of our knowledge of social phenomena and how this 
knowledge can be used in policy making situations. She discusses three aspects of 
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knowledge for use: Which claims are established, which methods “license” them, and 
how broad is their “scope” – in particular how such claims can be applied to situations 
outside the circumstances and population from which they were extracted. Let me 
address these three points one at a time.  
 
Cartwright first asks which claims are established. In the context of my discussion, I 
answer the question with a reference to section 6 later in this chapter. In that section, I 
introduce a well known case study showing that investments in stocks, over a period from 
1889-1978, have offered a significantly higher return than investments in bonds (Mehra 
and Prescott 1985). By way of a declarative sentence it is claimed: “Financial market risk 
taking has been systematically rewarded”. In order to explain why this has been the case, 
a consumption based capital asset pricing model is applied to the data. Although the 
model fails in explaining the empirical fact, it has led to a better understanding of the 
phenomena: “This knowledge is now leading to a much more successful set of variations 
on the consumption-based model.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 455).  
 
Cartwright’s second point is related to how such claims are established, i.e. the 
warranting method. Later in this chapter, in section 3 and 5, I show that Cochrane gives 
the CCAPM a microeconomic foundation in which a representative investor optimizes 
his own situation within a financial market setting. In Chapter Three, section 3.2.3, I 
demonstrate that the CCAPM’s approach to real situations can be interpreted in the 
context of John Stuart Mill’s deductive a-priori method, and in Chapter Four, section 4.3, 
I reconstruct that approach within a “hypothetico-deductive” framework. I conclude that 
Cochrane warrants his claims by applying standard methodological tools and processes, 
i.e. formulate a hypothesis, deduce a prediction from the hypothesis, test the predictions, 
evaluate the hypothesis on the basis of the test results. Now, the question is whether this 
is defendable in the financial market context. In Chapter Five, section 4 and 5, I discuss 
Cochrane’s research effort and conclude the deductive a-priori method is indeed 
defendable - albeit with a twist.  
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Cartwright’s third intervention points towards the scope of the claims that have been 
established. She is mindful about, first, their use in situations outside those that are 
warranted by the specific method, second, the data population, and, third, the 
particularities of a situation. For example, Cartwright explains that ideal experiments can 
“tell us with certainty what the effect of a given cause is” – but only in the circumstances 
of that particular experiment and not necessarily elsewhere.  
 
With this, Cartwright poses serious challenges for social scientists in general and 
financial economists in particular. For example, the socio-economic circumstances under 
which the stock market crashed in the late 1920’s and again in 2008, were not the same. 
Furthermore, unlike experimentation in the natural sciences, financial economists cannot 
easily set-up controlled experiments to isolate single causes and extract their direct 
effects. Finally, Cochrane’s choice of the deductive a-priori method is, as I mentioned, 
defendable but not faultless. For these reasons, Cochrane is careful. His claims seldom 
stretch beyond what is extractable from knowledge about past situations. Obviously, 
Cochrane is confident that his version of the CCAPM includes relevant and true 
principles that hold across a given range of circumstances. So anything derived from the 
CCAPM will also be true across anything in that range of such circumstances.  
 
Portability of claims beyond the data and the particular circumstances under review is 
therefore a major issue in Finance. Hence, toning down claims about the future state of 
financial markets is recommended. This, however, does not prevent Cochrane from 
giving advice such as: “You have to buy stocks that everyone else thinks are dogs. Then 
you have to sell stocks and long term bonds in good times, when stock prices are high.” 
(Cochrane 1999, p. 54). Nonetheless, such advice should in no circumstances be 
positioned as distinct, meritorious and scientific “knowledge for use”. 
 
Let me now leave this brief review of “knowledge for use” and turn back to the main 
content of this first section. I am concerned with the first local stops of the CCAPM 
research effort, i.e. the observable asset pricing data. Then, I explore how the two 
different groups of asset pricing models use this data.  
26 
 
 1.1 Financial market data 
It is not always easy to keep up with the ever changing headlines of financial market 
news or disentangling their complexities. This is particular the case when a casual 
bystander is exposed to financial markets jargon and their idiosyncrasies. Consider, 
therefore, the Financial Times (FT), a UK based newspaper which is printed in more than 
twenty global locations and brands itself the “World Business Newspaper”. Almost daily, 
the reader is presented with short summaries like the four quoted here from 2013. Let us 
first review the journalistic views on Google – the US internet search company: 
  
“Google shares soared on Wednesday following the release after Tuesday’s close of quarterly 
earnings that beat expectations, as the search engine’s revenues from advertising stabilised. Shares 
rallied 5.5 per cent to USD 741.50 and have gained more than 26 per cent in the past 12 months. 
(...) The benchmark S&P 500 dipped in and out of negative territory, however, the index finished 
the day 0.1 per cent higher at 1.494.78, hitting a fresh five-year high. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average closed 0.5 per cent higher at 13,779.17. The technology heavy Nasdaq Composite rose 
0.3 per cent to 3,153.67.” 9  
 
Later in the year, the FT reports on Google again: 
 
“Google, meanwhile, has been riding high on expectations, with mobile and YouTube advertising 
leading the way. While its shares have pulled back recently, they have been surging since its last 
results, climbing 12 per cent. Net revenues in the latest quarter are forecast to have jumped to 
$14.2bn from $8.1bn the year before, thanks in part to its acquisition of Motorola Mobility, with 
earnings rising 6 per cent to $10.69 a share.” 10 
 
Next, the FT has its focus on Caterpillar – the US earth-moving company:  
“Caterpillar, the machinery maker often seen as a barometer of economic activity, predicted 
continued global economic weakness in the first half of the year as it lowered its revenues forecast 
for 2013. (...) Announcing worse fourth-quarter results than expected, the world’s largest maker of 
earthmoving equipment by revenues forecast full-year 2013 revenue of USD 60bn to USD 68bn, 
(...) Caterpillar, which generates two thirds of its revenue outside of North America, said the 
9 Financial Times, 23 January 2013. 
10 Financial Times, 15 April 2013. 
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lowered revenues range “reflects the level of uncertainty we see in the world today”. (...) Shares in 
Caterpillar rallied as the company’s full-year earnings forecast beat analyst’s estimates, even 
though quarterly profits were disappointing. (....) The benchmark S&P 500 index, however, was 
trading 0.1 per cent lower at 1501.34, still at fresh five-year highs reached last week” 11 
 
Finally, mid 2013, the FT reported on Caterpillar’s fortunes:  
 
“Caterpillar, the earthmoving and mining equipment maker, cut its full-year profit forecast for the 
second successive quarter as it announced net income for the second quarter down 43 per cent on 
the same period last year. The company, which in the first quarter suffered from declining demand 
from the mining industry, cut its forecast for full-year sales 2.6 per cent to a range of $56bn to 
$58bn. Earnings per share would be $6.50 in the middle of that range, down 7 per cent from the $7 
forecast at the previous projected range…. Doug Oberhelman, chief executive, said the company’s 
expectations for overall end-user demand remained around the same as in April, when it 
previously cut its forecasts. However, equipment dealers had cut inventories more than expected 
during the quarter. (…) The shares fell 2.43 per cent to $83.44  12 
 
Before I comment upon these quotations, let us take a quick look at typical line-graphs of 
the stocks mentioned by the FT journalists, i.e. Google and Caterpillar, as well as one of 
the US stock market indices, i.e. S&P 500. 13 The graphs are extracted from Bloomberg, 
the business and financial market news provider. 14  They show the historical price 
development of the two stocks and the index value. The lines thus connect all end-of-day 
stock prices since 19 August 2004, the day Google became a publically traded or listed 
company, through 31 August 2013. Price graphs like these are published in popular 
media such as newspapers, magazines, television and on dealing screens at banks. The 
data are thus public available, abundant and easily accessible. We may call the data “raw” 
because they are emitted at the ultimate source, i.e. the company level and because the 
data have not yet been used to derive new time-series of data such as total-returns, 
variances and co-variances. 
 
11 Financial Times, 29 January 2013. 
12 Financial Times, 24 July 2013.  
13 The S&P 500 is a stock market index of the 500 largest US based companies in terms of their market 
capitalisation, i.e. stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding stocks. 
14 www.bloomberg.com 
 
28 
 
                                                          
  
29 
 
Graph 1: Google stock price from 19 August 2004 to 31 August 2013 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Caterpillar stock price from 19 August 2004 to 31 August 2013 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3: S&P 500 stock index price from 19 August 2004 to 31 August 2013 
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The four short journalistic FT statements related to these three graphs are similar in 
several ways. First, they describe how individual stocks of two US domiciled companies, 
i.e. Google (Graph 1) and Caterpillar (Graph 2), as well as three main US stock market 
indices, i.e. Nasdaq, Dow Jones and, as exemplified in Graph 3, the S&P 500 performed 
over a particular time period. Second, the FT extracts offer the readers explanations by 
connecting these price levels to specific events. These events are, for example, that 
Google’s “revenues from advertising stabilised”, and that Caterpillar’s dealers “cut in 
inventories”. The third unifying point is that investor’s activities and their behaviour are 
not mentioned. It is as if they are not partaking in the formation of asset prices. Fourth, 
no forecasts are offered. We are, for example, not given any indications related to the 
possible future path of the values of the stock market indices or the individual prices of 
their underlying constituents. This disappointment aside, the snippets are certainly 
informative to FT readers.  
 
For the not so versed financial newspaper reader, however, FTs descriptions and 
explanations contain financial market “jargon” which may not be comprehensible at first 
sight. There are references to “stock market indices”, “prices”, “returns”, “profit”, 
“revenue”, “uncertainty”, “economic activity”, etc. Different financial economists think 
differently about how to make sense of these concepts and how they connect. Earlier, in 
Chapter One, section 1.4, I mentioned that they can be allocated to two main schools of 
thoughts, i.e. the macro- and the factor-model group. Let me briefly introduce them. 
 
1.2 Two groups of asset pricing models 
The four FT extracts presented above aspire to be both descriptive and explanatory. They 
first describe the price developments of financial market data and then suggest that the 
price behaviour of individual stocks and their aggregates are influenced by particular 
financial and economic events. This raises at least two questions; first, can a connection 
between asset prices and individual events be established and, second, can such 
connections be generalized. Are we led to believe, for example, that whenever global 
economic activity increases, the price of Caterpillar’s stock will always go up? Or can we 
expect Google’s stock price to benefit from a higher level of advertising income? 
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Needless to say, such forward looking projections and advice, if reliable, will be of 
considerable help for those who invest their wealth in financial market assets. In 
anticipation of a less uncertain economic environment, investors could simply buy as 
much of Caterpillar’s stock as possible, wait for the price increase to happen and realize a 
positive return when selling the stock at a higher price than was initially paid. 
 
Financial economists have similar aspirations, i.e. they are looking to describe, explain 
and predict the behaviour of financial market data in order to give advice to various 
stakeholders. Earlier, I said that asset pricing models can be grouped in two cohorts under 
the labels macro-models and factor-models. Cochrane calls them “absolute” and 
“relative” models respectively:  
 
“In absolute pricing, we price each asset by reference to its exposure to fundamental sources of 
macroeconomic risks. The consumption based and general equilibrium models are the purest 
examples of this approach. The absolute approach is the most common in academic settings, in 
which we use asset pricing theory positively to give an economic explanation for why prices are as 
they are, or in order to predict how prices might change if policy or economic structure changed. 
In relative pricing, we ask a less ambitious question. We ask what we can learn about an asset’s 
value given the price of some other assets. We do not ask where the prices of the other assets come 
from, and we use as little information about fundamental risk factors as possible.” (Cochrane 
2005, p. xiv). 15  
 
Cochrane’s classification leads him to place his own consumption based capital asset 
pricing model (CCAPM) into the absolute, or macro-group. Cochrane also locates 
Sharpe’s Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in that group. Nonetheless, Cochrane 
explains that when the CAPM is applied to the financial market data, it loses some of its 
consumer based ambitions and moves into the camp of the latter school. Cochrane also 
puts “pure” factor-models as popularized by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
into the relative- or factor-based group. Option pricing models based upon the seminal 
work of Black and Scholes (1972) are also found in Cochrane’s second group.  
 
15 In this quote Cochrane makes references to “absolute” and “relative” pricing of financial assets. In my 
language, I denote the former “macro-models” and the latter “factor-models”.  
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In the next section, I briefly review two prominent factor-based pricing models, i.e. 
Sharpe’s CAPM and Fama and French’s factor-model. Thereafter, in section 2, I turn to 
Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM, which is the main focus of this thesis.  
 
1.3 Factor-based asset pricing models 
While Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) main focus was on how to construct investment 
portfolios from a large number of individual stocks, Sharpe (1963, 1964), and others such 
as Treynor (1961), Lintner (1965, 1969), Mossin (1966) and Black (1972), changed the 
perspective towards asset pricing. In this context, Sharpe stands out. He asked what can 
be said about individual stock prices if all investors followed Markowitz’ advise on 
“portfolio selection”. The answers were provided in two steps: In Sharpe (1963), he 
addresses the practical aspects of Markowitz’ portfolio construction. Later, in Sharpe 
(1964), he extends the research effort to a partial capital market equilibrium situation 
which considers the relation between expected rates of return on stock investments and 
their risk. 
 
Observing that the cross sectional variations in single stock returns tend to move together, 
Sharpe assumed that there is a common factor which could be held responsible for the 
return on any one stock. He was thus searching for this exogenous factor in the “stock 
market as a whole”, the “GDP” or “any other factor thought to be the most significant 
influence on the returns from securities”. Finally, Sharpe settled on the stock market as a 
whole and denoted this variable the market portfolio. 
 
In order to establish his CAPM, Sharpe first enriched the financial market with more 
asset classes than Markowitz’ stock only universe and confronted the investor with a 
choice between them. Sharpe found inspiration in Tobin (1958) which, based upon John 
Maynard Keynes’ theory of liquidity preference (1936), had already extended the 
investment opportunity set to include a so-called “riskless asset” class, i.e. cash deposit at 
the local savings bank. This also enabled Sharpe to use Tobin’s separation theorem 
which states that the investor first chooses an optimal combination of risky assets, i.e. 
follow Markowitz, and, thereafter, decide how much of his/her savings is allocated 
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between that risky portfolio of stocks and the riskless asset. Second, Sharpe also filled the 
gap that Tobin and Markowitz had left with respect to the pricing of assets and the 
equilibrium situation. Sharpe found inspiration in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
axioms of rational choice with uncertain outcomes, and from Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
on the conditions for an equilibrium situation. 
 
The combination, i.e. the “two-asset” investment universe and the introduction of a utility 
maximizing investor enabled Sharpe to offer a theoretical framework that eventually led 
to a partial equilibrium situation in the financial market. Sharpe assumed that the 
equilibrium is reached when all investors have optimised their own situation with respect 
to maximizing end-of period savings, i.e. investments. In this situation, all investors have 
agreed that there is only one desirable portfolio combination of the available risky assets, 
i.e. the market portfolio. This agreement is different from Markowitz who had investors 
hold different portfolios of risky assets.  
 
But Sharpe did not stop here. He also presented a mathematical equation that 
subsequently was statistically tested against the real situations. It can be expressed in a 
single equation, single-factor model, which linearly connects the expected return on an 
individual stock with that of the market portfolio (Sharpe 1964): 
 
E( Ri ) = Rf + ßi [ E (Rm) - Rf ] 
 
E(Ri) is the expected (E) rate of return (Ri) on a specific stock (i). It is set equal to the 
risk-free rate of return Rf plus a risk premium [E(Rm) - Rf], where E(Rm) is the expected 
return on the stock market portfolio minus the risk-free rate of return. The risk premium 
is then multiplied by the so-called “beta-factor” ßi for that specific stock. The beta-factor 
has a more detailed description (Sharpe 1964): 
 
𝛽𝑖 =  𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝑅𝑚)  
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The beta-factor ßi for any specific stock equals the co-variance (COV) between the 
historical return on the specific stock Ri and the historical return on the stock market 
portfolio Rm divided by the return variance (VAR) of the market portfolio Rm. Empirically, 
the market portfolio is proxied by a stock market index such as the S&P 500.  
 
CAPM claims that the return on a risky asset, for example, Caterpillar’s stock, has two 
components; the risk-free rate of return plus a compensation for company specific risks. 
Investors who venture beyond the risk-free assets to hold stocks get exposure to the risk 
of not getting the invested money back as initially expected. The investor, therefore, 
requires a compensation for the uncertainty of owning a particular stock. This 
compensation is given by the equity risk premium, i.e. the market price of risk multiplied 
by the “beta”, defined as the quantity of risk for each specific stock. For this reason, 
every stock is assigned a unique, empirical “beta”. The higher the beta, therefore, the 
more risk premium the stock should collect. The lower the beta, the more “defensive” the 
stock is. Intuitively this makes sense. Early empirical regression results confirmed the 
positive trade-off between risk and return; high beta stocks are riskier than low beta 
stocks. When the market portfolio performs well, for example, the high beta stock 
performs better. In a negative market environment, the high beta stocks do worse than the 
overall market.  
 
In the end, Sharpe’s CAPM did not survive more detailed empirical scrutiny, but there 
were other challenges as well. 16 Merton (1971, 1973), for example, points towards the 
theoretical possibility that other common factors could be used to statistically 
demonstrate why returns are differ across stocks. Ross (1976), for example, extended the 
CAPM to account for other factors in his Arbitrage Pricing Model (APT) framework. Not 
only did such models perform better than the CAPM in empirical tests, it also highlighted 
that CAPM’s single factor, i.e. the market portfolio could not be correctly identified as 
Roll (1977) pointed out. These findings seriously challenged Sharpe’s research effort, 
16 Well known references are Black, Jensen, Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend 
(1973), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Shanken (1985), Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Ang 
and Chen (2005). 
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and it also opened up for more elaborate equity pricing models denoted “multi-factor” 
models.  
 
Both macro- and microeconomics provide a rich background for finding factors, which 
might be used to determine asset prices and returns. Fama (1981) and Chen, Roll, and 
Ross (1986) are early sources. Chen, Roll and Ross, for example, explore the question 
whether changes in macroeconomic variables such as inflation, industrial production, or 
the different interest rates systematically influence the return on investments in risky 
assets in excess of the risk-free rate.  
 
In the course of developing multi factor pricing models, however, financial economists 
started paying more attention to variables that could be constructed directly from 
financial market data sources rather than from micro and macroeconomics. Fama and 
French, building upon the contributions of Merton (1973), Ross (1976) and Banz (1981), 
possibly developed the most influential example of a multi-factor model. It still stands 
out as an eminent reference point for all such factor-based research efforts – also 
recognized in Cochrane: “Fama and French (1996) is an excellent crystallization of how 
average returns vary across stocks.” (Cochrane 2006, p. 13). 
 
Using a broader universe of stocks, a longer time series and higher frequency data than 
those drawn upon by Sharpe (1963, 1964), Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
extended Sharpe’s regression framework to cover cross-sectional relationship between 
expected excess return and risk. In empirical tests, they found statistical significance in 
three such variables, i.e. CAPM’s market portfolio, the market capitalisation of a stock, 
i.e. the size of the company, and the equity price relative to its book value, i.e. a measure 
of a company’s market value. In particular, Fama and French claim that small and 
undervalued stocks tended to perform better through time and economic states than their 
large and overvalued counterparts. This means that a carefully assembled portfolio of 
stocks with such statistically properties would reward investors with a higher excess 
return than that offered by any other portfolio. They dubbed them “style” portfolios. 
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These findings were developed in the context of a single-equation, multi-factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993): 
 
Rp - Rf = αi + ßp ( Rm - Rf ) + sp SML + hp HML + εp 
 
The return on a portfolio of stocks Rp minus the risk-free rate Rf is a linear function of 
three factors: the return of the stock market portfolio Rm minus the risk-free rate of return 
Rf, the difference between the returns on a portfolio of small and large stocks, SML, i.e. 
small S minus M large L stocks, and the difference between the returns on a portfolio of 
high and low book-to-market stocks, HML, i.e. high H minus M low L valuation. The 
regression parameters are denoted αi, , ßp, sp, and hp. The error term is εp. 
 
This short description does not do justice to the path-breaking work of Sharpe as well as 
Fama and French in which specific factors were developed and used to describe and give 
explanations for stock price behaviour. Much more detail can be added, but that will take 
us away from our main focus which Cochrane claims should be on connecting asset 
returns directly to the investor, his/her behaviour and choices. Hence, let us keep the 
single- and multi-factor pricing models for future references and move on to the 
consumption based capital asset pricing model as advocated by Cochrane. 
 
2. Financial market facts and a story 
For more than two decades, Cochrane has published numerous articles and books on asset 
pricing (1991, 1997, 1999, 1999a, 2000, 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2011a). Some 
are theoretical contributions, but the majority of his work ends up in the empirical arena. 
It is rooted in observed data from which Cochrane extracts what he refers to as “facts”. 
Let us first review a few of those fact-based statements before I let Cochrane tell us what 
he calls a story about asset pricing. 
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2.1 The financial market facts 
Cochrane’s first fact-based claim tells us: 
 
 “Over the last century, the stock market in the United States has yielded impressive returns to its 
investors. For example, in the post-war period, stock returns have averaged 8 percentage points 
above Treasury Bills. Will stocks continue to give such impressive returns in the future? Are long-
term average stock-returns a fundamental feature of advanced industrial economies? (...) How 
does the recent rise in stock markets affect our views of future returns? (...) In this article, I 
summarize the academic, and if I dare say so, scientific evidence on these issues.” (Cochrane 
1997, p. 3).  
 
He continues:  
 
“The last 15 years have seen a revolution in the way financial economists understand the 
investment world. We once thought that stock and bond returns were essentially unpredictable. 
Now we know that stock and bond returns have a substantial predictable component at long 
horizons. (...). In this article I survey these new facts, and I show how they are variations on a 
common theme. (...). Each case suggests that financial markets offer rewards in the form of 
average returns for holding risks related to recessions and financial distress, in addition to risk 
represented by overall market movements.” (Cochrane 1999, p. 36). 
 
Cochrane reiterates: 
 
“Some assets offer higher average returns than other assets, or, equivalently, they attract lower 
prices. These “risk premiums” should reflect aggregate, macroeconomic risks; they should reflect 
the tendency of assets to do badly in bad economic times. I survey research on the central 
question: what is the nature of macroeconomic risks that drive risk premia in asset markets.” 
(Cochrane 2008, p. 239). 
 
Finally, Cochrane tells us: 
  
“What should investors do? An important current of academic research investigates how portfolio 
theory should adapt to our new view of the financial world. I summarize this research, and I distil 
the advice for investors.” (Cochrane 1999, p. 59).  
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The four paragraphs of statements have several commonalities. First, Cochrane alludes to 
many of the same concepts also used by the FT journalists. We hear about risk and return, 
stocks and bonds, and that their prices vary over time and across asset classes. In 
particular, we learn that risky stocks, over a long time horizon, have returned more to 
investors than riskless US Treasury Bills. 17  Cochrane portrays this as an observed 
statistical fact often referred to as a “risk premium” or “equity risk premium”. 18  
 
Second, we also learn that asset returns have a “substantial predictable component”. How 
does Cochrane know? He relies on statistical analysis:  
 
“We are not only concerned with the average return on stocks but whether returns are expected to 
be unusually low at a time of high prices, such as the present. The first and most natural thing one 
might do to answer this question is to look at a regression forecast.” (Cochrane 1997, p. 7).  
 
But not only that: “The most obvious approach to these questions is of course statistical. 
What is the evidence on past stock and bond returns?”. (Cochrane 1997, p. 4). Asset class 
return, or excess returns such as the equity risk premium, can thus be regressed on 
selected explanatory factors. Cochrane continues: 
 
“The central technique is simple forecasting regression: if we find |b| > 0 in Rt+1 = a +bxt + εt+1, 
then we know that Rt+1 varies over time. The forecasting variable xt typically has a suggestive 
business cycle correlation. Expected returns are high in “bad times”, when we might well suppose 
people are less willing to hold risks.” (Cochrane 2008, p. 244). 19  
17 US Treasury Bills, also known as T-Bills, are used by the US Treasury Department as a short-term debt 
financing instrument to borrow money from the public, ie investors. Their repayment and interest payments 
are guaranteed by the “full faith and credit” of the US Government. 
18 I will have more to say with respect to this “premium” later in this chapter. Cochrane tells us, for 
example, that in the period from 1947 to 1996, the annual average return on S&P 500 after inflation, i.e. 
“real” was 9.5% with a standard deviation of 16.8%. Over the same period, the “risk free” US Treasury 
Bills returned 0.8% p.a. after inflation with a standard deviation of 2.6% p.a. Subtracting the return on Bills 
from that of S&P 500 gets us the “equity risk premium” of 8.7%. Another way of viewing the risk premium 
is through the so-called Sharpe Ratio (SR). It is calculated by deducting the risk free US Treasury Bill 
return from the return of the asset under review and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the 
asset return. In this case the SR equals 0.51, i.e. (9.5 – 0.8)/16.8. The higher the ratio, the better the risk 
adjusted return is. 
19 In this linear function, Rt+1 is the expected stock market return in the next period t+1, xt is the current 
forecasting variable, a and b are parameters. or coefficients, while εt+1  is the error, or disturbance term.  
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 As I mentioned earlier in the context of factor-models, much of the asset pricing literature 
has been focused on how the return can be “explained” or as Cochrane prefers, 
“summarized” by one or several of these variables.  
 
Third, statistical analysis of time series data is suitable for delivering descriptive facts and 
analysing patterns in data. Cochrane, however, is of the opinion that such analysis is of 
limited use when trying to understand asset price movements. Something more 
fundamental is missing:  
 
“Statistical analysis of past returns leaves a lot of uncertainty about future returns. Furthermore, it 
is hard to believe that average excess return are 8 percent without knowing why this is so. Perhaps 
more important, no statistical analysis can predict if the future will be like the past. Even if the true 
expected excess return was 8 percent, did that result from fundamental or temporary features of 
the economy? Thus, we need an economic understanding of stock returns.” (Cochrane 1997, p. 
12). 
 
This is a crucial statement as it introduces the need for a theoretical and fundamental 
economic understanding of asset price behaviour. Implicitly, it criticises factor-based 
asset pricing models which rely exclusively on statistical analysis.  
 
Fourth, Cochrane seeks outlets for these asset return facts. In particular, he would like to 
use them as a basis for giving advice to the various stakeholders, i.e. investors, public 
policy makers or fellow academics. This advice could thus qualify as knowledge for use.  
 
2.2 The financial market story 
The financial market facts that Cochrane alludes to need explanation, and he has just told 
us that neither descriptive statistics nor regression analysis suffice. I have already 
indicated that Cochrane, for these reasons, has chosen a different kind of explanatory 
path. Specifically, he seeks to connect observable asset price and return data with 
macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption, production and investment. But these 
aggregates are sums of individual investors’ decision making and, ultimately, choices 
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about consumption and which assets to hold in their portfolio. Hence the importance of a 
microeconomic foundation firmly rooted in the individual investor becomes evident. 
 
Before I turn to how Cochrane formally intends to improve our economic understanding 
of stock returns by presenting supporting theories and the model “M” in CCAPM, let us 
first review how he frames that discussion with the use of what he alludes to as stories: 
 
“Many superficially plausible stories have been put forward to explain historically high return on 
stocks and the time-variation of returns. Economic models and theories make these stories explicit, 
(...). Few stories survive this scrutiny.” (Cochrane 1997, p. 12).  
 
Here, Cochrane makes references to how stories are used to explain and the importance 
of confronting the model-based claims against the empirical situations. Later in Chapter 
Four, sections 1.2.2 and 4.4 as well as in Chapter Five, section 5.2, I will discuss the 
methodological importance of stories in connecting the CCAPM to real situations.  Let us 
now turn to the narrative. 
 
As a starting point, consider two individual stocks, for example those of Google and 
Caterpillar, and then read Cochrane’s very informative story about he refers to as 
“recession proof stocks”: 
  
“One of them does well in recessions while the other does poorly. Clearly, most investors prefer 
the stock that does well in recessions, since its performance will cushion the blows to their current 
income. If lots of people feel that way, they bid up the price of that stock, or equivalently, they are 
willing to hold it at a lower average return. Conversely, the pro-cyclical stock’s price will fall or it 
must offer a higher average return in order to get investors to hold it. In sum, we should expect 
that pro-cyclical stocks that do well in booms and worse in recessions will have to offer higher 
average returns than countercyclical stocks that do well in recessions, even if the stocks have the 
same market beta. We expect that another dimension of risk – covariance with recessions – will 
matter in determining average returns. What kind of additional factors should we look for? 
Generally, asset pricing theory specifies that assets will have to pay high average returns if they do 
poorly in “bad times” – times in which investors would like their investments not to perform badly 
and are willing to sacrifice some expected return in order to ensure that this is so. Consumption 
(or, more generally, marginal utility) should provide the purest measure of bad times. Investors 
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consume less when their income prospects are low or if they think future returns will be bad. Low 
consumption thus reveals that this is indeed a time at which investors especially like portfolios not 
to do badly, and would be willing to ensure that wish. Alas, efforts to relate asset returns to 
consumption data are not (yet) a great success. Therefore, empirically, useful asset pricing models 
examine more direct measures of good times and bad times.” (Cochrane 1999, p. 39).  
 
Cochrane refines the important story:  
 
“Good assets pay off well in bad times when investors are hungry. Since investors all want them, 
those assets get lower average returns and command higher prices in equilibrium. High average 
return assets are forced to pay those returns, or equivalently to suffer low prices, because they are 
so “bad” – because they pay badly precisely when investors are most hungry. (...) To make these 
ideas operational, we need some procedure to measure the growth in marginal value of wealth or 
“hunger” (...). The traditional theories of finance, CAPM, ICAPM, and APT, measures hunger by 
the behaviour of large portfolios of assets. (...) Research connecting financial markets to the real 
economy (...) goes one step deeper. It asks what are the fundamental economic determinants of the 
marginal value of wealth? (Cochrane 2008, pp. 240).  
 
The story about “recession proof” stocks leads directly to the following advice:  
 
“You have to buy stocks or long-term bonds at the bottom, when stock prices are low after a long 
and depressing bear-market, in the bottom of a recession or the peak of a financial panic. This is a 
time when few people have the guts or the wallet to buy risky stocks or risky long term bonds. (...) 
You have to buy stocks that everyone else thinks are dogs. Then you have to sell stocks and long 
term bonds in good times when stock prices are high relative to dividends, earnings and other 
multiples... (...) You have to sell the popular stocks, with good past returns, good sales, and 
earnings growth. (...)  If this feels uncomfortable, what you are feeling is risk. If you’re 
uncomfortable watching the market pass you by, perhaps, you don’t really only care about long-
run mean and variance, you also care about doing well when the market is doing well.” (Cochrane 
1999, p. 54). 
 
The FT journalists and Cochrane present well-rehearsed narratives. They even make 
similar analytical comments. They share the ambition to explain asset prices and returns 
by linking these data points to particular events, or, in the case of Cochrane, general 
tendencies such as the demand for recession proof stocks. While the journalists, however, 
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tell a fairly straight-forward story, Cochrane is willing to dig a bit deeper. Prominently, 
he introduces an investor. At the same time, the investor is also a consumer. In other 
words, he/she connects investments with its assumed final purpose, i.e. consumption. 
Next, this agent is placed in a financial market context in which he/she reflects on his/her 
current and future consumption, and which portfolio of assets to hold. We are told that 
this leads to an “equilibrium” situation and “hunger”, i.e. marginal utility, takes the 
investor there with the support of the “recession proof” stocks. Cochrane thus has an 
internally consistent and almost all encompassing story. But we were also told up-front 
that the: “...consumption based model does not work very well.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 43). 
I discuss why this is the case in Chapter Three and Four, but, in particular, in Chapter 
Five.  
 
The above extracts indicate Cochrane’s view that asset return data can be described, 
explained and predicted. Cochrane is mindful of the difficulties involved in identifying 
the “forecasting variables” that may be used to explain and how to think about them. 
With this, Cochrane reminds us that not only should the stories “work well”, i.e. be 
statistically successful when compared with the available data, but they should also be 
“convincing”. These two aspects of model-based claim evaluation will grow in 
importance and, finally, be discussed in Chapter Five, section 5. But first thing first.  
 
Cochrane has so far extracted what he refers to as empirical facts from the financial 
market data. He has also told us a story about the investor’s search for recession proof 
stock returns that would enable him/her to uphold a steady consumption pattern when 
economic times are bad. As I continue the discussion on the CCAPM in the next three 
chapters, and in particular Cochrane’s version of it, I will have more to say about how 
financial economists measure financial market activities and how they use the available 
time- and cross-sectional data points to extract empirical facts. The stories that financial 
economists tell in order to connect their theories and models to the real situations will 
remain a main topic in Chapter Four, sections 1.2.2 and 4.4 as well as in Chapter Five, 
section 5.2.  
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Let me now turn to the theories that underlie the story-based narrative. In this myriad, I 
focus on three main elements, i.e. the investor, his/her utility and his/her attitude towards 
risk. In the next section, I show how these theories are made “explicit” in the equations of 
the consumption based asset pricing model. 
  
3. Investor, utility and risk  
Cochrane’s story identifies the investor and his/her demand for recession proof stocks. 
The topic of this section is to review who the investor is, and how his/her behaviour is 
described. The answers take us into three main topics, i.e. rational decision making, 
utility and risk preference. This section is thus relevant for my discussion in Chapter 
Three on CCAPM’s theoretical foundation. 
 
The review of these topics allows me to introduce basic notations, definitions and 
concepts that the reader will encounter throughout this thesis. Once they have been 
established, I can move on to the next section 4 that puts these concepts into a coherent, 
equation-based framework of the consumption based capital asset pricing model.  
 
3.1 The Investor  
In Cochrane’s story, and as a consequence, its theories and models, the investor gets a lot 
of attention: 
  
“An investor must decide how much to save and how much to consume, and what portfolio of 
assets to hold. The most basic pricing equation comes from the first order condition for that 
decision. The marginal utility loss of consuming a little less today and buying a little more of the 
asset should equal the marginal utility gain of consuming a little more of the asset’s payoff in the 
future. If the price and payoff do not satisfy this relation, the investor should buy more or less of 
the asset.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 3).  
 
Here, we learn two things: investors exist and they make two related decisions. For now, 
let us assume that the investor is a person just like you and me and focus on his/her 
decision making behaviour. Cochrane approaches the behavioural topic by focusing on an 
investor’s preferences with respect to deciding between consumption now or later and 
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which portfolio of assets to hold. An essential first step in the derivations to come is that 
investors are assumed to be “rational” in their decisions. To this end, the preferences of 
investors should satisfy a number of axioms, which give formal mathematical expressions 
to fundamental aspects of behaviour and attitudes towards the objects of choice (Jehle 
and Reny 2011). Let us briefly review the axioms:  
 
The first axiom tells us that payoffs on any asset, hence consumption of goods and 
services, in any two periods can be compared. The investor may, therefore, strictly prefer 
consumption in one period rather than in the other; he/she can be indifferent towards 
either; or he/she can weakly prefer one over the other. Such preferences are referred to as 
being complete. The investor is thus always able to express a preference between 
available alternatives, i.e. consumption now or later. Second, it is assumed that if we have 
two strategies that result in exactly the same consumption pattern, the consumer is 
indifferent between the two. In these situations, preferences are said to be reflexive. 
Third, if one alternative is preferred to a second, and the second is preferred to a third, 
then the first is also preferred to the third. Economists say that these preferences are 
internally consistent, i.e. transitive. Fourth, the agent prefers more of anything rather than 
less of it. This is captured by the axiom of strict monotonicity. Fifth, if bundle A is at 
least as good as B and bundle C is very close to B, then A is also at least as good as C. In 
other words, preferences and indifference curves are assumed to be continuous. Sixth, it is 
better receiving a little bit of several alternatives rather than lots of only one, i.e. averages 
are preferred to extremes. This is the convexity axiom, which is the most critical 
assumption of consumer theory because it implies that consumers are willing to trade-off 
some of one good to get more of another, e.g., substituting current consumption for future 
consumptions. 
 
The six consumer preference axioms are essential for Cochrane’s model building efforts. 
Predictions of behaviour can be formed based on these axioms using the process of 
mathematical derivations. The axioms require that consumers only make binary 
comparisons, i.e. they only examine two consumption plans at a time and make a 
decision regarding those two. Other aspects to having a rational investor included, is that 
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he/she will act, rationally, according to his/her own, and nobody else’s preferences and 
beliefs, i.e. self-interest, and, finally, that on average, his/her beliefs are correct. These 
are strong assumptions. I discuss them in a philosophical context in Chapter Three, 
sections 1 and 2.  
 
3.2 Inter-temporal consumption choice and utility 
But investor’s behaviour and decisions are governed by more than just rationality. There 
are also practical issues to consider. In particular, his/her pecuniary means are restricted. 
Robert E. Lucas, an early advocate of consumption based asset pricing, calls this initial 
budget, an “endowment” (Lucas 1978). Cochrane often uses this term but also, 
interchangeably, makes references to “income” and “wealth” as limiting restrictions. 20 A 
second practical issue is the time-frame of deploying the endowment. The investor is 
asked to decide how the endowment is spent across time, for simplicity two periods, now 
or later. Economists refer to this decision as inter-temporal. Thus, Cochrane formalizes 
the investor’s rational preferences mathematically in such a way that current and future 
consumption are both considered given the available budget. 
 
Economists use the so-called utility function to model the preferences of individuals. The 
mathematical function has as inputs certain variables, in this case current and future 
consumption. It gives the total level of utility, i.e. “satisfaction” or “wellbeing” associated 
with those inputs. For simplicity reasons, Cochrane typically imposes a convenient 
structure on the total utility from consumption (Cochrane 2005, p.4): 
 
U(ct , ct+1) =  u (ct ) + ß Et  [ u (ct+1) ] 
 
CCAPMs standard utility function U(ct ,ct+1) tells us that the total utility U of current 
consumption ct and the next period’s consumption ct+1 is a linear combination of the 
utility of the current consumption u ( ct ), and the current expected utility Et from the next 
20 Similar uses are found in Sharpe but not in Fama and French’s single- and multi-factor models. 
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period’s consumption (ct+1) multiplied by a parameter ß 21. Both the value of parameter ß 
and the choice of an appropriate functional form for the current utility u(ct) are crucial 
building blocks for the solution of the CCAPM.  
 
Financial economists call the β parameter the subjective discount factor. The subjective 
discount factor tells us how important an individual’s utility derived from expected future 
consumption is, when it is compared to the known utility of current consumption. It 
makes the expected utility from future consumption comparable with the known utility of 
consumption today. It thus discounts or brings the future utility back to its present value. 
In a sense, it reveals an investor’s subjective impatience in terms of “waiting to 
consume”. For example, if the investor rather consumes all his/her current income today 
than invest in a portfolio of assets that potentially generates payoffs for a higher level of 
future consumption, his/her impatience is extraordinary high. By implication, he/she 
demands a high expected future payoff, or return, for delaying consumption. Or, in other 
words, the price he/she is willing to pay for this future payoff is low. 
 
The choice of functional form for assessing the investor’s utility is also relevant because 
it models how strongly an investor prefers his/her consumption stream to be stable over 
time. One specific form for the utility from current consumption u(ct) is particularly 
popular because of its technical and empirical properties, i.e. its ability to capture certain 
stylized facts with respect to financial market returns. This function is called the power 
utility function. It is given by the formula (Cochrane 2005, p. 4): 
 
 u(ct ) = 
1
1−𝛾
𝑐𝑡   1-γ  
 
The power utility of current consumption u(ct) operates with the parameter γ  which is an 
estimated value of the investor’s subjective risk aversion. This particular function is also 
often referred to as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The power utility function is 
21 Not every function can be a valid utility function. Most importantly, the utility function should reflect 
rational preferences as described above. For example, having u(ct )= - ct would violate strict monotonicity 
as described earlier in axiom four. 
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an important concept that I will revisit throughout my thesis. In section 3.5, I discuss its 
properties and in section 6.2 its confrontation with the empirical situations. Before I get 
there, however, let me first proceed to a few central concepts related to the utility itself.  
 
3.3 Marginal rate of substitution 
From the utility function and the assumption of a rational preference for distributing 
consumption over time, economists often derive what they call indifference curves in a 
standard x-y diagram. The x-axis shows the amount of current consumption and the y-
axis the amount of future consumption. Several such indifference curves can be drawn, 
and the further “out” they lie in the diagram, the higher the level of total utility.  
 
Graphically, an indifference curve is negatively sloped and convex to the origin. This 
indicates that the investor can “trade-off” current and future consumption along any 
particular curve. Since every point on a single curve gives him/her the same total utility, 
the investor is said to be indifferent towards the split between the timing of consumption. 
This is noteworthy because it also indicates that the investor’s decision is not to consume 
either now or later, but related to the optimal allocation between the two alternatives. In 
other words, the investor does not specialize in any of the two outcomes but seeks a 
balanced consumption pattern over time and in varying economic states. 
 
However, as I mentioned earlier, there is the practical consideration of a limited budget – 
or endowment. It is represented by a straight line drawn between a vertical intercept at 
the y- and a horizontal intercept at the y-axis. The budget-line represents a set of current 
and future consumption bundles that exactly exhaust the available endowment, i.e. the 
consumption possibility set. The larger the budget, the further “out” the budget line can 
be drawn. At the point at which the budget line is tangential to an indifference curve, the 
investor has maximized his/her total utility and the optimal allocation between current 
and future consumption is given.  
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Figure 1: Trade-off between current and future consumption 
 
 
 
In the tangential point, there is an exact “exchange-rate” between consumption now and 
later. Economists call this rate the marginal rate of substitution, or MRS = - dct   / dct+1. It 
is the maximum amount of current consumption that the investor is willing to give up 
now in order to obtain one additional unit of consumption in the next period. In 
mathematical terms, it is the absolute value of the slope of the line that is tangent to the 
highest indifference curve the investor can achieve given his/her budget constraint.  
 
Another noteworthy aspect of the convex indifference curves is that MRS decreases as 
ct+1 increases. This is referred to as the diminishing marginal rate of substitution which 
implies that the investor wants to smooth consumption over time. An investor’s marginal 
utility is, therefore, closely related to the MRS concepts. To be precise, the MRS equals 
the ratio of the marginal utilities of the future and current consumption. It considers how 
an investor’s utility changes as he/she marginally trades out of consumption now for 
later. As I will discuss later in Chapter Four on the model “M” in CCAPM, Cochrane is 
adamant about the importance of marginal utility, i.e. the “hunger” for the next bite.   
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3.4 Investment risk and contingent consumption 
In section 3.2 above, I introduced the CRRA class of consumption function, and circled 
in on the favoured power utility version. One central element is the investor’s attitude 
towards risk. In this section, I continue the discussion on investment risk. I first show 
how financial economists view this risk in general before I, in the next section, turn to an 
investor’s risk preference and how it is described in the utility function.  
 
Risk and uncertainty are two terms that are often encountered in this context of asset 
pricing. The terms are, however, not the same. Frank H. Knight reminds us that risk 
refers to events to which we can assign probabilities while this is not possible in cases of 
uncertainty (Knight 1921). Consider, for example, a coin toss. If we know that the coin is 
fair, and not rigged, we are exposed to risk, because we can assign probabilities to the 
two possible outcomes when the coin is tossed. In these situations, we can list the 
possible outcomes and know the likelihood of each occurring. If we do not know whether 
the coin is fair or not and if so to which side, we are exposed to uncertainty because the 
outcome of the toss is uncertain and we cannot assign probabilities to them. In such 
situations, we know the possible outcome, but the likelihood of each is unknown. 
 
As uncertainty is challenging to work with because the expectation Et  in equation U(ct , 
ct+1) =  u (ct) + ßEt [u (ct+1)] is not defined, most financial economists, including 
Cochrane, consider only risk in their asset pricing research effort. Risk is defined as the 
difference between the expected and the realised payoff from an investment. This 
difference does not provide a good measure of risk because the outcome is sometimes 
positive and sometimes negative. Financial economists, therefore, choose to calculate the 
standard deviations of the actual investment returns. The standard deviation is the square 
root of the weighted average of the squares of the deviations of the payoffs. The measure 
makes it possible to compare the return variability of, for example, the stocks of Google 
and Caterpillar. Since the historical return of Google has a higher standard deviation than 
that of Caterpillar, investors consider Google to be a “riskier” investment. 
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The choice to model risk as a probability weighted outcome has implications. And as we 
shall see, uncertainty as a concept remains a critical element in the modelling of the 
investor and his/her behaviour. Consider again the investor and his/her dual decision, i.e. 
consume now and later and the content of his/her investment portfolio. Since he/she is 
inclined to spread consumption over time, he/she will always allocate savings to an 
investment portfolio. But how does this portfolio look like? In order to choose between 
which risky assets to hold, the investor must be clear with respect to three issues. First, 
he/she needs to forecast the future payoff on each individual assets in the available 
investment universe in each possible future state of nature; second compute the individual 
probabilities of realization for each state of nature; and, third, calculate the probability 
weighted expected payoffs. Thereafter, investors are in a position to rank all outcomes 
from the highest to the lowest state contingent payoff and rationally choose assets for 
their investment portfolio from within that set. This is a formidable task, to say the least.  
 
In order to overcome the challenges listed in the previous section, Cochrane makes 
several assumptions. He assumes that the investor knows the payoffs on all assets in all 
possible future economic states. The investor is also given perfect foresight with respect 
to all possible future economic states. Not only that. Also the probabilities of their 
occurrence are assumed to be known to the investor. The expected payoffs, therefore, 
connect with the states and create easy to calculate vectors of state-contingent payoffs, 
i.e. consumption opportunities for investors to consider. Since these states of nature are 
mutually exclusive, only one will be realized. For example, two different states such as 
an economic boom and a recession cannot happen at the same time in the same place. 
The investor, however, does not know which of these states will occur. This is the only 
element that remains unknown to him/her at the time of the decision to consume and save 
and what portfolio of assets to hold. Obviously, this lets the future payoff on his/her 
investment portfolio become uncertain. The final payoff, hence future spending level and 
ultimately consumption, therefore, is state contingent. His/her given ability to foresee 
certain aspects of the future helps reduce uncertainty, but not all of it. This conclusion of 
“near to perfect knowledge and foresight” will be of continued importance as I advance 
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my discussion of the investor (see, for example, Chapter Three, section 1.3.2 and section 
1.4). 
 
Given his/her assumed knowledge and foresight, the investor is now in a better position 
to decide which assets to hold in the portfolio. A quick glance at the available investment 
universe which now is ranked from the highest to the lowest payoff seems like a good 
guide. Choosing the “best” assets are, however, not straightforward. The leading stock in 
terms of probability weighted expected payoff, for example, might be extremely risky in 
the sense that if a particular state materializes, its payoff disrupts the investors desire to 
optimally distribute consumption over time and towards different economic states. 
His/her subjective preferences for risky payoffs must, therefore, be considered. This is 
the topic for the next section. 
  
3.5 Risk preference 
In a situation of state dependent future consumption, the investor is confronted not so 
much with the choice between particular stock names such as Google and Caterpillar, but 
more with monetary payoffs and the likelihood of their occurrence. In this respect, the 
financial economists tell us that the investor does not choose between individual stock 
names but rather between probability distributions of expected payoffs. These 
distributions produce expected utility.  
 
Expected utility is used by economists in the context of choices with uncertain outcomes. 
The idea behind the expected utility theorems was first given by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). Therein, a 
few basic theorems provide a set of hypothesis under which an investor’s preference 
ranking may be represented as a combination of the expected payoffs, on one hand, and 
their respective probabilities on the other. In an economic context, the expected utility of 
any asset is then the weighted mean of ex-post utilities with the state probabilities as 
weights. A real number is thus attached to each asset and ranked in a so-called “utility-
index”. Von Neumann and Morgenstern formulated this theory-based on the concept of 
52 
 
simple “lotteries”. Such a lottery can be denoted (x,y,Þ). It offers the participant a payoff 
x with a probability Þ or a payoff y with probability 1- Þ.  
 
We see that this is also what Cochrane uses when portraying the uncertain payoff of risky 
assets. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorems ensure that a utility function for the 
investor can be entertained on the lottery space, or in Cochrane’s context, over uncertain 
payoffs.  
 
Investors do not have the same tolerance towards uncertain payoffs. Some want stable 
and reoccurring investment income in order to support future levels of consumption. 
Others seek the excitement from the highest level of possible payoff and are willing to 
bet on that happening. And yet a third is indifferent to either. These different attitudes 
have to do with investors individual or subjective preferences towards risk. Cochrane, as 
we have seen, assumes that the investors, in general, belong to the first group. He/she 
extracts wellbeing from a smooth consumption path across time and different economic 
states. Economists refer to him/her as being risk averse. The assumption of risk-aversion 
is also motivated by experimental psychology research and patterns observed in financial 
markets. Representatives from the second and third groups of investors portray a 
preference for risk taking and risk neutrality. 
 
Cochrane choice to let the investor be of the risk averse type is important and this concept 
will also stay with us as we proceed through my thesis (see Chapter Three, section 1.1.2). 
From a technical perspective, Cochrane now needs to incorporate risk aversion into the 
chosen power utility function. Earlier I mentioned several notable properties of such 
utility functions. It tells us, for example, that the investor wants more consumption or 
wealth rather than less (as dictated by axiom four about strict monotonicity). As total 
consumption or wealth increases, his/her expected utility increases as well. Technically, 
this means that the first derivative of the utility function over, for example, wealth W 
must be positive U’(W)>0. It also tells us that marginal utility decreases with greater W 
because the second derivative of Cochrane’s favoured form of the utility function is 
negative, i.e. U’’(W)<0. This concept is called concavity, i.e. a measure of a function’s 
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curvature. This is at the same time a necessary and sufficient condition for risk aversion. 
Again, consumption smoothing and risk aversion go hand in hand and can be expressed 
by utility functions that exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. It is also possible to measure 
the degree of an investor’s risk aversion by looking at the curvature of the power utility 
function. 
 
To be more concrete, let us consider which restrictions power utility puts on the risk 
averse investor, or posed another way, since the investor receives utility from the 
uncertain payoff from investing in risky assets and wants to uphold his/her consumption 
pattern, how much will he/she be willing to pay for that investment opportunity? 
 
For illustrative purposes consider, once more, the utility function – here in terms of 
investor’s wealth: 
 
 ut (Wt) = 
1
1−𝛾
𝑊𝑡   1-γ  
 
Assume that the investor has an initial endowment of USD 100 and is looking at an 
investment opportunity. The payoff is dependent upon the realization of one of two future 
economic states. Depending upon which of two states will materialize, he/she will be 
paid either USD 50 or USD 100. There is a 50/50 chance that one of them will be 
realized, i.e. Þ equals 0.5. Economists often refer to this as a “fair bet”. In this case, the 
investor knows that the expected, average, future payoff is going to be USD 75 
(0.5*50+0.5*100). A risk neutral investor would be willing to pay exactly USD 75 while 
a risk taker would even pay more since he sees an upside in gaining USD 100, ending up 
with maximum USD 200 (initial endowment plus the maximum return). A risk averse 
investor, however, will never pay more than USD 75. He/she rather pays less. But how 
much less? The answer is dependent upon both the value of γ , i.e. the risk aversion 
parameter and the level of his/her wealth W. We can now define various levels thereof 
and calculate the price: 
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W+CE1−γ
1−γ
 =0.5*   (𝑊+50)1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 + 0.5*  (𝑊+100)1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 
 
In this equation, CE is the price, or the certainty equivalent, as many economists call it. 
The CE is the maximum amount the investor wants to pay to enter this lottery. Letting 
both γ and W be zero, an investor will pay exactly 75 for entering into this bet. His/her 
behaviour is thus governed by risk neutrality. If we increase his/her risk aversion by 
setting  γ to 5 and keeping W at zero, the price will be 58. If the wealth is also increased, 
for example, to USD 100, the price he/she is willing to pay for the uncertain payoff is 
USD 66.  
 
We make the following observations: First, there exists an optimal numerical value at 
which any investor will enter into a risky transaction. A risk averse investor will always 
pay less than the probability weighted expected payoff. Second, keeping the risk aversion 
parameter constant, the higher his/her wealth, the higher the price he/she is willing to pay 
for the risky payoff. This is because power utility implies that the absolute risk aversion 
is declining in wealth. Consequently, a wealthy investor is willing to pay a higher price 
because he/she demands a lower risk premium. Third, the functional form of power 
utility embedded in the von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility function 
synchronizes the knowledge regarding the distribution of future payoffs with that of the 
subjectively held view by the risk averse agent. Fourth, the difference between the 
probability weighted expected payoff, i.e. USD 75 and the price the investor is willing to 
pay can be regarded as a safety margin, i.e. a risk premium that is meant to compensate 
the risk averse investor for entering into a fair bet.  
 
In sum, the investor is rational, risk averse and utility maximizing individual. He/she 
applies these characteristics across two decisions. First, since the investor prefers 
spreading consumption over time, he/she decides to postpone some consumption for 
later. The unspent endowment budget thus reduces current level of spending. The 
difference is saved for future consumption. Since savings equals investment, the investor 
faces his/her second decision, i.e. what portfolio of assets to hold. This portfolio may be 
investments in financial assets ranging from a risk-free interest bearing savings account 
55 
 
in a nearby commercial bank or in more risky assets such as stocks. The payoff at the end 
of the investment period for the risk-free deposit is known in advance. This is not the 
case for risky assets such as stocks. These assets have uncertain payoffs in the sense that 
neither their end-of period price nor their, possible, dividends can be foreseen. This 
payoff uncertainty worries Cochrane’s rational agent. He/she is, therefore, said to be risk 
averse. When making decisions, Cochrane assumes that the rational, risk averse investor 
maximizes his/her utility across time and economic states subject to the available budget, 
i.e. endowment. We shall later see in section 5 that this set-up together with some 
additional assumptions leads to an equilibrium situation in the financial markets. Finally, 
the concept of the rational, risk averse and optimizing investor is important for my 
discussion in the upcoming chapters (see, in particular, Chapter Three, section 1.1.2, and 
1.3, as well as, Chapter Four, section 3). 
 
It is now time to put these concepts, definitions and notations into context. In the next 
section, I show how Cochrane uses them to develop his consumption based asset pricing 
model. This will continue lay the foundation for my discussions in Chapter Four. 
 
4. The consumption based asset pricing model 
Earlier, in section 2.2, I quoted Cochrane’s story about the representative investor’s 
demand for financial market assets in the form of recession proof stocks. It is the role of 
the consumption based asset pricing theory and model, Cochrane tells us, to make this 
story “explicit”. Below I summarize how Cochrane does just that. I describe and derive 
the consumption based model (CCAPM) using the definitions and notations I introduced 
above in section 3. The framework introduced here gives us a structure that is valid for 
any investor. In other words, Cochrane does not make any assumptions besides 
rationality and the form of the utility function of an investor. In the following section 5, I 
explore the consequences thereof when I make some simplifications to aggregate 
outcomes across all investors. Sections four and five, as a result, are the two pillars I need 
to initiate a philosophical discussion the model “M” in CCAPM in Chapter Four.  
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4.1 The basic pricing equation 
The CCAPM is formulated in a mathematical structure. Although much is requested from 
the readers with respect to technical dexterity, Cochrane seeks to reduce the story about 
the demand for risky assets and their pricing to something “simple”: “Asset pricing 
theory stems from one simple concept: price equals expected discounted payoff.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. xiii). The portrayed simplicity is expressed in what he denotes the 
basic pricing equation (Cochrane 2005, p.6):  
 
pt = Et (mt+1   xt+1 ) 
 
In the equation, pt is the current price an investor observes in the market place for a risky 
asset such as Google or Caterpillar – or even a stock market index such as the S&P 500. 
This price is the product of the current expected value Et of a future discount factor mt+1 
and a future payoff xt+1. Both x and m are stochastic. Cochrane tells us that the payoff  
xt+1 is the sum of the uncertain value of a financial asset at the end of the next period plus 
a dividend (if any) paid out in the meantime. The other term mt+1 is called the “stochastic 
discount factor” (SDF). Since the basic pricing equation indicates the current value of a 
payoff in a specific realized future scenario, the SDF is different for different future 
economic scenarios. In section 4.3, I return to the SDF. 
 
Next Cochrane asks what this future random payoff is worth to a rational, risk averse and 
utility maximizing investor. To this end, he uses the power utility function and form as 
introduced above in section 3.2: 
  
U(c , ct+1 ) =  u ( ct ) + ß Et  [ u (ct+1 ) ] 
 u (ct ) = 
1
1−𝛾
𝑐𝑡   1-γ  
 
Previously, I mentioned that the investor is concerned with the optimal distribution of 
consumption over time. How does he/she find this optimum? I discuss the answer to this 
question in the next section. 
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 4.2 The first order condition and the central asset pricing formula 
Cochrane assumes that the investor who is asked to value the random future payoff xt+1 
can buy and sell as much of this payoff as he/she desires at the current price pt  given the 
available budget. How does his/her optimal solution look like?  
 
If the investor does not desire to consume at a future point in time, which of course does 
not make sense for practical reasons, he/she would neither save nor buy any financial 
assets and would maintain the original consumption level equal to the available budget. 
On the other hand, reducing current consumption will allow him/her to buy ð units of 
financial market assets, such that he/she can consume the uncertain value of these ð units 
of financial market assets in the next period after selling of course. Under this constraint, 
Cochrane tells us that the investor would arrange his/her consumption plans in the 
following way (Cochrane 2005, p. 5): 
 
max u ( ct ) + Et  [ß u (ct+1 )] s.t. 
ð  
 
ct  =  et  - pt  ð 
ct+1 = et+1 + xt+1 ð 
 
Cochrane next substitutes the given constraints into the objective and sets the derivative 
with respect to ð equal to zero. This gives the first order condition for the optimal 
consumption and portfolio choice – the two central choices the investor has to make in 
the consumption based asset pricing framework. We thus get (Cochrane 2005, p. 5): 
 
pt u’(ct, ) = Et [ß u’ (ct+1  ) xt+1 ] or  
pt    = Et [β 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  xt+1] 
Cochrane denotes this important final equation the central asset pricing formula. I will 
make several references to it throughout my discussions in the upcoming chapters. For 
example, it will dominate my review of the importance of assumptions in Chapter Three, 
section 2.1, throughout Chapter Four on the asset pricing model itself, and, finally, in 
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Chapter Five, section 3 and 4 on model justification and the use of unrealistic 
assumptions. 22  
 
The equation tells us that the investor sacrifices current consumption for an uncertain 
future consumption. As long as the expected value-gain from the discounted future utility 
exceeds that of the current utility sacrifice in terms of foregone consumption, his/her total 
utility increases. Given the concave and increasing form of the utility function, sacrificing 
current consumption now becomes increasingly painful for the investor and the 
discounted future utility gain adds less and less. At some point, the gain and the sacrifice 
exactly offset each other. At that point, no further improvements can be made. This is 
exactly when the central asset pricing formula holds. It is referred to as the investor’s first 
order condition. 
 
4.3 The stochastic discount factor 
In the basic pricing equation referred to above in the previous section 4.1: 
 
pt = Et (mt+1   xt+1 ) 
 
we find mt+1, or, as Cochrane denotes it, the stochastic discount factor (SDF). It is the 
most important consumption based capital asset pricing concept, and it can be found 
again in Cochrane’s central pricing formula (Cochrane 2005, p. 6):  
 
mt+1=  β 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  
 
The SDF is the subjective present value of the expected marginal utility coming from the 
future and current consumption. 23  For known periodic payoffs, such as the one an 
22 The central asset pricing formula shows utility as a derivative, i.e. [u´(ct )] and [u´(ct+1)]. The apostrophe 
indicates that it is not the absolute level of utility, i.e. wellbeing but the next “bite”, i.e. the marginal 
improvement in wellbeing which is subject to optimisation – or as quoted from Cochrane in section 3.1. 
earlier: “…from the first order condition for that decision. The marginal utility loss of consuming a little 
less today and buying a little more of the asset should equal the marginal utility gain of consuming a little 
more of the asset’s payoff in the future.“ 
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investor could earn by placing money in an interest bearing savings account at a safe 
bank, i.e. the risk free rate Rf , the calculation is rather trivial. We have: 
 
pt =  
1
𝑅𝑓
 xt+1 
 
The price of a riskless asset is thus the present value of its future known payoff. 24 The 
value of  mt+1 is then the inverse of the risk free interest rate.  
 
It stays mechanistic, but the complexity increases when neither the future stochastic 
discount rate nor the future payoff can be determined with certainty – as is the case in the 
context of Cochrane’s CCAPM. The beauty of Cochrane’s mathematical structure 
becomes visible. The SDF is generic and is defined by the subjective discount factor β 
and the risk aversion parameter γ and does not depend on the asset in question. The SDF 
is thus a characteristic of the investor. Yet, we can use it to obtain asset specific expected 
returns or discount rates for any asset traded in the financial market. If we have 
 
pt    = Et [mt+1  xt+1 ] 
 
then we can find a number Ri, that is different for every asset i such that (Cochrane 2005, 
p.7) : 
 
pti = 
1
𝑅𝑖
 Et (xit+1) 
 
If, for example, Google’s payoff is more uncertain than that of Caterpillar, the investor 
would assign a higher discount rate to Google, making the price he/she is willing to pay 
for the stock lower than that of Caterpillar. In this case, the Google stock’s payoff is 
23 See footnote 22 above. 
24 If for example the risk-free interest rate is 2% and the payoff of a government bond USD 100, then the 
price of the bond today is approximately USD 98 (100*1/1.02). In other words, if the investor invests USD 
98 today he will receive USD 100 in the next period. Financial economists often refer to this as the “time 
value of money”. 
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indeed considered riskier than that of Caterpillar. This risk adjusted stochastic discount 
factor, therefore, is the sum of the risk free interest rate and the particular risk premium 
associated with a specific stock.  
 
The SDF adds flexibility to the asset pricing modelling task. Cochrane sees two main 
advantages. First, the SDF can incorporate any type of utility function. Modelling work 
is, therefore, not restricted to the power utility form. Second, the SDF can price any asset 
or asset class. The riskier a payoff is considered to be, the more risk premium is added to 
the risk free rate. In fact, assets with different degrees of riskiness should attract different 
asset specific discount factors. But there is still only one SDF and each asset specific 
discount factor is determined by it. 
 
The SDF has been given different names. It is also often referred to as the “marginal rate 
of substitution”. This term is often encountered in standard textbooks on microeconomic 
analysis.25 In such textbooks, it measures the “price” at which a consumer trades, for 
example, apples against oranges. In Cochrane’s context, this rate is also a price but the 
“goods” are current and future consumption.  Other names for the SDF are “state-price 
density” and “pricing kernel”. 
 
So far, we have seen how Cochrane incorporates uncertainty into the model and how this 
risk can be priced. Nonetheless, there are other ways to incorporate this uncertainty. 
Below, I present this second variation, which, in the end, is more central for his research. 
Keep in mind that this is the other side of the same medal. The approach presented below 
works out the theoretical concept of the SDF better and shows explicitly why one SDF 
can generate many different asset specific discount factors.  
 
25  See for example: Varian (2009), Baily (2005), Copland, Weston, Shastri (2005), Danthine and 
Donaldson (2005), Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004), Lengwiler (2004), Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green 
(1995), Krebs (1990).  
61 
 
                                                          
4.4 The covariance 
With the intuition of the story concerning investor’s demand for recession proof stocks 
and the utility gained from holding such stocks, Cochrane implicitly focuses on the 
covariance between the payoff from such an asset and the marginal utility of 
consumption. This topic will be addressed again when I evaluate Cochrane’s contribution 
in a historical context in Chapter Three, section 2.2.1. In order to explain this crucial 
piece of the theoretical framework better, let us first explore a similar link in Sharpe’s 
CAPM. 26 
 
Sharpe told us that the prices, hence returns, on any individual stock are given by the 
particular stock’s covariance, or “beta”, with the return on the stock market as a whole, 
i.e. the market portfolio. In good economic times, for example, the payoff from the 
market portfolio is expected to be positive. In such situations, some stocks will return 
more than the market portfolio while others will not. The outperformers have “betas” 
higher than one and are thus riskier than the lower than one beta stocks that underperform 
in a positive market environment.  
 
Cochrane does not share Sharpe’s view that investors focus on the relationship between 
risk and return in a portfolio context. Cochrane’s investor focuses on preserving a stable 
consumption pattern over time and through different economic states. Therefore, the only 
reason why investors care about the performance of stocks or portfolios thereof is 
because their payoff uncertainty influences the level and volatility of future consumption. 
Hence, Cochrane takes the view that investors seek to smooth their consumption through 
time and across economic states. They dislike disruptions in spending pattern – both 
positive and negative. 
 
Sharpe’s high-beta stocks typically do not ensure this. They pay out in good economic 
times when their returns are not necessarily required because the investor’s income from 
other sources is abundant. The marginal utility from that extra investment income is thus 
lower in good times when affluence reigns than in bad times. Cochrane’s advice to 
26 For reference, see section 1.3. 
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investors is thus anti-cyclical. He urges investors to identify, buy and hold “recession-
proof” stocks in their investment portfolios. It is thus expected from such stocks that they 
pay out exactly when this payoff is needed the most, i.e. during bad economic times. This 
payoff stabilizes income and contributes to maximizing utility from the trade-off between 
current and future consumption.  
 
The relationship Cochrane establishes between investment payoffs on one hand, and 
consumption growth on the other, is thus a simple one. This can also be shown 
mathematically. Cochrane first asks us to consider the definition of covariance:  
 
cov(m,x) = Et (mt xt) - Et (mt )Et (xt)  
 
From section 4.3 above, we know that the risk free interest rate is used in connection with 
the payoff to give the present value of an asset. Using the covariance definition we thus 
get (Cochrane 2005, p.13): 
 
pt =  
𝐸(𝑥𝑡)
𝑅𝑓
 + cov (m,x) 
 
Cochrane explains that the price of any stock pt equals the discounted present value of a 
known payoff 
𝐸(𝑥𝑡)
𝑅𝑓
 using a known risk-free rate, for example, a bank deposit interest 
rate Rf plus a mark-up or discount that is stock specific. The second term, i.e. cov, is 
called a risk adjustment: “An assets who’s payoffs covaries positively with the stochastic 
discount factor has its priced raised and vice versa.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 13). Cochrane 
offers the following equation to give his readers a better understanding of this risk 
adjustment by substituting mt, i.e. the SDF in terms of consumption and gets the 
following (Cochrane 2005, p.13):  
 
pt = 
𝐸(𝑥𝑡)
𝑅𝑓
 +  𝑐𝑜𝑣[ 𝛽 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)  (𝑥𝑡+1)]
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)   
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 Cochrane explains: 
  
“Marginal utility u´(c) declines as c increases because of the concavity embedded in the utility 
function. Thus, an asset’s price is lowered if its payoff covaries positively with consumption. 
Conversely, an asset’s price is raised if it covaries negatively with consumption.” (Cochrane 2005, 
p. 13). 
 
What does this analytical application of the basic pricing model imply? Cochrane again:  
 
“If you buy an asset whose payoff covaries positively with consumption, one that pays off well 
when you are already feeling wealthy, and pays off badly when you are already feeling poor, the 
asset will make your consumption stream more volatile. You will require a low price to induce 
you to buy such an asset. If you buy an asset whose payoff covaries negatively with consumption, 
it helps to smooth consumption and is more valuable than its expected payoff might indicate.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 13). 
 
Cochrane argues against Sharpe’s conclusion in an intuitive way. In his view, an 
investor’s utility stems from being able to upkeep his/her consumption-demand in dire 
economic times. The spending pattern, i.e. future consumption is, therefore, dependent 
upon the payoff from the stocks held in the investment portfolio. Stock prices should, in 
other words, reflect their ability to provide a pay-out during bad times. If the investor 
thinks this ability is high, he/she will pay-up to acquire those stocks. In the opposite case, 
prices will fall until the higher expected payoff compensates the investor for holding less 
than “recession-proof” stocks.  
 
5. From individual optimization to equilibrium asset pricing 
When developing and specifying the consumption based capital asset pricing model, 
Cochrane draws on a range of different concepts sourced to cover three broad categories, 
i.e. investor, financial market and financial assets. In combination, the three categories 
resemble a standard micro-economic setting in which economists place a rational agent in 
a choice situation with uncertain outcomes and ask him/her to maximize his/her 
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wellbeing, i.e. utility. 27  Beyond this traditional economic setting, however, other 
concepts are particular to finance. They are primarily related to tradable assets and the 
way markets are set to operate.  
 
In this section, I continue reviewing the theories underlying the CCAPM, but here I focus 
on Cochrane’s effort to generate an equilibrium situation which incorporates the investor, 
the utility maximizing behaviour, and risk aversion. In particular, I am interested in how 
Cochrane aggregates an individual first order condition towards an equilibrium situation 
in financial markets. In order to get there, Cochrane makes several simplifying 
assumptions with respect to the investor, the financial market and the financial assets. 
This strategy of simplifying complex real situations is a main topic that I will discuss in 
Chapter Three, section 1.3.  
 
Let me start with a short extract from Cochrane. It helps frame the following discussion. 
 
Cochrane claims:  
 
“Writing p = E(mx) we do not assume: (1) Markets are complete, or there is a representative 
investor; (2) Asset returns or payoffs are normally distributed (no options), or independent over 
time; (3) Two-period investors, quadratic utility, or separable utility; (4) Investors have no human 
capital or labour income; (5) The market has reached equilibrium, or individuals have bought all 
the securities they want to. All of these assumptions come later, in various special cases, but we 
have not made them yet.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 35).  
 
This extract has two separate parts. First, there is the basic pricing equation which we 
encountered in the previous section 4.1. We recall it states that the price an investor is 
willing to pay for an asset is equal to its expected discounted payoff. It goes without 
saying that in this form, the equation does not yet contain any of the assumptions that 
Cochrane, later, allocates to it. Cochrane, however, points out that this basic structure is 
in some ways sufficient for what he has in mind: “...for many purposes one can stop short 
27   See for example: Varian (2009), Baily (2005), Copland, Weston, Shastri (2005), Danthine and 
Donaldson (2005), Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004), Lengwiler (2004), Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green 
(1995), Krebs (1990). 
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of specifying (possibly wrongly) all this extra structure, and obtain very useful 
predictions about asset prices from (1.2), even though consumption is an endogenous 
variable.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 6).28 Second, Cochrane refers to the “extra structure”. The 
structure holds assumptions that can be added to the basic pricing formula. If this is done, 
the structure gains in explanatory stature but loses in robustness if the assumptions are 
violated.  
 
A review of these extra assumptions that harness the structure of the central asset pricing 
formula as shown in section 4.2, reveals that they can be clustered in the three different 
categories, i.e. investors, financial markets, and financial assets. Some of the assumptions 
are listed by Cochrane in the above extract. Nonetheless, as we shall see, other 
assumptions are also drawn upon. They have in common that they are simplifications of 
what happens in real situations. Let us start with the investor. 
 
5.1 Simplifications with respect to the investor 
Earlier I said that the investor can be just like you and I. But, we know that there are 
many financial market participants. They also have different reasons for their inter-
temporal consumptions choices, and they hold as Markowitz alluded to but Sharpe 
rejected in section 1.3 above, decidedly different investment portfolios. Aggregating 
preferences of all investors in an economy would make the CCAPM overly complicated 
and difficult to handle. Therefore, financial economists often make simplifying 
assumptions regarding the investors.  
 
One of the most popular simplifications is that of the representative investor: “Complete 
markets/representative agent assumptions are used if one wants to use aggregate 
consumption data (...) or other specializations and simplifications of the model.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 35). 29 The idea here is that instead of solving the portfolio problem 
28 The (1.2) equation that Cochrane refers to is the central asset pricing formula shown in section 4.2 
earlier.  
29 Yet, one of the most elegant features of Cochrane’s framework is that many of the derivations in the 
model hold for any investor and asset class:  “These equations [from the asset pricing model ] apply to each 
individual investor, for each asset to which he has access, independently of preference or absence of other 
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for all investors and then aggregating, it is assumed that there is one investor who is 
representative of the whole spectrum of investors. In this case, it is sufficient to solve 
his/her portfolio problem. The solution with respect to asset prices, or expected returns, 
follows naturally and justifies Cochrane’s interest in analysing “aggregate” 
macroeconomic data. Another notable simplifying aspect of the representative investor is 
that he/she is self-interested. This follows from the fact that he/she operates on his/her 
own, for his/her own account and in the absence of involvement in any social activities 
beyond the decision on current and future consumption, and which portfolio of assets to 
hold. 
 
Furthermore, financial economists often want to make additional assumptions about how 
additional income beyond the endowment is obtained. For example, most people work 
and receive an income. Yet, the level of human capital and its income generating capacity 
may be hard to measure. Therefore, financial economists often for simplicity reasons 
assume that income from financial market investments is sufficient to measure overall 
consumption growth. 
 
Cochran’s consumption based capital asset pricing research effort, therefore, has at its 
core the rational, self-interested and risk averse representative investors who maximize 
his/her total expected utility across time and different economic states – given his/her 
endowment. This is a powerful setting that will stay with us throughout this thesis – in 
particular Chapter Three, sections 1.1 and 1.3.  
 
5.2 Simplifications with respect to financial markets  
In reality, there is not one single financial market. In fact, there are several. In some 
stocks are traded, and in others, fixed income securities. Some exist in the US and others 
in Asia. And while some markets are open others are closed due to different rime-zones. 
How does Cochrane make them look homogenous? The answer lies in what economists 
call “completeness” of markets. 
assets or investors.” (Cochrane 2005, p.35). In other words, the assumption that the representative investor 
exists is not necessary for many of his results. 
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Earlier Cochrane told us that the theory assumes a payoff being dependent on which state 
of nature materializes in the future. Caterpillar’s stock, for example, might be expected to 
fetch a higher price and dividend in good economic times than in bad. These states of 
nature, we recall, can be exhaustively described. No matter what the future holds, 
therefore, there is an exact Caterpillar pay-out attached to every possible state of affairs. 
Since the investor does not know which state of nature prevails in the future, his/her 
preferences for holding a particular stock are not constant as he/she reviews the infinite 
number of possible outcomes. Caterpillar will, therefore, be priced according to the 
individual investor’s risk appetite, i.e. below the fair bet price in the case of risk aversion. 
 
Defined this way, the price for every possible pay-out can also be viewed as a distinct 
market for a particular stock. Cochrane assumes that markets are complete, which means 
that if there are n possible states and n linearly independent assets, any future 
consumption plan can be obtained as a portfolio payoff. All other asset prices can then be 
expressed as a function of these n basic securities. It is thus assumed that there exists a 
market in which a price is found for every possible future pay-out on all stocks:  
 
“Financial markets are said to be complete if, for each state of nature ø, there exists a market for 
contingent claim or Arrow-Debreu security – in other words, for a claim promising delivery of one 
unit of consumption good (...) if state ø is realized, and nothing otherwise.” (Danthine and 
Donaldson 2005, p. 196).  
 
Theoretically, therefore, there are an infinite number of Caterpillar stocks - one for 
moderately good economic times, another for better times, a third for the best of times, 
etc. In this way, stocks and their pay-outs are not only something for today or tomorrow, 
but also something for every possible future scenario.  
 
Market completeness ensures the existence of a unique competitive equilibrium in the 
financial market. If markets are incomplete, the equilibrium consumption allocations and 
prices are not unique because there are infinitely many portfolio allocations that generate 
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the equilibrium consumption allocation. I have more to say about this financial market 
structure in Chapter Three, section 1.2.1. 
 
5.3 Simplifications with respect to financial assets  
There are also many types of financial market assets. Previously, I have pointed towards 
stocks, bonds, options, etc. They come in all forms and shapes with different maturities 
and payoff patterns. Stocks pay dividend, bonds pay coupons, and option payoffs are 
contingent upon the realization of particular events.  
 
Financial economists simplify this multitude by referring to asset classes such as stocks 
and bonds, or they just speak about a representative security. Cochrane is not an 
exception. He uses this theoretical security with attractive properties. It can be bought 
and sold everywhere, anytime and at no transaction cost. It was first introduced in Arrow 
(1976). It is, therefore, called the Arrow-Security, or a “pure security” or a “state-
contingent” claim. It is defined as delivering a unit of purchasing power (consumption) 
conditional on a specific event, which is the occurrence of a particular state. If that event 
materializes, a predefined sum is paid out to the holder of such assets. If the event does 
not occur, its payoff is zero. An event can be, for example, a “good” economic state or a 
“bad” economic state. Should the former materialize, a pay-out of, say, 2 units is made. 
In the latter case, 0.5 units, for example, is earned. Both events, however, cannot happen 
at the same time. They are mutually exclusive. 
 
The Arrow-Security has several beneficial properties. If markets are complete and the 
law of one price holds, then the payoff pricing functional assigns a unique price to each 
state claim. In Cochrane’s language, a unique asset specific discount factor exists that 
equals the contingent claim price divided by the economic state’s probability. In Chapter 
Three, section 1.2.2, I continue this analysis. 30 
 
30 For a more detailed analysis of market structure and financial assets see Danthine and Donaldson (2005), 
Lengwiler (2004), LeRoy and Werner (2001). 
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5.4 Equilibrium 
In the previous section, we discussed how investors maximize their expected utility. 
Here, I am interested in one prominent consequence of this behaviour, i.e. an equilibrium 
situation. When all investors maximize their total expected utility, the loss in marginal 
utility incurred by foregoing current consumption, and instead buying assets, must be 
equal to the expected gain in marginal utility, contingent upon the anticipated increase in 
consumption given the uncertain return provided by the asset in the future. This trade-off 
will be settled when each investor cannot improve on his/her situation anymore, given the 
behaviour of the others. If this equilibrium situation is violated, i.e. the first order 
condition (see section 4.6), there exists at least one investor who would rather forgo 
consumption now and invest more for a higher level of future expected consumption. 
Furthermore, expected future utilities must be discounted back to their current values. I 
addressed this topic in the model discussion in section 3.2 above, on the subjective 
discount factor ß.  
 
Thus, in this situation, on aggregate, investors have reached agreement on their optimal 
holdings of all possible financial markets assets, at particular prices at a point where no-
one can benefit from additional transactions. Wellbeing is thus maximized at a societal 
level, and the financial economy will have reached an equilibrium situation. Many 
conditions support the existence of such an equilibrium situation and much can be said 
about the outcomes thereof, i.e. first and second welfare theorems. This is, however, not 
the place to explore any of them in detail. 31  
 
So far, I have reviewed Cochrane’s story concerning investor’s demand for risky assets, 
the first order condition for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice – the two 
central choices the investor has to make in the consumption based asset pricing 
framework, and how a simplified view of the investors, markets and assets leads to an 
equilibrium situation in the financial markets. This is theory. Cochrane’s next step is to 
check whether it corresponds with real situations. The next section reviews Cochrane’s 
suggestions. 
31 For further insights see Arrow and Debreu (1954), Hirshleifer (1964, 1965, 1966), and in particular 
Radner (1972). 
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 6. Assessing the CCAPM  
Earlier, in section 3 and 4, I established that Cochrane is providing more than a good 
story when it comes to explaining stock price behaviour. Economic models, but also 
theories, should investigate:  
 
“...whether they [the stories] are internally consistent, see if they can quantitatively explain stock 
returns, and check that they do not make widely counterfactual predictions in other dimensions, 
for example, requiring wild variations in risk-free rates or strong persistent movements in 
consumption growth. Few stories survive such scrutiny.” (Cochrane 1997, p. 12).  
 
Here, Cochrane makes two main points; asset pricing research is empirical in nature and, 
as a consequence, the model-based claims shall be compared with respect to their 
accuracy relative to the real situation data. 
 
Fellow academics agree: 
  
“Financial economics is a highly empirical discipline, perhaps the most empirical among the 
branches of economics and even among the social sciences in general. This should come as no 
surprise, for financial markets are not mere figment of theoretical abstraction, they thrive in 
practice and play a crucial role in the stability and growth of the global economy. (...) The close 
connection between theory and empirical analysis is unparalleled in the social sciences, although it 
has been the hallmark of the natural sciences for some time.” (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997, 
p.3). 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have reviewed the first three main elements of 
the asset pricing research effort, i.e. data, theories and models, In this final section, I turn 
towards the fourth, i.e. model assessment, and show how Cochrane’s CCAPM, 
empirically, has not been able to deliver on its promises. In support of my general 
statement, I chose a topic that has occupied a generation of financial economists. It is 
referred to as “equity risk premium puzzle” (Mehra and Prescott 1985). The equity risk 
premium, we recall, refers to the historical fact that investments in US equities have 
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returned more than investments in short-dated US Treasury Bills. The size of the positive 
return difference is a puzzle because consumption based asset pricing models have, so 
far, been unable to explain it. I will use this topic as a case-study for my philosophically 
related discussions on pricing model application and assessment in Chapter Five.  
 
6.1 The research question 
In their research paper, Mehra and Prescott notes: 
 
“Historically, the average return on stocks has far exceeded the average return on short-term 
default free debt. Over the ninety-year period 1889-1978, the average real annual yield on 
Standard and Poor 500 Index was seven percent while the average yield on short term debt was 
less than one percent. The question addressed in this paper is whether this large differential in the 
average yields can be accounted for by models that abstract from transactions costs, liquidity 
constraints and other frictions in the Arrow-Debreu set-up.” (Mehra and Prescott 1985, p. 145). 
 
Here, the authors tell us that in the United States, over a long period of time through 
differing economic and political states, the average annual real yield, i.e. inflation 
adjusted return on “risky” stocks was much higher than that of short term, “risk-less” 
assets. The proxy for the former is the S&P stock index of stocks comprised of the 500 
largest US domiciled companies, and for the latter, primarily, US Treasury Bills with a 
maturity of three months. The average annual return difference between these two 
different asset classes is more than six percentage points. It means that an investor who 
put his/her savings into the 500 stocks would have earned six percent more per year than 
other investors who preferred to hold and roll over their short term investment in the safe 
asset class. We are told that the difference is the equity risk premium, i.e. the premium or 
compensation that investors earn because equities are riskier than US Treasury Bills. 32 
 
Financial economists, as we know by now, frequently measure risk as the standard 
deviation of realized stock returns. When applying this statistical calculation to the long 
return time series used by Mehra and Prescott, we find that the result indicates a number 
close to seventeen percent for equities and near six percent for the riskless assets.  
32 See footnote 17 earlier in this chapter on US Treasury Bills. 
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Subtracting and adding the standard deviation number from, respectively, to the realized 
stock investment return of seven percent gives the average annual payoff corridor. For 
equities, the annual return range, i.e. one standard-deviation was between minus ten 
percent and plus twenty four per cent. This is a large number. It means that the investor 
does not know whether he/she receives a positive or a negative return next year from 
holding stocks in his/her portfolio. The US T-Bill investor experienced a tighter 
confidence interval of returns. His/her was between minus five and plus seven per cent 
return per annum. This difference in realized return volatilities also tells us that the stocks 
were three times “riskier” than US T-Bills. Hence, some financial economists often tell 
us that the stock investors were compensated by a higher realized return for bearing a 
higher realized risk.  
 
Financial economists consider the equity risk premium to be both of theoretical and 
practical relevance. The theoreticians are focused on understanding it while practitioners 
are afraid of missing out on it, i.e. reaping an excess return if the premium continues to 
exist in the future. The question that Mehra and Prescott ask themselves is how the equity 
risk premium connects with their type of consumption based model and its underlying 
theories. Below, in the next section, I continue this discussion. 
 
6.2 The complication 
After defining the research question directed at understanding the size of the equity 
premium, Mehra and Prescott decided to pursue its answer within a theoretical 
framework of the consumption based capital asset pricing model that I discussed earlier 
in this chapter. We know from previous discussions that the CCAPM connects financial 
asset’s payoff with consumption. In their version of the model economy, Mehra and 
Prescott suggest that the stock price expresses a claim on a stochastic production 
opportunity. This also defines future consumption because what is produced is also 
consumed. The stock payoff is thus defined to co-vary with the marginal utility of 
consumption. The question then raised is whether the magnitude of this covariance is 
large enough to justify the observed risk premium. Following some mathematical 
dexterity, Mehra tells us:  
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“...the equity premium is then the product of the coefficient of the risk aversion, γ, and the 
variance of the growth rate of consumption. As we shall see later this variance (...), is 0.00125, so 
unless γ is large, a high equity premium is impossible. The growth rate of consumption just does 
not vary enough.” (Mehra 2003, p. 58). 33  
 
We are told that the growth rate in consumption is fairly stable over time. In fact, this 
stability should only give a small equity premium – unless the risk aversion is unusually 
high. Alternatively, it is possible that better measures of consumption should be used that 
are more volatile and correlated with equity returns, a topic we return to at the end of this 
chapter in section 6.5. For now, I focus on investors’ preferences and how they are 
captured in the utility function.  
 
To examine the investor’s risk aversion γ, Mehra and Prescott assume the same power 
utility function that is used by Cochrane. They first calculate the mean and standard 
deviation of per capita consumption growth in the US economy. It averages close to two 
percent per annum and has a standard deviation of around four percent. Compared with 
the standard deviation of the stock return of 17 percent, we intuitively discover a 
disconnect between these volatilities. From there, and with the help of several 
mathematical assumptions covering the growth rates in consumption, production and 
returns, as well as their statistical properties and correlations, the two authors solve for 
the parameter values of the risk aversion and the subjective discount factor for which: 
“...the model’s average risk-free rate and equity premium match those for the U.S. 
economy over this ninety-year period.” (Mehra and Prescott 1985, p. 154). The risk 
aversion parameter γ impacts the expected return on the stock market whereas the 
subjective discount factor β impacts the risk-free rate since it measures the impatience of 
investors with respect to consumption now or later. This distinction is crucial because it 
is possible that the equity premium is too high because either stock market returns are too 
high or the risk-free rate is too low relative to the predictions of the CCAPM. 
 
33 A similar argument and conclusion can be found in Shiller (1981, 1982, 1989). 
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When specifying the model, Mehra and Prescott made the assumption that the risk 
aversion parameter γ should not exceed the value “10”. They say that this number is 
already on the high side and refer to several academic studies based on investment choice 
experiments, i.e. behavioural economics. These experiments mostly seek parameter 
values between zero and two. They also restrict the subjective discount factor to be 
between zero and one. This range is reasonable, but a number closer to one is even more 
so because it tells us that the utility from tomorrow’s consumption is not significantly 
different from that gained by consumption today. 
 
When put through this calibration of risk aversion of “10”, however, the CCAPM fails to 
account for the size of the return difference between risky and riskless assets. In fact, the 
model says that the risk premium is unusually low:  
 
“We find that for such economies, the average real annual yield on stocks is a maximum of four-
tenths of a percent higher than that on short-term debt, in shape contrast to the six percent 
premium observed.” (Mehra and Prescott 1985, p. 146).  
 
The stock market has, in other words, performed too well relative to the risk free asset – 
or the return on the risk-free asset has been too low.  
 
This result stunned the proponents of the consumption based asset pricing model. How 
can it be that the model predicts a very similar return on risk-free and risky assets, i.e. the 
difference being only 0.4 percentage-points per annum instead of the 6 percentage-points 
difference observed? Mehra and Prescott dubbed this anomaly the “equity premium 
puzzle”. It refers to the inability of consumption based asset pricing models adequately to 
explain the magnitude of the equity risk premium. 
 
In its defence, the consumption based asset pricing model used by Mehra and Prescott 
indicates a small positive risk premium. This is intuitively right because the 
representative investors equipped with von Neumann and Morgenstern capabilities would 
demand a premium for holding equities with a historical standard deviation of returns 
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approximately three times larger than that of a risk free asset. The puzzle, therefore, 
seems to be one of magnitude – albeit large. How can a more reasonable result be found? 
There are two paths for answering this question. First, Mehra and Prescott can alter the 
dispersion of the consumption growth. This solution, however, is not pursued because 
they want to anchor the parameterization in the realized numbers from the historical 
sample. Second, the authors can adjust the parameters attached to the risk aversion and 
the subjective discount factor. 
 
Which numbers, in other words, do Mehra and Prescott need to calibrate and “plug-in” to 
make the model output compatible with the observed growth process in the consumption 
data? “If we set the risk aversion coefficient γ to be 10 and β to be 0.99, what are the 
expected rates of return and the risk premium using the parameterization just described?” 
(Mehra 2003, p. 59). From this, a risk-free rate of return of 12.5% per annum and a stock 
return of 14.1 % p.a. is calculated. This implies an equity risk premium of 1.6 percentage 
points. The result is still decidedly different from what the historical experience has been. 
It turns out that the risk aversion and the subjective discount factor require unrealistic 
high numerical levels to match the equity premium. In fact, Black (1972) finds that γ  
must be as high as 55 and the β as low as 0.55 to “back-out” the historical realized 
premium from the consumption data. 
 
The risk aversion number is as most financial economists point out, too high. It implies, 
for example, that an investor would spend all his/her available income, or endowment, 
now, as quickly as possible, rather than invest to collect an uncertain future payoff that 
can be used for a higher level of consumption later. This, in particular, goes against the 
empirical fact that people indeed are observed to save, and the assumption that they target 
a smooth consumption pattern over economic states and time. Financial economists are 
thus challenged because their model readings do not correspond with the data from the 
real situations. How they respond, is the topic of the next section 6.3.  
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6.3 Three avenues of rectification 
Psychologically, reactions to negative and unexpected surprises and events come in 
waves, i.e. disbelief, denial, resignation, etc. In the case of model builders, reactions are 
not markedly different. Nonetheless, financial economists are of the resilient type. Up 
until now, “JStore”, the electronic storage platform for academic research papers, reports 
several thousand published references with “equity risk premium” in their titles. 34 This 
search result indicates interest, but also the fact that a generally accepted “explanation” of 
the phenomena has yet to be delivered. A brief review of the most recent papers reveals a 
trend in financial economists’ approach towards solving the equity premium puzzle. In 
fact, they seek answers to the puzzle in three areas: the theory and its collection of 
assumptions, the mathematical structure of the model, and, finally, the data. Let us start 
with the data. 
6.3.1 Data 
Earlier we saw that asset pricing data come as raw prices or derivatives thereof such as 
returns, variances or risk premia. We established that their existence and availability were 
unproblematic. In the search for puzzle-resolution, however, financial economists took a 
renewed interest in the data. Could it be, they asked, that “biases” in the data were 
responsible for the high risk premium? What do they have in mind? 
  
Students of the times-series sample used by Mehra and Prescott make the point that the 
time series is too long. They ask whether the risk premium is visible also over shorter or 
moving data time-windows. The answer is “yes”. Post World-War Two, in 20 year 
increments up to 2004, the risk premium in the US has always been positive (Siegel 
2005). However, the numbers differ from a low of 1.46% to a high of 11.21%. For others, 
the time period under review is too short. Siegel (1992), for example, reconstructs 
financial market data to go as far back as to 1802. Again, the risk premium was inherent 
in that data sample. Siegel points out, however, that real rates on short-term fixed income 
instruments have fallen over the time period under review. This might have put an 
upward bias on the return difference between riskless and risky assets. Other students 
asked if the premium observed in the US also is visible in other countries. The answer is, 
34 www.jstore.org 
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once again, “yes”. A comprehensive study in 16 different countries for the period 
between 1900 and 2000 established that the premium is apparent (Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton 2002). In historical and cross-market comparisons, therefore, no particular 
biases could be detected and the equity risk premium upheld its puzzle-status.  
 
Besides the length of the time-series, the data focus has also been directed towards the 
particular economic and political states or circumstances during the years of data 
collection. Do the data reflect socio-economic biases? A lot has happened in the US 
economy since the measurement started – to say the least. The country, for example, went 
through several wars, the Great Depression and other more recent significant economic 
and political events. While only the few “fittest” of companies survived through these 
times, the rest went bankrupt and other emerged. This so-called “survivorship” bias 
might, therefore, have underestimated the riskiness of stock markets and overstated the 
return on stock investments (Brown, Goetzmann and Ross 1995). But studies of stock 
returns in other countries, including Switzerland and Sweden, which experienced less 
economic and political disruptions, confirm the existence of the premium.  
 
In sum, the equity risk premium has often been dismissed on the notion of data-biases. 
Empirical studies refute this. 
  
6.3.2 Theoretical understanding 
Since data-biases so far have been excluded as a source for artificially introducing a high 
equity risk premium, proponents of the consumption based research effort turned towards 
the theoretical foundation upon which their models are built. The foundation has two 
pillars; the first pillar comprises assumptions that support the development of the 
representative investor, i.e. his/her rationality, self-interest and risk aversion. These 
elements are captured mathematically in the two arguments of the stochastic discount 
factor (SDF), i.e. the subjective discount factor and the utility function. The second pillar 
comprises particular conditions that define the circumstances under which the SDF is 
applied, i.e. the financial market conditions and the financial assets. Let us review how 
financial economists approach the second pillar in order to explain the puzzle.  
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 Mehra and Prescott (2003) draw our attention towards several possible theoretical 
“adjustments”. They mention: “...modified probability distributions to admit rare but 
disastrous events, survival bias, incomplete markets, market imperfections. (...) limited 
participation of investors in the stock market,..” (Mehra and Prescott 2003, p. 31). From 
the suggestions made by Mehra and Prescott in this bundle, much attention has gone 
towards the completeness of markets. As assumed by the standard CCAPM, a complete 
market has an asset for every possible trade that the investor can think of for every 
possible realization of a future economic state.  
 
The existence of an infinite number of assets is a certainly a strong theoretical 
assumption. Constantinides and Duffie (1996), therefore, in their own variation of the 
CCAPM, suggest incorporating markets that are “in-complete”. In a recessionary 
economic environment, for example, the “recession-proof” assets that are expected to 
generate positive returns during an economic slowdown might not be available, i.e. they 
do not exist. Investors, therefore, facing dire economic states and possible 
unemployment, have no means to effectively “hedge” against the uncertainties. In a 
model with market incompleteness, investors might require a large equity premium, i.e. 
the expectation of being paid a high return in order to be incentivized to buy and hold 
assets with uncertain payoffs. When this proposition is compared with respect to its 
accuracy relative to the real situation data, however, the equity premium does not yield 
and continues to persist.  
 
In sum, several assumptions have been reviewed and developed to adjust the market 
structures incorporated in the original CCAPM framework to account for the observed 
equity premium. These efforts, however, have not extinguished the puzzle. Another path 
has, therefore, been taken; review the more fundamental assumptions supporting the 
representative investor. This led to changes in the mathematical structure of the stochastic 
discount factor. Cochrane alludes to the incorporation of non-standard preferences as 
“reverse-engineering”. 
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6.3.3 Incorporating Non-Standard Preferences  
Richard H. Thaler points out:  
 
“Many explanations for the equity risk premium puzzle have been offered, and all the theoretical 
explanations so far proposed are behavioural – in the sense that they build on the Mehra-Prescott 
model and make some inferences about investors’ preferences. In most of these models, the 
investor makes rational choices but their preferences are slightly different from ones traditionally 
considered normal.” (Thaler 2002, p. 3). 
 
I am interested in exploring what these non-traditional preferences are, and whether the 
suggestions offered have helped solve the puzzle. The answer lays the foundation for my 
discussion in Chapter Three, section 2.  
 
Recall that the stochastic discount factor used by Lucas, Mehra and Prescott, as well as 
Cochrane, builds on a power utility function. It is the traditional “working-horse” of 
micro-economic theory. Economists say that this function is “well-behaved” (Varian 
2006, p. 44). Furthermore, as we discussed in the previous section, the assumption of 
power utility is not only convenient because it leads to tractable asset pricing models. It 
also explains the stability of financial variables in the face of secular economic growth 
because it implies that the absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth while relative risk 
aversion is constant. 
 
Nonetheless, the application of the power utility form has been criticized because it 
connects the coefficient of the relative risk aversion and the elasticity of the inter-
temporal consumption substitution. In fact, the CCAPM considers these decisions to be 
made simultaneously as one is the inverse of the other: “The implication is that if an 
individual is averse to variation of consumption in different states at a particular point in 
time, then she or he will be averse to consumption over time.” (Mehra 2003, p. 60). 
 
Hall (1988) claims that the investors’ attitude towards the risk- and the time-dimension 
should be pulled apart and analysed independently of each other; the former is related to 
the investor’s preference for consumption from across unknown states of the world at a 
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particular time in the future while the latter is the timing issue, i.e. now or later. Epstein 
and Zin (1989, 1991), for example, introduce a utility function that parameterize these 
two preferences independently. The advantage is that a high risk aversion does not 
necessarily mean that consumption needs to be smooth over time. Nonetheless, Weil 
(1989) demonstrates that despite this innovation, the equity risk premium puzzle remains 
what it is said to be, a puzzle. 
 
Given the disappointing performance of consumption based models, the most radical of 
the suggested avenues of improving our understanding of asset prices is to dispose of this 
set-up completely, i.e. wave the project that seeks to link asset prices to macroeconomics, 
and retreat to the factor-based, statistical explanations. A revival of the statistical times 
series analysis, however, is, in Cochrane’s view, a step in the wrong direction. 
Nevertheless, he can see some burden-sharing: “With this insight, we can achieve a 
satisfying division of labour, rather than a fruitless alpha-fishing contest.” (Cochrane 
2006, p. 6). Cochrane here alludes to factor models doing the relative pricing of assets 
based in Sharpe’s market- and Fama and French’s style- portfolios while macro-models 
explains why these factors are relevant as discussed above in section 1.3. 
 
Cochrane, however, has another idea that keeps the consumption based framework alive. 
He adjusts the assumptions that define the specific conditions at work inside the central 
asset pricing formula. This, once again, raises the question whether the manipulations of 
the model are founded in innovation in theories and their derivations, or if whether the 
manipulations merely contribute to the extensions of known mathematical techniques. It 
seems that the latter is the case. Cochrane’s belief in the ability to adjust the model to 
new empirical results supports my view. Neither theory nor data can then be viewed as 
the “primitive”. More relevant is the mathematical adjustment of existing arguments at a 
deep level inside the pricing formula.  
 
Let us now explore how Cochrane uses reverse-engineering techniques to manoeuvre 
his/her research effort towards better empirical results than those already achieved. It 
takes us into a topic labelled habit-persistence. I again discuss this important notion of 
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habit-persistence in the context of the asset pricing application and assessment in Chapter 
Five, section 2.2.  
 
6.3.4 Habit-persistency 
Cochrane’s starting point is his version of the standard CCAPM. We recall it contains the 
idea that investors prefer smooth consumption across different economic states and 
through time. This preference is modelled by the power utility function so that asset 
prices, in equilibrium, reflect the discounted first order condition times the expected 
future payoff from the investment portfolio. Since this model does not “explain well” and 
the data themselves are not open for renegotiation, Cochrane’s focus goes elsewhere, i.e. 
the utility function. We recall that the investor’s wellbeing comes from his discounted 
total expected utility. Cochrane and his financial economist colleague Campbell ask 
whether the current and expected marginal utility is influenced also by other variables. 
The answers to this question are given in the so-called Campbell-Cochrane habit-
persistence version of the standard CCAPM (Campbell and Cochrane 1999). The 
extension of the standard CCAPM to a new habit-persistent model is a main topic that 
will gain importance as I proceed into the next three chapters (see, in particular, Chapter 
Five, section 2.2). 
 
Campbell and Cochrane’s model is based on related work of modelling non-standard 
preferences by Abel (1990) and Gali (1994). They suggest the representative investor is 
interested in how other people are doing. It might be the case, the two authors explain, 
that the marginal utility of the representative investor increases if he/she does better 
relative to his/her peers. Abel referred to this “external” benchmarking as “keeping up 
with the Joneses”. The Joneses’ wellbeing is captured in the per capita consumption data, 
and this time variable is thus added as a new argument into the utility function of the 
representative investor. His/her marginal utility would then be influenced by fluctuations 
in the consumption of others. If the fluctuation is large, the representative investor would 
avoid stocks, i.e. become risk averse. This would explain a high and time-varying risk 
aversion number. Nonetheless, as we have seen above in section 6.2, per capita 
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consumption is fairly stable and does not induce the investors to shun stock investments. 
Empirically, the equity premium remains. 
 
In the second related example of reverse-engineering as an answer to the puzzle, 
investors are said to compare their expected utility relative to their own realized 
consumption over past periods. Constantinides (1990) and later Heaton (1995), refer to 
this as an “internal” benchmark. For this type of situation, the investor’s own past 
consumption is introduced as the new argument in the utility function. The investor is, 
therefore, concerned with avoiding a possible negative deviation from his/her earlier 
historical consumption path. If he/she succeeds to uphold his/her consumption level, the 
current marginal utility increases. Given the return volatility of equities, there is a real 
danger that this might not happen because the next period’s payoff could be negative. 
His/her consumption would possibly fall below past levels. This would explain why the 
risk aversion and the equity premium are both high.  Constantinides claims that: “...habit 
persistence can, in principle, reconcile the high mean equity premium with the low 
variance of consumption growth and with the low co-variance of consumption growth 
with equity returns.” (Constantinides 2002, p. 1580). In the end, however, Constantinides 
points out to us: “Habit persistence may well gain in empirical relevance in explaining 
assets returns, once we correctly measure the consumption of the unconstrained marginal 
investor in the capital markets.” (Constantinides 2002, p. 1581). This remark, as we shall 
see in the following section, and has not passed unnoticed. 
 
Campbell and Cochrane, in their habitual extension of the standard CCAPM  suggest that 
the utility function might be expanded to reflect on: “...extra goods like leisure, 
nonseparability over time in the form of habit-persistence, nonseparability over states of 
nature so that consumption if it rains affects marginal utility if it shines.” (Cochrane 
2005, p. 466). Incorporating such innovative arguments into the traditional utility 
function thus expands the efforts made earlier by Hall (1988), Weil (1989), Epstein and 
Zin (1989), and Abel (1990). It calls for a re-engineering of preferences in the sense that 
utility might flow from a variety of different sources other than exclusively from 
consumption now and later. For example, the utility of having an umbrella when it rains 
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is different from the utility it yields when the sun is out. In the standard model, this 
question is easily settled - either you have an umbrella or you don’t. The choice situation 
to save and invest, however, gets more complex when incorporating event-contingent 
utility – or, we can say, more realistic. 
 
In the end, Campbell and Cochrane settle for an external habit-persistence benchmark 
akin to that discussed in Abel (1990): “An individual’s habit level depends on the history 
of aggregate consumption rather than on the individual’s own past consumption.” 
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, p. 208). A relationship between per capita, aggregated 
societal consumption and the investor’s consumption choice is thus, theoretically, 
established. The two authors tell us that it can be captured by what they call the surplus 
consumption ratio or St (Campbell and Cochrane 1998, p. 3): 
 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡𝐶𝑡  
 
Ct equals consumption and Xt habit consumption – both at current time t. The ratio is thus 
the fraction of consumption that exceeds the habitual level. This surplus is said to 
influence the utility of the investor. In bad economic times, a surplus in excess of the 
habitual consumption level might shrink towards nil. But it can also, in good times, rise 
towards one. Whenever the surplus decreases and falls towards the per capita 
consumption trend-line, risk aversion increases. The perspective of a possible drop below 
this habitual level is thought of as being very bad indeed. In situations in which the 
economic activity typically falls, the marginal utility of consumption is high. 
Mathematically, however, this scenario of a negative surplus is excluded by modelling 
the log surplus consumption ratio in a particular way, which implies complex nonlinear 
dynamics for habit. In the Campbell-Cochrane model, habit adjusts slowly to 
consumption in order to explain long, cyclical paths in stock prices. 
 
Campbell explains:  
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“If habit Xt is held fixed as consumption Ct varies, the local coefficient of relative risk aversion is: 
-Cucc/ uc = γ / St 
where uc and ucc are the first and second derivative of utility with respect to consumption. Risk 
aversion rises as the surplus consumption ratio declines, that is, as consumption approaches the 
habit level.” (Campbell 2001, p. 67).  
 
Cochrane tells us that: 
 
“This specification means that a habit can act as a “trend-line” for consumption; as consumption 
declines relative to the “trend” in a recession, people will become more risk averse, stock prices 
will fall, expected returns will rise, and so on.” (Cochrane 2006, p. 34).  
 
Investor preferences are thus modelled with the standard power utility function, and let 
the investor extract utility from the difference between the expected consumption and the 
exogenously given trend line of habitual consumption. The investor’s total utility from 
the decision to consume or save is thus also influenced by Abel’s (1990) neighbours, i.e. 
the Jones’ family. The outcome of the mathematical dexterity tells that when the surplus 
consumption ratio is low, the marginal utility of consumption is high. 
 
Furthermore, the Campbell-Cochrane model points towards two theoretical forces that 
counteract. On one hand, in bad times, as current and expected future consumption 
expectations fall towards the habitual level, individuals save more to prevent 
consumption from falling further, and as a consequence, interest rates fall. On the other 
hand, investors might also want to upkeep past period’s consumption levels. This choice 
is related to the time dimension of inter-temporal consumption. It implies that the 
investor turns to the credit market to take out a loan in order to upkeep the level of 
consumption. Hence, interest rates will increase.  
 
The precautionary savings motive of investors in the former situation, therefore, contrasts 
with the inter-temporal substitution effect through borrowing in the latter. But this serves 
Campbell and Cochrane well. They make the assumption that these two tendencies 
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entirely offset each other. The implication is that their model work with the hypothesis 
that the interest rate used to discount future cash-flows to present values is stable, i.e. 
constant at their observed historical average. This example illustrates that the model 
proposed by Campbell and Cochrane is based on reverse engineering of the standard 
CCAPM in the face of empirical challenges.  
 
6.4 Evaluation of the suggested solutions 
Cochrane explains that reverse engineering works backwards from the observed data 
towards the desired model specification. This involves choosing and setting the 
parameters of the model accordingly. Let us review a few other examples from the work 
of Campbell and Cochrane (1999): 
 
“We choose the free parameters of the model to match certain movements of the post-war data. 
(...) We take the mean and the standard deviation of log consumption growth,..., to match the 
consumption data. We take the serial correlation parameter,..., to match the serial correlation of 
log dividend ratios. (...) Since the ratio of unconditional mean to unconditional standard deviation 
of excess returns, i.e. the Sharpe ratio, is the heart of the equity premium puzzle, we search for the 
value of (the model parameters) so that the returns on the consumption claim match the ratio in 
the data.“ (Campbell and Cochrane 1999, p. 218).  
 
The reason for this extensive cascade of quotations is twofold. First, it demonstrates how 
technical the debate has turned. None of these suggested changes is derived consequences 
of the fundamental assumptions of rationality and equilibrium. In other word, they are 
imported from outside of the original model. Second, they are all good examples of how 
Campbell and Cochrane use the data and let them define functional forms and how 
parameters can be calibrated for the purpose at hand, i.e. replicate the real situations. 
Cochrane has more to say regarding the method of “reverse engineering”: 
 
“Rather than dream up models, test them, and reject them, financial economists since the work of 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) have been able to work backwards 
to some extent, characterizing the properties the discount factors must have in order to explain 
asset return data.” (Cochrane 2005,  p. 455).  
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In this sense, the financial economists know the desired result, i.e. the closure of the 
equity risk premium gap, and then get to work towards getting there. How can this 
research approach be evaluated?  
 
First, by reviewing the empirical results. And, indeed, the empirical results modestly 
improve in comparison to the standard CCAPM without habit-persistency. During some 
time periods, the habit-persistency model does fairly well. In others, however, it fails to 
do away with the risk premium. On a longer term historical average basis, it gets the risk 
aversion parameter γ down to “6” – which is still far off the lower number needed to 
explain away the equity risk premium, i.e. 0.4% in the traditional CCAPM. Nonetheless, 
a parameter value of “6” is more plausible than “55” as Black suggested in section 6.2 
above. Out-of-sample forecasting is crucial for addressing concerns that the Campbell-
Cochrane model over-fits the data because it is calibrated to match historical stylized 
facts with respect to equity returns.  
 
Second, since the models’ ability to forecast has modestly improved, it might be that 
Cochrane has added in the right “causes”. Nonetheless, new functional forms, innovative 
arguments in the utility function or changes to the numerical values of parameters are not 
causes. They all, numerically, express what causes can take. By letting them take the 
desired forms, Cochrane, admittedly, seeks to tease out the “drivers” of the results. 
However, I am looking for the scientific basis of this approach. Cochrane seems to agree: 
“In general, empirical success varies inversely with theoretical purity.” (Cochrane 1999, 
p. 40).  
 
Third, it might well be that people’s consumption is influenced by both “internal” and 
“external” benchmarks. Purchasing patterns are hard to break as it involves a change in 
“life-style” and, possible, standard of living. This also questions whether the habit-
persistency enhanced CCAPM has identified the right cause. 
 
Habit formation, both from an “internal and “external” perspective, therefore, seems to 
have been a reasonable effort to reverse engineer the standard CCAPM. The choice to let 
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an investor derive utility from the difference between his/her current consumption and a 
time-varying and externally given habit level, and capture this within the utility function, 
enable the high and time varying risk aversion go hand in hand with the high and volatile 
excess return on equities. In Chapter Three and Five, this topic gains importance when I 
review it in a philosophical context. 
 
6.5 Recent work on consumption based models 
In a recent paper, Cochrane shows that during the financial crisis in 2008, consumption 
and stock prices did fall together. Based on this, he concludes: “…the basic logic of 
consumption based models that assets must pay higher returns if their values fall more 
when consumption falls, is not drastically wrong.” (Cochrane 2011, p. 1072). In addition, 
he shows that the price-dividend ratio is a nearly log-linear function of the surplus 
consumption ratio as predicted by the habit formation model. It is essential to note that 
Cochrane does not argue that the decline in consumption caused the stock market crash. 
Instead, he argues that habit-persistency acts as an amplification mechanism for the effect 
of consumption volatility on stock prices. This evidence leads Cochrane to conclude that 
he still thinks the macro-finance approach is promising: “…research and further 
elaboration of these kinds of models, as well as using their basic intuition as an important 
guide to events, is not a hopeless endeavor.” (Cochrane 2011, p. 1075). 
 
The most notable extension of the basic CCAPM in the last decade is the long-run risks 
model proposed by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Building on the Epstein-Zin-Weil recursive 
utility function, they add a term to the CCAPM that reflects the covariance of an asset 
return with long-run consumption growth expectations. They argue that investors are 
averse to shocks to long-run consumption even if those are uncorrelated with shocks to 
current consumption. Bansal and Yaron show that when the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is larger than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a small 
predictable component in consumption growth can explain the equity premium puzzle 
with modest risk aversion. Furthermore, they claim that the persistent, long-run 
fluctuations in the mean and volatility of aggregate consumption growth also explain the 
high variation in stock prices relative to consumption growth volatility. 
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 Essential in all consumption based asset pricing models is that variation in asset prices is 
due to shocks to the process driving aggregate consumption. These models differ in the 
exact type of consumption shock as well as with respect to how such a shock works 
through (which is determined by the specification of the utility function). The habit 
formation model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) stresses the importance of shocks to 
the current level of consumption relative to a moving average of its past values. In the 
long-run risks model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), the main shocks that lead to 
fluctuations in aggregate stock prices are changing expectations of long-run consumption 
growth and its volatility. In the rare-disaster model of Barro (2006), Gabaix (2011) and 
Wachter (2012), the main drivers are changes in the probability or severity of a large fall 
in consumption. These changes produce time-varying discount rates and, therefore, 
generate predictability of the equity premium and excess volatility of the stock market. 
 
Beeler and Campbell (2012) point out two difficulties with the long-run risks model. 
First, empirical evidence suggests that in contrast to the calibrations of Bansal and Yaron, 
in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is greater than one, the EIS is 
smaller than one if we look at aggregate consumption data, and even close to one in 
micro data for stock market participants. Second, there is little evidence that the 
consumption-wealth ratio predicts long-run consumption growth in the way implied by 
the long-run risk model. Third, the data do not show as much persistence in consumption 
growth as implied by the model, which casts doubt on the existence of the predictable 
variations in long-run consumption growth that drive the long-run risks model. 
 
Bansal, Kiku and Yaron (2012) respond to this critique by noting that there can be a 
downward bias in the estimates of the EIS when variables exhibit stochastic volatility, as 
is the case in the long-run risks model. Furthermore, they argue that when the model is 
tested on subsamples of the data as done by Beeler and Campbell (2012), it should be 
recalibrated because the macroeconomic dynamics in the sub-sample can be decidedly 
different from those in the full sample. They also note that the habit formation model of 
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Campbell and Cochrane (1999) implies that consumption growth predicts the future 
price-dividend ratio, which is inconsistent with the data. 
 
This heated debate shows that interest in consumption based asset pricing has 
reinvigorated in recent years by the development of a new generation of consumption 
based theories. The next step in the assessment of these theories requires moving beyond 
calibration to formal econometric estimation and model comparison. Apart from the 
aforementioned extensions of the CCAPM, recent work has also focused on the quality of 
the consumption data used to empirically test these models. In particular, Savov (2011) 
shows that a new derived measure of consumption, garbage is more volatile and more 
correlated with stock returns than the standard consumption measures used in the 
literature that are too smooth. A garbage-based CCAPM can explain the equity premium 
with relatively modest risk aversion in the U.S. and in Europe. A detailed overview of the 
recent developments in consumption based asset pricing and the empirical methods used 
to test these new models can be found in Ludvigson (2012).  
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Chapter 3: 
CCAPM Theory, Assumptions and 
Research Programme   
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I gave a focused description of main elements of John H. 
Cochrane’s research effort related to the so-called consumption based capital asset 
pricing model. The primer thus covered three main topics: asset pricing theories, asset 
pricing models, and empirical tests of model claims. In the following, I critically assess 
these three topics. I am motivated by Cochrane’s intuitive story related to investors’ 
demand for risky financial assets and how this story is made explicit in theories and 
mathematical equations. However, only modest theoretical and empirical progress give us 
justified reasons to doubt the research effort’s abilities to provide useful knowledge for 
use to the various stakeholders, i.e. investors, public policy makers and fellow academics 
(see Chapter Two, section 1). 
 
I believe the explanations for CCAPMs lack of success can be found, primarily, in the 
well-rehearsed representative agent-based equilibrium theories, the elaborate 
mathematical structures, and the assessment of the model-based claims. In this chapter, I 
address the first of these three potential sources of discomfort, i.e. the consumption based 
capital asset pricing theory. I postpone the two latter topics, i.e. asset pricing model and 
its assessment to Chapter Four and Five respectively  
 
My starting point is Cochrane’s suggestion: “The theory of asset pricing contains lots of 
assumptions...” (Cochrane 2005, p. 35). This claim is reasonable. In Chapter Two, section 
2.2, I initially pointed towards Cochrane’s story concerning investors and their demand 
for recession proof stocks. I also showed how this story can be seen as a casual 
interpretation of CCAPMs theoretical foundation. I reviewed this theoretical foundation, 
primarily, in section 3 and 5, where I described the agent’s utility, risk-preference, and 
optimizing behaviour which leads to a financial market equilibrium situation. It is crucial 
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not to underestimate the importance of this narrative and its relationship with the 
CCAPM theoretical foundation, and, as we shall discover in the next chapter, its 
modelling effort. In fact, I will show how the story has a dual role; it interprets the theory 
and it represents the real situations (see Chapter Four, section 4.4.1). The story thus 
makes use of simplifications, isolations, idealizations, and fictional constructions. These 
elements not only simplify a complex reality. They also deliberately distort them. 
Distortions, I will argue, help explain why the CCAPM, so far, has been statistically 
unsuccessful.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the theoretical foundation of the consumption 
based asset pricing research effort. The goal is to identify possible problem areas that can 
be held responsible for its only modest ability to generate knowledge for use. I conclude 
that the consumption based capital asset pricing effort is a distinct “research programme” 
that uses stable fundamental, “hard core”, principles, and a flexible set of auxiliary, 
“protective belt”, assumptions, methodological decision rules in the form of “positive and 
negative heuristic”, and an established form of assessing whether the research programme 
is “progressive” or “degenerating”. Nonetheless, regardless of my findings on the 
programme’s methodological insistence, its success is overshadowed by its content. The 
three main elements of the theory, i.e. the representative investors, his/her character and 
behaviour, the financial market structure, and the financial market assets take on 
idealized and fictional forms in isolation from a much richer empirical world. It points 
towards the challenges of reconciling the theoretical cases with the real situations. I refer 
to this as the “fallacy of simplification” (see Chapter Three, section 1.4). 
 
I argue for my conclusions in three sections: The first section takes Cochrane’s statement 
at face value, i.e. the asset pricing theory is a collection of assumptions. I put these 
assumptions into three compartment; first, the investor, his/her character and behaviour, 
second, the financial market structure, and third, the financial market assets. Of these 
three, my main focus has so far been and will continue to be on the investor because of 
CCAPMs important micro-economic foundation. Initially, I let Mary S. Morgan inform 
me with respect to the changing character of this individual through time. It emerges that 
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CCAPM’s central asset pricing formula builds on an agent referred to as the 
“representative investor”. Then, I progress my analysis in four steps. I, first, let James S. 
Buchanan and David F. Hendry remind us that a strategy that suppresses irrelevant details 
to achieve “simplifications” is generally accepted and makes the research effort 
“scientifically manageable”. Next, drawing mainly on Uskali Maeki, I show how 
simplification can be achieved in a process of isolation. Thereafter, I turn to Mary S. 
Morgan who informs us that the outcome of isolation, i.e. idealization, can be taken to the 
extreme through the construction of fictions. Finally, Daniel M. Hausman tells us that 
simplification, isolation, idealization take place in a “separate realm”. I argue that this 
strategy presents internally consistent and rigorous solutions on one hand, but it makes 
less useful representations of their real situation targets on the other because it relies on 
distortions. The epistemological value of idealizations and fictions is thus questioned, and 
I refer to this as the fallacy of simplification.  
 
In the second section, I continue my discussion of the many assumptions that characterize 
the asset pricing theory. Now, I turn to Cochrane’s assertion that some of the CCAPM 
assumptions are more “fundamental” than others. I explore this suggestion, and find that 
the assumptions can be classified as either “fundamental” or “auxiliary”. With this, I 
identify a clear hierarchy of assumptions. In the third section, I ponder over how to 
characterize Cochrane’s CCAPM framework from a philosophical of science point of 
view and establish a connection to Imre Lakatos’ concept of a “research programme”. 
This programme is seen as a collection of interlinked theories with a common set of 
“hard core” assumptions surrounded by a number of flexible, adjustable and replaceable 
assumptions in a “protective belt”. This view gives support to my claim that CCAPM’s 
fundamental and auxiliary assumptions can be characterized as “core” and “belt” 
respectively. Furthermore, Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM makes use of both the 
“negative” and “positive” heuristic that Lakatos promotes when facing “anomalies”. 
Finally, I identify a defined way of assessing the programmes’ theoretical and empirical 
progress, i.e. whether it is “progressive” or degenerating”. I, therefore, conclude that the 
consumption based capital asset pricing effort can indeed be characterized as a 
Lakatosian research programme. 
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 1. The microeconomic foundation 
In Chapter Two, section 1.2, I pointed out the differences between what Cochrane calls 
the “relative” and “absolute” approach to asset pricing. 35  While the former can be 
considered theory “light”, the latter is often regarded as theory “heavy”. Cochrane 
motivates his choice of a theory heavy approach first by discrediting it: “Why bother, 
given that “reduced form” or portfolio-based models like the CAPM are guaranteed to 
perform better?” (Cochrane 2008, p. 242). Following this rhetorical question, he gives a 
thoughtful answer: 
  
“The centrepiece of dynamic macroeconomics is the equation of savings to investment, the 
equation of marginal rates of substitution to marginal rates of transformation, and the allocation of 
consumption and investment across time and states of nature. Asset prices are the mechanism that 
does all this equating. If we can learn the marginal value of wealth from asset markets, we have a 
powerful measurement of the key ingredient of all modern, dynamic, intertemporal 
macroeconomics.” (Cochrane 2008, p. 242). 
  
From these quotes, I extract two main observations: First, Cochrane tells us that 
macroeconomics is considered to be the “endgame”. To get there, the analysis has to pass 
through the formation of asset prices. Asset price are the outcome of investor’s behaviour 
in a financial market context: “An investor must decide how much to save and how much 
to consume, and which portfolio of assets to hold.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 3). At the bottom 
of this hierarchy, therefore, Cochrane builds a microeconomic foundation centred on the 
investor. From there, preference-based choices feed into asset prices and connect micro-
events to the macro-level. Second, I note that Cochrane regards the predictive power of a 
theory and its model as selection criteria when choosing between various propositions. 
However, we also hear that this requirement can be overridden. Cochrane deliberately 
chooses to ignore Sharpe’s (1963, 1964) factor-based, relative capital asset pricing 
model, i.e. the CAPM, despite its “guarantee to perform better.” This is a crucial 
35 I also use the terms “factor” approach for the relative and “macro” approach for the absolute types of 
models. I will use these terms interchangeably with those that Cochrane here advocates. 
94 
 
                                                          
observation that I leave for now but return to and discuss in some length in Chapter Five 
on asset pricing application and assessment. 
 
Cochrane is thus of the opinion that a better understanding of the macroeconomic 
dynamics requires a microeconomic foundation. Hence, the assumptions that describe the 
individual investor take centre stage. The first section on the microeconomic foundation 
of Cochrane’s asset pricing theory has four sub-sections. I start with a review of where in 
the world Cochrane found this individual, who he/she represents, and how his/her 
character is best described. As a first step, therefore, we need to gain a better 
understanding of the individual’s origin. I let Morgan (1997, 2006) guide us in that effort. 
It takes us to brief reviews of classic references made by authorities such as Adam Smith, 
John Stuart Mill, W. Stanley Jevons, and Paul A. Samuelson. It becomes clear that 
Cochrane’s view of the investor’s rational, self-interested and risk averse character brings 
out essential aspects of human nature. Nonetheless, these simplified and idealized 
versions are not accurate descriptions of the “real man” he supposedly represents. I next 
show that same can be said in relation to Cochrane’s description of the financial market 
structure and the financial assets. 
 
Thereafter, I review how Buchanan (1958) and Hendry (1987) justify a strategy of 
deliberate simplifications and how Cochrane’s utilizes it with respect to developing the 
representative investor, the financial market structure, and the financial assets. The 
strategy comes at a cost. In order to frame that discussion, I draw mainly on contributions 
from Maeki (1992, 1994), Morgan (1997, 2001, 2001a, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2008a) and 
Hausman (1992). I use Maeki to show that Cochrane applies the “method of isolation”. 
This method ring-fences several entities and isolates them from a more complex reality, 
i.e. target situation. In their final forms, they become “idealized” versions of the real 
investor, market and assets. Having shown how Maeki isolates, I turn to Morgan. She 
tells us that economists not only isolate and idealize. They also create fictional constructs 
of an “artificial man in a mathematical laboratory”. 
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Next in line is Hausman. He demonstrates how these isolated elements can be structured 
in a way that creates a “coherent vision” of the economic project. In particular Hausman 
tells us that this “structure” establishes the “separate realm” of economics. I show that 
Cochrane follows a similar strategy when defining the financial market structure in which 
the investor is active. 
 
Finally, I turn to a critical assessment of the process of isolation that Cochrane applies 
when developing the investor, financial market structure and financial assets. The 
analysis shows that the generally accepted scientific method of isolation and the resulting 
simplified, idealized and fictional cases do not bring Cochrane’s asset pricing theory 
close enough to our image of the real situations that it seeks to portray. In fact, the ideal 
and the real may be regarded as opposites. This is problematic because the ideal versions 
of investors, markets and assets do not represent their targets very well. I, therefore, argue 
that our expectations of what these cases can achieve should be toned down. The fact that 
this strategy, so far, does not explain and predict well, supports my assertion. Despite the 
somewhat pessimistic conclusion, I present an argument that should encourage financial 
economists to continue their endeavours to explain and predict asset prices. But that has 
to wait until I discuss Cochrane’s “analytical cases” in Chapter Four, section 3. Here, it 
suffices to say that the simplified, idealized and fictional cases can be de-idealized and 
de-fictionalized. 
  
Before I turn towards the origins of the investor in Cochran’s theory, let me first pick up 
a few main themes from the previous Chapter Two in which Cochrane uses mathematical 
equations to “make the “facts”, the “story” around the investor’s demand for recession 
proof stocks “explicit”.  
 
1.1 The investor 
We recall from Chapter Two, section 2.2 that Cochrane first presents us with a story 
about investors’ choices related to consumption and investment as well as their 
preferences for “recession proof” stocks that, hopefully, will render a stream of payoffs in 
bad economic times. These choices and preferences have implications for stock prices. 
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Given the demand for these particular stocks, investors will bid up their prices and, as a 
consequence, their expected returns will fall. Following this plausible sounding narrative, 
Cochrane makes the stories “explicit” in a theoretical framework. This framework 
“contains lots of assumptions” that are formalized with the help of mathematical 
equations (see Chapter Two, sections 4.2 and 4.3). Finally, Cochrane confronts the 
model’s stock price predictions with the actual prices observable in financial markets. 
 
I showed that this starting point claimed that a current stock price pt “equals expected 
discounted payoff” which is expressed in the basic pricing equation:  
 
pt = Et (mt+1   xt+1 ) 
 
In the equation, xt+1 is the expected future payoff from a stock investment while mt+1 is 
the factor used to discount this future payoff. Cochrane also call the mt+1 the stochastic 
discount factor (SDF): 
 
mt+1=  β 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  
 
In this equation, Cochrane makes reference to an investor who applies his/her subjective 
discount factor ß to the ratio of his/her future marginal utility over his/her current 
marginal utility  𝑢
′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) ). The SDF is thus the numerical value of the subjective present 
value from the expected marginal utility originating from current and future consumption. 
The SDF and the basic pricing equation give the central asset pricing formula: 
 
pt    = Et [β 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  xt+1] 
 
It’s implied first order condition satisfies an equilibrium situation in the financial market. 
It claims that the investor’s loss in marginal utility incurred by foregoing current 
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consumption and buying assets at a particular price must be equal to the expected gain in 
marginal utility, contingent upon the anticipated increase in consumption from the 
uncertain return provided by the asset in the future.  
 
Accordingly, Cochrane claims that the observable asset price fluctuations, as expressed, 
for example, in the graphs 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter Two, are the outcome of investor’s 
adjustments towards the unobservable first order condition. Cochrane tells us “the central 
pricing formula” applies to “each individual investor”, but most of all they are used with 
respect to the so-called “representative investor”. This particular agent is thus a derivative 
of the original. He/she plays the dominant role in Cochrane’s consumption based capital 
asset pricing theory. Let us now review both the original and the derivative. 
 
1.1.1 From the “whole man” to the representative investor 
Consider Morgan’s findings: 
 
“Economic man was initially an explicit simplification of whole man, taken to represent real man 
in economic respects. Later, economic man became an artificial character, idealized to the extent 
required to explore the full outcomes of neoclassical economic theorizing. These simplifications 
and exaggerations, carried out always for reasons of good scientific method, created the modern 
caricature of “rational economic man”.” (Morgan 1997, p. 77). 
  
In this extract, Morgan confronts the reader with more than 300 years of economic theory 
development. I identify three main trends in her narrative: narrowing of man’s character, 
narrowing of the domain in which he is active, and the importance of “good” scientific 
method. In the following sections, I will discuss each of these topics one at a time. 
“Economic man” first. 
 
The short historical overview of man’s narrowing character is relevant for two reasons. 
First, its end-point forms the basis for CCAPMs representative investor, and, second, it 
lays the foundation for my analysis of Cochrane’s strategy with respect to justifying his 
use of this character. Morgan’s first reference goes to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(1776). Therein, Smith paints a picture of a passionate man of generous sympathy, who 
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avoids risk, loves the country-side over town-life, prefers his homeland to overseas, 
exploits his talents and has a natural tendency to exchange goods with others. This man is 
a broad-minded individual active in many fields of society. According to Morgan, he can 
be characterized as a “whole man”.  
 
In the course of the centuries, Morgan tells us, Smith’s “whole man” developed into a 
more and more single-minded and specialized individual. John Stuart Mill was the first to 
start this transformation from a broad human character in a complex societal context 
towards a narrower image. In a frequently referred quote, Mill makes the following 
statement related to the objectives of economics:  
 
“It [economic science] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor 
of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to 
possess wealth... (...) It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except 
those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, 
namely, aversion to labour, and the desire of present enjoyment of costly indulgences.” (Mill, 
1874, E5,V.38).  
 
This is a rich and insightful statement. It has often been used by scholars to justify why 
economics should be considered a science. I will not enter into this debate here. 
Nonetheless, the quotation warrants three points. First, Mill clearly narrows Smith’s 
broad-brush ambition to a more “manageable” scope. We see this in terms of both the 
economic area and the psychological outfit of the individual. Second, Mill identifies 
“desire of wealth” as the main causal driver for engaging in economic activity. Third, this 
main desire is counteracted by two other causal influences, i.e. “aversion to labour”, and 
“enjoyment of indulgences”. Morgan refers to Mill’s individual as the prototype of the 
“homo oeconomicus”.  
 
Interestingly enough, Morgan points out, of the two “perpetually antagonizing principles” 
that Mill refers to, the second “vice”, i.e. “enjoyment of indulgences“ was later picked up 
and reformulated into a “virtue” by Jevons who claims “...it is surely obvious that 
economics does rest upon laws of human enjoyment.” (Jevons 1871, Ch 3, 111.5). Mill’s 
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agent’s pursuit of wealth as a motivational factor was thus exchanged with a strive for 
“enjoyment” or “happiness”. This happiness comes through consumption and not from a 
higher level of wealth. This established a micro-economic view of the economic man and 
his behaviour and developed, in a bottom-up process, the economic consequences of the 
agent’s actions. In the quest for individual “happiness” through consumption, Jevons 
suggests that the society as a whole stands to benefit. The “laws” of economics were thus 
thought of as operating at a micro-economic level in a specific domain, and from there 
the, positive, aggregated societal consequences were derived. Subsequent writers 
portrayed this as “selfish” pleasure seeking and even “hedonism” void of any “higher” 
responsibilities or duties. Morgan has a name for Jevon’s individual, as well. She calls 
him the “calculating man”. 
 
Finally, with Samuelson (1938, 1947), the discussion shifted the focus away from 
possible behavioural motives, to rationality in both preference ordering and in the choice. 
In fact, rational choices came to dominate the theoretical development because of the 
intricacies related to expressing man’s subjective preferences. It was thought that other 
academic fields than economics were better suited to explore man’s preferences - for 
example psychology. Economists, therefore, conveniently assumed that a rational choice 
satisfied or even maximized these preferences – whatever they were related to. Any 
economic motives are, as a consequence, acceptable as long as rationality orders them 
and governs their choices. Morgan names Samuelson’s theoretical construct the “rational 
economic man”. He is as Morgan mentioned earlier, a less complete individual than 
Smith’s “whole man”. Nonetheless, this is mainly where micro-economic stands today 
with respect to rational decision making theory at the level of the individual. Cochrane, as 
we shall see, uses the concept in his theory of asset prices. The individual is at the same 
time an investor and a consumer. 
 
There is one further development of the individual we need to high-light before I turn to 
Cochrane’s investor. It is the introduction of the representative investor. Hartley (1996) 
reminds us that the representative agent concept was brought to life around the turn to the 
20th century through the writings of Alfred Marshall. Marshall’s agent, however, was not 
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introduced to represent a human being but an industrial firm: “Let us call to mind the 
“representative firm” whose economies of production...” (Marshall 1920, p.158). 
Marshall, Hartley claims, also toyed with the idea of introducing a similar construct to 
cover an individual’s role in the production process but decided against it because his 
focus was more on explaining wages as a dominant contributor to the costs of production. 
 
Since Marshall, modern microeconomic literature has shifted away from wages to how 
consumers spend and save their income. The first few chapters of such textbooks often 
introduce the “Robinson Crusoe” economy with only one consumer, one type of income, 
two goods to choose between and at prices that cannot be influenced. From this limited 
foundation, the literature usually expands towards a more mature economy encompassing 
many consumer and many goods. At this stage of the standard analysis, the aggregated 
demand for consumer goods is formulated as the sum of individual demands. Different 
tastes and inequalities in income distribution are neglected. The representative consumer 
is thus regarded as an “average” of a heterogeneous population. 
 
Financial economists also work with an individual, but he/she is quite different from the 
eremite on the island. Cochrane first tells us “the central pricing formula” can be applied 
to “each individual investor”. But then, as he expands his theoretical framework, 
Cochrane switches to a preference for the “representative agent”, or investor-based 
concept in relation to the analysis of aggregate macroeconomic data. This is not unusual 
for financial economists. It, however, requires aggregation.  
 
Aggregation across populations of individuals may have two possible starting points; 
either the underlying population is heterogeneous or it is homogeneous. In a 
heterogeneous population, the representative agent’s behaviour is considered to be the 
weighted sum of the societal behaviour. This is the case as we saw, in most 
microeconomic models. In the homogeneous case, all individuals are the same - anyone 
can represent the full population. Cochrane claims no particular preference. In a 
competitive equilibrium with complete asset markets, it is mathematically possible to 
aggregate the single investors’ utility function as a weighted average of the utility 
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functions of the various investors in the economy (see Chapter Two, section 5.2). In a 
theoretical context, therefore, it is often considered a matter of convenience whether the 
first or the second approach is taken. I revert to this point below.  
 
Let me now return to the transformation of Smith’s “whole man” to Samuelson’s 
“rational economic man”. In this process, moral sentiments are lost. The “rational 
economic man” is thus narrower than the “whole man”. However, the core of his 
character is kept unchanged throughout this transformation. Cochrane thus uses 
Samuelson’s description but also adds to it. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
1.1.2 The triad of temperaments  
As alluded to in the previous section 1.1, the investor or rather his/her derivative, the 
representative investor, is essential in Cochrane’s CCAPM context because he provides a 
micro-foundation for aggregated behaviour and allows for an analysis of observable 
macroeconomic data and asset prices: 36 
 
“The central and unfinished task of absolute asset pricing is to understand and measure the sources 
of aggregate or macroeconomic risk that drive asset prices. (...) For example, expected returns 
vary across time and across assets in ways that are linked to macroeconomic variables that also 
forecast macroeconomic events; a wide class of models suggest that a “recession” or “financial 
distress” factor lies behind asset prices”. (Cochrane 2005, p. xiv).  
 
In this quote, we receive a confirmation of CCAPMs micro-economic foundation. This 
anchors Cochrane in a theoretical paradigm which Morgan referred to as neoclassical. It 
is also often referred to as “methodological individualism”. 37 But not only that. The 
quote also confirms Cochrane’s aspirations to go beyond the simple one period pricing 
model such as Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM, which I discussed in Chapter Two, section 1.3, 
and embed asset pricing into a dynamic, more realistic setting in which production, 
consumption, investments, stock prices, etc. develop over time. Cochrane thus entertains 
36 I will use the two terms, “investor” and “representative investor” interchangeably. 
37 This view is radically different from the relative or factor-based asset pricing theory as advocated by 
Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French. The two authors, we recall from Chapter Two, section 1.3, do not 
need an investor in order to explain and forecast stock price returns. 
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an asset pricing model that seeks to understand how real investor’s behaviour impact real 
asset prices.  
 
Above, I introduced Samuelson’s “rational economic man”. Cochrane sees him as an 
“ideal” starting point for his own asset pricing theory. This choice reflects today’s 
mainstream economic theory and practice. 38 In fact, as I pointed out in Chapter Two, 
section 3, Cochrane engraves three standard but specific features into the core of the 
representative investor character; rationality, self-interest and risk aversion. Going 
forward, I will refer to them as the “triad of temperaments”. Let us take a closer look at 
these three characteristics one at a time. 
 
The first character attribute is rationality. Rationality, we recall from Chapter Two, 
section 3.1, is defined in relation to preferences, on one hand, and choices on the other. 
Rationality with respect to preferences is related to knowing all available options and 
then rank them according to their relative attractiveness. Economists say that preferences 
ordered this way are “complete”, “reflexive” and “transitive”. Rationality related to 
choices builds upon such preferences and concerns itself with always choosing the 
highest ranked option from the available opportunity set. It is also rational we are told, to 
want more rather than less and prefer averages over extremes. In a nut-shell, therefore, 
rationality concerns itself with doing what one believes is likely to render the best 
subjective overall outcome. 
 
The second feature of Cochrane’s representative investors’ character is self-interest (see 
Chapter Two, section 3.1). Self-interest directs the individual investor to choose on 
his/her own and, exclusively, for him/herself. He/she is self-centred. For example, when 
pondering over the current and future consumption decision, the agent is not concerned 
with the material or emotional well-being of others, such as family or friends. The agent’s 
choice is thus directed towards maximizing his/her own well-being, or his/her total 
expected utility. In Cochrane’s context, this maximization takes place at the margin. It 
38 See, for example, current literature on the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models (DSGE) in 
Dotsey (2013)  
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means that the marginal utility loss of consuming a little less today and buying a little 
more of the financial market asset should equal the marginal utility gain of consuming a 
little more of the asset’s expected payoff in the future. In addition, as we know by now, 
the future expected marginal utilities need to be discounted back to a present value and 
compared with the utility of consuming now.  
 
The third characteristic is risk aversion (see Chapter Two, section 3.5). By adding risk 
aversion to the first two sentiments, Cochrane widens the character of Samuelson’s “cut 
to the bone” individual. Furthermore, the CCAPM based individual is also given eternal 
existence. During his/her infinite life, he/she has a preference for stable consumption. 
This leads him/her to save part of his/her current income for future expenditures. The 
representative investor is namely allergic towards fluctuations in his/her consumption 
level. This is partly mitigated by rendering him/her insights into the probability 
distribution with respect to future states of the economy and the expected returns on the 
assets that he/she can hold in his/her portfolio. As a result, he/she is given close to perfect 
foresight (see Chapter Two, section 3.4). Nonetheless, the remaining uncertainty about 
which economic state will materialize makes the representative investor cautious when 
making decisions involving uncertain outcomes. This uncertainty is related to the 
expected future level of consumption which will be supported by the payoff on his/her 
investment portfolio. He/she will, therefore, not spend all his/her endowment or wealth 
on consumption today, but save some of it for future spending. This inter-temporal 
substitution of purchasing power is facilitated by financial market assets. Hence, the 
investor purchases stocks and hold them in his/her investment portfolio in the expectation 
of future payoffs in bad economic times. Uncertainty thus requires risk aversion. While 
his/her desires are subjective, his/her beliefs corresponds with the available facts, i.e. they 
are considered to be objective 
 
This triad of temperaments has consequences for CCAPM’s investor’s behaviour and the 
way this behaviour is modelled inside the CCAPM’s structure. The rational, self-
interested and risk averse individual acts to maximize the expected present value of 
discounted utility from consumption over his/her entire lifetime. This embedded drive 
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directs him/her towards an equilibrium situation in the financial markets in which all 
supplied and demanded assets are held at the desired price. The centrality of the utility 
function inside the stochastic discount factor now becomes clear (see Chapter Two, 
section 3). The chosen power utility function has two attractive analytical properties: 
First, it shows that more consumption is preferred to less. Utility is, therefore, an 
increasing function in consumption. Second, the marginal utility of consuming more is 
decreasing at higher levels of consumption. The power utility function is also used to 
capture the first order condition for a maximum, i.e. the equilibrium situation (see 
Chapter Two, section 5). 
 
It is interesting to note that two of the triad of temperaments are “expansionary” and one 
is “contractionary”. To see this point clearer, let us first recall that Mill introduced one 
dominant and two counteracting causes with respect to the individual active in the 
“Political Economy”. They were the desire for wealth on one hand and “aversion to 
labour” and “enjoyment of costly indulgences” on the other. Next, consider Cochrane. 
His asset pricing theory takes a similar approach. Also, here there is an interplay between 
“counteracting forces”. Rationality and self-interest might pull decisions in one direction 
while risk aversion pull in the other. In addition, Cochrane’s investor is also held back by 
budgetary constraints – he/she has a limited endowment - or money to spend. The 
endowment can be characterized as a technical restriction rather than one associated with 
the investors intrinsic motivational drives. 
 
In sum, this short historical review of the narrowing of man’s character towards a triad of 
temperaments reveals a process towards a simplified representative investor who is 
developed to perform very specific tasks inside a narrow area of economic life. In this, 
Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM follows a fairly standard micro-economic 
methodology. Nonetheless, the definition of the representative investor raises very 
specific topics that I discuss at some length in section 1.4 under the heading fallacy of 
simplification, i.e.  reconciling the theoretical cases with the real situations. Before I get 
there, however, I first move on from the representative investor’s character and 
behaviour, to, briefly, review how Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM establishes the 
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economic area, i.e. the financial market structure in which the agent unfolds his/her 
investing activities and the means he/she is given to balance current and future 
consumption, i.e. financial assets. Thereafter, in section 1.3, I return to the more 
philosophical question of why CCAPM needs simplifications in all those areas, for the 
purpose of, as Morgan tells us, “good scientific method”.  
 
1.2 The domain of the financial market activity 
From Morgan’s (1997, 2006) historical analysis, I identified three main trends along 
which economics as we know it today developed; the character of the individual, the 
domain of activities, and the good scientific method. I introduced the first trend in the 
previous section. Let us turn to the second here, i.e. the domain of activity and its content, 
i.e. financial market assets. 
 
1.2.1 The financial market domain 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations was concerned with nations as aggregates and asked what it is 
that makes them prosperous. His answer shifted the focus away from previous thinking 
that wealth is associated with the accumulation of gold and silver, to a competitive 
exchange-based economy, its main structure and processes. Smith highlights the 
productive energy of individuals but sees this more in the context of the resulting 
aggregations towards macro-variables such as investment and trade. His reference to the 
“invisible hand” as the coordinating mechanism is in this respect legendary.  
 
Subsequent writers, however, were quick to separate the economy from the rest of 
societal activities. John Stuart Mill, for example, states: “A department of science may 
thus be constructed, which has received the name of Political Economy.” (Mill 1882, 
6.9.3). Mill’s discussions are, therefore, more focused and narrower in scope than what 
Smith offered. Since then, this tradition has subsequently been upheld by most modern 
day financial market economists. 
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Financial economist’s theorizing is a good example of how Mill’s “Political Economy” 
was made even more specific. Cochrane often alludes to the modern economy as a 
complicated entity. In each sector of the economy, a multitude of companies engage in 
the production of numerous different goods and services that are brought to the “market” 
for distribution and sale. Individual consumers make decisions regarding what to 
purchase, where and when, given their preferences and limited budgets. Because it is so 
challenging to describe the features of the producers and buyers in any detail, economists, 
such as Samuelson, whom I introduced earlier, reduce real world complexities to 
something that is perceived to be “manageable”. Simpler and more comprehensible 
structures are thus developed.  
 
Cochrane’s domain for asset pricing is no exception, and I gave a short introduction in 
Chapter Two, section 5.2. It is a reduced view of the overall and more complex real 
financial market situation. He argues: “The central and unfinished task of absolute asset 
pricing is to understand and measure sources of aggregate or macroeconomic risk that 
drive asset prices.” (Cochrane 2005, p. xiv). By now we know that this theoretical 
ambition takes place at different levels. At the bottom, we have the representative 
investor, his/her character and behaviour, in the middle the financial markets and their 
asset prices, and on the top we find macroeconomic aggregates such as savings, 
investments, and consumption. This three layer structure is a simplified version of the 
economic domain. Cochrane thus assembles an accurate theory of asset pricing that 
combines the three layers to generate an unambiguous equilibrium situation. 
 
In the context of financial markets, therefore, the representative investor is given the 
choice to consume now and later, and the means, i.e. financial assets to transport 
purchasing power into the future. But the representative investor is alone. There is in 
other words no one with whom he/she can exchange assets. Hence, market forces such as 
competition do not exist. What kind of equilibrium has Cochrane then derived and what 
can then be said about it? At least it is a peculiar one. Economists characterize the 
situation as a “non-trade” equilibrium. On this point, Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM 
deviates massively from what is thought of as the “essence” of financial market activities. 
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 In the absences of transactions, the supply of stocks equals its demands, and all stocks are 
held by the sole investor at equilibrium prices. But this also means that there are no non-
equilibrium situations that incentivise the lone investor to reconsider his/her decisions to 
consume and invest. To simplify the market situations even more, Cochrane assumes that 
the representative investor does not work and is not independent wealthy. But this does 
not seem to bother the model-based investor. At birth, he/she is entitled to an endowment, 
i.e. a starting level of cash. This cash is used for consumption and for the part not 
immediately consumed, for investments. 
 
Much is excluded from Cochrane’s financial market structure. And these elements, 
structures and relationships go unmentioned. No references, for example, are made to 
other pending decisions or trade-off’s that the investor might be confronted with – for 
example that of work and leisure. No references are made to other individuals or any 
societal activities. There are no companies that produce, distribute and sell products and 
services - or issue stocks for that matter. 39 Neither is there any institutions that provide 
infrastructure for these activities. There are no banks and no stock exchanges. Nor are 
there any institutional governance structures or intervention minded public sector 
servants. 
 
We note, however, that some financial market details are pointed out but neglected. There 
are, for example, zero taxes on stock dividend and capital gains, and stock transactions 
are carried out at zero costs. Information gathering, i.e. research is also costless. Markets 
without taxes and costs are, as financial economists like to call them, “frictionless”.  
 
Cochrane, therefore, does with the financial market structure as he did for the 
representative investor. He lists the minimum requirements that are necessary for the 
development of a theory of asset prices. Cochrane’s simplified version of the 
representative investor and the financial market structure is certainly a long way from 
39 Lucas (1978), who I introduced in Chapter 2, section 3.2 as an early advocate of the CCAPM, assumes 
such production structures. 
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what can be considered to be real situations. Is this the case for the financial market 
assets as well?  
 
1.2.2 The financial market assets 
Morgan did not cover financial market assets when she reviewed the historical 
development from the “whole man” to the “economic man”. Her intervention had a 
different focus. In the context of my discussion here, these financial assets are of utmost 
importance. Without them, the investor could not be called an investor. In fact, of the two 
decisions he/she was confronted with, the last, i.e. which portfolio of assets to hold, could 
be disregarded. As a consequence, there would be no theory of asset pricing. It is, 
therefore, the financial market assets that make an asset pricing theory possible. They are 
the intertemporal mediator or transporter of purchasing power between current and future 
expected consumption. But the investable assets in Cochrane’s asset pricing theory do not 
resemble those issued by companies in the real situations. 
 
Consider, for example, the stocks of Google and Caterpillar. Cochrane is interested in 
their prices, and how they behave through time and in various economic states - for 
example through economic contractions and expansions. One of the concerns is 
concerned with the equity risk premium, i.e. the historical return difference between the 
higher yielding stocks and the lower yielding bonds. This return difference is readily 
available. It can be extracted by applying basic time series analysis. But, as we know, this 
is not enough to satisfy Cochrane. He wants to connect the premium to the behaviour of 
investors. He thus assumes that investors save parts of their endowment, and that stocks 
are used as a collection vehicle for consumer’s surplus cash balances.  
 
But it is not the individual stocks of Google and Caterpillar that the representative 
investor is confronted with when in a theoretical context. Here, the investor encounters 
nameless entities. In Cochrane’s story (see Chapter Two, section 2.2), we hear about 
“recession” proof - but not prone - stocks. In the same context, they are referred to as 
“Arrow Securities”. We recall that some financial economists also call these assets 
“contingent claims” because their payoff is dependent upon the outcome of the future 
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realisation of a particular “state of the world” (see Chapter Two, section 5.3). 
Furthermore, they are assumed to be infinitely divisible – a standard assumption often 
found in micro-economic text-books. 
 
These terms abstract from the given names of Google and Caterpillar – their empirical 
counterparts. Arrow Securities do not exist in real situations. They can only be acquired 
and disposed of in the context of the asset pricing theory. They are thus simplified entities 
that cannot be expected to be “discovered” in the same sense as the Higgs-Boson particle 
was at the CERN in July 2012, i.e. as an instantiation of a theoretical prediction. 40 
 
As he did for the representative investor and the financial market structure, Cochrane 
does for the financial assets. He lists the minimum requirements that are necessary for the 
development of a theory of asset prices. In the context of standard economic modelling, 
this methodological strategy is well established and represents what Morgan, probably, 
would denote “good scientific method”. 
 
With respect to the representative investor, who I introduced in section 1.1.2, I pointed 
towards the upcoming discussion of a topic I denoted the fallacy of simplification, i.e. 
reconciling the theoretical cases with the real situations. Since Cochrane follows the same 
blueprint of simplification with respect to financial markets and their assets, this fallacy is 
also at work in those two other main areas of his theorizing. As already mentioned, I 
revisit these issues in section 1.4 where I assess CCAPMs micro-economic foundation. 
Before I get there, however, I need to introduce and review Cochrane’s strategy with 
respect to his simplifications.  
 
1.3 Simplifications, idealizations, fictions and separateness 
In his version of the CCAPM, Cochrane introduces a rational, self-interested and risk 
averse investor who makes a limited number of decisions within a financial market 
structure in which financial assets are employed to transport savings into an uncertain 
40 www.cern.ch 
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future. The dynamics of this situation is wrapped in an eloquent story and made explicit 
in a mathematical structure. I suggest that this set-up can be viewed as simplifications of 
the real situations they seek to describe, explain and forecast. Simplification is practised, 
as Morgan probably would agree, for good scientific reasons. As I pointed out in the 
previous sections 1.1.2 and 1.2.2, my concerns are not directed towards this practice but 
rather towards what I denote the fallacy of simplification. 
 
In this section, therefore, I continue to focus on the microeconomic assumptions that 
form CCAPM’s theoretical basis. At the outset, I show why simplifications of complex 
real situations have been a time-honoured practice among economists, and let James M. 
Buchanan and David F. Hendry inform us. Next, I show how such simplifications can be 
addressed in a more formal context. I will, therefore, let the discussion be informed by 
Uskali Maeki’s views on how simplification can be achieved through a process of 
“isolation” and how the results can be viewed as “idealizations”. I find that Maeki’s 
views are in general shared by Frigg and Hartmann (2006, 2006a).  
 
Following the simplification and the process of isolation and the topic of idealizations, I 
turn to Morgan (1997, 2001, 2001a, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2008a), who explains that 
economists often let their analytical starting point take-on fictional traits. I find this is 
true not only with respect to the representative investor, but also for CCAPM’s financial 
markets structure and its assets. Idealized elements thus carry constructed, fictional, parts. 
Thereafter, I review Daniel M. Hausman’s claim that economics is a science conducted 
within a “separate realm”. As I proceed through my thesis, the concepts of “isolation”, 
“idealization”, “fiction” and “separate realm” will gain in importance.  
 
With respect to Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM, I draw two conclusions. First, 
Cochrane’s methodological strategy is indeed directed towards simplifying investors, 
markets and assets and isolating them in a separate realm. Second, this strategy goes 
beyond simplification to the development of idealized, and even constructed, i.e. fictional 
pictures thereof.  
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1.3.1 Buchanan’s and Hendry’s simplification 
The strategy of suppressing “irrelevant” details from a rich and complex reality is 
certainly not idiosyncratic to Cochrane. Buchanan explains:  
 
“At the heart of any analytical process lies simplification or abstraction, the whole purpose of 
which is that of making problems scientifically manageable. In the economic system, we 
recognize, of course, that “everything depends on everything else”, and also that “everything is 
always changing”. (…) Real problems require the construction of models,…(...). We simplify 
reality to construct those models but the fundamental truth of interdependence must not be 
forgotten.” (Buchanan 1958, p. 259).  
 
According to Buchanan, “simplification” makes a research project “scientifically 
manageable” but, he warns we should not be lulled into believing that the dynamics of 
the real situations, its “interdependencies” and reflexivity are sufficiently accounted for. 
Hendry takes a similar view and reminds us: 
 
“I take it as self-evident that economic behaviour is sufficiently complex and evolutionary that it is 
not helpful to talk about economic theories being “true” or of inferences yielding “correct” results. 
(...) By their very nature, [theory] models are inherently simplifications and inevitable false.” 
(Hendry 1987, pp. 31).  
 
There is thus an agreement between the two authors; theories and models are 
“simplifications” of a “complex” economy and warning flags need to be raised with 
respect to finding “truth” when simplified theories and models are applied to real 
situations. 
 
Cochrane’s road from the complexities of the financial economy, its interconnections, 
dependencies and evolutions to their simplified forms – be it with respect to the investor, 
the market or assets – is similar to what Buchanan and Hendry allude to. For the sake of 
“good scientific method”, this strategy takes Cochrane from observation of financial 
market activities, to stories that are made “explicit” in theories and models before the 
model’s predictions are compared against the collected data – a veritable 360 degree tour. 
This sequel has two main components. In the first process step, Cochrane seemingly 
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starts in a complex world and ends up in simplified descriptions. In the second process 
step, Cochrane compares the findings emanating from this reduced picture with what is 
observable on a full scale in the real world. It is about application and assessment. Let us 
here focus on Cochrane’s simplification strategy.  
   
Making things simpler, as Buchanan and Hendry suggest, implies a starting point from 
which to begin reducing. By definition, the starting point must be fuller or even more 
accurate and complete than what Cochrane ends up with. This more complete starting 
point is, therefore, something like Adam Smith’s “whole man”, i.e. the “real man”, real 
financial markets and real stocks. In principle, Cochrane should find it less problematic to 
capture the full reality of the individual components of financial markets and their assets 
than identifying the essence of man. After all, the first elements are of a technical nature 
and have been designed purposefully by humans. But even in these cases there are 
hurdles for Cochrane to overcome.  
 
Consider, first, the financial market assets. Can one say that Cochrane sets out with a full 
description of a real stock, for example that of Google or Caterpillar, and then subtracts 
properties to get to a simplified structure to be used in his version of the CCAPMs 
theoretical structure? In some ways yes, but in others not. Both in the CCAPM theory and 
in real situations, stocks have a price and the potential to pay a dividend to its owners. In 
real financial markets, however, they are issued by public stock companies and have a 
specific nominal value, i.e. issue price and they are traded on stock exchanges and 
electronically moved from one bank account to another. This is not the case in 
Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM. These and many other properties have been removed 
from the defining characteristics of stocks because they are deemed irrelevant. Their 
inclusion, it is assumed, will add little to improve the understanding of asset pricing.  
 
Next, can we draw parallels from the example of financial assets to Cochrane’s 
representative investor? Absolutely. Consider first the starting point. The target of 
Cochrane’s theorizing is the “real man”. Having first told us stories regarding the real 
investor and his/her demand for recession-proof stocks, Cochrane’s individual comes fast 
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and furious. His character is already cut to the bone upon arrival. This simplified 
individual, also referred to as the representative investor, is straight forward rational, self-
interested and risk averse. To quote Amartya Sen: “The purely economic man is indeed 
close to being a social moron.” (Sen 1977, p.336).  
 
However, being a “social moron” might not be troublesome for Cochrane’s asset pricing 
theory. Neither Smith, nor Mill nor Samuelson gave a complete and accurate description 
of their starting point, i.e. the “real man”. Smith’s “whole man” was probably as close as 
it came by letting him be informed by, for example, generosity, sympathy, public spirit 
and a sense of duty. However, little of this was left after Mill’s and Samuelson’s had put 
their degenerating knives to his/her character. In fact, we only hear about the most 
general and, possibly, positive features of the “real man’s” dispositions. Little or no 
attention at all goes towards, for example, vices and the more darkening temperaments of 
man. The definitions of human characters, as suggested by Smith, Mill, Samuelson, and 
Cochrane are, as a consequence, incomplete. Incompleteness in description, however, is a 
justifiable outcome of simplification. Cochrane’s theoretical effort, therefore, is more 
concerned with presenting a specific individual convenient for CCAPM’s case than 
packing all human traits, financial market structures and idiosyncratic stock details into 
his theory of asset prices and their behaviour. Cochrane thus works with a theoretical 
construct. But he still wants this construct to give relevant and accurate insights to real 
situation activities.  
 
Finally, not only have the financial market assets properties and the representative 
investor’s character been simplified. Also, the complexities of the real market structure in 
which the agent is active have to a large extent been lost in the process of simplification. 
Smith’s competition amongst men and trade with foreign nations, for example, were 
replaced with Cochrane’s narrowly defined financial market structure. It contains just one 
individual and one asset. Stock prices adjust instantaneous, and an equilibrium situation 
is reached given the first order condition of the representative investor. In the name of 
simplification, all other market participants have been removed. There is no other 
investor to exchange stocks, no private sector companies that issue stocks, no banks, no 
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stock exchanges, no political parties, no regulators, etc. Again, we see that simplification 
removes what is perceived to be unnecessary details.  
 
It is clear that Cochrane’s strategy of simplification is a dogmatic choice as it rests in a 
neoclassical microeconomic starting point. I will not raise any particular issues with 
respect to this choice as it reflects Morgan’s “reasons for good scientific method”. My 
interest and concerns are more directed towards the consequences of this starting point 
and the use of their implications. Before I explore them, and in particular the alluded to 
fallacy of simplification, I need to take the analysis of Cochrane’s research strategy to a 
different level. For that, I will rely, mainly, on Maeki and Hausman. While Maeki 
informs regarding a more sophisticated strategy of isolation for theory development than 
Buchanan and Hendry offer, Hausman gives good reasons for accepting Cochrane’s 
narrowly defined financial markets structure and activities.   
 
1.3.2 Maeki’s idealizations and Morgan’s fictions 
While Buchanan and Hendry speak about “simplifications”, Maeki takes this 
methodological strategy one step further. He uses the term “modify” and “deform” in 
order to make the real situations “manageable”: “Faced with the essential complexities of 
the world, every science is compelled to employ methods of modifying or deforming it so 
as to make it or the image of it theoretically manageable and comprehensible.” (Maeki 
1992, p. 317). Maeki’s quote thus expands on Buchanan’s and Hendry’s suggestions. 
Will this help us to understand better Cochrane’s strategy for developing his consumption 
based asset pricing theory? My answer is yes, and below I explain why.  
 
In order to “modify” and “deform” the complex reality, Maeki introduces the “method of 
isolation”. The method is so called because: “...a set of elements is theoretically removed 
from the influence of other elements in a given situation”. (Maeki 1992, p. 318). Maeki 
refers to the long historical tradition this method has seen and, in particular, mentions 
John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall as early advocates. He continues:  
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“In an isolation, something, a set of X of entities, is “sealed off” from the involvement or 
influence of everything else, a set of Y of entities; together X and Y comprise the universe. (...) 
Let us call X the isolated field and Y the excluded field.” (Maeki 1992, p. 321).  
 
Let us first review Maeki’s “method of isolation”. I claim that this method, which I will 
refer to as a process, is at work in Cochrane’s deliberations. Cochrane, namely, 
introduces the investor and gives him/her particular characteristics. He/she is rational, 
self-interested and risk averse. Using Maeki’s terminology, this triad of temperaments is 
“sealed off” from the rest of the individuals’ dispositions and thus included in the X set. 
Cochrane then tells us how the three elements within the X set interact and that this 
interaction leads to an optimizing behaviour under the technical term that I introduced in 
Chapter Two, section 4.2, i.e. the first order condition of intertemporal utility transfer. 
The triad of temperaments, therefore, defines the representative investor’s character. But 
not only that. In cooperation, and undeterred by other influences, and in particular 
whatever is stored away in the Y set, the triad produces expected and very specific model 
outcomes. 
 
Defining the X set automatically establishes the Y set in the sense that Y = 1 – X.  The Y 
set must, therefore, comprise all the rest there is to human character. The X and Y set, 
taken together, could, therefore, be understood as constituting the “real man’s” full 
character – if such “summing-up” would be possible. Cochrane does not name what is 
included in the Y set, but we can imagine that we might find sentiments such as envy, 
lust, and pride, sense of duty, loyalty, irrationality, behavioural biases, or public sector 
regulators and competition amongst a multitude of investors for stocks issued by public 
sector companies. None of these items are discussed in Cochrane’s asset pricing theory. 
They are as Maeki points out, “excluded by omission” and carry no causal weight. We 
know, however, that the Y elements do not constitute assumptions used in the asset 
pricing theory and, more importantly, they do not influence the inner workings of the 
CCAPM.  
 
In the context of describing various types of models, Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann 
also take interest in the method of isolation. They see the process as: “...stripping away 
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all properties from a concrete object that are believed not to be relevant for the problem at 
hand. This allows one to focus on a limited set of properties in isolation”. (Frigg and 
Hartmann, 2006, p. 741). While Maeki says “elements are theoretically removed”, Frigg 
and Hartman portray the isolation process as “stripping away” properties from a concrete 
object. Despite different use of language, I think the three authors would agree on the 
main issues present in the process of isolation. It is not about, as Smith suggested, 
creating a starting point in the definition of the “whole man” which would include a full 
X + Y set of human traits. No, it is more about Samuelson’s “rational economic man” 
who arrives, stripped of complexities and perceived irrelevant details, containing only 
relevant and manageable character traits that are useful and appropriate for the modelling 
effort. 
 
In Cochrane’s context, there is little, if any, evidence that his starting point is a definition 
of the complete X + Y set of human traits, and, from there, develops his version of the 
CCAPM that, eventually, comes to rest in the triad of temperaments. Cochrane’s starting 
point, as I alluded to above, is a dogmatic one, well nested within a neoclassical 
economic setting. This does, however, not imply that Cochrane is unaware of other 
influences that could affect the decision-making process of his representative investor. In 
Chapter Two, section 6.3.4 on the topic of consumer’s “habit-persistency”, for example, I 
show how Cochrane goes beyond the triad when faced with empirically inadequacies of 
the claims emitted from the CCAPM. Nonetheless, I do not want to pre-empt my 
discussion on this topic which is at the core of Chapter Five. I would here argue that 
Cochrane’s strategy is one of simplification through the process of isolation as described 
by Maeki, Frigg and Hartmann. This strategy is considered to be, I want to emphasise, a 
common methodological practice within the field of finance, and, more generally, 
economics. It does, however, raise several serious questions that I will discuss at length 
later in section 1.4.  
 
But Maeki has more to say with respect to isolation: 
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“Isolation in the present sense is sometimes also called idealizations. In this usage, idealization is 
understood widely, so to encompass almost anything that theoretically deforms reality. For the 
purpose of the present essay, I will be using “idealization” in a narrow sense in which idealizations 
are formulated in terms of limiting concepts designated or designatable with variables 0 or |∞| 
(...). Idealizations are unrealistic in the straight forward sense that they are false statements (...).” 
(Maeki 1992, pp. 324).  
 
We here, first, learn that the process of isolation leads to idealizations, second, that 
idealizations are “limiting concepts” and, third, that such idealizations “deform reality”, 
are “unrealistic” and even “false”. Let me accept the first suggestion and spend the next 
few paragraphs on the remaining two statements on possible idealization in Cochrane’s 
version of the CCAPM.  
 
Maeki explains that idealizations are easily spotted in economics: “Examples are 
assumptions of full employment, zero transaction costs, zero cross-elasticities, perfectly 
divisible goods, and infinitely elastic demand curves.” (Maeki 1992, p. 324). In these 
examples, Maeki tells us that economists use the variables 0 and |∞| to idealize concepts 
used in their theories. We immediately see how Cochrane’s own research effort follows 
this strategy when formulating the asset pricing theory. He names, for example, taxes and 
transaction costs that are “nullified”, that stock prices adjust instantaneously, i.e. 
infinitely fast, and stocks’ infinite divisibility. These technical variables are thus 
explicitly mentioned and included in the theory of asset pricing but idealized through 
their extreme values. These statements can be considered, as Maeki suggests, to be 
“deliberate falsehood” when compared with real situations. Real financial markets do not 
exhibit such properties. And Cochrane is certainly aware of this. 
 
I do not take issue with the idealizations just mentioned. They can be regarded as 
“technical” and overcome easily by de-idealizing them in the theoretical framework and, 
thereafter, mathematically modify them in the context of CCAPM’s equations. De-
idealization would then correct the idealized situation and take the theory a step closer to 
the real situations it sets out to describe, explain and predict. Transaction costs, for 
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example, may be introduced in the theory and given a numerical value in the model. I am, 
however, more sceptical towards idealizations related to the representative investor.  
 
Maeki told us in the above quote that theorizing with respect to complex situations 
involves “deformation” that might lead to “unrealistic” situations and “false” statements. 
With respect to the economic agent, Maeki sees him/her as a: “...strongly idealized and 
isolated version of ordinary humans”. (Maeki 1992, p. 334). Such conclusions are not 
uncommon amongst philosophers of science. Frigg and Hartmann, for example, claim 
that an idealization “involves deliberate distortions” and tell us that: “Physicists build 
models consisting of point masses moving on frictionless planes; economists assume that 
agents are perfectly rational; biologists study isolated populations,...” (Frigg and 
Hartmann 2006, p. 742). The perfectly rational agent is also according to Frigg and 
Hartmann “distorted”.  
 
As we know by now, in the context of CCAPM, the representative investor is 
characterized by the triad of temperaments. It defines his/her behaviour in situations 
where choices with uncertain outcomes are forced upon him/her. The triad, since they 
were the outcome of a process of isolation, is, according to Maeki, Frigg and Hartmann 
idealizations. But not only that. They “deform” real situations, are “deliberate 
distortions”, “unrealistic” and, even, “false”. I believe these rather strong statements can 
be applied to the outcome of Cochrane’s theory development as well. It goes without 
saying that the triad of temperaments exemplifies such deformations of real situations. 
 
Nonetheless, Mary S. Morgan expands on the topics of simplification, isolation and 
idealization. I believe she thinks they take theorizing beyond idealizations into the field 
of constructed fictions. (Morgan 2006, 2011).  She claims: 
 
“In neoclassical economics of the mid-twentieth century, economic man held an idealized 
character, one no longer taken to represent real man, but to be an artificial character created by 
economists. No longer one whose behavior could be imagined, and so understood partly at least 
through introspection, but a construction of artifice that took economics into the mathematics 
laboratory.“ (Morgan 2006, p. 22 ).  
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 Constructions, Morgan claims, can be traced back historically to the way generations of 
economists, since Smith, have “constructed a highly idealized portrait of economic man 
... according to the theory of the day”. More importantly in the context discussed here, 
however, is how simplifications of the real man have introduced elements that this 
individual has yet to portray. Morgan, in particular, refers to Knight who endowed this 
agent with “full information” and “perfect foresight” (Knight 1921). 
 
It is not difficult to find such constructed elements in Cochrane’s theorizing. In the 
financial markets, for example, Arrow-Securities are defined, but no transactions take 
place. Additionally, the representative investor’s triad of temperaments is complemented 
with the almost perfect foresight and an infinite live-span. (see Chapter Two, section 3.4 
and above sections 1.1 and 1.2). Focusing on the representative investor, his/her two 
additional properties have yet to be identified as part of man’s dispositions. No one has 
almost perfect foresight and live eternal, earthly, lives. In this sense, these properties 
cannot originate from simplifications during a process of isolation that “theoretically 
remove” or “strips away” elements from a real situation starting point. Close to perfect 
foresight and infinite lifespan are, therefore, the results of theorizing. They do not 
originate from observation or introspection. I, therefore, argue that these additions to the 
idealized version of man willingly “distort” the real counterpart for the sake of “good 
scientific method” in a different way than those achieved through the process of isolation. 
Hence, constructions such as these extend the concept of idealizations. They create 
fictional characters. In section 1.4, I show that this view has implications for how the 
asset pricing theory is used to portray real situations. In particular, I am concerned that 
Cochrane, without further ado, lets this fictional “model man” represent the “real man”. 
 
At this point, therefore, I conclude that the process of isolation helps explain how 
Cochrane reduces complexities in the real financial world to make it more manageable in 
a theory building context. The theory of asset prices deliberately distorts real situations 
by the process of isolation, and idealizes its inhabitant, the financial market area as well 
as the financial assets. But the theory of asset pricing extends beyond mere idealizations. 
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In all these three areas of assumptions, Cochrane adds constructed elements. It turns them 
into fictions. The theoretical development of fictional elements, however, does not 
necessarily imply that the outcome is useful for those awaiting advice. It certainly 
questions whether such insights are helpful in understanding the real situations. 
 
1.3.3 Hausman’s separate realm 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I mainly emphasized the representative investor 
and his/her character. He/she is a simplified, distorted, idealized and, in many aspects, 
fictional representations of his/her real situation counterpart. Here, I want to take a closer 
look at the domain of activity, i.e. the financial market within which the investor makes 
his/her dual decision – how much to consume now and later and which portfolio of assets 
to hold – based in his/her triad of temperaments. As was the case with the representative 
agent, Cochrane is not overly explicit on how he arrives at this financial market structure, 
its boundaries and inter-linkages to other fields of economic and social life. With insights 
drawn from Daniel M. Hausman, I hope to bring more clarity to Cochrane’s strategy.  
 
In his book The inexact and separate science of economics, (1992), Hausman argues that: 
“Economics is governed by a coherent vision of its overall theoretical mission”. 
(Hausman 1992, p. 90). In an effort to explain the “vision” of theoretical economics, 
Hausman argues that there is an underlying structure to the “project”. This structure is 
“generally accepted” but “rarely explicitly stated”. Hausman seeks clarity in four claims 
that supposedly establish “the vision of economics as a separate science”: 
 
“1. Economics is defined in terms of the causal factors with which it is concerned, not in terms of 
a domain. 
2. Economics has a distinct domain, in which its causal factors predominate. 
3. The “laws” of the predominating causal factors are already reasonably well known. 
4. Thus, economic theory, which employs these laws, provide a unified, complete, but inexact 
account of its domain.” (Hausman 1992, p. 90). 
 
Let me here focus on the two first claims that Hausman presents as they are most relevant 
for my discussion of Cochrane’s asset pricing theory. My question is straightforward. 
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Does Cochrane subscribe to Hausman’s formulations, and can I argue that Cochrane 
seeks to establish a separate area of asset pricing? The answer to this question has 
importance for the discussions on “research projects” that I commence in section 2 of this 
chapter.  
 
In the first claim, Hausman refers to causal factors. He identifies them from within the 
standard paradigm of the basic neo-classical “equilibrium theory”. In particular he 
mentions the “theory of consumer choice” which comprises “rationality”, 
“consumerism”, and “diminishing marginal rates of substitution”. (Hausman 1992, p. 30). 
These three elements define what Hausman refers to as “rational greed”. He next asserts 
that economics is defined by these causal factors. A reference is also made to the domain. 
In this respect, we are told that economics is defined, primarily, by causal factors and not 
in terms of ring-fencing a specific “domain”.  
 
Consider, first, John Stuart Mill who also started his inquiry into economics from the 
point of view of main causes. He went on to explore the consequences of these causes 
when acting together in agents’ “pursuit of wealth”. This method could be used in the 
separate area that Mill denoted “Political Economy”. Causes, therefore, come first and 
are followed by the domain of activity. In view of Cochrane’s research effort, I think he 
could subscribe to Hausman’s first claim, and also side with Mill’s views. Cochrane’s 
representative investor, with his/her triad of temperaments, is the starting point for 
subsequent theorizing. Nonetheless, I do not think there is anything distinct in CCAPMs 
triad that would earmark it for the exclusive use in asset pricing theories. In fact, these 
temperaments are active in many strands of life and found in various social science 
contexts. I have mentioned, for example, that von Neumann and Morgenstern used them 
in the context of any decision making situation in which the final outcome is uncertain. In 
particular, the two authors referred to gambling. As a consequence, turning the triad on in 
a theoretical context does not define in which area they have been activated. The 
definition of that area is a separate decision.  
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This takes me to Hausman’s second claim. I think Hausman’s “rational greed” can be 
viewed as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing the separate realm 
that he advocates. Sufficiency, in Hausman’s view, is reached when economists use the 
rational greed credo in the context of a “partial equilibrium theory”. Cochrane, again, can 
be seen as a follower of Hausman’s analysis. The presence of the triad of temperaments 
leads the investor to the first order condition. The dynamic of this set-up plays itself out 
within a financial market structure that provides financial assets as intertemporal 
transporters of purchasing power. A stable equilibrium situation is thus reached when all 
assets are held at “market clearing’ prices. Both Hausman’s rational greed and 
Cochrane’s triad of temperaments, therefore, need a backdrop against which the 
consequences of their causal factors can play themselves out.  
 
Without these additional elements of optimizing behaviour, financial markets and assets, 
the triad of temperaments, or Hausman’s rational greed for that matter, does not on its 
own define the consumption based asset pricing theory. It is only in their combination 
and interaction that they make the theory, first, complete, and, second, internally 
consistent. This mutual interdependence thus reinforces and ring-fences Cochrane’s asset 
pricing project. If one of its main elements is removed, the consumption based asset 
pricing theory crumbles. Cochrane, therefore, establishes what Hausman calls “a coherent 
vision of its overall theoretical mission”. Cochrane so establishes asset pricing as a 
separate science by “explicitly stating” all elements of its theoretical structure.  
 
It is now a good time to assess Cochrane’s microeconomic structure upon which he 
develops his asset pricing theory. This is the content of the following section.   
  
1.4 The fallacy of simplification 
It is certainly challenging to give an assessment of the important role which the 
microeconomic structure of Cochrane’s asset pricing theory plays. Earlier, I established 
that Cochrane takes the much travelled road of economic methodology that aims at 
simplifying the complexities of the real investor, financial markets and their assets 
through a process of isolation. At the end of this process, I found a separate economic 
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realm that was defined by idealized and constructed, even fictional, versions of the real 
situations. I critically alluded to the challenges of reconciling the theoretical cases with 
the real situations as the fallacy of simplification. Below, I discuss how this fallacy 
reveals itself in Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM. 
 
1.4.1 The dogmatic starting point 
Let me start with the neoclassical economic paradigm in which Cochrane’s asset pricing 
framework originates, i.e. the dogmatic starting point which forms the basis for the 
fallacy of simplification.  
 
This well-rehearsed economic framework, as I have argued throughout this section 1, 
establishes three main simplified, idealized and constructed elements, i.e. the investor and 
his/her triad of sentiments, the financial market structure, and the financial market assets. 
But how does Cochrane justify a starting point in narrow and rather thin 
characterizations? In fact, he does not. How can we then know that, for example, the triad 
of temperament, i.e. rationality, self-interest, and risk aversion are primitives? That they 
are coherently isolated from the rest of the investors’ sentiments? That the triad form a 
closed system? That the triad of sentiments, and nothing else, matters in economic choice 
situations with uncertain outcomes? The closest Cochrane gets to answering these 
questions is as follows: “Something like the consumption based model – investors’ first 
order conditions for savings and portfolio choice – has to be the starting point.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 455).  
 
Cochrane’s justification for the basis of his asset pricing theory is certainly meagre. First, 
it seems that we are just presented with what Cochrane seems to take as a “known fact”, 
i.e. it is so obvious that it meets only a few, or if at all, any objections. Above, in section 
1.3.2, I referred to Morgan’s analysis of the “economic man” and his “artificial character 
created by economists”. In Cochrane’s context, this means that the representative investor 
is not established as initially discussed by Smith, Mill and Jevons, thorough observation 
and introspection. No, as I have indicated at several occasions, and this is my second 
point, Cochrane’s representative investor is the outcome of theorizing. And this is where 
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in particular Cochrane’s construction of this individual is of importance. As I described in 
Chapter Two, section 3.4, for example, the investor knows the payoffs on all assets in all 
possible future economic states. The investor is also given perfect foresight with respect 
to all possible future economic states. Not only that. Also the probabilities of their 
occurrence are assumed to be known to the investor. The investor, however, does not 
know which of these states will occur. This gives him/her close to perfect knowledge and 
foresight. In addition, he/she lives an infinite life. Certainly, these add-ins do not reflect 
circumstances found in real situations.  
 
I am most sceptical towards Cochrane’s methodological strategy of enriching the 
simplifications that indeed have real situation counterparts, such as rationality, self-
interest and risk aversion, by adding in properties that do not exist in real situations. 
Perfect foresight across time and economic states and immortality are not only fictional 
but simply false. I raise similar concerns related to Cochrane’s theorizing with respect to 
the financial market structure and the financial assets (see previous sections 1.2.1 and 
1.2.2).  
 
By not having a justifiable starting point, Cochrane might be on thin methodological ice. 
He could certainly claim that it is perfectly fine to start out with simplified, idealized and 
fictional characteristics of real situations. In this sense, he has coherently isolated the 
right characteristics that are set to interact with each other in a closed system undeterred 
by any outside influences. If this is a possible answer, I would make the following 
remarks. 
 
First, as I explained in the previous Chapter Two, i.e. the asset pricing “primer”, 
Cochrane has developed an internally consistent theory of asset pricing. He sealed off the 
main causes of character and behaviour and showed how they interact towards creating 
an equilibrium situation in the financial market. More important than technical dexterity, 
however, is whether he has sealed off the right characteristics. Above, I discussed my 
scepticism towards his justifications. Second, even if the right characteristics have been 
identified, how can they be successfully demarcated from “the rest”? Would we not want 
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to know what happens when the representative investor is embedded in a societal context, 
i.e. when savings and investment choices are made based upon other influences as well? 
In other words, how sensitive are Cochrane’s theoretical and empirical results to the 
introduction of a more complex set of such “moral” and “altruistic” considerations? I am 
thus concerned with the representative investor’s life in a vacuum outside of professional 
and social interactions. I claim that Cochrane cannot justify that the listed properties 
within the asset pricing theory are independent of “the rest”. Third, Cochrane’s 
methodological strategy obviously sets the asset pricing theory a long distance away from 
it targets. My question in this respect concerns the consequences of this strategy. Does 
the starting point limit our ability to explain and predict the real situations? Are such 
explanations and predictions harmful to the user of such asset pricing advice? Let me 
analyse possible answers in the next section in which I review the second part of the 
fallacy of simplification claim, i.e. the consequences of the dogmatic starting point. 
 
1.4.2 The consequences of the dogmatic starting point  
In this section, I address the consequences of Cochrane’s dogmatic starting point with 
respect to his asset pricing theory. Ultimately, the derived consequences must go beyond 
the consistency of theoretical work and its technical dexterity. I believe it must be shown 
that the results are tangible and useful for its stakeholders, i.e. investors, public sector, 
and fellow academics. Stakeholders would, therefore, need independent and objective 
advice on the consequences of using the CCAPM derived results that, as we know from 
the previous section, works from a dogmatic starting point of simplified, idealized and 
constructed characteristics of the investor, the financial markets and its assets.  
 
Since Cochrane is conflicted in this process and, in addition, does not do a lot to justify 
the starting point, the stakeholders could consult the outcome of empirical tests. 
However, as I indicated in Chapter Two, section 6, the CCAPM’s statistical success is 
limited. Since this is a stated fact, the main justification for Cochrane’s dogmatic starting 
points is not well supported. This is certainly a problematic situation for Cochrane and 
his version of the CCAPM. Without pre-empting my discussion on CCAPMs empirical 
assessment in Chapter Five, I will, below, point to a few areas in which the fallacy of 
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simplification is evident. My first point is related to the gap between the theory’s starting 
point and the real situations. My second point addresses the role of Cochrane’s stories.  
 
My first point is directed towards the fact that most observers of financial market 
activities agree that there are more to real situations than what the CCAPM portrays in its 
theories. So why should we care about such a simplified, idealized and constructed 
version of man, markets and assets when we know that we will not encounter them in real 
situation? We would care, I believe, if we knew that the gap between the real and the 
theory’s output is insignificant, and claims of statistical success is warranted. Since we 
are told that the latter is, so far, not the case, let me focus on the former. 
 
At the “heart of this story”, as Hausman (1992) calls it, we find the investor in a financial 
market setting involved in consumption and investments. When describing these 
elements, Cochrane distances himself from the complexities that are visible in the real 
situations. He simplifies and thus aspires to extract what he believes are the essentials for 
the consumption based asset pricing theory. These essentials are all idealized and 
constructed fictional entities which exist in a mathematical framework. As a 
consequence, they give us pictures of processes and results that with absolute certainty 
obtain in the theoretical analysis. This information is of value in that specific context. 
Given the context dependency, however, CCAPM cannot be expected to inform about 
other situations, i.e. those observable in the real financial markets. Idealized and 
constructed, and even fictional, theories that claim to capture the essentials of financial 
market activities are thus distances away from the real situations. This is unproblematic, 
some would argue, if statistical success is achieved. This is, however, not the case for the 
CCAPM. 
 
The difference between the theory and the real situations is also visible in the use of 
language. Characterizations of financial markets are part of our day to day vocabulary. In 
contrast to these every-day characterizations, we are also being exposed to the various 
technical concepts such as utility, stochastic discount function, subjective risk aversion, 
first order condition, contingent claims, and frictionless markets. Cochrane is certainly 
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aware of these differences, but he does not go to any length addressing them. In fact, he 
leaves me with the impression that one may exchange everyday vocabulary with 
technical characterizations. Stakeholders might, therefore, be (mis)led to believe that 
there are no significant differences between the real counterparts and CCAPM’s technical 
characterizations.  
 
There are several examples that demonstrate the difference between the real situations 
and their idealized, constructed, and even fictional counterparts in the asset pricing 
theory. The most prominent, again, is the difference between the real and CCAPM’s 
representative investor. On one hand, the representative investor is given extraordinary 
capabilities, but on the other hand, the investor is deprived of crucial human traits. 
Included sentiments make the representative investor an idealized and constructed 
version of his/her real situation counterpart. We thus know what is isolated and included 
in Cochrane’s asset pricing theory, but we are not told how and why other aspects of the 
investor were omitted. The same hold for real and theoretical financial markets and 
assets. For example, it is costly to execute stock-transactions in the financial market. And 
investor, mostly, pay taxes on payoffs, i.e. dividend and capital gains. Market frictions, 
therefore, influence real investors’ behaviour. These frictions are removed in the CCAPM 
context.  
 
Where do these comparisons take us? My concern is that the consequences of the fallacy 
of simplification, i.e. the theory-based results, are carried over, with no further ado, to the 
real situations thoughtlessly by not distinguishing clearly between every-day “speak” and 
the technical counterparts. Such misinterpretation might have real effects as stakeholders 
are prone to make wrong decisions regarding their consumption and investment because 
they mistook theory-based knowledge with reality. This is certainly a problematic issue. 
But Cochrane does not seem to address it effectively. In his defence, he points towards 
the strategy’s limited statistical success, but he does not “hammer” this point home 
enough. Cochrane also fails to say convincingly that the idealized and constructed 
versions of investors, markets and assets do not provide sufficiently good approximations 
of the real situations. Where Cochrane is good, however, is how he tells stories with 
128 
 
respect to his perception of financial market activities. And this is where my second point 
comes in.   
 
We already encountered Cochrane’s story regarding financial market activities in 
Chapter Two, section 2.2. I will not repeat it here. The point to make, however, is that his 
good and plausible stories might obfuscate real investor’s view of financial markets. 
They might feel confident that what they hear is accurate. In this respect, they are prone 
to overlook the lack of statistical success and focus on this intuitive narrative. This again 
might lead investors into making decisions that turn out to be built on a weak foundation. 
In Chapter Four, sections 1.2.2 and 4.4 as well as in Chapter Five, section 5.2, I will 
discuss the methodological importance of stories in Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM.  
 
2. CCAPM and its assumptions 
Cochrane’s asset pricing research effort finds inspiration from a well-rehearsed neo-
classical economic back-drop. He uses this back-drop to establish a theoretical 
framework around the three main areas which define his asset pricing project, i.e. the 
investor, his/her character and behaviour, the financial market structure, and their assets. 
The purpose of this section is to continue analysing these old and more newly developed 
assumptions. My issue is not so much the fact that there are, as Cochrane claims, “lots” 
thereof. My goal here is more to assess their methodological development and their 
relative importance and cooperation in developing a theory of asset pricing that, possibly, 
is progressive.  
 
My review shows that Cochrane is not overly explicit with respect to creating and 
maintaining a list of both stable and fleeing assumptions. Nonetheless, throughout his 
writings, Cochrane seems to want such an order. It should, therefore, be possible to 
bundle these assumptions into clusters and combine them to create this overarching unity. 
I argue that a hierarchy of assumptions is of value. It helps distinguish the central 
assumptions from the less so. Not only does such a hierarchy facilitate ex-ante theoretical 
development but it also help guiding ex-post theoretical adjustments and changes should 
empirical tests fail to support the claims emitted from the theory. I find support for this 
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view in the publications of two contemporary philosophers of science, Nancy Cartwright 
and Ronald N. Giere.  
 
2.1 Some assumptions are more fundamental than other 
From Chapter 2, sections 4.1 and 4.2, we know that Cochrane assembles the central asset 
pricing formula based upon the theory of asset pricing. Before Cochrane gets to the 
central formula, he presents the basic pricing equation: 
 
 pt = Et (mt+1  xt+1 ).   
 
Cochrane elaborates: “Given the payoff [xt+1] (...) and given the investor’s consumption 
choice [mt+1] (...), it tells you what market price (...) to expect. Its economic content is 
simply the first order condition for optimal consumption and portfolio formation.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 6). Cochrane’s statement makes references to the “economic content” 
which is the first order condition of consumption and portfolio choice, or mathematically 
in the central asset pricing formula: (see Chapter Two, section 4.2, footnote 22): 
 
pt    = Et [β 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  xt+1] 
At the centre of this formula, we find the stochastic discount factor (SDF) consisting of 
the subjective discount factor ß and the, marginal, utility function u’ (ct+1  ) / u’ (ct,).  
 
The topic I want to pursue here is not the number of assumptions supporting the central 
asset pricing formula or the consequences of applying them, but whether they are of 
equal importance. I will make the point that Cochrane is not overly explicit with respect 
to their relative importance but that establishing such a hierarchy of assumptions is of 
benefit to his research project.  
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In the next sections, I again focus on the representative investor and arrange the 
assumptions that support his/her character and behaviour into two clusters that I denote 
“fundamental principles” and “auxiliary assumption”.  
 
2.1.1 Fundamental principles  
My task ahead is to disentangle the central pricing formula with its mathematical symbols 
and assumption-filled content and extract those elements that are more essential than 
others. Importance, however, is a relative concept. Let us, therefore, inform ourselves. 
Philosophers of science, for example, are also interested in assumptions and the role they 
play when developing theories. Two prominent references are Cartwright (1983, 1989, 
1999, 2004, 2007, 2008) and Giere (2004, 2008). Cartwright, for instance, asserts that 
theories rely on both principles and assumptions. Her focus is on the principles. Drawing 
also on Hempel’s insights (1965, 1966), Cartwright tells us that there are two groups of 
principles. The first group has many names; theoretical-, internal-, first- or fundamental-
principles. The second is called bridge-laws or bridge-principles. Here, I am interested in 
the fundamental principles. Later, in Chapter Four, section 4.4.3, I briefly discuss the use 
of bridge principles. 
 
Natural sciences, and in particular physics, we are told, are rich in fundamental 
principles. Newton’s Principles of Mechanics, Maxwell’s Principles of Electrodynamics, 
Principles of Quantum Mechanics, and Principles of Thermodynamics are often used as 
references. Consider, for example, Newton’s Second Law. It is mathematically expressed 
as F = m a. Cartwright and Giere agree that this statement is neither an empirical nor a 
modal generalization over existing entities. Their properties do not occur universally or 
by necessity. The two authors also agree that Newton’s second law does not present a 
“vehicle for making empirical claims”: 
 
“Newton’s three laws of motion, for example, refer to quantities called force and mass, and relate 
these to quantities previously well understood: position, velocity, and acceleration. But they do not 
themselves tell us in more specific terms what might count as a force or mass. So we do not know 
where in the world to look to see whether or not the laws apply.” (Giere 2004, p. 745).  
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 Cartwright goes on to assert that the social sciences, such as economics and finance, have 
only a limited number of fundamental principles. She explicitly refers to two; the 
principle of “utility maximization” by agents’ rational behaviour, and the principle of 
“market equilibrium”. Giere is supportive. He also refers to “various equilibrium 
principles”, in particular to the economic Principle of Nash Equilibrium. Both Cartwright 
and Giere, therefore, share the opinion that fundamental principles are present in both 
natural and social sciences. If this is the case, these principles share common 
characteristics. Above I pointed towards three: they are neither universal nor modal 
generalization and they cannot be compared directly with the real situations. 
  
How does this resonate with Cochrane’s asset pricing approach? I think quite well. Here 
is why. From the aggregate consumption data, information related to the state contingent 
payoff and the prices of the financial market assets under consideration, Cochrane 
estimates the representative investors utility function. At the heart of this function, we 
find the agent and his/her given three sentiments. This particular character is exposed 
towards a choice situation with the uncertain consequence that he/she might not receive 
the expected pay-off to upkeep his/her desired level of consumption. By carefully 
considering which assets to hold in his/her portfolio, he/she, unknowingly, brings the 
financial markets forward towards the equilibrium situation. This narrative, I think, gives 
a rich foundation for exploring the existence of fundamental principles. Let us start with 
the investor. 
 
I suggest that Cochrane, indeed, works with a few crucial assumptions when establishing 
“the theory of asset pricing” and assembling “the central asset pricing formula”. They are 
found with respect to the investor. How fundamental are they? I think we can find 
assumptions that deserve to be characterized as fundamental principles. The investor’s 
behaviour is determined by his/her character, i.e. he/she maximizes utility. And his/her 
character and behaviour, as we know, rests on the triad of temperaments. I believe 
Cochrane’s commitment to these concepts is near to dogmatic. Without the investor, 
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his/her character and forced behaviour, there is no consumption based capital asset 
pricing theory.  
 
Is the triad of temperaments universal or modal, and can they be compared with the real 
situations? It seems difficult to imagine a social setting in which the triad is entirely 
absent. These sentiments, as I have pointed out earlier, may be operating in a reduced 
mode or they are possibly counteracted by other, unnamed, “disturbing” causes. Are they 
universals? We do not know the final answer to this question. When confronted with 
decisions with uncertain outcomes, have all people at all times in all places been guided 
by the triad? Will their behaviour in all future situations be a consequence of these 
temperaments only? Will we know that the triad has been completely absent in some 
choice situations with uncertain outcomes? Is the triad modal? Does it hold by necessity? 
I think these are difficult questions to answer in the context of my discussion on asset 
pricing. Nonetheless, I believe Cochrane wants them to be testable. In sum, therefore, I 
suggest referring to rationality, self-interest and risk aversion as the three fundamental 
principles of consumption based asset pricing theory.  
 
What about the financial markets and their assets? Are there principles therein that we 
can characterize as fundamental? My answer is “no”. Consider, for example, the absence 
of taxes and transaction costs, one agent universe, infinite lifespan, no labour income, the 
statistical distribution of return, etc. They are not fundamental to the theory nor can they 
be characterized as universal or modal. Comparing such statements with respect to their 
accuracy relative to the real situations is meaningless because we know they are absent in 
real market situations. These concepts belong to a different category of assumptions that I 
describe in the next section. 
 
2.1.2 Auxiliary assumptions 
Having written down the central pricing formula, Cochrane insists: “Most of the theory 
of asset pricing just consists of specialisations and manipulations of the formula.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 6). He continues: “The rest is elaboration, special cases, and a closet 
full of tricks that make the central equation useful for one or another application.” 
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(Cochrane 2005, p. xiii). Cochrane here refers to the way the formula can be given more 
structure by adding in assumptions. Which are they? Cochrane answers, as I indicated in 
Chapter Two, section 5:   
 
“Writing p = E( m x ) we do not assume: (1) Markets are complete, or there is a representative 
investor; (2) Asset returns or payoffs are normally distributed (no options), or independent over 
time; (3) Two-period investors, quadratic utility, or separable utility; (4) Investors have no human 
capital or labour income; (5) The market has reached equilibrium, or individuals have bought all 
the securities they want to. All of these assumptions come later, in various special cases, but we 
have not made them yet. We do assume that investors can consider a small marginal investment or 
disinvestment.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 35).  
 
I would like to divide Cochrane’s statement into two parts. The first part captures the 
assumptions he makes when spelling out the central pricing formula and the other part 
contains the assumptions “not yet made”. The first is straight forward. Cochrane says that 
the investor “can consider a small marginal investment or disinvestment”. This takes us 
back to the triad of temperaments, i.e. the rational, self-interested and risk averse 
representative investor who contemplates the effect of marginal changes in his /her 
consumption and investment plan. I have already sorted these assumptions to the group of 
“fundamental principles”. Point (5) in the above quote is also notable. Here, Cochrane 
claims that the equilibrium condition is not contained in the basic pricing equation. I 
agree. It is more the consequence of what the representative investors are told to do. 
 
The second part of Cochrane’s statement is more complicated to grasp. It lists several, 
seemingly, unrelated assumptions. They have in common, however that they can all be 
attached to the central pricing formula. When that occurs, they create what Cochrane 
alludes to as elaborated, distinct analytical cases that are “useful for one or another 
application”. In Chapter Two, section 5 and in the previous section 1.3 of this chapter, I 
have already pointed towards the assumptions that develop idealized and fictional 
investor, financial markets and assets. From a theoretical point of view are extremely 
helpful in developing the consumption based asset pricing research effort.  
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I, therefore, think that the items listed in (1) to (4) represent a second category of 
assumptions that provide Cochrane with flexibility in the choices of where to take the 
basic pricing equation. They help refine the investor and his/her behaviour, the financial 
market structure and the financial assets. But such assumptions are neither dependent 
upon the fundamental principles, nor are they necessarily the derived consequences 
thereof. For example, a complete market is not dependent upon investors being rational; 
an infinite life-span is not the derived consequence of the investor’s risk aversion; the 
investor’s self-interest does not need a contingent claim market. 
 
I refer to assumptions in this category as auxiliary assumptions. A combination of 
fundamental principles and auxiliary assumptions, therefore, creates flexibility with 
respect to Cochrane’s research effort in deriving their combined consequences, i.e. 
various analytical cases that I expose in more detail in Chapter Four. The principles and 
assumptions also combine to make the theory of asset pricing internally consistent. 
 
2.2 A hierarchy of assumptions 
The philosophers of science, Cartwright and Giere, informed us regarding the 
fundamental principles, bridge principles and auxiliary assumptions. When combined, 
new and more granular cases can be derived, and several of these cases can be assessed 
against the empirical situations. Cochrane, however, does not use these terms. He prefers 
calling all of them “assumptions”. Yet he seems to endorse the notion that some of the 
assumptions are more important than others. In the past few sections, I confirmed this. I 
followed Cartwright and Giere’s advice and labelled them “fundamental principles”. 
Furthermore, assumptions that are not a fundamental principle are, as a consequence, 
“auxiliary assumptions”. 
 
Specifically, I argued that the representative investor’s three characteristics, i.e. 
rationality, self-interest and risk aversion can be considered to be fundamental principles. 
In contrast to Cartwright and Giere, however, I do not consider the equilibrium condition 
to be a fundamental principle. It is rather the outcome of the investors’ considerations of 
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incremental investments in order to maximize his/her discounted total expected utility. 
These considerations take financial markets towards the equilibrium situations in which 
“markets clear” at a specific asset price. The representative investor does not even know 
that this is the outcome of his/her activity. Additionally, a large set of assumptions 
supports the fundamental principles along the way. Good examples are the eternal life 
span of the investor, contingent claim securities, and almost perfect foresight, zero taxes 
and transaction costs. These assumptions give the central pricing formula more structure. 
 
If this categorization of assumptions into two compartments is acceptable, we also have a 
hierarchy of assumptions, i.e. the first set is more important than the second. However, 
we need to take the analysis one step further. Cochrane frequently refers to the theory of 
asset pricing. It gives the impression that there is a single theory spanning his entire asset 
pricing research project. It certainly is Cochrane’s goal to give such a holistic view, i.e. to 
provide: “...a complete answer to all the questions of the theory of valuation.” (Cochrane 
2005, p. 42). Scientific ambition might aim that high but few involved in his or other 
finance related research projects would claim to have reached such a general level yet. 
How can Cochrane’s theoretical ambitions best be characterized? 
 
3. Imre Lakatos’ research programme and the CCAPM  
In the previous two sections of this chapter, I showed how Cochrane’s hierarchy of 
assumptions can be interpreted as establishing simplified, idealized and fictional versions 
of the investor, markets and assets. This model-based outcome is certainly a long distance 
away from the real situations they are seeking to represent. In section 1.4, I referred to 
this gap as the fallacy of simplification. In this section, I ask how Cochrane’s research 
effort can be characterized from a philosophy of science point of view. To answer this 
question, I turn to Mark Blaug’s classic Methodology of Economics (1992). Therein, he 
asks what the nature of economic explanation is: “Insofar as these explanations consist of 
definite theories, what is the structure of these theories, and, in particular, what is the 
relationship between the assumptions and the predictive implications of economic 
theories?” (Blaug 1992, p. xxv). He reviews several possible answers given by various 
economists and philosophers of science. In the context of my discussion, Blaug’s 
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coverage of Imre Lakatos’ response stands out as a promising back-drop for my own 
endeavour to characterize Cochrane’s CCAPM research effort. But there are also other 
alternatives that might be used. I am, like Blaug for example, thinking of Kuhn’s (1970) 
and McCloskey’s (1988) elaborations on, respectively, the progress of science and, more 
specifically, economic rhetoric. Instead of characterizing these alternatives, I rather point 
towards the similarities between Lakatos’ description of what a research programme is 
and how Cochrane complies with it without falling prey to Lakatos’ many critics. 
 
The section has six parts. I first review the four main pillars that characterize what 
Lakatos refers to as a “research programme” and show the parallels to Cochrane’s 
version of the CCAPM research effort. Second, I describe the historical development of 
Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM. Third, I compare what I called CCAPM’s 
fundamental principles and auxiliary assumptions with Lakatos “hard core” propositions 
and “protective belt” hypotheses. Fourth, I show how the CCAPM uses the positive and 
negative heuristic. Fifth, I discuss whether the CCAPM is progressive or degenerating. 
Six, I point towards articulated criticism of Lakatos’ description of research programmes. 
I argue that the criticism can be withstood in the context of my analysis. 
 
3.1 The “research programme” 
Blaug, who I referred to above, claims:   
 
“Lakatos begins with denying that individual theories are the appropriate units for making 
scientific appraisals; what ought to be appraised, and what inevitable is appraised, are clusters of 
more or less interconnected theories or scientific research programs.” (Blaug 1992, pp. 32).  
 
How does Lakatos characterize the structure of such scientific research programmes? 
Lakatos explains: 
 
“All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their “hard core”. The negative 
heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this “hard core”. Instead, we 
must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent “auxiliary hypotheses”, which form a protective 
belt around this core, and we must redirect modus tollens to these. It is this protective belt of 
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auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even 
completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core. A research programme is successful if all 
this leads to a progressive problemshift; unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating problemshift.” 
(Lakatos 1978, p. 48). 41 
 
Lakatos offers several examples of a research programme. Here is but one: 
 
“Now, Newton’s theory of gravitation, Einstein’s relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Marxism, 
Freudianism, are all research programmes, each with a characteristic hard core stubbornly 
defended, each with its more flexible protective belt and each with its elaborate problem-solving 
machinery. Each of them, at any stage of its development, has unsolved problems and undigested 
anomalies. (...) This programme [Einstein’s] made the stunning prediction that if one measures the 
distance between two stars in the night, and if one measures the distance between them during day, 
(...), the two measurements will be different. Nobody had thought to make such an observation 
before Einstein’s programme. Thus, in a progressive research programme, theory leads to the 
discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. In a degenerating, however, theories are fabricated 
only in order to accommodate known facts. Has, for instance, Marxism ever predicted a stunning 
novel fat? Never! (Lakatos 1978, pp. 4).  
 
Lakatos claims that research programmes evolve over time and have a generic structure. 
The programmes are seen as a collection of interlinked theories with a common “hard 
core”. In fact, the hard core is the defining element of the research programme. 
Assumptions at the core are considered “irrefutable”. They are surrounded by a flexible 
set of auxiliary assumptions collected in a “protective belt”. These assumptions are open 
to debate and alterations in view of the development of the research programme. Beside 
these two theoretical elements of a research programme, Lakatos also argues that a 
research programme has methodological components in the form of rules regarding how 
to develop the programme, i.e. what to avoid (negative heuristic), and what to pursue 
(positive heuristic). When the theoretical and the methodological components are 
combined, it can be assessed whether a research programme is theoretically and 
empirically progressive or degenerating.  
 
41 Modus tollens is the destructive form or argument. If the conclusion of an argument is shown to be false, 
then at least one of the premises on which the argument is based is false.  
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In sum, Lakatos’ elaborations on the structure of a research programme articulate four 
main topics or pillars: First, an historical component that contains clusters of 
interconnected theories that evolve over time. Second, a theoretical component consisting 
of rigid “hard core” principles and flexible “protective belt” hypotheses. Third, a 
methodological component that guides the theoretical and empirical development of the 
programme, i.e. “negative” and “positive” heuristic. And, fourth, an appraisal component, 
i.e. the assessment whether a research programme is “progressive” or “degenerating”. 
With these four characteristics in mind, I can turn to Cochrane’s version of the CCAPM 
and explore whether it can be characterized as a research programme in a Lakatosian 
sense. At the end of my assessment, which will follow in the next few sections, I 
conclude that Cochrane’s asset pricing effort can indeed be viewed as Lakatosian 
research programme and, in addition, withstand its critics. Cochrane, namely, first, 
follows a research tradition with deep historical roots, second, protects its fundamental 
principles against attacks, third, deductively develops lower level models from these 
fundamental principles, and, fourth, applies statistical tests to gauge CCAPM’s 
theoretical and empirical progress. 
 
3.2 CCAPM’s historical development 
In the previous section 1.1, I already pointed out that CCAPMs microeconomic 
foundation lies within a neoclassical theoretical tradition. It builds upon the rational, self-
interested and risk averse individual whose decision making under uncertainty takes the 
financial market towards a stable equilibrium situations at market clearing asset prices. 
Clearly, this starting point has long and complex historical roots. Early dated 
consumption based asset pricing efforts were led by Hirshleifer (1964, 1965, 1966), 
Stiglitz (1970), Rubinstein (1976) and Lucas (1978) who all, in their own ways, 
introduced pieces of a theoretical puzzle that were later combined in today’s CCAPM. 
Breeden (1979), Grossmann and Shiller (1980), Shiller (1981, 1982), Hansen and 
Singleton (1982, 1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger 
(1989), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Campbell (2001), Mehra (2003), Cochrane 
(2005) all continued to explore the microeconomic foundations. They document 
variations on the theme that asset prices should be studied in the context of the consumer. 
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 Lakatos claims that distinct research programme evolves over time. In this directional 
process, the programme carries with it a set of theoretical clusters containing specific 
assumption. Without dismissing earlier contributions, I search for those clusters and 
assumptions and start my review with Lucas (1978), who many of his successors list as 
the main historical references. In a short paper named “Asset Pricing in an Exchange 
Economy”, Lucas describes his own contribution as a: 
 
“…theoretical examination of the stochastic behaviour of asset prices in a one good, pure 
exchange economy with identical consumers. (...). An asset is a claim to all or part of the 
output...(...). Most of our attention will be focused on the derivation and application of a functional 
equation in the vector of equilibrium asset prices which is solved for price as a function of the 
physical state of the economy. (...). A general method of constructing equilibrium prices is 
developed and applied to a series of examples.” (Lucas 1978, p. 1429.).  
 
Lucas continues with an informal description of the particular economy he is interested in 
and then, formally, first, defines and, next, constructs the equilibrium situation in which 
the necessary and sufficient first order conditions takes a central role. He continues:  
 
“Consider an economy with a single consumer, interpreted as a representative “stand in” for a 
large number of identical consumers. He wishes to maximize the quantity E { ∑ t = 0 β
t U(ct) } 
where ct is a stochastic process representing consumption of a single good, β is a discount factor, 
U (.) is a current period utility function, and E (.) is an expectation operator. (...) ...shares are 
traded, (...), a competitively determined price vector pt ... (...). ...all relevant information on the 
current and future physical state of the economy is summarized in the current output vector y. (...) 
...consumer behavior determines the equilibrium price function. We close the system with the 
assumption of rational expectations:... (Lucas 1978, pp. 1430). 
  
In these two statements, Lucas makes several notable references to the assumptions 
underlying the theory of asset prices in an exchange economy. I take note of the 
following main characteristics: consumer based micro-economic foundation, identical 
consumers, i.e. representative agents, rational and utility maximizing behaviour, i.e. first 
order condition, knowledge with respect to all relevant current and future structure/state 
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of the economy, an equilibrium situation, and one asset. Lucas then goes on to apply this 
general structure and mentions in the example section of his paper, for example, that “... 
the price of the i th asset is the expected, discounted present value of its real dividend 
stream, conditioned on current information y” and “the elasticity of price with respect to 
income is equal to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion”. Lucas concludes 
that the paper is primarily methodological, i.e. “an illustration of the use of some methods 
which may help to bring financial and economic theories closer together”.  
 
Following Lucas’ contribution towards providing “some methods”, the next seminal 
paper was so-authored by Hansen and Singleton (1982) called “Stochastic Consumption, 
Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns”. Already in the heading of 
this paper we find similarities back to Lucas and forwards to Cochrane’s version of the 
CCAPM. The paper sets out to study “the time-series behavior of asset returns and 
aggregate consumption”. Consider the following extracts:  
 
“In the asset pricing models of Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and Brock 
(1982), amongst others, agents effect their consumption plans by trading shares of ownership of 
firms in a competitive stock market. (...). The purposes of this paper are to characterize explicitly 
the restrictions on the joint distributions of asset returns and consumption implied by a class of 
general equilibrium asset pricing models and to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters describing preferences and the stochastic consumption process. (...). the framework for 
this analysis is a production-exchange economy of identical agents who choose consumption and 
investment plans so as to maximize the expected value of a time-additive von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. The joint distribution of consumption and returns is assumed to be 
lognormal, and preferences are assumed to exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). (...) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the subjective discount 
factor, and the parameters that describe the temporal evolution of consumption are obtained using 
this closed-form characterization of the restrictions.” (Hansen and Singleton 1983, pp 249).  
 
From this extensive quote, it is obvious that the consumption based asset pricing theory 
continued to evolve around the idealized and fictitious representative investor, the 
character traits I have referred to earlier as the triad of temperaments, his/her optimizing 
behaviour with respect to utility of consumption plans, the CCRA utility function, and the 
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equilibrium conditions. An innovation can be seen in the introduction of “the subjective 
discount factor”. This is the same discount factor that I have referred to earlier in Chapter 
Two, section 4.3 when discussing the arguments found in Cochrane’s stochastic discount 
factor. 
 
Finally, I want to point towards the influential paper by Breeden, Gibbons and 
Litzenberger (1989) on “Empirical Test of the Consumption-Oriented CAPM”. This 
paper takes Lucas (1978) theoretical contributions to the empirical arena. It also builds 
upon Rubinstein (1976) and Breeden (1979). Their idea is to “demonstrate that 
equilibrium excess returns are proportional to their consumption betas” and also to 
address particular econometric or measurement problems in the consumption data. The 
latter, the authors point out, “lowers the variance of measured consumption growth and 
creates positive autocorrelations”, and “underestimates the covariance between measured 
consumption and asset returns”. I point to these particular findings when I discuss my 
assessment of Cochrane’s CCAPM in Chapter Five. Consider, however, first, the 
theoretical set-up. It comes as no surprise to find language also used by Cochrane:  
 
“Since the CCAPM is well known, a standard review is unnecessary. The following synthesis 
provides a theoretical basis... (...). All individuals are assumed to have time-additive, 
monotonically increasing, and strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for 
lifetime consumption. Identical beliefs, a fixed population with infinite life-times, a single 
consumption good, and capital markets that permit an unconstrained Pareto-optimal allocation of 
consumption are also assumed. From the first-order conditions for individual k’s optimal 
consumption and portfolio plan, it follows ... (...). This is well known (e.g., see Lucas (1978)). 
(...).Thus, in equilibrium in a Pareto-efficient capital market, the growth rate in the marginal utility 
of consumption would be identical for all individuals and equal the growth rate in the “aggregate 
marginal utility” of consumption. (Breeden, Gibbons, Litzenberger 1989, pp 232).  
 
The three authors conclude that:  
 
“A number of tests of the consumption-oriented CAPM are examined. (...). Another implication of 
the CCAPM is that the market price for risk should be positive; in other words, the expected return 
increases as the risk increases. This implication is verified in all sub-periods, and the point 
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estimate is statistically significant in most of the sub-periods. (...). Based upon the quarterly 
consumption data for the overall period, the linear equality between reward and risk implied by the 
CCAPM is rejected at the 0.05 level.“ (Breeden, Gibbons, Litzenberger 1989, pp 260).  
 
In these two quotes, we learn that the empirical results are mixed and that no conclusive 
evidence is presented with respect to deeming the CCAPM’s predictions an outright 
success. This finding is also echoed in Cochrane (2011) and Campbell and Cochrane 
(2000). 
 
In terms of the language used in the theoretical framework, we, again, meet the 
consumer, his/her utility and maximizing behaviour, the equilibrium condition, and 
several of the other “standard” assumptions regarding assets and agent’s longevity. 
Besides the empirical work, we also find the critical covariance between the excess return 
on an investment is proportional to its “covariance with respect to aggregate 
consumption”. This idea was floated in Lucas (1978) but made more explicit in Breeden 
(1979) who, in one interpretation of his theoretical work, focuses on the “marginal rates 
of substitution between consumption today and consumption in the future”. He 
continues:...holding the expected payoff on an asset constant, the value of asset will be 
negatively related to the covariance with the individual’s consumption.” (Breeden 1979, 
p. 277). Cochrane also focuses on the covariance between asset payoff and consumption. 
This is an important technical piece in the theory of the consumption based asset pricing 
because the investor is assumed to be interested in assets, i.e. recession proof stocks as 
Cochrane denotes them that exhibit a negative covariance with consumption. Holding 
such stocks helps the investor to smooth his/her consumption in bad economic states 
because they payoff when income from other sources, such as work, is endangered. In 
Chapter Two, section 4.4, I already pointed toward this topic. 
  
It is thus fairly obvious to see how the research on the consumption based asset pricing 
theory has evolved through time. But does it contain clusters of interconnected theories as 
Lakatos alludes to? From the historical review, it certainly looks like this is the case. On 
one hand, I identified the investor, his/her character and behaviour, the financial market 
structure and the financial assets. Taken together, these three elements certainly form 
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three clusters of theories that in combination interact and sum to a whole, i.e. the 
consumption based asset pricing theory. If, for example, the investor with his/her triad of 
temperaments are not incorporated within a financial market structure, he/she cannot 
execute on the job he/she is asked to do, i.e. make decisions with respect to current and 
future consumption. And without the financial market assets, the individual would not 
have any means to transport his/her endowment across time and different economic 
states.  
 
At this stage, therefore, I conclude that the consumption based capital asset pricing effort 
has followed a fairly stable development around a few main characteristics of the 
individual, his/her character, and behaviour, the financial market structure and the 
financial market assets. Is there sufficient evidence that this close to 30 year effort from 
Lucas (1978) to Cochrane (2005) can be considered what Lakatos alludes to as a 
scientific research programme? To answer that question to its fullest, let us briefly recall 
that all elements of Lakatos research programme that I spelled out in section 2.3 above 
need to be confirmed; the programme contains clusters of interconnected theories that 
evolve through time, it has rigid “hard core” principles and flexible “protective belt” 
hypotheses, it uses “negative” and “positive” heuristic to guide its development, and in its 
appraisal, “progressive” and “degenerating” problemshift can be identified. Given these 
three criteria and a fourth that assess a research programme’s progress, it is too early to 
draw a final conclusion concerning Cochrane’s asset pricing effort being a Lakatosian 
research programme.  
 
Now, since I have concluded that the CCAPM research effort has evolved consistently 
over a period of time, I move to the second criteria and ask the question whether 
Cochrane asset pricing theory entertains a hard core and a protective belt. 
 
3.3 Cochrane’s hard core and protective belt 
In sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above, I arranged Cochrane’s assumptions into two groups; 
the first group contains what I call fundamental principles, and the second contains what I 
call auxiliary assumptions. The question I pursue here is whether these two groups are 
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similar to what Lakatos calls hard core propositions and protective belt hypotheses. If 
they are, Cochrane has taken a second hurdle on the road towards being characterized as 
a Lakatosian research programme.    
 
How does Lakatos characterize the programmes theoretical component, i.e. the rigid 
“hard core” principles and flexible “protective belt” hypotheses? Here is one example:  
 
“Newtonian science, for instance, is not simply a set of four conjectures – the three laws of 
mechanics and the law of gravitation. These four laws constitute only the “hard core” of the 
Newtonian programme. But this hard core is tenaciously protected from refutation by a vast 
“protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses.” (Lakatos 1978, p.4).  
 
Here, Lakatos points towards the hard core of Niels Bohr’s research programme of light 
emission that is characterized by:  
 
“...five postulates as the hard core of his programme: (1) that energy radiation [within the atom] is 
not emitted (or absorbed) in the continuous way..(...). (2) That the dynamical equilibrium of the 
systems in the stationary states is governed by the ordinary laws of mechanics...(...). (3) That the 
radiation emitted during the transmission of a system between two stationary states is 
homogeneous... (...). (4) That the different stationary states of a simple system consisting of an 
electron rotating round a positive nucleus are determined by the conditions that...(...). (5) That the 
“permanent” state of any atomic system (...) is determined by the condition that...” (Lakatos 1978, 
p. 56).     
 
We here read about the “rational reconstruction”, as Lakatos describes it, of a research 
programme’s hard core. Such a core is thus the most important defining element of any 
research programme. While the programme as a whole may change through time, its hard 
core remains the same throughout the sequence of the theory development. Nonetheless, 
Bohr’s hard core was soon proven wrong: “Wave mechanics soon caught up with, 
vanquished and replaced the Bohr programme.” (Lakatos 1978, p. 68). 
 
Blaug (1992) also puts emphasis on the importance of the hard core proposition. They are 
“rigid” and “irrefutable beliefs”, go unquestioned, and remain highly respected by all 
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members of the research programme’s community. In the context of asset pricing, this 
community can be seen as financial economists working with the tradition of the 
consumption based version as shown in the previous section. By definition, this should 
exclude, for example, the relative or factor-based pricing programme of Fama and French 
(see Chapter Two, section 1.2.3). However, this might be too quick a conclusion. Later in 
this section, I assess whether this exclusion is warranted or not.  
 
I suggest that Cochrane’s simplified, idealized and constructed fundamental principles, as 
reviewed in section 2.1.1 above, can be viewed as a set of Lakatos’ hard core (HC) 
propositions. There are three:  
 
HC 1: A financial market is populated by a rational, self-interested and risk averse 
representative investor.  
HC 2: The representative investor maximizes his/her total expected utility with respect to 
present and future consumption using financial assets as inter-temporal “transporters”. 
HC 3: Financial markets are in equilibrium when all assets are held by the representative 
investor at the desired price. 
  
I claim that these three hard core propositions capture the essence of the consumption 
based capital asset pricing theory as seen developed from Lucas (1978) to Cochrane 
(2005). Their common goals are to examine, either theoretically or empirically, the 
stochastic behaviour of asset prices. Listed in this way, these fundamental principles have 
proven resilient, i.e. “rigid” and “irrefutable”. Let me briefly review them one after the 
other.  
 
The HC 1 proposition claims the existence of a financial market and an inhabitant. The 
historical review in the previous section always incorporated a financial market. In some 
cases, however, it was denoted a “capital market”, the “physical state of the economy” or 
the “production-exchange economy”. The company inside this economy issues stocks or 
produces a good in a “competitive” environment of “trading”. In all reviewed historical 
references, there is only a real economy, i.e. central bank money is not introduced. The 
146 
 
inhabitant is an individual who “stands in” for a homogenous, i.e. “identical” population. 
He/she is at the same time a “consumer” and an “investor”. He/she is endowed with 
“rational expectations”, is self-interested, and “risk averse” according to von “Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s axioms”. Financial economists working within the HC1 proposition, I 
find, view them as rigid and irrefutable. They are, what Lakatos would say, the hard core 
of the consumption based asset pricing theory.  
 
I reach the same conclusion with respect to HC 2. Cochrane’s fundamental principles 
concerning investor’s behaviour, i.e. utility maximization with respect to his/her present 
and expected future consumption are considered rigid and irrefutable by its practitioners. 
We recall from the previous section the considerations of the practicing individual who, 
with specific “preferences”,  “maximizes the expected value” of some utility function. 
Again, Cochrane’s integration of utility maximization into his theoretical work helps 
describe the commitment to a historical tradition that makes his core “rigid”.  
 
Finally, HC 3 is an uncontroversial proposition. If the agent is rational, self-interested and 
risk averse, seeking maximum level of utility from consumption over a particular time 
span, there will be an equilibrium situation in the financial markets in which an asset 
transports consumption and utility.  
 
As a conclusion, Cochrane’s fundamental principles, as developed in section 2.1.1 above, 
are all part of a theoretical tradition of a specific research programme denoted the 
consumption based capital asset pricing theory. All in all, HC 1 through 3 spell out a 
narrow set of rigid and irrefutable propositions that define the ground rules for doing 
“consumption based asset pricing theory”. 
 
I now turn to the second set of propositions that Lakatos suggests, i.e. those belonging to 
the protective belt (PB). In addition to the hard core, this belt is needed: 
 
“The protective belt contains the flexible parts of a scientific research programme, and it is here 
that the hard core is combined with auxiliary assumptions to form the specific testable theories 
with which the scientific research programme earns its scientific reputation.” (Blaug 1980, p. 34).  
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 Lakatos gives the following, short, description of the purpose of the protective belt: “It is 
the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get 
adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core.” 
(Lakatos 1978, p.48).   
 
Based on my review of the historical development of the consumption based asset pricing 
tradition in the previous section 2.2.1, and without any claim to completeness, I suggest a 
list of possible propositions that can be viewed as auxiliary assumptions carried in the 
belt. My question here is whether these PB propositions can be likened with those I 
identified as Cochrane’s auxiliary assumptions in section 2.1.2 above. The short answer 
is “yes”: 
 
PB 1: The representative investor knows the payoff of all future investments. 
PB 2: The representative investor knows all future states of the economy. 
PB 3: No taxes are paid on capital gains and dividends, i.e. payoffs. 
PB 4: Transactions in financial markets are costless. 
PB 5: There exists a unique security for all possible future payoffs. 
PB 6: The representative investors never die – he/she lives forever. 
 
Protective belt propositions are according to Blaug neither rigid nor irrefutable. On the 
contrary, the propositions in the belt can, and must be, addressed and adjusted in light of 
what Lakatos refers to as “anomalies”, i.e. when a theory is contradicted by the facts. 42If 
the predictions of the asset pricing model, for example, fail to resemble the actual data, 
such auxiliary assumptions are the theory’s first line of defence. They are there to protect 
the hard core. How financial economists in the consumption based asset pricing tradition, 
and Cochrane in particular, work with the flexibility of the protective belt is a main 
subject in Chapter Five where I assess its empirical results.  
 
42 One such anomaly is the equity risk premium puzzle discussed in Chapter Two, section 6.1 
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At this stage of my discussion, it suffices to say that Cochrane’s auxiliary assumptions 
can be seen as Lakatosian protective belt hypotheses. They have provided the 
consumption based tradition with the necessary flexibility to address unsuccessful 
statistical tests. Hence, I claim that the consumption based asset pricing tradition has 
taken yet another hurdle to be considered a Lakatosian research programme. But more 
needs to be considered. 
 
3.3.1  Combining the hard core and the protective belt 
In combination, Cochrane’s fundamental, hard core, principles and auxiliary, protective 
belt, assumptions are well anchored within the consumption based asset pricing research 
programme. If it can be established that this programme is different from the relative, i.e. 
factor-based asset pricing effort, we can gather more evidence that the CCAPM is a 
separate and unique programme (see Chapter One, section 1.4 on the differences between 
the two). Below, therefore, I intend to show that Cochrane’s absolute pricing programme 
is decisively different from the relative programme Lakatos would refer to them as “rival 
methodologies”. Let me, therefore, briefly review the main reasons for my claim.  
 
Earlier, I divided the asset pricing research effort into two different camps. I used Eugene 
F. Fama and Kenneth R. French’s multi-factor model as an example in the first group 
while the consumption based capital asset pricing model exemplified the second. 
Cochrane referred to these categories as the relative and the absolute tradition. He sees 
them as: “...two polar approaches to this [asset pricing] elaboration.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 
xiv). He goes on to tell us that the relative approach is less “ambitious” than the absolute, 
but also that: “Asset pricing problems are solved by judiciously choosing how much 
absolute and how much relative pricing one will do, depending on the assets in question 
and the purpose of the calculation. Almost no problems are solved by the pure extremes.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. xiv). These extracts tell us that the two versions have the same goal, 
i.e. explain and predict observable market prices of financial assets, but that they are in a 
“friendly competition”. In this respect, Cochrane wants us to believe that they belong 
together under the same umbrella. They are merely two different versions of a larger 
scientific project. I disagree.  
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 First, consider CCAPM’s micro-economic starting point in the representative investor, 
his/her character and behaviour. Fama and French implicitly argue that it is not necessary 
to introduce such a character when modelling asset prices. They work at the level of 
statistical time series analysis. When analysing the pricing data set, however, Fama and 
French make an important assumption. They assume that the data are generated by 
market participants who all specialize in using all available public information to evaluate 
the current stock prices of, for example, Google and Caterpillar. Market participants are 
thus assumed to react immediately to any new and relevant pieces of information by 
buying the stock on positive news and selling it on negative. Stock prices, therefore, at 
any specific point in time, can be seen as reflecting this rational information evaluating 
activity. The point can, therefore, be made that Fama and French use rationality to 
describe the data generating process. These activities make stock markets “efficient” 
(Fama 1970). 
 
Second, consider Cochrane’s references to the importance of consumption. Although 
assuming rational market participants, Fama and French do not connect the assumed 
rationality in prices with the rationality of an investor in their theory because they do not 
need to do so. Hence, the two authors are not describing rationality in the same 
fundamental way that Cochrane does with references to, for example, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s axioms. A similar outcome can be seen with respect to self-interest and 
risk aversion.  
 
Third, in the absence of a representative investor and the assumed triad of temperaments 
inside the factor-based theory, Fama and French have no need to establish a first order 
condition in utility maximizing individuals with their inter-temporal consumption now 
and later choice that take financial markets towards an equilibrium situation. A 
discussion on the purpose of investment income as a result of not spending all the current 
endowment is, of course, also absent in Fama and French. 
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All the three counts lead me to conclude that the fundamental principles in Cochrane’s 
research effort and its historical tradition are not shared by Fama and French. As a 
consequence, Cochrane’s absolute and Fama and French’s relative approaches are 
different. Lakatos’ programme terminology, therefore, helps draw a dividing line 
between the relative and the absolute research programmes This again makes clearer the 
implications when switching between the two research programmes, as Cochrane suggest 
we could. Anyone following his advice should, therefore, bear in mind that he/she is also 
exchanging one set of fundamental principles for a time series analysis based upon a 
notion of “efficient markets”. The Lakatos based analysis has consequences also for 
Cochrane’s ambition. He/she claims to have “the theory of asset pricing”. Furthermore, 
that all other asset pricing efforts can be subsumed under his: “All factor models are 
derived as specializations of the consumption based model.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 151). 
Given my discussion in this section, I believe these statements cannot be defended.  
 
3.3.2 Interlinked theories 
A remaining question is whether Cochrane’s theory can be characterized as a collection 
of interlinked theories as Lakatos suggests a research programme is. Given the 
fundamental, hard core, principles and the auxiliary belt assumption and their 
relationships, I argue below that Lakatos requirement towards the research programme 
containing interconnected theories is fulfilled. Hence, the first hurdle I alluded to earlier 
is definitively met. 
 
Interlinked theories connect various elements and derive specific consequences. In the 
context of the CCAPM, the three fundamental principles are first established. Then they 
are connected with the auxiliary assumptions. Finally they are set-off, as a complete 
programme, to interact in a closed system, i.e. they interact with each other and not with 
any other, excluded elements. In section 3.1 above, I showed how various authors in the 
tradition of the consumption based asset pricing theory explain the starting point and the 
consequences of this set up. But are these connections strong enough to establish an 
interconnected whole? 
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First, consider the connection between Cochrane’s triad of temperaments and his/her 
optimizing behaviour, i.e. the combination of HC 1 and HC 2 that lead to HC 3 as 
referred to above. In this framework, all hard core propositions are active at the same 
time, and their relative forces add up to support the outcome. It is thus the specific 
combination that is exploited by the consumption based theory for the purpose of 
building an internally consistent outcome.  
 
Second, the triad of sentiments need the other HC principles and PB assumptions to 
assemble a full theory of asset prices. If we remove, for example, the specific financial 
market context and focus on the representative investor’s character traits only, we find 
that they are not exclusively held by the investor. In fact, there are good reasons to 
believe that these sentiments are active in most of us most of the time, i.e. in situations 
that have little to do with financial markets – for example when we are asked to make 
decisions with uncertain outcomes. We also recall that von Neumann and Morgenstern 
initially suggested that these traits are introduced in a theory of gambling. The 
fundamental principles that Cochrane applies are, therefore, not exclusively “made” for 
financial market situations. They can even be considered to be “borrowed” from 
somewhere outside this context - possibly from psychology. Yet again, establishing a 
relationship between the three fundamental core principles does not give us an asset 
pricing theory. Cochrane needs more. Let us next consider the auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions. 
 
Third, for Cochrane to develop a theory of asset pricing, he needs more than the 
fundamental principles. In other words, they need to be tied down for use in the “Political 
Economy”, i.e. the financial market. It is precisely here that the protective belt 
assumptions come into play, i.e. PB 1 to 6. Without these assumptions, Cochrane does 
not have a consumption based capital asset pricing theory. The belt assumptions do not 
seem to be related to each other in any systematic way. For example, knowing the payoff 
of all future investments is not in any way connected with the assumptions that no taxes 
are paid on that payoff or that transactions are costless. The investor’s infinite lifespan is 
also unrelated to the existence of a unique security for all possible future payoffs. 
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However, these belt assumptions enrich the HC principles and enable them to form a 
logical whole.  
 
Fourth, the connectedness has several specific attributes. The PB assumptions such as 
complete markets, Arrow Securities and near to perfect knowledge are elements that do 
not “fall out” from the other PB assumptions or the HC principles. Like their HC 
counterparts, they are also “borrowed’ from somewhere else and added to create a 
financial market structure and particular financial assets. The point I want to make is that 
most of these initial conditions were not originally linked to each other or with the 
fundamental principles. These seemingly unconnected elements have thus been put 
together in a web of propositions that make up the consumption based theory of asset 
prices.  
 
In sum, the strategy of adding auxiliary PB assumptions to fundamental HC principles is 
considered uncontroversial and may be regarded as good scientific practices when 
assembling a theoretical framework. The CCAPM tradition successfully connects a 
theory of man, his character and behaviour with a financial markets structure and 
establishes financial asset to transport consumption and utility. From there, CCAPM 
explores the consequences of very specific derivations towards a set of narrow analytical 
cases. I think we can agree that Cochrane’s asset pricing theory is a collection of more or 
less interconnected theories. Every HC and PB proposition can even be viewed as a 
separate theoretical proposition. When synthesized, they gel to become a theory.  
 
3.3.3 Deductions from the a priori 
In this section, I review another relevant aspect of the consumption based asset pricing 
research effort. It is related to the methodology used by the various authors in its 
development over time, i.e. how fundamental, hard core, principles and auxiliary, 
protective belt, assumptions are applied to “do science”. I suggest that a common 
denominator can be found throughout this development in how the principles are used as 
starting points from which theoretical consequences are deduced and compared with the 
real situations. This “theory heavy” deductive strategy is different from the “theory light” 
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inductive strategy followed by, for example, Fama and French’s relative, or factor-based 
research on asset prices and their behaviour which, again, confirms my claim that the 
CCAPM is a distinct research effort.  
 
I argue my views on CCAPMs methodological case by drawing on John Stuart Mill, who 
I introduced in section 1.1.1, and what he calls the “a-priori” method. Here is a well-
rehearsed starting point:  
 
“Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and 
aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, 
would be impelled, if that motive, except in the degree in which it is checked by the two perpetual 
counter-motives above adverted to, were absolute ruler of all their actions. (...) Not that any 
political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but 
because this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed. When an effect depends upon 
a concurrence of causes, those causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately 
investigated, if we wish, through the causes, to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling 
the effects; since the law of the effects is compounded of the laws of all the causes which 
determine it.” (Mill 1874, Essay 5, v.38). 
 
This is a rich statement. Daniel M. Hausman, in his effort to “resuscitate” Mill’s a-priori 
method, presents the following schemata: 
 
“1. Borrow proven (ceteris paribus) laws concerning the operation of relevant causal factors. 
2. Deduce from these laws and statements of initial conditions, simplifications, etc., predictions 
concerning relevant phenomena. 
3. Test the predictions.  
4. If the predictions are correct, then regard the whole amalgam as confirmed. If the predictions 
are not correct, then judge (a) whether there is a mistake in the deduction, (b) what sort of 
interferences occurred, (c) how central the borrowed laws are (how major the causal factors they 
identified are, and whether the set of borrowed laws should be expanded or contracted).” 
(Hausman 1992, p. 147) 
 
Hausman’s suggested second proposition is concerned with deducing predictions from 
the first, i.e. the “borrowed” and “proven” laws”, other “initial conditions” and 
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“simplifications”. This delivers the foundation for proposition three, i.e. tests and, four, 
i.e. corrections – if necessary. Let me dwell upon this set-up in the next few paragraphs. 
 
Mill’s elaborations and Hausman’s explanations should strike a familiar cord with the 
reader of my thesis. There is little doubt that the consumption based asset pricing theory 
proceeds along this methodological structure. Despite the fact that economists in general 
are vague in the definition of what “causes” and “laws” are, it does not seem far-fetched 
in the context of my interpretation of CCAPM to classify the investor’s triad of 
sentiments as “causes” and his/her drive towards a first order condition with respect to 
inter-temporal consumption as a “law”. 43  As in Mill, CCAPM practitioners derive 
consequences from such causes and laws. The consequences, also referred to as 
predictions, are then compared with respect to their accuracy relative to the real 
situations. However, this is a peculiar test. Hausman argues: “...verification is essential, 
but not in order to test the basic laws; they are already established and could hardly be 
cast in doubt by the empirical vicissitudes of a deduction from a partial set of causes.” 
(Hausman 1992, p. 146). Blaug expands: 
 
“Over and over again, in Senior, in Mill, in Cairnes, and even in Jevons, we have found the notion 
that “verification” is not a testing of economic theories to see whether they are true or false, but 
only a method of establishing the boundaries of application of theories deemed to be obviously 
true: one verifies in order to discover whether “disturbing causes” account for the discrepancies 
between stubborn facts and theoretical valid reasons: if they do, theory has been wrongly applied 
but the theory itself is still true.” (Blaug 1992, p 71.).  
 
I think the two interpretations of Mill are broadly in line. The deduced consequences in 
Mill are logical extensions from a given starting point established, inductively, from 
observation and introspection. Mill also calls this activity “abstract speculations”. Mill 
43 Economists often refer to the “law of demand and supply”, “law of one price”, “law of diminishing 
returns”, “Okun’s law”, “Gresham’s law”, etc. In most cases, they think about them as empirical 
generalizations. It can be observed, for example, that, most of the time across most of the provided goods 
and services, demand increases when their prices fall. But this is not always so. And it is certainly not so 
for all products and services - or financial assets for that matter. Neither do the “law” tell us how much the 
demand changes when prices fall or - rise. A similar relaxed “law” related attitude amongst economists can 
be found with respect to their use of “causes”. In most cases, the word is applied interchangeable with 
terms such as “establish”, “explain”, “determine”, “drive”, “depends upon”, “influence”, etc. 
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himself says that not too much should be expected with respect to the quality of the 
predictions. In fact, he advices economists to lower their expectations because this set-up 
is, generally, “insufficient for predictions” but “most valuable for guidance” (Mill 1882, 
6.9.2). Comparing model-based statements with the real situation data is, therefore, not 
about ex ante prediction but ex post verification of an a priori starting point. A successful 
extension towards the real situations thus confirms the starting point and the logic of the 
deductions. If unsuccessful, there are, in Mill’s world, only one source of errors - 
“disturbing causes”. Given Mill’s emphasis on the disturbing causes, the advice is always 
to look in that space: 
 
“In this way a nearer approximation is obtained than would otherwise be practicable, to the real 
order of human affairs in those departments. This approximation is then to be corrected by making 
proper allowance for the effects of any impulses of a different description, which can be shown to 
interfere with the result in any particular case. (...). The discrepancy between our anticipations and 
the actual fact is often the only circumstance which would have drawn our attention to some 
important disturbing cause which we had overlooked.” (Mill 1874, Essay 5, v.38). 
 
In section 3.1 above, I showed the historical development of the consumption based asset 
pricing research effort. One of several relevant common threads is the investor and 
his/her behaviour that leads to the first order condition. Consider an important element as 
described by Cochrane – also noted in Chapter Two, section 4.4: 
 
“If you buy an asset whose payoff covaries positively with consumption, one that pays off well 
when you are already feeling wealthy and pays off badly when you are already feeling poor, the 
asset will make your consumption stream more volatile. You will require a low price to induce 
you to buy such an asset. If you buy an asset whose payoff covaries negatively with consumption, 
it helps to smooth consumption and is more valuable than its expected payoff might indicate.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 13).  
 
Cochrane captures this story in mathematical equations, and when the model-based 
claims turn out to be inaccurate, they should be corrected as we saw in the case of 
Breeden (1979) and Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989). The attractive negative 
co-variance set-up is an idealization within a separate realm i.e. it isolates a theoretical 
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case from a fuller and more complex reality. The example includes carefully chosen 
properties of the human character, market structure and financial assets that are 
considered to be important for the theoretical analysis. The theory, therefore, only 
describe the effects of selected causal influences. In a real setting, there is a set of 
unnamed “disturbing causes” that are active but ignored and excluded from the theory. 
Adding them in, as Cochrane suggests, might explain away and overcome the differences 
between the theoretical cases and the empirical situations that are evident in the lack of 
statistical successes.  
 
Let me now turn to Lakatos and review the similarities between Mill’s deductive a priori 
method and CCAPM practitioner’s use thereof in the framework of a research 
programme. I find that the use of Mill’s method is a shared tradition among consumption 
based asset pricing promoters. Hence, it manifests them as practitioners within a specific 
research programme.  
 
First, Lakatos sees a research programme containing hard core propositions. I believe 
these propositions are mirrored in the “causes” and “laws” that Mill alludes to despite me 
not finding any specific references to these concepts in the historical review of the 
consumption based asset pricing research effort. Nonetheless, I think Cochrane, and most 
of his predated peers, view their agents, their character and behaviour as main factors, or 
causes that influence the pricing of assets. Likewise, the agent’s actions and connections 
with the financial market structure and assets can be regarded as governed by “laws”. It 
might be that these causes and laws are borrowed from outside the realm of economic, for 
example from psychology and sociology as Mill refers to, but in the context of the 
Lakatosian review here, I do not need to follow up on that particular point. 
 
Second, while Mill saw the deduced consequences flowing “solely from the desire of 
wealth”, consumption based asset pricing practitioners follow the tradition that their 
agent is driven by the desire to consume. However, the desire to smooth consumption 
over time and across different economic states, as Cochrane refers to above, but also in 
my Chapter Two, section 3.3, is an innovation to the story that his predecessors told. 
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Nevertheless, Lakatos identified deductions from a few hard core principles as a defining 
element of a research programme. Earlier, I referred to the review of Bohr’s light 
emission programme containing five postulates that constituted its hard core. Lakatos 
used them to show how Bohr deduces their implications. The consumption based asset 
price followers use the same technique. In this sense, the consumption based agents are 
well behaved in the sense that he is always going to do what he is asked to do, i.e. 
optimize the discounted utility of current and future expected consumption. He will never 
disappoint, and the model outcome is from this point of view rather trivial. The CCAPM 
tradition thus guarantees internal consistency. It goes without saying that both in the case 
of Bohr and Cochrane, specific conditions or auxiliary assumptions were needed to 
further specify in which environment, for example, the deductions take place. 
 
Third, research programmes, Lakatos maintains, use methodological negatives, i.e. “do 
not” and positives, i.e. “do” rules, i.e. heuristic when encountering anomalies (see section 
3.3 below). So what do Cochrane and Mill suggests doing when the empirical tests turn 
out to be inaccurate? Again there is a shared remedy. First, acknowledge that the causes 
captured in the theory were insufficient for explaining the real situation. Next, analyse the 
reasons for this failure. Then, look for “disturbing causes” that operate in those situations 
but had been overlooked or deliberately omitted at the starting point. Finally, test again. I 
will not expand on this aspect here as it is a main concern in Chapter Five. The point I 
want to make, however, is that with respect to the inaccurate claims, Cochrane and Mill 
are not far apart from what Lakatos finds in a research programme. 
 
Fourth, neither Mill nor the most practitioners in the CCAPM tradition develop theories 
for their own sake. They share the methodological commitment towards testing their 
theories against the real situations. This is also, Lakatos explains, an important part of 
any research programme. It lays the foundation for exploring whether the programme is 
progressive or degenerating. Apart from the fact that Mill uses logic and the CCAPM 
practitioners use mathematics when deducing the consequences of their fundamental, 
hard core, principles, Mill is, as I pointed out above, more cautious with respect to what 
can be expected from the a-priori method. He is also explicit about how the results should 
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be used, i.e. not as a challenge to the fundamental principles but for “inquiries” inside the 
field of Political Economy. Cochrane is not as explicit as Mill on this.  Nonetheless, both 
seem to agree with Lakatos’ claim that research programmes do not challenge the hard 
core.  
 
I conclude from the analysis of Mill and the consumer based asset pricing followers, 
using Cochrane as a main advocate that they follow practices and processes that are 
similar to those Lakatos claims are present in a research programme. Also on this 
methodological count, I can claim that the CCAPM research effort fulfils the criteria of a 
Lakatosian research programme. 
 
 
3.4 Cochrane’s positive and negative heuristic  
Having discussed the historical development, as well as the hard core and protective belt 
considerations of Lakatos’ research programme, I now turn to the third aspect thereof, i.e. 
the methodological component. Now, I illustrate CCAPMs development in view of  the 
“positive” and “negative” heuristic that Lakatos uses to illuminate such evolutions. 
Lakatos views heuristic as “rules of discovery” that guide problem solving as to what 
should be pursued, i.e. positive heuristic and what should be avoided, i.e. negative 
heuristic when developing scientific research programmes:  
 
“The research policy, or order of research, is set out – in more or less detail – in the positive 
heuristic of the research programme. The negative heuristic specifies the “hard core” of the 
programme which is “irrefutable” by the methodological decisions of its proponents; the positive 
heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop 
the “refutable variants” of the research programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the “refutable” 
protective belt.” (Lakatos 1978, p.50).  
 
Lakatos continues stating that the heuristic is: 
 
“...a powerful problem-solving machinery, which with the help of sophisticated mathematical 
techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive results. (...) For instance, if a 
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planet does not move exactly as it should, the Newtonian scientists check his conjectures 
concerning atmospheric refraction, concerning propagation of light in magnetic storms, and 
hundreds of other conjectures which are all part of the programme. He may even invent a hitherto 
unknown planet and calculate its position, mass and velocity in order to explain the anomaly.” 
(Lakatos 1978 p. 4).  
 
Lakatos, here, and even elsewhere, is not overly explicit as to what this “problem solving 
machinery” precisely is. Hence, his advice with respect to how scientists should proceed 
to address problems in order to protect and grow a particular body of knowledge is not 
highly specific. But this was not his aim anyway. Nonetheless, let me, informed by 
Hoover (1991), dwell on how this “machinery” of negative heuristic (NH) and positive 
heuristic (PH) can be formulated. Consider, therefore, my following suggestions from the 
consumption based asset pricing theory, which I list, again, without any claim of 
completeness. Let me start with the negative heuristic along the following lines: 
 
NH 1: Do not violate any hard core propositions. 
NH 2: Avoid irrational, selfish, risk taking and non-optimizing individuals. 
NH 3: Avoid mortal and uninformed investors. 
NH 4: Avoid disequilibrium situations. 
NH 5: Avoid more than one asset. 
 
Likewise, I suggest the following positive heuristic along the lines of: 
 
PH 1: Simplify, idealize and construct consumption based asset pricing theories. 
PH 2: Isolate a specific area of theory operation and call it the financial market. 
PH 3: Use a representative agent with a triad of temperaments. 
PH 4: Establish first order condition of optimizing intertemporal consumption and utility. 
PH 5: Use state of the art mathematics.  
PH 6: Test the ability of the model to explain and predict observable asset prices. 
 
Formulated in this way, the CCAPMs development is methodologically protective 
regarding the fundamental principles related to the individual, his/her character and 
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behaviour as well as the embedded equilibrium condition. These elements are well 
anchored in the paradigms found in neoclassical economics. So far, Cochrane has not 
diverted from this paradigm as changes to it would bring him on a collision course with 
the hard core propositions of his own research programme. The hypotheses in the 
protective belt, by contrast, are in flux. Existing ones have been altered or removed, and 
new were added. For example, Lucas (1978) introduces a two period time-horizon while 
Cochrane (2005) works with an infinite time horizon. Also, Lucas (1978) was a 
theoretical work while Cochrane (2005) is both theoretical and empirical. This makes 
Cochrane consider topics that were not a concern in Lucas. Hence, the heavy lifting with 
respect to programme development can be found in the belt. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
say whether the programme developers have deliberately worked towards protecting the 
core or just using the greater flexibility of the belt. 
 
The rules of programme protection at the core, i.e. negative heuristics and the rules to 
modify the belt, i.e. positive heuristics might be considered fairly loose. I could have 
added in several other of the characteristics that I showed in the quotations from the 
proponent of the consumer based asset pricing theory. For example, I did not mention 
specific utility functions, variations on subjective discount functions and risk aversion, 
information distributions, taxes, as well as time series of consumption data and their 
measurement frequency, and possibly more importantly, the theory’s connection to the 
rest of the economy, incorporation of business cycle shocks, the monetary sector, and 
public sector regulators. This multitude of related but not included topics in my, 
admittedly, incomplete listing of NHs and PHs certainly affect asset prices and their 
behaviour in real situations. But at this stage of the theory development, the practitioners 
consider many of the items to be outside both the fundamental core principles and the 
auxiliary belt assumptions. They are all parked as Maeki stated earlier in section 1.3.2, in 
the Y set. My point here is that Lakatos “powerful problem solving machinery” is 
available and on duty, but, in the context of the current development of the consumption 
based asset pricing programme, not entirely called upon to act (see Chapter Two, section 
6.5 on recent development of the programme).  
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At this stage of my discussion, we can conclude that the CCAPM can take the third 
hurdle with respect to branding it a Lakatosian research programme. Using the 
consumption based pricing theory, it is possible to establish a methodological practice 
that is used by programme proponents to both defend and develop it. 
 
3.5 Progressive of degenerating?  
Finally, I briefly review how Lakatos suggests how a research programme is assessed 
and, thereafter, draw some preliminary conclusions with respect to the CCAPM and its 
development under the control of Cochrane. I have more to say regarding theory 
assessment in the final Chapter Five of my thesis. I let Lakatos introduce the topic and 
draw on his discussion of the Bohr’s research programme which is, as Lakatos claims,  
“based on the idea that light-emission is due to electrons jumping from one orbit to 
another within an atom”: 
  
“The programme lagged behind the discovery of “facts”. Undigested anomalies swamped the 
field. With ever more sterile inconsistencies and even more ad hoc hypotheses, the degenerating 
phase of the research programme had set in. (...) A rival research programme soon appeared: wave 
mechanics. Not only did the new programme, even in its first version (de Broglie, 1924), explain 
Planck’s and Bohr’s quantum conditions; it also led to an exciting new fact, to the Davisson-
Germer experiment. In its later even more sophisticated versions, it offered solutions to problems 
which had been completely out of the reach of Bohr’s research programme, and explained the ad 
hoc later theories of Bohr’s programme by theories satisfying high methodological standards.” 
(Lakatos 1978, p. 68).  
 
In the above extract, we hear about a research programmes’ “degeneration” and its 
abolishment. In contrast to this development, Lakatos also introduce the term 
“progressive”. In both cases, a programme is evaluated by both its theoretical and its 
empirical degeneration or progression. It is relevant in this context that it is not a single 
fundamental, hard core, principle or any single individual auxiliary, protective belt, 
assumption that is evaluated but the programme as a whole.  
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For a research programme to be theoretically progressive, its positive heuristic 
incorporates the hard core principles from the previous version of the programme and 
develops new protective belt assumptions that account for the novel facts. Empirically, 
the newest version of the programme must account for all the facts in the legacy 
programme, and in addition, can generate predictions in new areas of the empirical 
situations. When these new implications are confirmed by real situation observations, and 
statistical success is demonstrated, the programme is empirically progressive, i.e. it has 
predicted “some novel, hitherto unexpected fact”. Degenerating programmes, as was 
exemplified above in the case of Bohr, do not portray these desirable properties. They are 
as Lakatos says “fabricated” only in order to accommodate new facts. Elsewhere, he 
alludes to “ad hoc“ manoeuvring when the functional form of already rejected equations 
are altered to better fit the facts – as was demonstrated in Bohr’s mathematical structure 
(Lakatos 1978, p. 67). 
 
It can certainly be said that the way Lakatos connects methodology with historical 
developments is in itself interesting and debatable. It can be argued, for example, that 
Lakatos’ review of research programmes leads to requirements that themselves are both 
simplifications and idealizations of how practitioners proceed. Additionally, Lakatos does 
not effectively address the role of inductive evidence for a particular model-based claim. 
The inductive evidence is important for the factor-based modelling of Fama and French, 
but has no room, it seems, in Cochrane’s efforts. His approach, as we have seen, is 
deductive from a few hard core principles. The implications of these evaluation criteria, 
however, for the CCAPM research programme are profound. They help support the 
practitioners within the research programme to uphold their work when facing, what 
Lakatos refers to as “anomalies”, i.e. puzzles, inconsistencies or conflicting facts.  
 
The role of the positive and negative heuristic now becomes clearer. Given the history of 
the consumption based asset pricing model and its theoretical underpinning, a practitioner 
might believe that it entertains an accurate hard core even if the programme fails to 
provide statistically successful results. Nonetheless, there must be clear justifications for 
such a belief in the core, for example, through past explanatory and predictive accuracy. 
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In order to protect the fundamental, hard core, principles, the programme follower would, 
therefore, turn to the positive heuristic and make adjustments to the auxiliary, protective 
belt, assumptions in the belief that they would save the day – as had been evidenced by 
previous experiences. Nonetheless, should the practitioner face an accumulation of such 
anomalies, and the positive heuristic is unable to account for them, the programme might, 
after all, be abandoned. This also raises the important point that protective belt 
developments do not guarantee that a troubled research programme can be saved. This 
again challenges the perceived protected status of the hard core propositions.  
 
It goes without saying that the CCAPM research programme has met several anomalies 
in the course of its confrontations with data extracted from observable asset prices. This 
is a known fact to the practitioners within the consumption based pricing tradition. As I 
showed earlier in the literature review, statistical success is hard to pin down. Cochrane 
acknowledges this (see Chapter One, section 1.5 ):  
 
“Unfortunately, this specification of the consumption based model does not work very well.” [this 
motivates the] “...exploration of different utility functions, general equilibrium models, and linear 
factor models such as CAPM, APT and ICAPM as ways to circumvent the empirical difficulties of 
the consumption based model.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 43).  
 
The natural question, therefore, is why the consumption based pricing theory has 
survived these confrontations. An even more concrete question is how the practitioners 
have applied the negative and positive heuristic in this quest for making improvements to 
their programme. I have already in Chapter Two, section 6.3.4 pointed towards one 
recent development within the programme, i.e. that of “habit-persistence” which could 
promise theoretical and empirical progress. Again, I hold back on that discussion for 
now, and refer impatient readers to Chapter Five, sections 2 and 5.  
 
Furthermore, the CCAPM research effort is challenged by Lakatos’ suggestion that a 
research programme develops “novel unexpected facts”. In this respect, Lakatos 
explicitly mentions a few examples from Newton’s natural sciences (Lakatos 1968-1969, 
pp. 169). In finance, this requirement is challenging to meet. First, it is somewhat unclear 
164 
 
what a “novelty” is. Clearly, the equity risk premium, for example, was not “discovered” 
following CCAPM’s theoretical development. It was rather the outcome of a simple 
review of asset return data. One could, of course, argue that the habit-persistence asset 
pricing model was an innovation compared with its predecessor, but this does not qualify 
when Lakatos’ criteria is to detect so far hidden facts. 
  
Nonetheless, despite some interesting “re-engineering” performed by Cochrane on his 
version of the CCAPM, it still looks as if the programme is facing persistent challenges 
that it has yet to solve. These challenges are not emitted by the advocates of the relative, 
factor-based school. Hence, there is little pressure from within the “asset pricing 
industry” for the consumption based practitioners to change and adopt. However, it is in 
its own interest to either continue their work in the protective belt area or start chipping 
away from the hard core. The latter, we know by now, would seriously challenge the 
programme at its foundation. However, early Lakatos still leaves the door open for such 
fundamental surgery: “The actual hard core of a programme does not actually emerge 
fully armed like Athene from the head of Zeus. It develops slowly, by a long, preliminary 
process of trial and error.” (Lakatos 1970, p, 133, fn 4). 
 
3.6 Lakatos’ critics 
Having motivated my choice of reviewing Cochrane’s CCAPM version from a 
Lakatosian point of view, I cannot ignore the fact that Lakatos has met criticism on 
several elements of his description of what characterizes a research programme. Below, I 
will demonstrate that this criticism can be withstood. Hence, I can feel confident that my 
choice of using Lakatos as a basis for analysing the CCAPM is well founded.  
 
Maeki (2008) summarizes this criticism well and claims that, within economics, (1) hard 
core principles are not easily identifiable, (2) predictions of novel facts are not actively 
generated, (3) social institutions and the history in the development of research 
programmes are not systematically addressed, and (4) connections between novel 
predictions and truths about the real situation are not systematically account for. My 
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question here is whether CCAPM can withstand such criticism because if it can, using 
Lakatos to characterize Cochrane’s research effort is valid.  
 
On the first point, I think the identification of hard-core principles in financial economics 
is in many ways a fairly straight forward process. Economics, for example, distinguishes 
between macro-models that have a microeconomic foundation and those that do not have. 
Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium Models (DSGM), for example, uses individual 
consumers and firm as their foundation (see Section 1.1.2). Such micro-based models are 
distinguishable from vector auto regressive (VAR) time-series models. They merely 
apply statistical analysis to explain and predict macro-economic variables. A similar 
distinction can be drawn between macro- and factor-based asset pricing models and 
theories. The former is akin to the DSGM approach while the latter is similar to the VAR 
approach.  
 
The distinction between the two schools of asset pricing thought is further detailed when 
looking at CCAPM’s theoretical centre. I have and will continue to draw the reader’s 
attention towards the triad of temperaments that underlies all consumption based capital 
asset pricing models. Rationality, self-interest and risk aversion have been, as I 
demonstrated in section 3.2, at its centre since Lucas (1978). Hence, I argue that a hard 
core of fundamental principles exist in the consumption based capital asset pricing 
research and that it is easily identifiable. 
 
The second point refers to Lakatosian requirement that progressive theories must have 
“excess content” over its predecessor and make “novel predictions”. The latter term is 
central because it means that such theories must be able to predict phenomena not yet 
known or phenomena that had not been considered when the theory was developed. 
These requirements certainly raise the bar for financial economists. A novel fact, it can be 
argued, is hard to come by in financial economics. In economics and financial economics 
as well, it is often the observation of financial market facts that motivates the 
development of theories – not a proactive search for “novel facts”.  
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Consider, for example, the equity risk premia puzzle (Chapter Two, section 6.1). Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) established that there had been a significant return difference 
between investments in bonds and stocks. This empirical fact started a search for a 
relevant explanation – not a “novel fact”. Nonetheless, I think theoretical developments 
also can be characterized as novel if they can explain existing phenomena in a different 
way than previously done. In Chapter Two, section 6.3.4 I show how Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999) responded to the equity risk premium puzzle by incorporating an 
innovative argument into the utility function, i.e. habit persistence. This development 
progresses the scientific project. On this count as well, therefore, my claim that CCAPM 
can be characterized as a Lakatosian research programme is not derailed. 
 
Third, Lakatos is criticized because he does not systematically allow for the rational 
reconstruction of the role of social institutions and history in the development of research 
programmes. This criticism, I believe, is unduly harsh. Most scientists recognize that 
social institutions and history combine to influence their thinking. For example, 
Keynesian economics grew out of the Great Depression while DSGE macro-models were 
developed under less strenuous economic conditions often referred to as the “Great 
Moderation”.  
 
Taken to the extreme, however, critics would demand a socio-economic explanation of 
the introduction of, for example, habit-persistence into the asset pricing theory. Since 
Lakatos sees research programmes evolve, fail and succeed over time, an answer might 
be warranted. The criticism, therefore, bites because Lakatos did not systematically 
account for how such developments are assessed. However, any review would require a 
detailed, and possibly, subjective analysis that, in itself, would demand an investigation 
into the interpreter’s own socio-economic background and intention. We have yet to see 
the development of rational and objective criteria for such an inquiry. I will on this third 
account, therefore, dismiss the critics who request such developments. 
 
The fourth and final point of criticism raised above also relates to the assessment of any 
given research programme. Such assessment is mainly related to the empirical adequacy 
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of a given claim. For example, the CCAPM has over the past 30 years undergone various 
empirical tests in order to establish whether it can provide knowledge for use. Such tests 
have been carried out at specific points in time throughout its existence. There is, in other 
words, a dynamic element to its appraisal. Now, critics have it that such tests of empirical 
adequacy seek to progress the research programme towards establishing true claims about 
the empirical situations but that the connection between claims and truth has gone 
unexplored. Maeki (2008), for example, maintains that besides complete and detailed 
truths about the phenomena being investigated, there might also be incomplete truths 
about “some limited yet significant aspects of the world” and points towards causal 
mechanisms. His claim is that the Lakatosian framework is unfit for dealing with such 
“truths”. It requires, so Maeki, a more granular analysis than what Lakatos provides. 
 
This criticism in essence boils down to what I earlier labelled the fallacy of simplification 
and shows how simplified, idealized and fictional concepts are unfit to bridge the gap 
between the model world and the real situations. On this point, I side with the critics. 
Lakatos does not give much attention towards this aspect of a research programme. Can 
this criticism cast doubt on whether it is appropriate to use Lakatos as a guide towards 
assessing the CCAPM? I do not think so. Lakatos is more focused on how to assess 
theories in terms of their progression towards excess theoretical and empirical content. 
This in itself takes the project towards higher level of truth content. I have chosen to 
accept this goal but also to question how this can be accomplished given the theoretical 
starting point of the CCAPM. Again, the type of criticism raised in this final point cannot 
persuade me to abandon my choice of letting my discussion be framed by the Lakatosian 
suggestions. Lakatos’ insight, therefore, offers a good basis for discussing the merits of 
Cochrane’s effort in mobilizing a “general theory” of asset pricing.  
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Chapter 4:  
CCAPM Ontology, Use and 
Representation 
Introduction 
The consumption based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) is used to explain and 
predict prices of financial market assets. In a long row of proponents, John H. Cochrane 
is its main advocate today. My focus has been and will be both on the tradition and 
Cochrane’s contributions. Cochrane sets out explaining the observable asset pricing data 
by, first, developing a plausible story of their behaviour. Next, he lets theories and 
mathematical equations make this story “explicit”. Thereafter, Cochrane compares the 
model’s predictions against the real situations. Finally, after concluding that the empirical 
tests are inaccurate when compared with the real situations, Cochrane initiates 
adjustments to the theory and its models. These methodological steps have been followed 
as a normal practice among financial economists within the consumption based asset 
pricing research programme. However, due to the only modest theoretical and empirical 
progress, we have justified reasons to doubt the research programme’s abilities to provide 
useful knowledge to the various stakeholders, i.e. investors, public policy makers and 
fellow academics. 
 
As already stated in the introduction to the previous chapter, I believe there are several 
explanations for CCAPM’s lack of notable progress. They can be found, primarily, in the 
well-rehearsed agent-based equilibrium theories, the elaborate mathematical structures, 
and the assessment of the model-based claims. While the first topics, i.e. asset pricing 
theory, was addressed in Chapter Three, and the final topic, i.e. model-based claim 
assessments is reserved for the next Chapter Five, I now turn my attention towards the 
pricing model itself, i.e. the model “M” in the CCAPM.  
 
I start out with a statement from the preceding Chapter Three’s introduction, in which 
Cochrane suggests that the asset pricing theory “contains lots of assumptions”. This quote 
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has an extension. Cochrane tells us that these assumptions are applied for two specific 
purposes: “The theory of asset pricing contains lots of assumptions used to derive 
analytically convenient special cases and empirically useful representations.” (Cochrane 
2005, p. 35). Now, in its full length, the statement has three parts; “theory and 
assumptions”, “analytically convenient special cases” and “empirically useful 
representations”. Since I covered the first part in Chapter Three, I here turn to the two 
latter parts. 
 
The purpose of this chapter it to clarify what the model “M” in CCAPM is, what it is 
used for and, what it represents. The goal is to identify possible problem areas in and 
around the research programme’s modelling effort that can be held responsible for its 
lack of success in generating knowledge for use. I conclude that “M” is an applied 
mathematical model which is formed by a few fundamental, core, principles. The model 
“M” is used as the general starting point for deriving lower-level models, referred to as 
analytically convenient special cases. These specific cases aspire to be empirically useful 
representations. Although the analytical cases are de-idealized and de-fictionalized 
versions of their general starting point, they remain within the confines of the theoretical 
and find few bridges to the real situations they target. Hence, the provision of knowledge 
for use for practitioners is limited (see Chapter Two, section 1). 
 
I argue my conclusions in four sections. In the first section, I seek a better understanding 
of what Cochrane’s asset pricing model is, i.e. model ontology. My starting point is the 
central asset pricing formula that I describe in Chapter Two, section 4.2. Next, I give a 
short overview of various model types, and let myself be informed by Frigg and 
Hartmann (2006, 2006a) before drawing on Gibbard and Varian’s (1978) classic paper on 
the topic, supplemented by Giere (1999, 2004, 2008), and Friedman (1953). The second 
and third sections are descriptive. I review how the central asset pricing formula is used 
as a general starting point for deriving a hierarchy of increasingly specific equations that 
Cochrane calls analytically convenient special cases. Next, I review how Cochrane uses 
these analytical cases as extensions towards the real situations. 
 
170 
 
Having established what the model “M” is and how Cochrane uses it to derive 
analytically convenient special cases and empirically useful representations, I turn to their 
representational roles. In section three, I first identify what the analytically convenient 
special cases represent. I demonstrate how these cases are de-idealized and de-
fictionalized versions of their general starting point formed by a few fundamental, core, 
principles. In the process of deriving these specific cases, Cochrane makes use of the 
positive heuristic that the consumption based research programme offers and identifies 
several new auxiliary, belt, assumptions that are then attached to the existing 
mathematical structure. I argue that the fundamental, core, principles are present in most 
of these special cases. The principles, therefore, are vertically portable. Since the cases 
are tailored to a specific situation, I claim that they are not horizontally portable to 
situations unlike those they are targeted for. Finally, I let Hausman (1992) suggest that 
the models economists assemble are mainly used for what he denotes “conceptual 
explorations”. But, I believe Cochrane is more ambitious. 
 
The fourth section addresses analytical cases that aspire to make empirically useful 
representations. I find that Cochrane applies a generally accepted HD framework when 
“working with theory” to develop these representations. However, I find that only a few 
of these cases can be extended towards the real situations they seek to explain and 
predict. Most of the cases are burdened by their fundamental, core, principles that use the 
triad of temperament as their a priori starting point. Hence, Cochrane needs to build 
bridges to the empirical and relies on stories to do the job. I argue that Milton Friedman’s 
“connectors” are too vague, and Carl Hempel’s (1965, 1966) concept of “bridge-
principles” is challenging to handle. Nancy Cartwright’s representative models, however, 
might point Cochrane in the right direction.  
 
1. What is the consumption based asset pricing model?  
We recall that Cochrane’s asset pricing research effort starts with the observation and 
collection of real stock market prices. In a narrative form, Cochrane explains the 
behaviour of these prices through time and across economic states. This explanatory story 
pictures an investors’ choice to consume and invest and his/her specific preference for 
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stocks referred to as “recession proof”. These stocks are held with the expectation that 
they provide purchasing power when it is most needed, i.e. in bad economic situations. 
This story is then made “explicit” which means that Cochrane gives the story-based script 
a theoretical underpinning and a mathematical structure.  
 
In this first section, I want to establish what the model “M” in CCAPM is. I first revisit 
my description of Cochrane’s main mathematical equation, i.e. the fundamental asset 
pricing formula. Thereafter, I review model ontology from a philosophical point of view.  
 
1.1 The  model “M” in CCAPM 
At the centre of the Cochrane’s consumption based asset pricing model we find the 
central asset pricing formula that I described in some detail in Chapter Two, section 4.2, 
footnote 15:  
 
pt    = Et [β 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1)𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)  xt+1] 
Here is Cochrane explanation:  
 
“Given the payoff xt+1 and given the investor’s consumption choice ct, ct+1 it [ the central  asset 
pricing formula] tells you what market price pt to expect. Its economic content is simply the first 
order conditions for optimal consumption and portfolio formation. (...). We relate one endogenous 
variable, price, to two other endogenous variables, consumption and payoffs. One can continue to 
solve this model and derive the optimal consumption choice ct , ct+1 in terms of more fundamental 
givens of the model. (...) We shall in fact study such fuller solutions below. However, for many 
purposes one can stop short of specifying (possibly wrongly) all this extra structure, and obtain 
very useful predictions about asset prices from [the central pricing formula], even though 
consumption is an endogenous variable.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 6). 
 
In this extract, Cochrane highlights several aspects of the central pricing formula and the 
modelling effort in and around it. First, the equation contains interpreted elements. 
Cochrane tells us, for example, that xt+1 is the payoff that a stock is expected to return to 
the investor at the end of the following period. Second, the various interpretations are put 
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in the context of a constrained maximization, i.e. the first order condition. Cochrane 
refers to the first order condition as the formula’s “economic content”. This content can 
be explained either through its technical solutions inside the model, or with the help of 
intuitive stories about the inter-temporal transportation of consumption with the help of 
“recession proof” stocks. Third, the formula, with its left and right hand variables, is 
endogenous, i.e. it forms a closed system. The expected price of a stock is thus 
determined by the included variables, i.e. the payoff and the stochastic discount factor – 
and nothing else. The right and left hand variables in the formula, or equation give us 
what Cochrane refers to as a model. Fourth, we read that Cochrane’s formula is flexible. 
It can be used as a foundation for further explorations. This, however, would involve 
more structure. More structure means more assumptions of the type I discussed in the 
previous chapter, i.e. fundamental “core” principles and the auxiliary “belt” assumptions. 
 
In this short review, it becomes clear that Cochrane does not differentiate between the 
concept of a central pricing formula and that of a model. In the context of consumption 
based asset pricing, the two are regarded as identical. I also note that the formula is but 
the starting point from which more structure can be added so to derive other equations, 
i.e. lower level models. Can this formula be anything else than a mathematical model as 
Cochrane suggests? The next sections reveal my answer. 
 
1.2 Model ontology 
In this second section, I first revisit the main characteristics of the consumption based 
capital asset pricing model. Next, I use the model classification scheme offered by Frigg 
and Hartmann (2006, 2006a) to explore whether the model “M” falls naturally into one or 
the other categories that the two authors suggest. Thereafter, I contrast Cochrane’s view 
with one held by the two economists Gibbard and Varian (1978). This short paper is by 
many considered being an early “classic” on the topic. Additionally, I draw on Giere 
(1979) and Friedman (1953) to complete my discussion on model ontology. Finally, I 
formulate a working hypothesis for what Cochrane’s asset pricing model is. Let me first, 
however, make a few general remarks on the model “M” in CCAPM. 
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When asked what a model is, different people have different views. An architect, for 
example, associates models with something else than what a physicist has in mind. Frank 
Lloyd Wright’s architectural scale models of private homes or the Copernican model of 
the universe are cases in point. Adding an economists’ opinion to the panel opens up yet 
another perspective. Cochrane, for example, believes, like many of his colleagues, that 
models are mathematical equations. These equations are mostly clustered into 
interconnected structures. Philosophers of science are yet another stakeholder in the 
model centric discussion. They seem to have an on-going debate concerning what models 
are and how they differentiate themselves from theories. Their views are more complex 
and intricate than those on offer by the other discussants. As we go forward, I have little 
to say related architects and physicist’s views, but let my discussion on what the model 
“M” in CCAPM is and how it is used be informed by philosophers of science. 
 
 
Frigg and Hartmann remind us that models are extensively used in both the natural and 
social sciences. From the natural sciences, they give us examples such as the Bohr model 
of the atom and the MIT bag model of the nucleon. They also list economic and finance 
related models. Four are explicitly named: The “general equilibrium model of markets”, 
the “Mundell-Fleming model of an open economy”, the “Phillips-Curve” model of 
growth and inflation, and the “Black-Scholes” option pricing model.  
 
Scanning the model related writings of other contemporary philosophers of science like 
Boumans (2004, 2005), Cartwright (1983, 1989, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2008), Giere (1999, 
2004, 2008), Hausman (1992), Maeki (1992, 1994, 1994a, 1996, 2005, 2009), Morgan 
(2001, 2001a, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2008a, 2011), Morgan and Morrison (1999), Morrison 
(1999, 2007), reveals only a few additions to the ones mentioned by Frigg and Hartman. 
None of the authors, however, have in their listings the asset pricing models of the type I 
discuss in my thesis. Economists with strong methodological views like Backhouse 
(1994), Boylan and O’Gorman (1995), Hands (2001), Hoover (2001), Lawson (1994, 
2009), and Rosenberg (1976, 1994) are also silent on the asset pricing research effort 
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I think there are several reasons why asset pricing models have not been on the forefront 
of the economist’s and philosophers of sciences discussions. One reason is that there are 
many more economic models than asset pricing models to choose from when the topic is 
brought up. Another reason is that asset pricing models are considered less “important” 
than their macroeconomic cousins. Finally, it can be argued that models in finance and 
economics are quite similar. Nonetheless, as we have and will continue to see, Cochrane 
argues that the consumption based asset pricing models stand alone and are unique. They 
represent the “missing link’ between micro- and macro-economic theories. At the time of 
writing, given the severe financial market, banking and sovereign debt crisis in the 
western world, it seems pressing to address these pricing models – what they are and how 
they are used. I start with the former and let Frigg and Hartman guide us onwards. 
 
1.2.1 Frigg and Hartman’s model classification 
Frigg and Hartmann are of the opinion that models can be better understood if they are 
properly sorted. I agree. In this context, they refer to model ontology. They draw our 
attention towards six different categories: “physical objects”, “fictional objects”, “set-
theoretical structures”, “descriptions”, “equations”, and, finally “gerrymandered 
ontologies”. On the category of “equations”, Frigg and Hartmann say: “Another group of 
things that are habitually referred to as models, in particular in economics, consists of 
equations (which then termed “mathematical models”) – for instance the Black-Scholes 
model of the stock market and the Mundell-Fleming model of the economy.” (Frigg and 
Hartmann 2006, p. 744). Although different from the two economic models that the 
authors mention, it is natural to conclude that the asset pricing equations encountered in 
Chapter Two of my thesis can be characterized as models. Cochrane confirms this. He 
has repeatedly told us that the core of the CCAPM is the central pricing formula. Is there 
more to be said concerning such mathematical models? The short answer is “yes”. Let me 
dwell on this in the next sections before I conclude. 
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1.2.2 Gibbard and Varian’s model views 
Gibbard and Varian (1978) also offer an explanation on what a model is and what a 
model does. In this section, I review their views on ontology and postpone a discussion 
on representation to sections 4 of this chapter. Let us start with an extract: 
 
“A model, we shall say, is a story with a specified structure: (...) The structure is given by the 
logical and mathematical form of a set of postulates, the assumptions of the model. The structure 
forms an uninterpreted system, in much the way postulates of a pure geometry are now commonly 
regards as doing. The theorems that follow from the postulates tell us things about the structure 
that may not be apparent from the postulates alone. (...). In economists’ use of models, there is 
always an element of interpretation: the model always tells a story. If we think of the structure as 
containing uninterpreted predicates, quantifiers, and the like, we can think of a story as telling 
what kind of extension each predicate has and what kind of domain each quantifier has:...” 
(Gibbard and Varian 1978, p. 666).  
 
The first point that Gibbard and Varian make is that a model is a kind of formal system 
that is interpreted by a story. The second point is methodological; it discusses the 
deductive form of arguments that many economists sign-up for doing. Their third point is 
that neither a structure nor a story on its own can be a model. It is the combination of the 
two that counts. The fourth point is that economists often do not distinguish between the 
terms “model” and “theory”. 
 
The CCAPM research programme resonates well with Gibbard and Varian’s assessment. 
In terms of the confusing role that economists assign to the terms theory and model, 
Cochrane provides a good example in his book Asset Pricing (2005). Part one is called 
“Asset Pricing Theory” and the first chapter of that part is given the title “Consumption-
Based Model and Overview”. This would indicate that the model is set, or discussed, 
within the theory. In the text, for example, Cochrane says: “A wide class of models 
suggests that a “recession” or “financial distress” factor lies behind many asset prices. 
Yet theory lags behind; we do not yet have a well described model that explains these 
interesting correlations.” (Cochrane 2005, p. xiv). Here, Cochrane tells us that we need a 
theoretical foundation to build better models, i.e. the two terms are not the same. Theories 
could be considered to be hypothetical descriptions or definition of the real, economic 
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world while models, as indicated earlier, are sets of interlinked equations that aim at 
making these descriptions and definitions explicit. Nevertheless, I do not intend to pursue 
the debate related to differences and similarities between “theory” and “model” here but 
refer to the philosophical and economic literature I mentioned previously when listing 
various contributors. Let us, therefore, proceed for now as most economists do and use 
the terms interchangeably. When important, I will remind the reader and make the 
distinction visible. 
 
In order to bring clarity to the theory and model terminology, Gibbard and Varian suggest 
applying the term model “whenever there is economic reasoning from exactly specified 
premises”. By now we know that Cochrane also makes use of such “premises”. 
Cochrane, however, calls them “assumptions”. In the previous Chapter Three, sections 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2, I distributed these assumptions into two categories; fundamental 
principles and auxiliary assumptions and likened them with Lakatos’ hard core 
propositions and protective belt assumptions. Gibbard and Varian also tell us that such 
premises are the foundation for continued elaboration and “reasoning” within a 
theoretical framework. Cochrane rather denotes this process “derivations”. Earlier we 
have seen how Cochrane applies the fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions to derive analytically convenient special cases. He even speaks about the 
“economic content” and specifically refers to the first order condition. In all these 
circumstances, a structure of interlinked equations is involved. In Chapter Three, section 
3.2.3, I used Mill’s terminology and called reasoning from such “specified premises” the 
a priori method. 
 
In previous chapters and sections, I have referred to Cochrane’s causal use of stories. A 
story is then told to support the outcome of this a priory, deductive method. The theory 
of, for example, the representative investor, his character and optimizing behaviour, the 
financial market structure, and the financial assets are embedded in the story concerning 
the investor’s desire for recession proof stocks. The stories are thus a means for 
communicating the narrative to, possibly, a non-scientific audience. Hence, it is told in a 
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casual style. For the technically skilled set of that cohort, the story is made “explicit” in a 
mathematical structure supported by theories.  
 
We can ask the question, however, whether Gibbard and Varian’s reference to the term 
“story” is the same reference Cochrane gives his. Initially, it seems that the authors agree. 
A closer look reveals that there is one main difference. While Gibbard and Varian use the 
story to predicate the abstract mathematical arguments, Cochrane formulates an intuitive 
narrative that knits his predicates together to an intuitive whole. The difference can be 
regarded as the one between a dictionary and a novel. Nonetheless, although there are 
initial differences, I think Cochrane provides a natural extension of Gibbard and Varian’s 
use of the term “story”. Hence, I argue that the authors would agree on the usages of the 
term. It is, therefore, the combination of the structure and the story that makes the set-up 
formal, rigorous and intelligible. 
 
1.2.3 Giere’s pure and applied models 
Ronald N. Giere remind us that a mathematical model can come in two different forms - 
“pure” and “applied” (Giere 1999, 2004, 2008). While pure mathematical models can 
look like Cochrane’s central pricing formula, the applied model has more substance: 
“Beginning from a pure mathematical model, we can construct an applied mathematical 
model by replacing its mathematical elements with models of real objects and relations.” 
(Giere 1999, p. 6). As an example Giere presents the following “pure” mathematical 
model. It is one in which the mathematical terms are left uninterpreted:  
 
y – ax – b = 0 
 
In an “applied” mathematical model, the letters are interpreted and possibly replaced by 
other terms: “For example, we can create a general model in which the variable y is 
distance from a fixed origin, x is time t from an arbitrary starting time, which can be zero, 
a is the velocity, v of a moving point, and b the initial distance d0 of the moving point 
from the origin.” (Giere 1999, p. 6). 
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Following Giere, I think it is wrong to characterize Cochrane’s central pricing formula as 
a “pure” mathematical model. Cochrane certainly has something in mind when he writes 
down the formula because he gives precise interpretations, i.e. descriptions of what the 
various letters and arguments mean. By giving them meaning, Cochrane connects the 
story of what he believes goes on in the financial markets with the equations in the 
model. In this way, the mathematical language formalizes his story. Or in Cochrane’s 
words, the mathematics makes his story “explicit”. Cochrane’s pricing formula is, 
therefore, richer than Giere’s pure model which takes the form of an uninterpreted linear 
equation. Cochrane insists that a model must have a theoretical basis and the central 
pricing formula goes beyond this level of “purity”.  
 
1.2.4 Friedman’s layers 
In possibly one of the most widely distributed research papers on economic methodology, 
Milton Friedman tells his readers that economists should not be judged by the 
“realisticness” of their assumptions but by the theory’s predictive success within its 
designated empirical area of applicability (Friedman 1953). While I discuss this aspect of 
Friedman in some detail in Chapter 5, section 4.1, I direct my attention towards another 
topic addressed by Friedman in relation to theories and models: 
 
“...a hypothesis or theory consists of an assertion that certain forces are, and by implication others 
are not, important for a particular class of phenomena and a specification of the manner of action 
of the forces it asserts to be important. We can regard the hypothesis as consisting of two parts: 
first, a conceptual world or abstract model simpler than the “real world”, and containing only the 
forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important; second, a set of rules defining the class of 
phenomena for which the “model” can be taken to be an adequate representation of the “real 
world” and specifying the correspondence between the variable or entities in the model and the 
observable phenomena.” (Friedman 1953, p. 24). 
 
This quote is rich in content. I believe it tells us three important things: First, a theory is a 
collection of isolated “forces” believed to be of importance in explaining events and 
processes. Friedman’s suggestion expresses a view that is in line with my analysis of 
Mill’s and Cochrane’s preferred research strategy, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
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sections 1.3.2 and 3.2.3. Second, the theory is manifested by, or made explicit in, as 
Cochrane uses the term, a model. Third, Friedman tells us that such a model consists of 
two parts, i.e. abstractions and correspondence rules. We are here neither told what a 
model exactly is nor what correspondence rules are. Nonetheless, we gain the impression 
that the model, like its theory, contains a limited number of “forces” that, possibly, are 
expressed in mathematical equations. The correspondence rules help translate the abstract 
model terms to “every-day” concepts, i.e. they establish a connection between the model 
and the “real world”, or, in other words, the rules fit the data to the model. I do not think 
Friedman means that these rules are an integral part of a model. They are more, I believe, 
purposeful interpretations by the model developer. 
 
Friedman’s model views helps me define what Cochrane has in mind when he claims that 
a model is a formula that finds specific uses, i.e. derive analytically convenient special 
cases and empirically useful representations. Friedman, like Giere, does not halt his 
analysis at the theoretical, level, but extends the model towards the empirical. 44 For that 
purpose, Friedman needs to interpret the model terms so that the data can be fitted onto 
the model. From Friedman, therefore, we get the impression that the model plays a dual 
role. On one hand, the model is characterized by a few, possibly, idealized “forces” that 
are then used to explore their, theoretical, consequences. On the other hand, the model is 
applied to the data, i.e. it extends beyond the theoretical towards the empirical. A model, 
therefore, as I will discuss in some length in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, can be used 
in several ways. Having several uses also implies that the model can represent in several 
ways, and that we can learn from it in several ways. More on this will follow later in the 
next two sections. Now, let me return to the topic of model ontology and conclude.  
 
1.3 An applied mathematical model 
When presenting us with different categorical “options”, Frigg and Hartmann remind us 
that model classification is not straight forward and that they are all subject to particular 
44 Here, Friedman uses the term “abstract” and not “idealizations”. The term, like idealization, has many 
interpretations. In most cases, idealizations involve distortions by altering some particular features of the 
object while abstraction is about omitting features, i.e. subtracting features from an object.  
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points of criticisms. If models, for example, are classified as “descriptions”, like in 
textbooks, a German translation of Cochrane’s 2005 book on Asset Pricing does not give 
rise to a new model of asset pricing. Similarly, if Cochrane’s pricing model is 
characterized as a set of “equations”, different functional forms of the same situations 
cannot be characterized as different models. Cochrane tells us, for example: “It is often 
convenient to express asset pricing ideas in the language of continuous-time stochastic 
differential equations rather than discrete stochastic difference equations as I have done 
so far.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 25). Cochrane’s point is not regarding which of the two 
equations are right, but which one is more suitable for describing a particular situation. 
The constructed model man inside the CCAPM, for example, lives continuous and not 
discrete lives. 45 However, they receive investment payments at discrete points in time - 
at which they also enjoy consumption. It is, however, difficult to maintain that 
Cochrane’s two stochastic equations give rise to two different models of asset prices. The 
equations are thus two ways of describing the same thing.  
 
Despite these issues, it seems fairly straight forward, given the offered classification by 
Frigg and Hartmann and the consideration by Gibbard and Varian as well as Giere and 
Friedman that the model “M” in CCAPM as presented by Cochrane, i.e. the central asset 
pricing formula, is an applied mathematical model. This interpretation also contains what 
Gibbard and Varian referred to as a “structure” and a “story”. Cochrane’s structure is thus 
equations and their interconnectedness on one hand, and, on the other hand, his story 
interprets these terms. From the previous Chapter Three, section 3.1 on the historical 
development of the CCAPM in the context of Lakatos’ research programme, it is also 
clear that the use and development of mathematical models have been a main activity for 
the consumption based asset pricing advocates. Some of these models, as seen, for 
example in Lucas (1978), are purely mathematical, but most of them are applied to real, 
empirical, situations. Knowledge for use by stakeholder, therefore, has been a main 
direction of this research. 
45 In Chapter Three, section 1.1.2, I argue that the model man  inside the CCAPM is first made ideal by 
isolating his sentiments, i.e. rational, self-interest, and risk averse. Then he/she is given distorted extensions 
such as almost perfect foresight and eternal life. These givens have so far not been found in any real 
situation counterparts. Hence, by adding such traits, Cochrane and the CCAPM tradition moves beyond 
idealizations to constructions, i.e. fiction. This might help explain the lack of statistical success.  
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 Having defined what the model “M” in CCAPM is, let me progress and ask what this 
model is used for. Cochrane has two suggestions. It used for, first, deriving what he calls 
“analytically convenient special cases” and, second, “empirically useful representations”. 
In the section below, I review the former and leave most of the discussion of Cochrane’s 
second application for section 3. 
 
2. How is the consumption based model used?  
What does Cochrane have in mind when he says that the theories of asset pricing are used 
to “derive analytically convenient special cases” and “empirically useful 
representations”? First, we learn that theories are of use, i.e. they are used to derive. 
Second, theories derive both the analytical cases and the empirical representations. Third, 
the convenient cases are not the same as the useful representations. Fourth, there is an 
indication of sequencing – first theories, then cases followed by representations. Not only 
would this indicate that Cochrane’s analytical cases are different from his empirical 
representation, it would also put the cases closer to the theory than the representations. 
The representations are then, presumably, closer to the real situations than the cases. By 
pointing towards these various topics, I seek to reconstruct Cochrane’s original statement 
related to the analytical cases in this section, and, thereafter, in section 2.2, follow the 
same strategy with respect to the empirical representations.  
 
2.1 The analytically convenient special cases 
Cochrane uses the framework of the asset pricing theory to introduce a range of what he 
denotes “classic” research issues in the field of finance: 
 
”A few simple rearrangements and manipulations of the basic pricing equation (...) give a lot of 
intuition and introduces some classic issues in finance, including determinants of the interest rate, 
risk corrections, idiosyncratic versus systematic risk, beta pricing models, mean variance 
frontiers.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 10).  
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Here, I am interested in what these classical cases are. Below, I demonstrate how 
Cochrane works from the basic pricing equation via the central pricing formula to one of 
them, i.e. the analytical case of “risk correction”. To get to the end-point, Cochrane takes 
us via another classic case, i.e. the risk free interest rate. 
 
The risk free interest rate can be approached in two ways; either the consumer knows at 
the time of making the decision to consume and invest, what that interest rate is, or he 
does not know. The latter is for obvious reasons, more difficult to handle due to the 
introduction of two risk dimensions, i.e. time and uncertain payoffs. Let us start with the 
certainty case.  
 
Cochrane has told us that the basic pricing equation is described as pt = Et (mt+1   xt+1 ). In 
the absence of uncertainty, mt+1, i.e. the stochastic discount rate, or SDF, is known. It is, 
for example, the observable over-night deposit rate an investor can earn on the cash-
balance he places with his/her local savings bank. As we know from Chapter Two, 
section 4.3, the pricing equation can then take the following form: 
 
pt =  
1
𝑅𝑓
 xt+1 
 
where Rf is the risk free interest rate. Cochrane refers to this rate as a discount factor. 
Next, he opens up for uncertainty regarding the risk free rate. This introduces a new 
specification of mt+1 to account for the subjective discount factor β and the utility 
function. Using Cochrane’s preferred functional form, i.e. power utility: 
 
u (ct ) = 
1
1−𝛾
𝑐𝑡   1-γ  
 
the risk free rate is (Cochrane 2005, p.11): 
 
Rf =  1
𝛽
(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
 )𝛾  
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 Cochrane gives the following explanation: 
 
“Real interests are high when people are impatient, i.e. when β is low. (...). Real interest are high 
when consumption growth is high. In times of high interest rates, it pays investors to consume less 
now, invest more, and consume more in the future. (...). Real interest rates are more sensitive to 
consumption growth if the power parameter γ is large. If utility is highly curved, the investor cares 
more about maintaining a consumption profile that is smooth over time and is less willing to 
rearrange consumption over time in response to interest rate incentives.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 11).  
 
Intuitively this makes sense. High inflation adjusted interest rates, i.e. real rates induce 
investors to save rather than spend. This makes their real wealth grow to the tune of the 
interest rate, more can be spent on consumption later, and their total marginal utilities 
increase.  
 
Having reviewed the risk free rate analytical case, we are now ready to derive the “risk 
correction” case. Risk correction tells us how the investor accounts for the risk that 
he/she faces with respect to his/her investment when the return of that investment comes 
in subsequent periods and is conditional upon the realization of a specific economic state. 
It leads to the concept of an ex ante required return of an investment. Intuitively, the price 
of risk is positive, i.e. the more risk the investor is willing to take, the higher is the 
compensation he/she would demand. If this “mark-up” requirement or risk premium is 
not rendered, the investor will refrain from investing in that particular financial asset. To 
get to this risk corrected required return, Cochrane introduces the definition of a 
covariance: 
 
cov (m t+1 x t+1  ) =  E (m t+1 x t+1  ) - E(m t+1 ) E(x t+1 ). 
 
Next, Cochrane suggests writing; 
 
p t = E(m t+1) E( x t+1) + cov (m t+1 x t+1 ) as; 
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p t = E(m t+1 x t+1 ) and input the risk free rate, we get; 
 
p t = E(x t+1 ) / R
f  + cov (m t+1 x t+1 ). 
 
Rearranging, and making a fuller representation of m t+1  we get the risk corrected formula 
(see Chapter 2, section 4.4): 
 
pt = 
𝐸(𝑥𝑡)
𝑅𝑓
 +  𝑐𝑜𝑣[ 𝛽 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1),(𝑥𝑡+1)]
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)   
 
As I already stated, this classic risk correction formula at the end of the above 
derivations, is a good example of an analytically convenient case. There are several 
elements attached to it that I now will describe. 
 
Cochrane explains: 
 
“The first term [in the final equation] is the standard discounted present value formula. This is the 
asset’s price in a risk-neutral world – if consumption is constant or if utility is linear. The second 
term is the risk adjustment. An asset whose payoff covaries positively with the discount factor has 
its price raised and vice versa.” (Cochrane 2005, p.13).  
 
The intuition, or story that Cochrane evokes is that:  
 
“[investors]...do not like uncertainty about consumption. If you buy an asset whose payoff 
covaries positively with consumption, one that pays off well when you are already feeling 
wealthy, and pays off badly when you are already feeling poor, that asset will make your 
consumption stream more volatile. You will require a low price to induce you to buy such an 
asset. If you buy an asset whose payoff covaries negatively with consumption, it helps to smooth 
consumption and is more valuable than its expected payoff might indicate.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 
13).  
 
I interpret such classical cases in asset prices theory to be examples of the analytically 
convenient special cases that Cochrane alludes to. Like the central asset pricing formula, 
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they are interpreted mathematical equations, form closed systems, are flexible, and come 
with an intuitive story. The mathematical extension of the starting point, as shown here, 
fits comfortably within the tradition of the consumption based capital asset pricing 
research programme. The fundamental, core, principles described by the triad of 
temperaments are thus carried forward into other, lower level, equations, while intuitive 
“rearrangements” and “manipulations” are supported by changes in and additions to the 
set of auxiliary, belt, assumptions. The heuristic of the research programme is exploited 
to its fullest by sticking to the axiomatic development methodology that I discussed 
earlier in relation to Mill in Chapter Three, section 3.2.3. 
 
When the mathematical terms in the lower level equations are interpreted, some of the 
analytical cases are immediately applicable to the empirical situations. The observable 
risk free rate is one example in which the mathematical name is predicated and attached 
to a specific time series of data over a specified period of time. However, this equation is 
not deduced from the fundamental, core, principle but “plugged-into” the consumption 
based capital asset pricing structure. It is thus included in the “belt” of auxiliary 
assumptions. Other analytical cases lack the ability to connect to the empirical world. The 
utility function and the equilibrium condition are examples thereof. In such cases, the 
triad of temperaments, i.e. rationality, self-interest and risk aversion is the core building 
block which is also the starting point for mathematical derivations. Hence, not all 
analytical cases can be taken beyond the theoretical and reach the empirical arena. 
 
Before I start analysing the analytical cases from a philosophical point of view along the 
dimensions use, representation and learning, let me first turn to the empirically useful 
representations in the next section.  
 
2.2 The empirically useful representations  
Cochrane told us in the introduction to this chapter that the consumption based asset 
pricing theory can derive both analytically convenient special cases and empirically 
useful representations. In the previous section, I suggested that the combination of 
fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, assumptions derive a hierarchy of 
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specific models called analytically convenient cases. The development from the most 
general level of the central pricing formula to lower-level analytical cases of, for 
example, the risk corrected equation, gives us new sets of equations, or models that are 
used to represent specific financial market situations.   
 
So far I have accepted that the framework of the asset pricing theory can be used to 
assemble such a hierarchy of analytical cases. The question I pursue in this section, is 
how these cases break out of their theoretical background and connect with the empirical 
situations. Cochrane does not seem to leave much doubt. He claims it is possible, and 
even necessary to make this connection. His vision is: 
 
“The model [central asset pricing formula] I have sketched so far can, in principle, give a 
complete answer to all the questions of the theory of valuation. It can be applied to any security – 
bonds, stocks, options, futures, etc. – or to any uncertain cash-flow. All we need is a functional 
form for utility, numerical values for the parameters, and a statistical model for the conditional 
distribution of consumption and payoffs.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 42).  
 
Cochrane adds: “Most of the theory of asset pricing is about how to go from marginal 
utility to observable indicators.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 3). He continues:: “The accent of 
this book is on understanding statements of theory, and working with that theory to 
applications,...” (Cochrane 2005, p. xvi). And, finally:  “Economic theory and modelling 
is often portrayed as an ivory tower exercise, out of touch with the real world. Nothing 
could be further from the truth,...” (Cochrane 1997, p. 12). 
 
Following this myriad of statements, let me make the following two main observations: 
First, Cochrane’s vision of establishing the theory of asset pricing and its empirical 
usefulness is extremely broad, certainly not modest, but at least he is clear on what he 
thinks the model “M” in CCAPM can be used to do. Second, Cochrane sets himself the 
goal to “work with theory”, as we have seen several times for example in Chapter Two, 
section 6, to bring the asset pricing theory to the data and evaluate its predictions against 
the real situations. Cochrane, therefore, suggests making the theory explicit in the pricing 
model and specifying it in a way that makes it useful for these comparisons. 
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 From Cochrane’s point of view, therefore, theory, through its analytical cases, can reach 
all the way down and “touch” the empirical situations. This is certainly challenging. 
Below, I review how he intends to fit the model to the data. Consider another classical 
case in which Cochrane establishes an analytical case that seeks to explain the, empirical, 
expected excess return from an investment. We recall form Chapter Two, section 6.1, that 
the excess return is the numerical difference between the return on an investment and the 
short term risk free interest rate. 
 
Cochrane starts with the standard power utility function that we first encountered earlier 
in Chapter Two, section 3.2: 
 
 u (ct ) = 
1
1−𝛾
𝑐𝑡   1-γ   
 
The excess returns should obey (Cochrane 2005, p. 42) : 
 
0 = Et [ß ( 𝑐𝑡+1𝑐𝑡  ) -γ, R 
e
 t+1] 
 
Cochrane then suggests “taking unconditional expectations and applying the covariance 
decomposition, [and] expected excess return [E(R 
e
 t+1 )] should follow” (Cochrane 2005, 
p. 42): 
E(R 
e
 t+1 ) = - R 
f cov [ß ( 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
 ) -γ, R e t+1] 
Cochrane concludes: “Given a value for γ and data on consumption and returns, you can 
easily estimate the mean and the covariance on the right hand side, and check whether 
actual expected returns are, in fact, in accordance with the formula.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 
42). Despite this encouragement, Cochrane adds: “Unfortunately, this specification of the 
consumption based model does not work very well.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 43). This 
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statement takes a more central role in Chapter Five, in which I assess Cochrane’s 
reactions to statistically unsuccessful model-based predictions. 
 
Cochrane believes that in this example of the expected excess return to have derived an 
empirically useful representation. It shows how he “works with theory”, equations, 
derivations, data and statistical measures to bring the asset pricing research programme 
closer to the real situations. In fact, in this example, he only needs to estimate two free 
parameters, i.e. the risk aversion of the representative investor γ and his/her subjective 
discount factor ß. The rest, Cochrane would probably say, is a matter of mathematics, the 
availability of data, and their statistical properties. The challenge, however, is to turn 
“analytically convenient special cases” of excess expected return into “empirically useful 
representations”. And this, as we are told, “does not work very well”. Something, 
therefore, is going wrong. The next section 4 focuses on possible reasons.  
 
Before I get there, let me sum up. Having established first, that the model “M” in 
CCAPM is an applied mathematical model, I gave examples of how this model is used to 
derive a hierarchy of lower level models that Cochrane calls analytically convenient 
special cases and empirically useful representation. Not all cases can easily be extended 
to also represent real situations because they involve the unobservable triad of 
temperaments. The case study of the expected excess return is one such example. This 
might help explain why consumption based asset pricing, so far, has failed to deliver 
successful statistical results.  
 
Let us now approach the topic of model ontology and use in the context of a 
philosophical analysis. In the following sections, I therefore take a different perspective. I 
will discuss two main topics. First, in section 3, I discuss how the “analytically 
convenient special cases” represent the consumption based asset pricing theory. Second, 
in section 4, I ask how Cochrane “works with theory” to reach the empirical situations, 
i.e. fitting theories to the world.  
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3. Analytical cases and their representation 
In Chapter Three, section 1.3, I centred the discussion on how a rich and complex reality 
could be simplified and made “scientifically manageable” by suppressing perceived 
irrelevant details. This strategy, as advocated by James S. Buchanan and David F. 
Hendry, took us to Uskali Maeki’s “process of isolation” and “idealization”, to Mary S. 
Morgan’s “fictional constructions”, and to Daniel M. Hausman’s suggestion that 
economics can be considered to operate in a ”separate realm”. This leads to, as I argued 
in Chapter Three, section 1.4, to “fallacy of simplification”, i.e. reconciling the 
theoretical cases with the real situations.  
 
In relation to my assessment of the CCAPM in the context of a Lakatosian research 
programme (Chapter Three, section 3), I demonstrated that Cochrane’s asset pricing 
theory was developed along those lines with respect to his three theoretical building 
blocks, i.e. the representative investor, his/her character and behaviour, the financial 
market structure, and the financial assets. In particular, I showed that the programme’s 
heuristic supported such mathematical extensions of an a priori starting point.  
 
Here, I discuss what the analytically convenient special cases represent. Cochrane argues 
that they are empirically useful representations. I do not agree on all counts. I find that 
the analytically convenient special cases are lower-level models developed from their 
more general starting point, i.e. the central asset pricing formula, with the help of a 
myriad of auxiliary, belt, assumption. These specific cases certainly aspire to be 
empirically useful representation, but I find this goal ambitious. Although the analytical 
cases are de-idealized and de-fictionalized versions of their starting point, they remain 
within the confines of the theoretical and find few bridges to cross-over to represent the 
real situations they target.  
 
It is not surprising that the special analytical cases retain much of their idealized and 
fictional starting point. I have already concluded in Chapter Three, section 1, that the 
asset pricing research programme’s main building blocks are idealized and fictional as 
well. In this section, however, I demonstrate that idealized and the fictional elements are 
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useful when thought of in the context of the model’s mathematical extension. The 
analytical cases should be used for theorizing. As a consequence, when the analytical 
cases seek their empirical counterparts, the models’ ability to render knowledge for use 
diminishes. I let my assessment be informed primarily by Frigg and Hartmann (2006, 
2006a), Gibbard and Varian (1978) as well as Morgan (2001, 2006, 2008, 2008a 2009). 
 
3.1 What models represent 
Frigg and Hartmann (2006, 2006a) take a broad view of what a model can represent:  
 
“Models can perform two fundamentally different representational functions. On the one hand, a 
model can be a representation of a selected part of the world (the “target system”). Depending 
upon the nature of the target, such models are either models of phenomena or models of data. On 
the other hand, a model can represent a theory in the sense that it interprets the laws and axioms of 
that theory.” (Frigg and Hartmann 2006, p. 741).  
 
Here, we learn that the model has two representational roles; it can represent a “selected 
part of the world” or it can represent “theory”. The two authors are quick to point out, 
however, that: “These two notions are not mutually exclusive and scientific models can at 
once be representations in both senses.” (Frigg and Hartman 2006, p. 741). Like Frigg 
and Hartmann, Gibbard and Varian (1978) also explore the representational use of 
models. Their focus is on models that are developed and used by “economic theorists”. 
These models are divided into the “descriptive” and the “ideal” type. While the 
descriptive models “attempt to describe in some sense, economic reality”, the ideal 
models: “...are concerned with the description of some ideal case which is interesting 
either in its own right or by comparison to reality.” (Gibbard and Varian 1978, p. 665). 
The descriptive model again has two branches – “models of approximations” and 
“models of caricatures”: “Approximations aim to describe reality, albeit in an 
approximate way. Caricatures seek to give an “impression” of some aspects of economic 
reality, not by describing it directly, but rather by emphasizing, even to the point of 
distorting, certain selected aspects of the economic situation.”  (Gibbard and Varian 
1978, p. 665).  
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We also recall from Chapter Three, section 1.3.2, that Maeki’s suggested process of 
isolation, i.e. theoretically removing a set of elements “from the influence of other 
elements in a given situation”, leads to idealizations. For example, the triad of investor’s 
temperaments, i.e. rationality, self-interest and rationality is “sealed-off” from other traits 
such as envy, lust, and pride, sense of duty, loyalty, irrationality, behavioural biases, etc. 
Frigg and Hartmann show a similar process of isolation when discussing simplifications. 
They say that certain properties of an object can be removed in order to understand it 
better: “An idealization is a deliberate simplification of something complicated with the 
objective of making it more tractable.” (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006, p. 741). Maeki, Frigg 
and Hartmann, and I will include Gibbard and Varian as well, agree on both the process 
of isolation and its result, i.e. idealization. They also agree that a model can represent its 
theory. While Frigg and Hartmann are explicitly mentioning this latter possibility, 
Gibbard and Varian are more subtle. They tell us that the models they review are used by 
“economic theorists”. In the next section, I take a closer look at the idealized model and 
its relationship with theory. 
 
3.1.1 Idealization and fictions 
Frigg and Hartmann maintain that idealized models come in two variations; the 
Aristotelian and the Galilean. The Aristotelian idealization: “...amounts to “stripping 
away” all properties from a concrete object that we believe are not relevant to the 
problem at hand.” (Frigg and Hartmann 2006, p. 741). As an example of Aristotelian 
idealizations in the natural sciences, Frigg and Hartmann mention the Bohr model of the 
atom and the MIT bag model of the nucleon. In the social sciences, the two authors refer 
to the “Phillips-Curve” model. 46 The Galilean idealizations seem to be different as they: 
“...involve deliberate distortions.” (Frigg and Hartmann 2006, p. 741). Here, the example 
the two authors have chosen from the natural sciences are “point masses moving on 
frictionless planes” and the ‘study of isolated populations” in biology.  The social 
sciences are represented by the assumption that “agents are perfectly rational”. Frigg and 
Hartmann also point out that these two types of idealizations, i.e. the Aristotelian and the 
46 This model is often graphically represented by a convex curve drawn in a coordinate system with 
unemployment on the x-axis and inflation on the y-axis. As unemployment grows, inflation abates. 
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Galilean are not mutually exclusive. Often, they go hand in hand. This happens, they 
claim: “...in what is sometimes called “caricature models” which isolate a small number 
of main characteristics of a system and distort them into an extreme case.” (Frigg and 
Hartmann 2006, p 742).   
 
Distortions, we recall, was also a central topic in Chapter Three, section 1.3.2, where I 
referred to Maeki’s who even goes as far as claiming that idealizations encompasses 
“almost anything that theoretically deforms reality”. This points us in the direction of the 
“caricatures” that Frigg and Hartman as well as Gibbard and Varian make references to. 
Also Morgan (2006, 2011) makes a similar point: “Morgan (2006) interprets the 
caricaturing process as something more than exaggeration of a particular feature, rather it 
involves the addition of features, pointing us to the constructed nature of the exaggeration 
rather than to it as an idealization.” (Morgan 2011, p. 19). To demonstrate this in the 
context of the CCAPM, I maintained that the representative investor’s character and 
behaviour is not only idealized. He/she is also constructed and take on a fictional 
character because of his/her allegedly near to perfect foresight and eternal life (see 
Chapter Three, section 1.3.2). Hence, these constructed, fictional caricature cases are 
taken beyond what can be considered to be the “ideal”. 
 
My interest, therefore, is directed towards the combination of the Aristotelian and the 
Galilean idealizations. 
 
3.1.2 Richer analytical cases 
I start my analysis of the analytical case considered here, i.e. the risk correction with the 
central pricing formula. 47 This formula, as we know, is an applied mathematical model. 
It is used as a general starting point from which more specific analytical cases and 
empirical representations are derived. While the central pricing formula already contains, 
as Cochrane points out, “lots of assumptions”, the more specific cases and representations 
47 Risk correction tells us how the investor accounts for the risk that he/she faces with respect to his/her 
investment when the return of that investment comes in subsequent periods and is conditional upon the 
realization of a specific economic state. 
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contain even more. For example, in the previous Chapter Three, section 2, I order the 
central pricing formulae’s assumptions according to their relative importance and 
grouped them into two main buckets, i.e. fundamental, core, premises and auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions.  
 
The risk corrected asset pricing formula contains these principles and most of the 
assumptions. Nonetheless, it is expanded or augmented with additional arguments such as 
those related to the covariance between the expected future payoff from investments and 
the expected future consumption as well as the expected future risk free interest rate. This 
expansion is thus rooted in the central pricing formula, but many of the auxiliary, belt 
assumptions are imported directly into the structure. These imports are, therefore, not 
always deduced from the fundamental, core, principles. In fact, many of them completely 
separate from them. The risk free rate is a good example. It is tagged onto the existing 
mathematical structure. As more and more assumptions are added to the central pricing 
formula, the more able these cases should become to replicate specific real situations. 
The risk corrected equation, therefore, is richer that its starting point. It is also a more  
targeted version of its more general starting point. It zooms in on a specific situation. 
Furthermore, and as a consequence of the targeted approach, a more specific story can be 
told with respect to the investor and his/her behaviour than just his/her demand for what 
Cochrane alludes to as “recession proof” stocks. Cochrane now builds on that initial, 
more general story, and tells us that the rationale for this demand lies in the way the 
payoff covaries with consumption. 
 
The risk corrected analytical case, therefore, exposes us to several innovations. Below, I 
will mention four. First, in comparison with the central pricing formula, the new risk 
corrected equation contains two new arguments. This makes the risk corrected case richer 
in content than its more general starting point. Second, and as a consequence of my first 
point, adding additional auxiliary, belt, assumption to the general asset pricing formula 
places the enriched versions thereof, i.e. the risk corrected version in a better position to 
target a more specific situation than that under review by its general starting point. The 
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richer, more targeted equation also has a different mathematical structure than its starting 
point.  
 
Third, the analytical cases tell new stories. Now we hear about the risk corrected return 
an investor would require in order to buy and hold stocks with a specific statistical excess 
return property, i.e. negative covariance with private consumptions. Earlier, at the more 
general level of the central pricing formula, we were told that stock prices equals as 
Cochrane maintains:  “...expected discounted payoff. The rest is elaborations, special 
cases, and a closet full of tricks that make the central equation useful for one or another 
application”. (Cochrane 2005, p. xiii). Fourth, when adding the new arguments, the 
fundamental, core, principles remain untouched, but the catalogue of auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions increases. In Chapter Three, section 3.2, I discussed this strategy as a good 
example of what Lakatos claims to find in a scientific research programme. At its core of 
such programmes, there is a stable set of principles that are used to derive more specific 
lower level models supported by a broader set of flexible auxiliary, belt, assumptions. But 
not only that. Cochrane also uses the heuristic of the consumption based asset pricing 
programme. As I showed in Chapter Three, section 3.3, the tradition of its practitioners 
has been to pro-actively develop the auxiliary, belt, assumptions to account for more 
specific real situations.  
 
Of the four innovations that I mention in the previous section, the first two are of 
importance at this stage of my analysis. In the next two paragraphs, I will address them.  
 
3.1.3 De-idealization  
The first two points I raised above states that a specific analytical case, such as the risk 
corrected equation, is richer than its starting point because it has been furnished with 
additional auxiliary, belt, assumptions. The development of the risk corrected equation is 
not an isolated example. It forms the back-bone of Cochrane’s strategy to derive other 
“classic” issues in finance. A similar method is also used to derive, for example, the 
“determinants of the interest rate, idiosyncratic versus systematic risk, beta pricing 
models”. Cochrane, therefore, develops a multitude of new and more granular asset 
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pricing models that are interconnected in a web of mathematical structures. It is targeted 
at representing specific situations observable in the financial market. Whether these 
analytical cases can reach all the way down, is a topic I discuss later in section 4.2. Here, 
I am interested in the way the central pricing formula is enriched with additional 
arguments to build a net of interrelated equations.  
 
In the process of adding additional auxiliary, belt, assumptions, Cochrane de-idealises the 
more general starting point of the central asset pricing formula. This process is described 
by Morgan:  
 
“One influential defence of idealization is the idea of de-idealization, according to which the 
advancement of science will correct the distortions effected by idealizations and add back the 
discarded elements, thus making the theoretical representations become more usefully concrete or 
particular. A classic formulation of this position was provided by Tjalling Koopmans who thought 
of models only as intermediary versions of theories which enabled the economists to reason his 
way through the relations between complicated sets of postulates. In the process of this discussion, 
..., he portrayed “economic theory as a sequence of models”. (Morgan 2008a, p, 9).   
 
In this extract, my earlier reference in section 1.2.4 of this chapter to Milton Friedman 
becomes visible. Friedman (1953) also refers to the dual role of models, i.e. exploratory 
tools for theorizing within a “conceptual world” thought of as being less complex than its 
real counterpart, and as connectors that may take the theory all the way to the real 
situations with the help of what he denoted “correspondence” rules. 
 
De-idealization, clearly, seeks to bring more “realism” into the isolated, idealized, and 
even fictional cases that in the context of CCAPM describe the representative investor, 
the financial market and financial assets. Cochrane’s development of the CCAPM brings 
many examples of this strategy. Moving away from assuming zero taxes and transactions 
costs to assigning them positive values or choosing between a discrete or continuous 
calculation are cases in point when making a model more tractable than its general 
starting point. Introducing the risk free rate or the concept of covariance to the simple 
starting point of discounted payoff are additional examples. We here take note of the fact 
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that these examples of de-idealization relate to the set of auxiliary, belt, assumptions. So 
far, little progress has been seen in terms of de-idealizing the fundamental, core 
principles. The triad of temperaments remains fairly resilient towards such attempts 
although Cochrane, and other financial economists, have experimented with, in 
particular, rationality and risk aversion. For example, in the next Chapter Five, section 
2.2, I will, discuss de-idealization again in the context of Cochrane’s “habit-persistency” 
argument and the utility function of the representative investor. 
 
De-idealization, as Morgan points out elsewhere, can, in some cases, also be problematic. 
She points, for example, to mathematical challenges as de-idealization can upset the 
derivations “to go through”, and to disruption in the model’s “causal structure”:  
 
“If it really is the case that there are only a very few or one strong causal factor and the rest are 
negligible then the minimizing strategy suggests that adding more detail to the models may in fact 
render the model worse from an epistemic point of view. It makes the explanatory models more 
complicated and diverts attention from the more relevant causal factors to the less relevant.” 
(Morgan 2008a, p. 12).  
 
In the context of the CCAPM, in which just a very few causes have been isolated, 
idealized and even given fictional character, this problem seems acute. However, as we 
shall see in Chapter, section 2, Cochrane, very effectively, deals with the challenges 
Morgan here alludes to.   
 
In sum, de-idealization aims at making theories more realistic than their general, 
idealized and fictional starting point. The enhanced lower level equations, therefore, have 
been mathematically extended to offer more precision and applicability to real situations 
where the assumptions may approximately hold. For every analytical case, therefore, 
there is a specific claim, and as Cochrane explores new and possibly granular cases, the 
more specific these claims get. This process, however, is not always straight forward – a 
topic in the two next sections. 
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3.1.4 Vertical Portability  
There is another aspect to consider with respect to the research programmes’ practice of 
adding assumptions to a general starting point in order to account for specific situations. 
It is related to how the more general starting point, i.e. the central asset pricing formula, 
is transported across these more specific analytical cases. The portability of the starting 
point is, therefore, interesting in its own right. Let me call it “vertical portability”. It 
differs, as I will show in section 3 below, from the portability of analytical models across 
different real situations. This I refer to as “horizontal portability”. 
 
Vertical portability thus refers to where and how the fundamental, core, principles travel 
through the hierarchy of increasingly specific analytical cases. In the example I am 
pursuing here, i.e. risk correction, this journey becomes apparent. Risk correction, as I 
have already stated, is related to how the representative investor accounts for the risks 
that he faces with respect to his/her investments when the return is uncertain in terms of 
both the timing of the payoff and its size. It is clear from this definition of the risk 
correction, that the concept is well embedded in both a first order condition and an 
equilibrium condition. Both elements are thus a consequence of the fundamental, core, 
principles. These principles are thus extended, vertically, down to the lower level case of 
risk correction. One could argue that the strength of the fundamental principles has been 
diluted because new mathematical arguments have been added in the process. I am here 
in particular thinking of the risk free rate that has been imported into the mathematical 
structure of the CCAPM. However, I would dismiss this idea on the ground that however 
weak the fundamental principles, they are active and in control of deriving the final, 
equilibrium, result. Vertical portability is therefore an important aspect of the 
consumption based asset pricing research programme. 
 
3.1.5 Horizontal Portability  
Let me now address the issue of portability in another context. The type of portability I 
have in mind is related to the way the analytically convenient cases can be re-used in 
situations unlike those they are targeted for. I refer to this as “horizontal portability”. I let 
Cartwright guide us: 
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“If the deductions have been carried out correctly and the general principles employed are true in 
the target situations, the result of the model will obtain in any real situation that fit the description 
that the model provides. And in general we have no reason to think they will obtain anywhere 
else.” (Cartwright 2007, p. 225).  
 
Cartwright here tells us that a model that is specific, de-idealized and de-fictionalized 
enough will be able to describe at least one specific case. Such models will render correct 
predictions concerning a given situation because they are tailored just to that situation. 
That kind of model will thus only describe other cases that satisfy almost all the same 
assumptions. This implies that the horizontal portability of Cochrane’s analytical cases is 
restricted.  
 
In another context Cartwright asserts: 
 
“The situation must resemble the model in that the factors that appear in the model must represent 
features in the real situation (...) But it must also be true that nothing too relevant occurs in the 
situation that cannot be put into the model.” (Cartwright 1999, p. 187). 
 
These requirements again raise the bar for the horizontal portability of Cochrane’s 
analytically special cases, but for a different reason. Cochrane, I believe, can in a 
reasonable way comply with Cartwright’s first point. It can thus be argued that the 
fundamental, core, principles, i.e. the triad of temperaments are “factors” that represent 
“features” in the real situations. Cartwright’s second point, however, is more challenging. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the idealized and fictional model world can hardly, 
even with a host of additional auxiliary, belt, assumptions account for all the factors that 
are at work in specific real situations. So we tighten the requirement and ask the model to 
incorporate only the “relevant factors at work in the real situations”. This, however, is 
Cochrane’s stumbling block because, so far, he has been struggling to identify the other 
relevant factors – beyond those incorporated in the fundamental, core principle.   
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We thus have the following conundrum. The triad of temperaments can be considered 
important enough to be carried over, i.e. horizontally transported to all situations that are 
targeted by the asset pricing theory. The de-idealized and de-fictionalized analytical cases 
are customized to very specific situations and lack horizontal transportability. And, 
finally, there is “something too relevant” occurring in the real situations that has yet to be 
identified. If it is possible to clarify the final point on which factors are missing and then 
incorporate them into the model, Cochrane might improve the horizontal portability of 
the consumption based asset pricing model. But if a general model makes too general 
claims, and a specific model makes to specific claims, what does model in between the 
two extreme really tell us? Cartwright warns that we should not raise our expectations too 
high. 
 
To their defence, however, it can be said that the analytically convenient special cases are 
rigorously connected to the central pricing formula and so internally consistent. The 
hierarchy of models, therefore, creates an asset pricing theory “whole” that can guide the 
users in a plethora of situations. Seeking even more refinements and lower level 
granularity of the analytically convenient cases is achieved by using the auxiliary, belt 
assumptions to “correct” the predictions of the fundamental, core, principles, when they 
act on their own and there are many disturbing causes at work in the real situations. In 
this way, the cases can be fitted onto at least some very specific real situations. Cochrane 
thus shifts the theory away from the more general starting point. What he ends up with, 
however, is the de-idealized and de-fictionalized leaf at the tip of a branch while the trunk 
of the tree is still not well understood. But these leafs might in some cases provide 
attractive insights and even an accurate and reliable understanding of those very specific 
situations. I am here, for example, thinking of the “risk corrected” required return type of 
derivation Cochrane exposed us to, or even Fama and French’s assertion that small, 
undervalued stocks have done better in terms of return than their larger, overvalued peers 
(see Chapter Two, section 1.3). Nonetheless, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the 
understanding of such very specific situations is, in some, cases rather trivial and raises 
the questions how we can use this outcome to improve our understanding of the trunk of 
the three.    
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 Below, in the next section, I continue to explore the representational role and use of the 
analytical cases. Now is a good time to invite a clear philosophy of science view of the 
situation. 
 
3.2 Hausman’s “conceptual explorations” 
Daniel M. Hausman, whom I introduced in the context of my discussion on asset pricing 
assumptions in Chapter Three, section 1.3.3, also has a view on the type of 
“developments and derivations” that economists embark on in their research efforts. 
Hausman claims that economists: 
 
“...are merely constructing concepts and employing mathematics and logic to explore further 
properties which are implied by the definitions they have offered. Such model building and 
theorem proving does not presuppose that one believes that the particular model is of any use in 
understanding the world. (...) Insofar as one is only working with a model, one’s efforts are purely 
conceptual or mathematical. One is only developing a complicated concept or definition.” 
(Hausman 1992, p. 79).  
 
In this extract, Hausman makes two main observations. First, he claims that economists 
develop models that are primarily useful for mathematical and logical explorations within 
a set of definitions: “That is, they may sometimes wish to investigate the properties of 
models without worrying about whether those models depict or apply to any aspect of the 
world.” (Hausman 1992, p. 79). Second, economists can do so with little concern for the 
real situations - with a disclaimer that model-based claims can be compared with the real 
situations: “Their point lies in the conceptual explorations and in providing the 
conceptual means for making claims that can be tested and can be said to be true or 
false.” (Hausman 1992, p. 78). 
  
Hausman, therefore, wants us to believe that economists, first and foremost, see models 
as “definitions of hypothetical economies or markets”. These definitions do not 
necessarily have anything to do with the real situations. It would be a “category mistake”, 
Hausman tells us, to ask if the models economists develop are true or false, or even test 
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them. Models that economists develop are, as a consequence, neither true nor false or just 
trivially true, Hausman explains. They are used for “conceptual explorations” only. Yet, 
at the end of the “explorations”, the model can be applied to make claims regarding the 
real situations. It is therefore not the model itself, but its claims that are compared with 
the real situations. These claims about the empirical world are, as a consequence, either 
accurate or not.  
 
At a first glance, there are several commonalities between the way Hausman explains 
how he thinks economists “construct concepts and employ mathematics” to develop 
models, and how Cochrane develops the analytically convenient specific cases. What 
immediately stands out is that Cochrane, as Hausman correctly assumes, starts from some 
fundamental, core, principles, and develops more specific cases. For example, by 
claiming that investors are rational, self-interested and risk averse, Cochrane has said 
nothing related to the domain in which these characteristics can be applied. Only the triad 
of temperament is portrayed. Cochrane then offers more. He situates these sentiments in a 
financial market context and provides financial assets to the investor. The investor is next 
asked to make decisions concerning consumption and investments, and, in addition, 
Cochrane informs us, he should be mindful with respect to keeping his/her consumption 
at a stable level. In this way, Cochrane introduces and constructs “concepts” and 
mathematically explores, inside the model, further properties and the consequences of the 
fundamental, core, principles. This type of activity has merits on its own. It certainly led 
to the “discovery” and developments of the consumption based asset pricing theory in 
Lucas (1978) and the capital asset pricing model in Sharpe (1964). 
 
Besides common themes as the one alluded to above, Hausman and Cochrane seem to 
disagree on one main thing. While Hausman maintains that models are for “conceptual 
explorations”, and not for “empirical theorizing”, Cochrane, I believe, thinks differently. 
He is certainly interested in Hausman’s “explorations” but his emphasis is on “empirical 
theorizing”. That is visible in the way the fundamental, core, concepts are mathematically 
extended with the help of the auxiliary, belt, assumptions. And in this theoretical field, 
Cochrane has left the profession of financial economists baffled and impressed by his 
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dexterity. However, Cochrane wants more out of his pricing model than “conceptual 
explorations”:  
 
“The absolute approach is most common in academic settings, in which we use asset pricing 
theory positively to give an economic explanation for why prices are what they are, and to predict 
how prices might change if policy or economic structure is changed.” (Cochrane 2005, p.xiv). 
 
Cochrane leaves no doubt that the “M” in CCAPM is developed to “explain” and 
“predict” asset prices and their behaviour. Ultimately, it is less related to an extension of 
theoretical concepts and an effort to improve our understanding of the internal logic 
portrayed in the specific analytical cases. I believe Cochrane’s asset pricing research 
project must be considered much richer than a just a “story” attached to a “structure” as 
Gibbard and Varian alluded to in their model definition or plainly “conceptual 
explorations” as Hausman suggests. Cochrane wants to tell us something with respect to 
the real world and his CCAPM aspires to provide knowledge for use in that world. 
 
In light of the commonalities and the differences, I suggest a compromise. I think 
Hausman’s notion of a “model” and Cochrane’s “analytical cases” are just local stops on 
the way to comparing the model-based claims against the real situation data. This 
comparison also connects to my earlier references to Friedman in section 1.2.4 above, 
and his view that the model has a dual role, both in theorizing and in fitting to real 
situations. Hausman tells us that it is not the model itself but the claims that the model 
makes that are tested against the empirical situations. Cochrane, I believe, does not 
foresee that the analytical cases are immediately applied to the empirical situations and 
tested. Nonetheless, Cochrane seems to develop the “M” in CCAPM to a degree that it is 
as “similar” as possible to the real situation so that they can be directly compared. This 
happens when the mathematical terms are fully specified, i.e. the letters in the analytical 
cases are interpreted and directly linked to specific time series of observable data. But 
this decisive step has not yet been taken. Before we let Cochrane take us there in the next 
section, let me sum up. 
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So far we have been concerned with the analytical cases and their derivations. We found 
that fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, assumptions combine to develop 
these cases within a rigorous mathematical setting. I do not consider this strategy to be 
wrong and have little ground for opposing it. This is, as I pointed out, well within the 
heuristic of what Lakatos calls a research programme. Nonetheless, deductive 
mathematical reasoning creates challenges for Cochrane. The fallacy of simplification, 
which I introduced in Chapter Three, section 1.4, is not only active at a theoretical level, 
but also in situations in which these theories are made explicit in a mathematical structure 
of specific analytical cases. It shows how simplifications originating in an a priori 
environment of hard to justify fundamental, core, principles, leads to unintended 
consequences in the form of unsuccessful empirical tests. This is, of course, regrettable. I 
think these results have little prospect of improving when financial economists remove 
themselves from the real situations by developing increasingly hypothetical and 
constructed assumptions regarding investors, markets and assets. It might be a good time 
to de-idealize or de-construct such deductive systems by re-visiting the classic writers on 
the subject, i.e. Smith and Mill who advocates insights anchored in observation of real 
situations and introspection. Nonetheless, given my interpretation of Hausman, Cochrane 
might resist such a recommendation. 
 
I will, for now, leave the discussion of the analytically convenient cases and turn to the 
second part of Cochrane’s statement I presented up front at the beginning of this chapter. 
It is related to Cochrane’s assertion that the consumption based asset pricing theories are 
used not only to derive analytically convenient special cases but also the empirically 
useful representation. With respect to these representations, I will assess how they are 
made to represent, and what it is they really represent. This is the topic for the next 
section. 
 
4. Empirical representations of analytical cases  
In the previous section 3, we learn that the model may have several representational 
roles; it can represent a “selected part of the world” or it can represent “theory” – or both. 
I have thus far focused on how the analytically convenient cases can be characterized as 
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representations of the consumption based asset pricing theory. In this section, I change 
track and assess how the analytical cases are transformed into empirically useful 
representations. The goal of this transformation is, as Cochrane claims, to establish 
empirically useful representation.  
 
Consider, first an extract from Varian (2006). Almost thirty years after Gibbard and 
Varian (1978), he has not changed his views on modelling:  
 
“Economics proceeds by developing models of social phenomena. By a model, we mean a 
simplified representation of reality. The emphasis here is on the word “simple”. Think about how 
useless a map on a one-to-one scale would be. The same is true of an economic model that 
attempts to describe every aspect of reality. A model’s power stems from the elimination of 
irrelevant detail, which allows the economist to focus on the essential features of the economic 
reality he or she is attempting to understand.” (Varian 2006, pp. 1).  
 
Already in the preceding section, I showed how Gibbard and Varian’s earlier views 
related to what a model can represent were shared, in many central aspects, by Frigg and 
Hartmann (2006, 2006a). Not only are the authors in-line with respect to models 
representing their theories, but they are also in agreement that models can represent the 
real situations as well. The idea that models might represent both its theory and the real 
situations were flagged by Friedman (1953), as I showed earlier in this chapter’s section 
1.2.4. This view is also shared by the four authors reviewed here. Since I covered the first 
or the two roles that models might have, i.e. theory representation I here turn to the 
second, i.e. how the analytical cases can represent the empirical.  
 
I think it is important to state that the empirical representations that Cochrane alludes to 
do not represent a second set of cases separate from the analytically convenient ones. In 
fact, I argue that empirically useful representations are identified when the analytical 
cases have been properly predicated and connected with appropriate empirical data. The 
empirical representations are thus proper extensions of the analytical cases towards the 
real situations. I let my assessment be informed primarily by Frigg and Hartmann (2006, 
205 
 
2006a), Morgan (2001, 2006, 2008, 2008a 2009) as well as Hausman (1992) and 
Cartwright (1999). 
 
I argue that the analytical cases in many instances cannot properly be connected with the 
real situations. The reasons are provided first and foremost by their idealized and fictional 
character that makes them unsuitable for empirical representations. Second, despite the 
fact that Cochrane develops the CCAPM within a recognized “hypothetico-deductive” 
account (see section 4.3) of theory appraisal, he still relies on stories to informally de-
idealize and connect his theories to the world. Third, even in situations where a 
connection could have been established, the correspondence rules as Friedman calls 
them, or the bridge-principles in Cartwright’s terminology, raise serious methodological 
obstacles.  
 
As a consequence, the analytical cases are mostly not able to extend their reach beyond 
the theoretical and into the empirical. The models’ ability to render knowledge for use is 
therefore threatened. In section 4.4, I discuss some routes Cochrane can explore in order 
to make the analytical cases provide better empirical representations. 
 
4.1 Analytical cases and real situations 
On the face of it, Cochrane’s script for the consumption based capital asset pricing 
research programme seems to be close to what we know and observe in our daily life of 
social interactions. We acknowledge that there are financial markets, investment 
opportunities, and decision making consumers. Investors certainly reap satisfaction from 
being successful in buying the stocks which generate positive returns in “bad” economic 
states. This supports an increasing level of wealth, and their total well-being might 
improve as well. Consumers think ahead and save for future purchases of goods and 
services. Some of them are risk takers while others are not.  
 
From this perspective we get the impression that Cochrane is good at representing this 
peculiar finance related corner of our social world and in capturing its interactions. He 
uses every-day concepts to describe complex processes and interactions. This intuitive 
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narrative of individuals and their decisions, the financial market structure and the 
financial assets, therefore, makes sense. In sections 3, I described how Cochrane makes 
the story explicit in a structure of equations referred to as convenient analytical cases and 
how these cases extend towards the real situations. I am here interested in how Cochrane 
bridges the gap between the explicitly formulated mathematical structure and the real 
world. This is the topic for the next section.  
 
4.2 Cochrane “works with theory” 
In this section, I consider how Cochrane envisages what he suggested, i.e. “working with 
theory” as alluded to in section 3 above, to establish a link between the mathematical 
expressions in the analytical cases and the empirical world. Even more concretely, 
Cochrane seeks ways for the asset pricing research programme to go from “marginal 
utility to “observable indicators”. We also know that his analytical cases, which I 
consider being detailed, idealized and fictional applied mathematical models merely 
reflect the axiomatic starting point in a certain logical and hierarchical way. Internal 
consistency, therefore, is assumed to be assured. Finally, I established that most of the 
analytical cases have not been specified to the degree necessary to make them represent 
empirical situations. In their current form, therefore, the analytical cases do not reach all 
the way “down” to the empirical. Something is missing.  
 
As a starting point consider Cochrane’s analytical case regarding the risk correction or, 
alternatively, the expected excess return as described in, respectively, sections 2 and 3 
earlier. We recall from section 2.1 that the risk correction is given by: 
 
pt = 
𝐸(𝑥𝑡)
𝑅𝑓
 +  𝑐𝑜𝑣[ 𝛽 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡+1),(𝑥𝑡+1)]
𝑢′(𝑐𝑡)   
 
And from section 2.2 we get the expected excess return: 
 
E(R 
e
 t+1 ) = - R 
f cov [ß ( 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
 ) -γ, R e t+1] 
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We also recall Cochrane’s statement that the analytical cases, such as the two equations 
here, do not represent the target situation particularly well. This is intriguing. On one 
hand, Cochrane claims that formulas such as the risk correction and the expected excess 
return are “useful”, but, on the other hand, they do not “represent” well. This raises the 
question why, in his view, useful empirical representations fail to give us reliable 
knowledge? To answer this question, let me review Cochrane’s translation from the 
fundamental, core, principles to the empirical situations in some more detail. The purpose 
is as stated above; identify paths taken from the theoretical to the empirical, and point to 
possible obstacles that hinder a successful translation.  
 
Cochrane interprets the mathematical terms in the risk corrected and the excess return 
equations shown above by predicated them. For example, Rf is the risk free interest rate, 
the cov is a statistical co-variance matrix, and the parameter γ  is the representative 
investor’s risk aversion. We therefore get the impression that these interpretations have 
found their real situation counterparts. We know, for example, what a risk free interest 
rate is and where to look for it in the readily available statistical time series. Then, we can 
subtract the risk free rate from the time series of historical equity returns to find the so-
called equity risk premium. This premium is then important for the risk correction 
because it indicates the required pick-up an investor would demand for shifting his/her 
savings into a portfolio of publically traded stocks. Since we also know where to find the 
per capita consumption data we are getting closer to establishing the co-variance matrix. 
All we need are, again, some time series data, their statistical correlations and volatilities. 
Finally, the risk aversion parameter can be statistically estimated or, if necessary, given 
an adequate value, i.e. calibrated. But hold on. Are these examples given not of very 
different natures? I think the answer is yes.  
 
4.2.1 Category one cases  
Most challenging, I believe, is that several of the mathematical terms in the equations are 
neither observable nor do they have direct empirical counterparts. I am specifically 
thinking about the stochastic discount factor (SDF) and its two elements, i.e. the “utility 
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function” and “subjective discount factor”. Even deeper inside the utility function, for 
example, we find the sentiments of rationality, self-interest and risk aversion. None of 
these fundamental, core principles are directly observable. Additionally, Cochrane is 
often targeting next period’s realisation, i.e. (t+1). The future values of the risk free rate 
and the consumption data are, of course, unknown at the current time (t).  
 
The point I want to make here is that Cochrane’s commitment to the development of 
empirically useful representations from the analytical cases meets obstacles. They are 
mainly related to interpretation of the equations’ functional arguments. While some of 
these arguments contain elements that have direct empirical counterparts, others do not. 
For example, the risk free rate has but the risk aversion parameter does not. Let me, 
therefore, suggest that we distinguish between two categories of analytical cases. The 
first category of cases provides arguments that can be empirically identified. These cases 
must be considered what Cochrane claims to be “useful”. I am in particular thinking 
about some of the classic cases in finance that Cochrane lists such as the risk free interest 
rate. These analytical cases have in common that they do not carry in them assumptions 
regarding the representative investor, his/her character and behaviour. They are based 
upon descriptive statistical results that are extractable directly from the time- or cross-
sectional data. 48 Let me call analytical cases that do not contain the fundamental, core, 
principles category one cases.  
 
The category one analytical cases, however, face two challenges. One is related to 
measurement, and the other is concerning their importance. It is clear that the analytical 
cases, such as the two equations shown above, do not themselves carry any indications of 
their predicates, their interconnectedness, and measurement. It is the financial 
economists, following the heuristics of the research programme, who decides on these 
issues. In order to reach the empirical level, Cochrane needs to make several steps. The 
stories, for example, of consumers’ demand for recession-proof stocks leads to the so-
called Arrow Securities or “contingent claims” inside the analytical cases. And from 
48 Such cases and their direct connection with the data are the area of specialisation of Eugene F. Fama and 
Kenneth R. French, who I discussed earlier in the context of the multi-factor pricing models in Chapter 
Two, section 1.3. 
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there to a specific stock with empirical names such as Google and Caterpillar. Finally, 
Cochrane would line up, for example, Caterpillar’s daily stock prices between 19 August 
2004 and 31 August 2013 as I showed in the graphical representation in Chapter Two. A 
similar process needs to be applied for the other functional arguments that can find an 
empirical counterpart. This is not complicated and the problems encountered are mostly 
measurement related.  
 
The second challenge, beside the measurement topic, is the importance of the empirical 
concepts within the mathematical structure of the consumption based capital asset pricing 
research programme. The analytical case I have been focusing on the most, i.e. risk free 
interest rate, serves as a good example. I stated earlier that this concept is not an original 
part of the basic pricing equation that merely states that a “stock price equals expected 
discounted payoff”. The discount rate, i.e. the risk free interest rate that Cochrane here 
mentions needs, however, to be explicitly defined. There is, of course, nothing in the 
fundamental, core, principle that would help him achieve this goal. Hence, the discount 
rate cannot be derived from the triad of temperament and the equilibrium condition. So 
Cochrane needs to look elsewhere. And he finds the concept of a risk free interest rate in 
standard micro-economic literature. This formula is then imported into a financial market 
structure. And this is my point with respect to the importance of the analytical cases that 
are empirically useful. They are trivial. In Cochrane’s analysis of the two equations I 
referred to above, i.e. risk correction and expected excess return the risk free rate of 
return, for example, can be the well-known 3 month USD Libor rate. This rate is certainly 
needed to complete the specification of such analytical cases, but there is little to learn 
from it.  
 
The case I describe here, i.e. the risk free interest rate, is not an isolated example. 
Consider, for example, the relationship that Cochrane establishes between the data 
distribution and the utility function. In this case, the statistical properties of a price-
distribution are not the derived outcome of the first order condition. There is nothing in 
the first order condition that demands a particular data distribution. In fact, they are two 
very separate elements.  
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 4.2.2 Category two cases  
Beside this first category of analytical cases, I suggest there is a second. The second 
category contains arguments that cannot directly be assigned to their empirical 
counterparts. Hence, these cases cannot be linked to the real situations. They are thus less 
useful in providing the analytical cases their proper empirical representations. Their 
commonality is that they evolve around the fundamental, core, principles, i.e. the 
representative investor, his/her character and behaviour. The triad of temperaments, i.e. 
rationality, self-interest, and risk aversion cannot be identified by any specific time series 
of data. They are not directly observable. The representative agent, therefore, do not have 
any direct empirical counterpart. The same can be said with respect to his/her constrained 
maximizing behaviour. This behaviour, as we know, leads to the first order condition 
which is a prerequisite for the equilibrium market condition. This condition is not 
observable. It needs to be assumed.  
 
Let me refer to such analytical cases as category two cases. While analytical cases in 
category one are challenged by their relevant identification and accurate measurements, 
category two cases face their own challenges. One such challenge is that they can neither 
be observed nor measured. This, however, is a common topic across various scientific 
projects. Another challenge is whether we trust the main arguments presented to us in the 
category two cases. I am in particular thinking of the fundamental, core, principles. 
Earlier, Mill reassured us that the “economic man’s” character and behaviour could be 
established by observation and introspection. Cochrane, however, did not present such 
justification. His representative investor came fast and furious. Let us explore. 
  
We know by now, as in described in Chapter Three, section 3.2.3 that Cochrane’s 
research method is deductive from an a priori starting point as formulated in the central 
pricing formula. Cochrane thus derives analytical cases that carry with them arguments 
that can be either directly connected to the empirical situations (category one) or not 
(category two). In the latter group of analytical cases, the arguments remain theoretical, 
and their content and meaning need to be assumed. My concern is here not so much 
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related to the unobservable elements. They are part of most theories – social and natural 
sciences alike. I am more focused on the fundamental, core, principles and ask whether 
we can trust them. 
 
Cochrane’s research project is namely critically dependent upon the quality of the chosen 
fundamental principles, i.e. the triad of temperaments that lead towards the first order 
condition an equilibrium situation in the financial markets. I believe there are several 
reasons why we should doubt the validity and soundness of Cochrane’s fundamental 
principles. Consider first how they are established. Mill tells us that they have been 
established “beyond doubt”, they are “obviously” true and verifiable through 
introspection. In this sense, they build on inductive “evidence”. Inductive evidence, as we 
know, is considered to be weak evidence. Subjective awareness is no real basis for 
generalisation, of course, and gives a fragile, or even, false foundation. 
 
Next, Cochrane’s CCAPM has so far failed to explain and predict observable asset prices 
and their behaviour. Cochrane is the first to admit this and points out to us that: 
“Unfortunately, this specification of the consumption based model does not work very 
well.” [this motivates the] “...exploration of different utility functions, general 
equilibrium models, and linear factor models such as CAPM, APT and ICAPM as ways 
to circumvent the empirical difficulties of the consumption based model.” (Cochrane 
2005, p. 43). Here, we see Cochrane’s doubts with respect to the quality of the 
fundamental principles he uses in his asset pricing research approach. From what we 
read, it even seems that Cochrane is ready to abandon the theorizing concerning the 
representative investor and revert to the statistical time series analysis offered by the 
alternative models (see Chapter Two, section 1.3). Nonetheless, it is difficult to reject 
Cochrane’s hypothesis that stock prices move and that investors through their actions 
influence these changes through their actions. Maybe stock prices are indeed discounted 
cash-flows, and that they fluctuate randomly around a preconditioned idea that the level 
of the equity risk premium should be, as an accepted rule of thumb, 6% (I discuss this 
number in the following Chapter Five). So far, however, the CCAPM has failed to 
confirm Cochrane’s suggestion. 
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 Finally, can it be that the financial markets and their activities do not render themselves 
to the type of ordered analysis that Cochrane advocates? The representative investor is set 
up to reduce and not endorse heterogeneity. He/she is a “calculating machine” in a 
system that possible requires some quite different specifications of the individual, the 
market and assets. This was a main topic of mine in Chapter Three, section 1.3, and I will 
have more to say in Chapter Five, section 4.2.  
 
There might, therefore, be something fundamentally wrong with Cochrane’s approach. 
Nicholas Kaldor reminds us:  
 
“My basic objection to the theory of general equilibrium is not that it is abstract; all theory is 
abstract and must necessarily be so, since there can be no analysis without abstraction; but that it 
starts with the wrong kind of abstraction and, therefore, gives a misleading “paradigm” (...) of the 
world as it is: it gives a misleading impression of the nature and the manner of operation of 
economic forces.” (Kaldor 1975, p. 347). 
 
I think Kaldor addresses two main issues. The first is related to how the fundamental, 
core, principles are established and, second, how appropriate or sustainable they are for 
the tasks at hand. My concern, therefore, is that we cannot take too much comfort from 
the starting point of Cochrane’s asset pricing theory. And if the starting point is wrong, 
the end-result is possibly wrong as well. 
 
Where does this leave us? I remain sceptical towards Cochrane’s ontological 
commitments towards the fundamental, core, principles. I acknowledge, however, the 
flexibility of the auxiliary, belt assumptions that may help Cochrane defend the 
fundamental, core, principles and develop analytical cases that zoom in on particular 
questions that the real situations may generate. Nonetheless, I believe Cochrane’s 
references to the competing asset pricing theories are generous in the sense that he 
advocates “horses for courses”, i.e. depending upon the situation and asset class, apply 
either the fundamental or the relative approach. This indicates that he is not completely 
locked into his position that requires representative investors to solve for asset prices. 
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Lakatos might cry foul at this stage because of the lack of commitment towards the core 
principles within a research programme while Cochrane would, possibly, argue for 
research flexibility and more pragmatism. After all, holding onto core propositions for the 
sake of it would indicate that science cannot err. Nonetheless, Cochrane and others 
should be reminded that they also switch between two highly different research 
programmes when “betting” on different horses. In the end, therefore, I side with Kaldor 
and his scepticism, i.e. the core is not to be trusted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Cochrane’s general statement with respect to taking the analytical cases directly to the 
market place must, as a consequence, be rejected. 
 
Given my scepticism towards the inability of the category two analytically cases’ ability 
to reach down to the real situations thereby making them empirically useful, I now 
examine whether Cochrane, in his research programme endeavours apply generally 
accepted methodological standards. The reason for this examination is twofold; first, it 
enables me to break the research programme into clearly identifiable steps, and second, it 
facilitates my search for reasons why the programme, so far, has failed to deliver 
knowledge for use to its stakeholders, i.e. investors, public sector entities and fellow 
academics.  
 
4.3 A stylized HD account 
I think there are good reasons why it is challenging for Cochrane to go directly from a 
theoretical concept such as “marginal utility’ to a set of “observable indicators”. There 
are certainly several intermediate steps that need to be taken before that can be the case. 
In the example I provided in the previous section in relation to the modelling of the risk 
correction and the expected excess return, I showed how Cochrane envisaged such a 
progression. At the end of that process, we would like to know whether Cochrane’s 
theories are good or not and whether we can trust the knowledge he offers for the various 
stakeholders to use. Here, I am not focusing on the empirical evidence given in favour of 
his theories - that will be a discussion point in Chapter Five. I rather review how 
Cochrane’s leads his theories to the empirical, i.e. the derivation of empirical 
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representations. I will use a familiar view of theory appraisal in the natural and social 
sciences. It is referred to as the “hypothetico-deductive” account – HD for short.  
 
The HD account for theory appraisal can be formulated succinctly as follows (Hausman 
1992, p. 123): 
 
1. Formulate a hypothesis 
2. Deduce a prediction from the hypothesis and other statements 
3. Test the predictions 
4. Evaluate the hypothesis on the basis of the test results. 
 
In this stylized four step process, we first observe that the hypothesis is not undergoing a 
direct empirical test. That role is reserved for the prediction. The prediction is formulated 
from the “hypothesis and other statements”. To understand the reason for making these 
two steps, we would need to do some archaeology related to the “syntactic” account of 
theories. Space does not permit an elaborate explanation and relevant literature can be 
found elsewhere. 49  Yet, the short comment in this context is that advocates of the 
syntactic view believe that theories are typically related to processes or mechanisms we 
cannot directly compare with the empirical situations by observation or experiment. 
 
Alexander Rosenberg, for example, explains: 
 
“The axiomatic approach [also referred to by Rosenberg as the “syntactic” or HD account of 
theories] begins with the notion that theories are, (...), axiomatic systems in which the explanation 
of empirical generalizations proceeds by derivation or logical deduction from axioms (...). Because 
the axioms – the underived laws fundamental to the theory – usually describe an unobservable 
underlying mechanism (...) they cannot be directly tested by any observation or experiment. These 
underived axioms are treated as hypotheses indirectly confirmed by the empirical laws derivable 
from them, which can be directly tested by experiment or observation. It is from these two ideas, 
that the foundation of a theory is hypotheses supported by the consequences deduced from them, 
the name hypothetico-deductive models derives.” (Rosenberg 2000, p. 76).  
49 da Costa and French (2000, 2003), Rosenberg (2000), Suppe (2000)  
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 Rosenberg tells us that the HD account acknowledges that theories are axiomatic systems 
that cannot directly be tested. Hence, testable predictions must be deduced from the 
axioms. If the predictions are confirmed in empirical tests, then there are good reasons to 
believe the hypotheses arising from the theories. This is referred to as an indirect 
confirmation of theories. Rosenberg goes on to a critical assessment of the HD account. 
Again, I will leave this, elaborate, discussion aside and focus on the asset pricing project. 
Is the HD method relevant for Cochrane’s own procedures for taking the theories to the 
test? In some aspects it is, but in others it is not. The starting point is the hypotheses. 
 
Proponents of the HD account are fairly generous in the answer as to the origin of the 
hypotheses. Nonetheless, a common starting point is found in theories with known 
empirical or pragmatic virtues. Rosenberg, for example, refers to axiomatic systems such 
as the “kinetic theory of gases”, “theory regarding the molecular structure of the gene” or 
“Newton’s three laws of motion”. Does Cochrane make reference to similar systems of 
theories in his asset pricing approach? Does he use them in formulating “hypotheses”? 
The short answer is a possible “yes”. 
 
Cochrane uses a few fundamental “core” principles to get the ball rolling. His most 
dominant are as we know the principles that lead to the development of the utility theory. 
Therein we find, for example, the various “axioms of rational choice”, and how they 
formally show how individuals rank all possible situations from the least to the most 
desirable. Add uncertain outcomes, and we are in the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
“choice-arena” and the expected utility theorems. It is challenging to defend the assertion 
that these theorems have the same status as the axioms and theories alluded to above by 
Rosenberg in the field of natural sciences. Cochrane’s departure point is a tentative one 
that is established as Mill reminded us, by inductive “evidence” and “introspection”. 
Nonetheless, they could be viewed as a launch pad akin to step one in the HD schemata.  
 
Cochrane suggests above that theories are used to “go from marginal utility to observable 
indicators”. This would indicate that the triad of temperaments is not directly observable 
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or testable. They are part of the axiomatic marginal utility theory. Cartwright, Giere, 
Frigg and Hartman have also suggested “rationality” is one of the few “fundamental 
principles” used in the development of theories and models in economics. Both 
Cartwright and Giere agree that fundamental principles, at least in the natural sciences, 
do not make any empirical claims. Giere explains: 
 
“I think it is best not to regard principles themselves as vehicles for making empirical claims. 
Newton’s three laws of motion, for example, refer to quantities called force and mass, and relate 
these quantities previously well-understood: The Law makes references to terms like force, mass 
and velocity. However, they do not themselves tell us in more specific terms what might count as 
a force or a mass. So we do not know where in the world to look to whether or not the laws 
apply.” (Giere 2004, p. 745).  
 
In addition, Cartwright says that the fundamental principles are neither empirical nor 
modalized generalizations, i.e. neither universally nor by necessity do they hold. 
Nonetheless, Cartwright would claim that the fundamental principles, although not ripe 
for a comparison with the real situations, are true when used inside models. Principles, 
therefore, are true within models in cases where they are understood as definitions. 
Definitions are thus trivially true. Or as Giere puts it: “...if understood as universal 
generalizations, the resulting statements [from the fundamental principles] are either 
vacuously true, or else false and known to be so.” (Giere 2004, p. 745). The philosophers 
of science are here backing up Cochrane’s statement that he needs to find “observable 
indicators” for his “marginal utility” theory because utilities are not directly observable. 
So far, therefore, Cochrane is within the context of the HD account. 
 
Consider, next, how Cochrane formulates a hypothesis from his theory of asset pricing: 
“Asset pricing theory tries to understand the prices or values of claims to uncertain 
payments. (...) Asset pricing theory all stems from one simple concept, (...) price equals 
expected discounted payoff.” (Cochrane 2005, p. xiii). Cochrane here tells us that a 
statement from the theory can be regarded as a hypothesis. The hypothesis is, for 
example, that investors are rational, self-interested and risk averse, or that asset prices 
equals “expected discounted payoffs”. As Cochrane works his way into point 3 in the HD 
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account, i.e. towards testing predictions from the hypothesis, he adds several other 
assumptions related to the investor and his behaviour, the financial market structure, and 
the financial assets, i.e. Hausman’s “other statements”. In line with Lakatos, I would 
characterize these theory enriching assumptions as the auxiliary, belt, assumptions. Also 
on step 2, therefore, I can agree that Cochrane, bar some practical impediments, follow 
the HD schemata.  
 
Nonetheless, point 2 of the stylized HD account, i.e. deduce predictions, need more 
analysis. We have thus far only arrived at the “analytical cases” and they are still a step 
away from being “empirical representations”, i.e. predictions or scientific claims. As 
indicated in the quote above, Cochrane wants to “work with theory” all the way down to 
its applications. This also involves empirical test of the predictions, i.e. step 3 in the HD 
account and its evaluations, i.e. step 4. These two final steps are discussed in Chapter 
Five. Before we get there, however, I need to spend more time on the second step, i.e. 
deduce a prediction from the hypothesis.  
 
4.4 Stories and other bridges to the empirical 
I demonstrated that Cochrane is well within the standard methodological framework in 
terms of theory appraisal. As a follower of the stylized HD account (see section 4.3), 
however, he meets challenges. I am in particular thinking of the way Cochrane seeks to 
transform the analytically convenient special cases to become empirically useful 
representations. Below I assert that when Cochrane’s mathematical dexterity ends, he lets 
stories take over. In other words, a narrative steps in to plug the gap between model-
based entities and their empirical counterparts. I think it is questionable to let stories 
perform this important task as they go beyond what the model’s mathematical 
expressions support. Let us, once again, revisit one such story. 
  
4.4.1 Cochrane’s story 
By now, we know Cochrane’s story about the representative investor, his/her preferences 
and the choices he/she faces (see Chapter Two, section 2.2 and Chapter Four, section 
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1.2.2). Additionally, we have been exposed to the mathematical asset pricing model and 
its many arguments. The story and the structure, as Gibbard and Varian point out, 
combine to offer an explanation of real phenomena (see section 3.1). But what is the 
systematic question that stories address? I will argue that Cochrane uses stories to 
connect the mathematical model to the real world. The stories thus inform and entertain 
beyond the mathematical structure. But they cannot replace the model’s own reach 
towards the empirical situations. In particular, stories cannot be used effectively as 
connecting devices or middleware between the analytical convenient special cases and 
the empirical situations because they lack theoretical and methodological rigour. 
 
Morgan (2001a) reminds us that philosophers of science often have analysed the 
relationship between the theories and their models. Economists, however, seem to be 
more concerned with the relationship between the models and the real situations. In the 
former relationship, logic, deductions and mathematical derivations play an important 
role. It is all about “theorizing”. We recall Hausman’s (1992) view that economists 
engage in “conceptual explorations” (see above section 3.3): 
 
A theory must identify regularities in the world. But science does not proceed primarily by 
spotting correlations among various known properties of things. An absolutely crucial step is 
constructing new concepts – new ways of classifying and describing phenomena. Much of 
scientific theorizing consists of developing and thinking about such new concept, relating them to 
other concepts and exploring their implications.” (Hausman 1992, p. 13). 
 
An excellent example of what Hausman here describes, i.e. conceptual innovations is 
Cochrane’s (in cooperation with Campbell) answer to the equity risk premium puzzle as 
introduced in Chapter Two, section 6.3.4. There, I showed how they developed the 
concept of “habit-persistency” and integrated it into the consumption based utility 
function. (In the next Chapter Five, I will have more to say about this topic.) 
 
Nonetheless, I also argued that Cochrane wanted more than just “conceptual 
explorations” across theoretical entities. And this is where his narrative plays an 
important role. Stories, Morgan claims, are either stories about the model world or stories 
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about the past, present or the future real world. Morgan (2008) explains that economists’ 
mathematical models are “...designed only to approximate the world, and, unlike 
econometric models which go through a serious process of fitting to the world, they are 
casually connected to the world by “stories” which interpret the terms in the model to 
elements in the world”.  Morgan here wants to draw a distinct line between mathematical 
models used for “theorizing” and econometric models used for “fitting theories to the 
world”. Theorists’ explorations are thus contrasted with econometricians’ data analysis.  
 
In the context of my discussion of Cochrane’s version of the consumption based asset 
pricing research programme, I think we can see elements of both theorizing and 
conceptual explorations on one hand, and the desire, on the other, to fit his theories to the 
world. As a consequence, mathematical structures, stories and real situation data interact. 
In this respect, Cochrane’s research programme cannot be fitted entirely into one of the 
categories that Morgan develops. Cochrane spans both of them.  
 
The aim of his endeavour however, is to develop knowledge for use. Is Cochrane 
successful? I have already, and will continue to point out, that the empirical tests of 
Cochrane’s model-based claims, so far, have been unsuccessful in providing adequate 
predictions. Nonetheless, the mathematical structures are impeccable and the stories he 
tells about them are intuitively convincing. So at least on those two counts, Cochrane is 
convincing. The concern I have in this context, however, is the dominant role of stories in 
Cochrane’s set-up. On one hand, Cochrane predicated the mathematical terms of the 
model by giving the parameters in the utility functions names such as subjective discount 
factor and risk aversion. But he extends the theoretical interpretations to tell stories about 
these parameters. For example, he tells us why investors are risk averse. On the other 
hand, Cochrane uses stories to tell us how these elements connect to the real situations. 
For example, he says that such risk averse investors seek recession proof stocks. Here, 
Cochrane refers to the everyday concept of financial market assets, i.e. stocks. In this 
regard Cochrane’s narrative is portrayed at two interconnected levels; the first story is 
told within the model, and a second story is told with respect to real situations outside the 
model.  
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 I see two challenges. First, the stories told within the model are interpretations of 
parameters and the derived, theoretical, results. The mathematic ensures that these results 
are internally consistent. But can we say the same thing about their interpretations? It is 
certainly challenging to develop the same type of precision and accuracy within a 
narrative structure. For example, we know from Chapter Two, section 3.5 that Cochrane, 
and other financial economists, have a preference for using the power utility function in 
their theorizing due to its mathematical properties. These properties are used to develop 
the concept of the risk averse investor. But we know that the investor can also be 
modelled as risk neutral or risk seeking. In these cases, different stories must be told.  
 
My second point is related to Cochrane’s stories that reach outside the model. In this 
respect, Cochrane uses the central asset pricing formula to fit the consumption based 
asset pricing research programme to the world. Such models are no longer theoretical but 
applied econometric models. They explain some observed facts. But how does the 
model’s mathematical structure give rise to Cochrane’s stories? There is, for example, 
nothing in the central asset pricing formula’s payoff notation, i.e. xt+1 that tells us that 
these future, expected, cash-flows stem from recession proof stocks. The story Cochrane 
tells, therefore, goes beyond what the mathematical structure can reveal. Morgan 
explains: 
 
“We can only ask questions and tell stories about terms and relations that are represented in the 
structure and only within the range allowed by the mathematics or material of the structure”. 
(Morgan 2001a, p. 369).  
 
I think the consequence for Cochrane’s double narrative is twofold. The first level 
narrative tells stories inside models. Such stories are used for theorizing. They are 
explorative in nature and might lead to new classifications and innovative concept as 
exemplified by the “habit-persistency’ argument placed within the representative 
investor’s utility function. On this first count, Cochrane is on safe ground. The second 
level narrative tells stories outside models. Here, the derived consequences of the 
theorizing are compared with the real situations. Cochrane explores, for example, to 
221 
 
which extent the representative investor is risk averse or how much recession protection 
can be found in the time series of excess returns. On this count, Cochrane needs to be 
cautious. On one hand, empirical tests of the consumption based programme are not 
overly successful. On the other hand, narratives extend beyond their fundamental, core, 
principles and the auxiliary, belt, assumptions. They tend to take a life on their own. 
Practitioners should, therefore, be warned not to dwell too long on stories about the real 
world but to pay more attention to their lack of empirical success.  
 
Given the challenges Cochrane faces with respect to rendering plausible narratives when 
linking the analytical cases to the real situations, can we think of alternative ways for him 
to reach his/her stated goal? The answer to this question takes me to the next section 
related to connectors and bridges. 
 
4.4.2 Friedman’s connectors 
We recall from section 1.2.4 above that Friedman, as well, is concerned with the way 
theories are connected to the empirical. In particular, he mentioned the importance of 
“specifying the correspondence between the variable or entities in the model and the 
observable phenomena”. I think there are two ways of thinking of his comments. On one 
extreme, as we have seen being preferred by Cochrane, the variables in the model are 
linked casually with the real situations. This is the story-telling account. On the other 
extreme, given the weaknesses of using stories as connectors, we find econometric 
models that seek a rigorous connection between the two. Morgan informs us:  
 
“...econometricians’ arguments about model derivation and selection, along with their battery of 
statistical tests, are really all about how to get a correspondence via models in fitting theory to the 
world: one might even say that econometrics could be broadly described as a project developing 
the theory and practices of correspondence rules for economics.” (Morgan 2008a, p. 32). 
   
In its early historical developments, models were used: “...as vehicles for bridging the 
gap between theories of the business cycle and specific (time and place) statistical data of 
the cycle.” (Morgan 2008, p. 3). Positioning the model in between theory and empirical, 
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however, does not solve the topic of correspondence rules that Friedman is concerned 
with. Morgan tells us: “Developing correspondence rules has formed one of the major 
difficulties for economists seeking to defend the method of modelling, and for 
philosophers and methodologists seeking to account for the work done by economic 
models.” (Morgan 2008a, p. 32). I will not be able to contribute to this debate in the 
context of my thesis. 50 
 
4.4.3 Hempel’s bridges and Cartwright’s two models  
We have seen that Cochrane struggles to connect his analytical cases to the target system, 
i.e. real situations when seeking to develop empirically useful representations. So far, 
Cochrane lets intuitive, causal and even informal stories and ad-hoc translations dominate 
where mathematically derived representations fail. Gibbard and Varian, we recall, were 
also retreating to casual stories in such circumstances. Is there another strategy? 
Philosophers of science might answer this question with a “yes” and refer to the so-called 
“bridge-principles” But what are they, and is there room for them in Cochrane’s research 
programme? 
 
Drawing on Hempel’s insights (1965, 1966), Cartwright (1999) tells us that there are two 
groups of principles. As I indicated earlier in Chapter Three, section 2.1, the first group 
has many names; theoretical-, internal-, first- or fundamental-principles. The second is 
called bridge-laws or bridge-principles. Since I dealt with the fundamental principles in 
the previous chapter, I now briefly turn to the use of bridge principles. Bridge-principles 
were initially introduced to cover the distance between what was perceived as 
“theoretical-” and the “observational-terms”. Carl G. Hempel says that the bridge-
principle: “…will indicate how the processes envisaged by the theory are related to the 
empirical phenomena with which we are already acquainted, and which the theory may 
explain, predict or retrodict.” (Hempel, 1966, pp. 62). Strict procedural rules should, 
therefore, be in place to define how to connect theory with the empirical reality.51 The 
50 There is, of course, a rich literature on how modelling can be viewed as fitting theories to the world 
(Morgan 2008). 
51 From the previous section 4.4.2, intuition and creativity are in more demand than strict procedural rules.  
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bridge-principles should give the theoretical concepts meaning, i.e. they interpret the 
theory. 
 
Cartwright tells us that bridge principles are essential – at least in physics:  
 
“...physics needs bridge principles because a large number of its most important descriptive terms 
do not apply to the world directly; rather, they function as descriptive terms.(...) The quantum 
Hamiltonian, the classical force function... are all abstract. Whenever they apply, there is always 
some more concrete description that also applies, and that constitutes what the abstract concept 
amounts to in the given case. Mass, charge, acceleration, distance, and the quantum state are not 
abstract. “ (Cartwright 1999, p. 189).   
 
Cartwright, here, gives a clear account for a process by which an abstract term turns more 
concrete. In fact, this process makes two steps. The first step deals with the de-abstraction 
of the term “force” as a traditional mechanical concept to another, more concrete term, 
such as “mass”, position”, ‘extension”, “motion”. Cartwright tells us that there are 
specific rules for how to fill in the force variable with a more specific force function and 
that these rules are given by the bridge principles. She calls the outcome of this process 
an “interpretative model”. The second step in the process is taken when a specific 
prediction of a real situation is requested. It is then necessary, Cartwright claims, to 
specify a particular value for the force, “such as 10 dynes”. (Cartwright 2008, p. 134). If 
one, therefore, applies a bridge principle to a fundamental principle, one ends up with a 
version of the fundamental principle that has real empirical content. In this sense, 
Cartwright’s bridge principle gives an empirical translation of a theoretical term in a 
model, and the result is that the model can represent more easily. Cartwright calls these 
second-step models “representative models”: 
 
“The first are models that we construct with the aid of theory to represent real arrangements and 
affairs that take place in the world – or could do so under the right circumstances. I call these 
representative models. (...) Theories in physics do not generally represent what happens in the 
world; only models represent in this way, and the models that do so are not already part of any 
theory. (...) When we want to represent what happens in these situations [very specific kinds of 
situations] we will need to go beyond theory and build a model, a representative model. (...) This 
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is an old thesis of mine. If we want to get things right, we shall have to improve on what theories 
tell us, each time, at the point of application.” (Cartwright 1999, pp. 180).  
 
Cartwright, here, makes several points that are relevant for our discussion relating to 
fitting theories to the world, i.e. establish connections between the theoretical and the 
empirical.  The main thrust is that scientists need to go beyond theory to build 
representative models that tell us what goes on in the world. 52 The reason for this is that 
theory “need not contain the resources to represent all the causes and effects in its 
prescribed domain”. Theory, therefore, should not be regarded as a “vending machine”, 
as Cartwright portrays it, in which prescribed input is fed, and desired output is 
generated:  
 
“The vending machine view is not true to the kind of effort that we know it takes in physics to get 
from theories to models that predict what reliably happens; and the hopes that it backs up for a 
shortcut to warranting a hypothesised model for a given case – just confirm theory and the models 
will be warranted automatically – is wildly fanciful.  For years, we insisted theories have the form 
of vending machines because we wished for a way to mechanise the warrant for our predictions. 
(...) The first step beyond the vending machine view is various accounts that take the deductive 
consequences of a single theory as the ideal for building representative models but allow for some 
improvements, usually improvements that customized the general model produced by the theory to 
the special needs of the case at hand.”  (Cartwright 2009, pp. 185).  
 
More than good theory is, therefore, needed if we want to account for real situations. And 
this is where the bridge principles and other assumptions enter. Representative models 
are thus constructed in a “co-operative effort” between the theory, bridge principles and 
auxiliary assumptions – often “borrowed” from outside the domain of the theory. 
Theories on their own, therefore, are insufficient when trying to reach all the way down 
to the real situations.  
 
How do these elaborations on the bridge principles and the representative model resonate 
with Cochrane’s set-up? In some areas better than in others, I will argue. I have already 
suggested that Cochrane’s central pricing formula is an applied mathematical model. It is 
52 The theories Cartwright discusses here are related to the natural sciences, i.e. physics. 
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used to derive more specific models, i.e. the analytically convenient cases. There exists, 
in other words, a hierarchy of increasingly more granular analytical cases that are de-
idealized and de-fictionalized relative to its general starting point with the help of the 
auxiliary, belt, assumptions. The question Cartwright answers with the help of the bridge 
principles is how to go from such abstract cases, first, to more concrete cases, and finally 
to the empirical representation. We thus need to identify which “translators” or 
“interpreters” Cochrane might use to help him bridge the gap. 
 
Let me start with Hempel first before I turn to Cartwright’s suggestions. Hempel requires 
that the theory should “envisage” a process for how it wants to relate itself to the 
empirical phenomena. This vision, I would argue, is not stated in the asset pricing theory 
itself, but is more a matter of the heuristics as followed by the practitioners within the 
consumption based capital asset pricing programme. In the previous section 4.2, I have 
indicated how Cochrane, as a leading advocate of this tradition, “works with theory” to 
take the theory downstream from the theory of “marginal utility to observable 
indicators”.  
 
Now to Cartwright. Her starting point is clear: “I begin from the assumption that it is the 
job of any good science to tell us how to predict what we can of the world as it comes and 
how to make the world, where we can, predictable in ways we want it to be.” (Cartwright 
1999, p. 181). In order to reach this goal, she suggests bringing our theories closer to the 
real situations, because “the fundamental principles of theories in physics do not 
generally represent what happens”. Cartwright, therefore, sets out to work with what she 
calls interpretive and representative models. How does Cochrane’s theory of asset pricing 
fit with Cartwright’s set-up and what are the consequences if it does? 
 
I think Cochrane shares Cartwright’s vision of what science is about. I have given 
evidence for this previously when pointing toward his endeavour to explain and predict 
stock prices, excess returns and the equity risk premium. I have also shown how he starts 
in an axiomatic system of a priori principles and from there, deduce the implicit 
consequences. Such mathematical derivations, however, are supported by a host of 
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auxiliary, belt, assumptions. With the support of such assumptions and the dexterity of 
his mathematics, Cochrane is able to take the asset pricing theory downstream towards 
the empirical situations.  
 
Consider, for example, Cochrane’s starting point in the representative investor. Cochrane 
needs to formulate an hypothesis that this individual can be described by reference to 
some behavioural instincts. These instincts are then spelled out and take the forms of 
rationality, self-interest and risk aversion. Risk aversion, for example, is more concrete 
than the term behavioural instinct. However, the term is not yet concrete enough to be 
applied to a specific choice situation. That situation needs to be defined by its boundaries. 
In this respect, Cochrane refers to a particular financial market structure and the choices 
to which the representative investor will be confronted. There are two; save and invest 
and which portfolio of assets to hold. In this confined situation, the risk aversion makes 
an entry into the utility function that Cochrane has chosen to be the best representation of 
the real choice situation, i.e. power utility. Even at this stage of more concrete terms and 
representation, Cochrane is still working with the confines of his mathematical structure. 
He has yet to make the leap across to the real situations. 
 
As we can see from this cascading down of concepts, Cochrane is willing to engage in 
the way Cartwright discusses. The lower-level, specific analytical cases are connected to 
the more general fundamental, core, principles and enriched with auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions. As such, they are part of what Cochrane calls the theory of asset pricing. 
However, these models are not contained within the principle in a way that they are 
deduced results from these principles only. Along the way towards the empirical 
situations, they are enriched by specific conditions and their interpretations. These are 
plug-ins and not the derived outcome of the principles. As such, one could argue that the 
hierarchy of increasingly specific models, i.e. analytically convenient special cases, are 
similar, at least in spirit, to Cartwright’s representative models that are assembled in a 
“co-operative” spirit. They are thus not the outcome of, as Cartwright warned us against, 
a “vending machine” process but genuine steps in the right direction, i.e. they take “the 
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deductive consequences of a single theory as the ideal for building representative models 
but allow for some improvements”, as I quoted Cartwright saying above.  
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Chapter 5: 
CCAPM Application and Assessment  
Introduction 
In the last chapter of his textbook Asset Pricing, John H. Cochrane claims: “As the 
Campbell-Cochrane model is blatantly (and proudly) reverse-engineered to surmount 
(and here, to illustrate) the known pitfalls of the representative consumer models, the 
Constantinides-Duffie model is reverse-engineered to surmount the known pitfalls of 
idiosyncratic risk models.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 477). Only insightful students of financial 
economics are, off-hand able to make sense of this statement. But this is not the point to 
make here. I have two other topics in mind; the statement is extracted from the 
“Empirical Survey” part of this book, and it directs attention towards “reverse-
engineering”. Both references are central topics in this chapter.  
 
After a brief review of the empirical asset pricing literature, Cochrane, in his book, 
concludes that many observable asset prices are predictable. He, however, also highlights 
several data-puzzles or anomalies as Imre Lakatos called them. These are a frequently 
chosen terms when the empirical world does not behave in a way the model says it 
should. Cochrane is in particular alluding to the so-called “equity risk premium puzzle” 
first comprehensively documented by Mehra and Prescott (1985). The two authors 
demonstrate that the consumption based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) cannot 
adequately explain why investments in “risky” stocks, over a long period of time, have 
returned so much more than investments in “riskless” government-guaranteed interest 
bearing assets. 
 
This empirical puzzle, I claim, gives rise to what Cochrane above denotes reverse-
engineering. The term refers to how Cochrane “blatantly” and “proudly” manipulates the 
CCAPM to make the puzzle go away. He is not alone in such a response. The reference 
made above to his financial economist colleagues George Constantinides and Darrell 
Duffie is a case in point. Neither is this reverse-engineering technique entirely new. Mary 
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S. Morgan reflects: “Understanding twentieth-century economics as a science in the 
mould of engineering is to see that the economic profession came to rely on a certain 
precision of representation of the economic world along with techniques of quantitative 
investigation and exact analysis alien to the experience of the nineteenth century 
economics when the extent of such technologies of representation, analysis and 
intervention were extremely limited.” (Morgan 2001, p. 3). Morgan here relates 
engineering to techniques, quantitative precision, exact analysis, and intervention to 
which Cochrane’s modern term can now be counted. The goals of Cochrane’s 
manipulations are to improve our understanding of asset price behaviour, solve practical 
problems and, having done so, offer policy advice. Reverse-engineering, therefore, is a 
means to reach that end because it works backwards from the data, seeking validation 
and, where necessary, improvements to the model and its underlying assumptions. 
 
Building upon the two previous chapters on asset pricing theories (Chapter Three) and 
asset pricing models (Chapter Four), I now focus on the third central topic of my thesis, 
i.e. how Cochrane confronts his version of the consumption based capital asset pricing 
research programme with the accessible asset pricing data. In fact, both of the previous 
chapters lead into and build towards this final chapter. The purpose here is to examine 
how the CCAPM is applied and assessed. For that, I draw on the equity risk premium 
puzzle as a representative case study. The goal of this chapter is threefold; show that 
forecastability, initially, is the accepted “litmus test” for assessing the progress of the 
CCAPM research programme, point towards the two main obstacles that the programme 
is confronted with, i.e. unrealistic assumptions and socio-economic complexities, and 
propose a solution for the programme to consider overcoming the double-trouble.  
 
I conclude that Cochrane’s reverse-engineering approach falls within the heuristic of 
what Lakatos calls a research programme, and that the CCAPM programme has 
experienced modest theoretical and empirical progress. Since I believe financial market 
activities do not easily surrender to an a priori based deductive mathematical reasoning 
which seeks to capture event regularities in the time-series of asset prices, more of that 
sort could hinders rather than fosters its development. As a consequence, Cochrane, being 
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the CCAPM programme’s main promoter, is well advised to move away from the model-
based “point-forecasts” approach towards making claims about tendencies with respect to 
empirical situations. This re-direction could replace Cochrane’s own suggestion to reduce 
the importance of standard statistical tests in evaluating the model-based claims, and, in 
addition, offer a sound foundation for emitting knowledge for use to the various 
stakeholders. 
 
The chapter has six sections: The first section defines the empirical research question 
related to the well-known equity risk premium puzzle and reflects on how, in general, 
financial economists have reacted to the fact that their models do not explain the data 
particularly well. From there, in section two, my interest turns towards Cochrane and how 
he reverse-engineers his asset pricing model in light of its disappointing statistical 
performance. His reaction is to add a “habit-persistence” variable to the standard utility 
function. I refer to this innovation as the “triad of temperament plus habit”. This 
innovation modestly progresses the theoretical and empirical relevance of the pricing 
model. Nonetheless, building on Robert M. Solow and Nancy Cartwright, I discuss 
whether adding this auxiliary, belt, assumption leads to the “right kind” of model. In 
section three, I show how Cochrane, despite its statistical inadequacies, defends the 
CCAPM as the “correct” starting point for assessing the behaviour of asset prices. The 
correct endpoint for Cochrane’s research effort can, initially, be found in the empirical 
tests, i.e. how well the model-based claims represent the real situations. Borrowing from 
Alexander Rosenberg, I refer to this as the “litmus-test”. 
 
In the fourth section, in view of the CCAPM’s disappointing empirical success, I review 
two of the programme’s main challenges; first, its use of unrealistic assumptions, and, 
second, the complexities of the empirical situations it seeks to explain and predict. The 
double challenge raises high hurdles for the programme’s a priori, deductive 
mathematical approach. I am encouraged to advice Cochrane to de-emphasise “point-
forecasting” and instead focus the programme on making claims about tendencies. The 
identification of tendencies is, however, complicated because the current methodological 
tool-set available to financial economists do not easily support their identification and 
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extraction. My discussion is informed by John Sutton, John Dupré, Tony Lawson, Milton 
Friedman, and Nancy Cartwright. 
 
In section five, I turn to what Cochrane calls “statistical philosophy”. Following the 
disappointing model predictions against the real situation data, Cochrane unexpectedly 
claims that statistical success is not “the last and decisive” check to evaluate whether a 
theory is acceptable or not. These tests must be complemented with other metrices. 
Cochrane then explicitly tells us that model choice is made more on the basis of a 
“persuasive”, “coherent”, “interesting” and “clean” story than on a high statistical 
significance. I advise against this suggestion. Finally, in section six, I indicate that 
Cochrane cannot, at the same time, make predictability the litmus test for model-based 
claims, and then chose to ignore their rejections. Again drawing on Rosenberg (1994), I 
claim that Cochrane pays “lip-service” to Karl Popper.  
 
1. The research question, complications and rejections  
From Chapter Two, section 6, we recall that Mehra and Prescott (1985) found that the 
inflation adjusted, i.e. real total return on a portfolio of US stocks held from 1889 to 1978 
provided investors, on average, almost 7 percent per annum. In the same period the 
annualized return on a three month risk free US Treasury Bill was around 1 percent. The 
positive average difference of 6 percentage points is the so-called “equity risk premium”. 
This premium handsomely compensated the investors who, over the historical period 
under review, were willing to hold risky stocks instead of riskless T-Bills. 
 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) thus formulated an empirical research question that has 
occupied almost a whole generation of financial economists: Why have investments in 
stocks issued by the private sector companies provided a higher return than investments 
in the public sector, government guaranteed fixed interest bonds? When Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) approach the question more thoroughly in the context of the standard 
Lucas (1978) consumption based capital asset pricing model similar to the one Cochrane 
promotes, they discovered that their intuition is right, but the model-based risk premium 
is much lower than what is observed in the data. In fact, CCAPM tells us that the 
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premium should not have been the observed 6 percentage points, but closer to 0.4 
percentage points per annum. The stock market has, in other words, performed too well 
relative to the risk free asset – or the return on the risk-free asset has been too low. Since 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) could not explain the large return difference between the two 
asset classes, they labelled it the equity premium puzzle. 
 
Financial economists were challenged by these findings, and much research effort has 
been undertaken to make the puzzle go away. The effort has taken three avenues; review 
the data set, alter the theories and their assumptions, and, finally, make changes to the 
structure of the applied mathematical model (see Chapter Two, section 6.3). 
 
2. Cochrane’s response 
Cochrane, as we know by now, is also disappointed by the statistical performance of his 
version of the CCAPM when it is confronted with the data. In his book Asset Pricing 
(2005), Cochrane acknowledges the equity premium puzzle and seeks ways around it: 
 
“We want to end up with a model that explains a high market Sharpe ratio, and the high level and 
volatility of stock returns, with low and relatively constant interest rates, roughly i.i.d. 
consumption growth with small volatility, and that explains the predictability of excess returns in 
the future. Eventually we would like the model to explain the predictability of bond and foreign 
exchange returns as well, time-varying volatility of stock returns, and it would be nice if in 
addition to fitting all of the facts, people in the models did not display unusually high aversion to 
wealth bets.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 465). 
 
These requirements are neither modest nor trivial. Nevertheless, at least Cochrane has a 
good idea of how to proceed in terms of developing a general asset pricing model. When 
encountering anomalies, as Imre Lakatos called them, Cochrane’s answer is “reverse-
engineering”. Reverse-engineering works backwards from the data seeking validation and 
where necessary, improvements to the model and its underlying assumptions. Let me 
review Cochrane’s response (see also Chapter Two, section 6.3 for a more general 
discussion).  
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 2.1 Habit-persistence 
In Chapter Two, section 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, I described the development of the so-called 
Campbell-Cochrane habit-persistence version of the standard CCAPM (Campbell and 
Cochrane 1999). Let us briefly review the main topics. 
 
Constantinides (1990) had argued that the consumer’s utility is not only shaped by the 
trade-off between current and discounted future marginal utilities. The investor’s 
wellbeing should also be affected by his/her past consumption. Earlier references can be 
found in Ryder and Heal (1973) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). A consumer’s past 
consumption can be viewed as an “internal” wellbeing benchmark. In this sense, the 
consumer’s utility is impacted, or even “spoiled” by his/her own historical spending 
pattern. As he/she got used to an adequate and possibly increasing level of past 
consumption, he/she also seeks to upkeep it in the future. Constantinides here is 
reflecting on the “habitual” level of spending. This is also intuitive. Technically, the 
investors’ marginal utility from consuming today can be modelled as an increasing 
function of his/her past consumption. 
 
However, there are also “external” benchmarks that might have an effect on the total 
utility of the investor. Financial economists refer to this phenomenon as “keeping up with 
the Joneses” (Abel 1990). This consideration originates from across the street, i.e. it is 
external to the investor. In this interpretation, the investor’s neighbour’s consumption is a 
vital consideration for his/her own. As the investor monitors the consumption pattern of 
others, he/she is concerned that it will affect him/her as well. For example, when he/she 
sees that the Joneses are tightening their consumption belt, he/she assumes that he/she 
will soon have to do the same. In the model context, the Joneses expenditures are proxied 
by the time series of aggregated per capita consumption. Linking slow-moving macro-
economic data into the utility-function that explains, fast-moving asset prices are 
technically and theoretically challenging. That aside, it seems intuitively right that our 
own decision to consume and invest is affected by how other people behave. 
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Both the internal and the external benchmarking call for a modification of preferences in 
the sense that utility flows from a variety of different sources other than exclusively from 
own consumption now and later. Cochrane continues: “The Campbell-Cochrane model is 
a representative from the literature that attacks the equity premium by modifying the 
representative agent’s preferences.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 466). 
 
In the end, Campbell-Cochrane (1999) settles for an external benchmark akin to that 
discussed in Abel (1990): “An individual’s habit level depends on the history of 
aggregate consumption rather than on the individual’s own past consumption.” 
(Campbell and Cochrane 1999, p. 208). This decision is not explicitly defended. It seems, 
however, to be out of convenience or, possibly because by considering this version, the 
model performs better when compared with real situation data than its “internal” 
benchmark alternative. 
 
A relationship between per capita, aggregate societal consumption and habit-persistence 
is thus established both theoretically, and as we shall later see, empirically. It can be 
captured, Campbell and Cochrane tell us, by what they call the “surplus consumption 
ratio” St  (Campbell and Cochrane 1999, p. 209):  
 
𝑆𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡𝐶𝑡  
 
Ct is the current consumption and Xt is the measure for the habitual level of consumption 
- both at the current time t. The ratio is thus the fraction, or “surplus” of an investor’s 
consumption that exceeds the eternal, aggregate level. This surplus is said to influence 
the utility of the consumer. In dire economic states, the surplus in excess of the 
benchmark consumption level might collapse towards nil. But it can also, in good states, 
expand towards one. When the surplus decreases and falls towards the per capita 
consumption trend-line, the investor’s risk aversion increases. The perspective of a 
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possible drop below this level is thought of as being very bad indeed because the investor 
might not do as well as the Joneses. 53  
 
In these cases, when the economic activity typically falls, the marginal utility of 
consumption is increasing. Alternatively, when the economic activity slows or even falls 
when in recession, the prospects of losing income from employment increases because 
the investor might become unemployed. At that time, receiving income in the form of 
payoffs from the investment portfolio is a good thing. Investors are thus afraid of holding 
stocks because they do poorly in a recession type of economic environment, i.e. when the 
surplus consumption ratio falls towards zero. Hence, they demand a high equity risk 
premium for holding financial assets that, possibly, are not recession proof. 
 
After developing this idea and wrapping the intuitive story into the narrative I just 
referred to, the question is how to integrate it into the CCAPM. Again, Campbell and 
Cochrane takes out the power utility function and adds in the “surplus consumption ratio” 
as an additional argument. Here is how it looks like in the form of the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution Mt+1 (Campbell and Cochrane 1999, p. 210): 
 
Mt+1 = 𝛿 𝑢𝑐 (𝐶𝑡+1,𝑋𝑡+1 )𝑢𝑐(𝐶𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡) =  𝛿(𝑆𝑡+1𝑆𝑡 𝐶𝑡+1𝐶𝑡 )−𝛾 
 
The externally driven habitual level of consumption is thus incorporated in the standard 
power utility function used in the CCAPM. Cochrane tells us: “This specification means 
that a habit can act as a “trend-line” for consumption; as consumption declines relative to 
the “trend” in recession, people will become more risk averse, stock prices will fall, 
expected returns will rise, and so on.” (Cochrane 2006, p. 34).  
 
53 Mathematically, however, a negative surplus ratio is excluded due to the non-linear functional form of 
the way habit responds to changes in the consumption. 
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2.2 Reverse-engineering 
Cochrane’s reverse-engineering takes place inside the utility function. Here are some 
further examples of what a slow moving, habitual consumption level can do. It:  
 
“...eliminates terms in marginal utility in which extra consumption today raises habits tomorrow, 
while retaining fully rational expectations. (...) ...produces slow mean-reversion in the price-
dividend ratio, long horizon return forecastability,... (...). We specify that habit adapts non-
linearity to the history of consumption. The non-linearity keeps habit always below consumption 
and keeps marginal utility always finite and positive in an endowment economy.” (Campbell and 
Cochrane 1999, p. 208).  
 
Cochrane’s reverse-engineering, therefore, works backwards from the observed data 
towards the appropriate model specification. This involves choosing and setting the 
parameters of the model to the desired levels – as I showed in detail in Chapter Two, 
section 6.4. Putting the technical language aside for now, I first direct my attention 
towards how these results are generated. In particular, I note that there is little evidence 
that would indicate that they are derived results from the fundamental, core, principles of 
a rational, self-interested and risk averse investor. But it is not necessary for the 
principles to deduce all results entirely by themselves. Additional information can, and in 
many situations, must be added to reach for the theory to reach all the way down to the 
empirical (see, for example, Chapter Four, section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) From a Lakatosian 
point of view, therefore, Cochrane is well within the heuristics of the consumption based 
research programme.  
 
Second, the extracts are all good examples of how Campbell and Cochrane use the data 
and let them define functional forms and calibration of parameters: 
 
“Rather than dream up models, test them, and reject them, financial economists since the work of 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) have been able to work backwards 
to some extent, characterizing the properties the discount factors must have in order to explain 
asset return data.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 455).  
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Financial economists, in other words, know how large the equity risk premium has been 
historically, and they know they have to work towards altering the stochastic discount 
factor (SDF) to meet the empirical requirements. 
 
The results are extracted with one goal in mind, i.e. fitting theories to the world. And this 
requires a model in-between the two and lots of imagination, intuition and technical 
skills. I believe this approach to the problem at hand, i.e. the equity risk premium puzzle, 
is justifiable from a research programme point of view. Changing functional forms, 
adding new auxiliary, belt, assumptions and re-formulating the narrative have all been 
traditional means since Lucas (1978) to establish analytically convenient cases and turn 
them into useful empirical representations (see Chapter Four, section 3 and 4). The story 
around the “Joneses” and the habitual level of consumption are outstanding examples of 
this practice. And I may point out that this practice is far away from Hempel’s strictures 
related to the use of so-called bridge-principles that I discussed in the previous Chapter 
Four, section 4.4.3, in relation to theories reaching all the way down to the empirical 
situations. It, therefore, comes naturally that the programmes’ heuristic accommodates 
innovative approaches that over time will integrate more and more realistic sources of 
utility. After all, habitual consumption seems to reflect what we observe and, possibly, 
from an introspective point of view, it makes sense as well. An interesting, still open 
issue at this time, is a careful analysis of how much the new argument contributes to 
utility when acting on its own independent of the other factors Cochrane has identified in 
the utility function. He must be warned, therefore, not to keep adding in whatever it takes 
to engineer the right prediction. 
 
2.3 Statistical results 
I now, briefly, address how empirical tests of the consumption based model are 
conducted. Let us start with the model evaluation and then proceed to the outcomes, 
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2.3.1 Model evaluation 
Cochrane tells us that the habit-persistent extended CCAPM explains the equity risk 
premium better than the standard CCAPM: “The model replicates the level of risk free 
rate, the mean excess return (equity premium), and the standard deviation of excess stock 
returns. Most importantly, the models fit the dynamic behaviour of stock prices.” 
(Campbell and Cochrane 1999, p. 207). These results are impressive, but they come at a 
cost.  
 
Recall that Cochrane added an additional argument to the standard CCAPM, i.e. the 
exogenous per capita consumption trend. The movement of the investor’s consumption 
relative to this “external benchmark” directly influences his/her own consumption and 
thus marginal utility. In particular, if the surplus consumption ratio is low, the marginal 
utility of consumption is high and vice-versa. In this dynamic adjustment process, the 
representative investor’s character does not change. He/she continues to maximize his/her 
total utility through time and across economic states relative to the available budget. The 
theoretical foundation, i.e. the fundamental, core, principles as portrayed in the triad of 
temperaments are thus kept intact – as the heuristic of the programme demands. The 
adjustment, therefore, came as an additional auxiliary, belt, assumptions because it 
increases the number of causal factors the investor needs to consider when making 
choices with respect to the distribution of current and future consumption over time and 
through various economic states. In other words, the investor is given a new argument 
that needs rational considerations.  
 
Although little was changed in the standard CCAPM, the results seemed to have 
improved. What happened? In Campbell-Cochrane (1999), we are told that the fully 
specified enhanced CCAPM model gained in structure as several new parameters were 
added to the central pricing formula. In fact, there are seven of them ranging from the 
“mean consumption growth” and ‘standard deviation of consumption growth” to “utility 
curvature” and “log risk free rate”. An additional three parameters are “implied”. They 
are the familiar “subjective discount factor” and the new ‘steady state surplus 
consumption ratio” and the “maximum surplus consumption ratio”. All these parameters 
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are given specific values so that they match particular moments of the post-war US 
consumption data I pointed towards earlier. For example: 
 
“Since the ratio of unconditional mean to unconditional standard deviation of excess returns is at 
the heart of the equity premium puzzle, we search for a value of [utility curvature] on that the 
returns on the consumption data claims match this ratio in the data.” (Campbell and Cochrane 
1999, p. 218).  
 
Now, having calibrated the model using real data, some oddities emerge. 54 Campbell and 
Cochrane, for example, point out: 
 
“It is important to understand that with these parameter values the model uses high average risk 
aversion to fit the high unconditional equity premium. Steady-state risk aversion is (...) 35. In this 
respect the model resembles a power utility model with a very high risk aversion coefficient.” 
(Campbell 2001, p. 60).  
 
During some time periods, the habit-persistence model does fairly well. In others, 
however, it fails to do away with the risk premium. On a longer term historical average 
basis, it gets the risk aversion parameter γ down to the value of 6 – which is still far off 
the lower number needed to explain away the equity risk premium, i.e. 0.4% in the 
traditional CCAPM. Nonetheless, a parameter value of 6 is more plausible than 55 as 
Black (1972) suggested in Chapter Two, section 6.2. Out-of-sample forecasting is crucial 
for addressing concerns that the Campbell-Cochrane model over-fits the data because it is 
calibrated to match historical stylized facts concerning equity returns.  
 
This confirms my point related to the costs of making better models. While the enhanced 
CCAPM model produces an improved statistical fit with the data from real situations, it 
still depends upon unrealistic assumptions concerning, for example, the representative 
investors’ near to perfect foresight of future economic states or the calibrated high level 
54 Calibration is a step-wise simulation procedure often used as an alternative to the traditional econometric 
analysis of estimation. A model draws on its theoretical framework to identify the observable variables it 
would need to be confronted with the data. The coefficients are thus not directly estimated but given a 
particular value, i.e. calibrated according to what is observable in an economy. For example, the average 
p.a. growth in aggregate house-hold consumption numbers can be directly used in the modeling. 
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of risk aversion - which in the habit-persistence model is time-varying and not constant as 
in the standard CCAPM. There is as a consequence little benefit when Campbell claims: 
 
“The time-variation in risk aversion generates predictable movements in excess returns (...), 
enabling the model to match the volatility of stock prices even with a smooth consumption series 
and a constant riskless interest rate.” (Campbell 2001, p. 61). 
 
Cochrane seems to agree: 
 
“This model does have high risk aversion. (...) many authors require that a “solution” of the equity 
premium puzzle display low risk aversion. This is a laudable goal, and no current model has 
attained it.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 473).  
 
Both authors have thus admitted that they have failed in their endeavour to model the risk 
aversion factor down to a level consistent with their asset pricing theory. 
 
Besides calibrating the model’s parameters, they can also be estimated. For the standard 
CCAPM Cochrane tells us: 
 
“Our first task in bringing an asset pricing model to the data is to estimate the free parameter: β 
and δ in m = β (ct+1/ct) 
- δ . Then we want to evaluate the model. Is it a good model or not? Is 
another model better?” (Cochrane 2005, p. 187). 55  
 
Based upon either calibration or estimation, Cochrane also suggests that comparative 
statistics is a good way to distinguish and choose between different models, i.e. rank 
them according to the quality of their predictions against real situation data. He continues 
on this point: “Even when evaluating a specific model, most of the interesting 
calculations come from examining specific alternatives rather than overall pricing error 
tests.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 304). Here, Cochrane sows some first seeds of doubt related to 
the absoluteness of using predictability as the sole measure for selecting between 
55 We note that he is here referring to the subjective discount factor parameter β and the risk aversion 
parameter δ found inside the stochastic discount factor. 
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alternative asset pricing models. More than a statistical result seems to be needed. I have 
more to say with respect to t this topic in the up-coming section 5. 
 
2.3.2 Rejected models  
Early statistical tests of William F. Sharpe’s CAPM indicate that the pricing model had 
explanatory powers (see Chapter Two, section 1.3). In subsequent tests, the model’s 
claims were, however, rejected. Well-known empirical references are Black, Jensen, 
Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend (1973), Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979), Shanken (1985), Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Fama and 
French (2004), Ang and Chen (2005). But, as Cochrane rightly points out, the CAPM was 
not abandoned despite its empirical inadequacies. It is still alive and doing well – at least 
in the academic literature and university level introductory courses in finance. The same 
can be said in relation to the multi-factor style models that Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth 
R. French have been promoting. They have also been rejected. Despite this, the multi-
factor model has severely challenged, if not dethroned, Sharpe’s CAPM. Of late, Sharpe 
has even turned sceptical towards his own asset pricing research efforts.56 Finally, the 
CCAPM has also been rejected. Campbell and Cochrane claims: 
 
“The development of the consumption based asset pricing model ranks as one of the major 
advances in financial economics during the last two decades. (...) Unfortunately, consumption 
based asset pricing models prove disappointing empirically. Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) 
(...) reject the model on U.S data, (...). Wheatley (1988) rejects the model on international data.” 
(Campbell and Cochrane 2000, p. 2863).  
 
A newer contribution by Cochrane (2011) also expands upon the topic of predictability 
but does not offer new empirical insights. As I have pointed out earlier as well, no asset 
pricing efforts have withstood standard statistical tests of predictive significance. Some of 
these models, however, have rendered better results than others. 
56 Sharpe (2007) claims that his capital asset pricing model (CAPM) “…was built from Harry Markowitz’s 
view that an investor should focus on the expected return and risk of her overall portfolio… (…) This is not 
an entirely happy state of affairs. There are strong arguments for viewing mean/variance analysis as a 
special case of a more general asset pricing theory.” (Sharpe 2007, p 4). This “more general theory” Sharpe 
refers to is indeed a version of the macro-model that Cochrane advocates.  
242 
 
                                                          
 2.4 Assessing Cochrane’s habit-persistence response 
On one hand, Cochrane’s reverse-engineering approach modestly improved the enhanced 
model’s empirical estimates relative to the standard CCAPM result. Historically, during 
some short time periods, the habit-persistent enriched CCAPM even delivers modestly 
improved statistical results. Longer term, however, the results are statistically rejected as 
I indicated in the previous section 2.4. On the other hand, since the models’ ability to 
forecast has modestly improved, it might be that Cochrane has identified and added in a 
right additional “cause”. It implies that habit-persistence possibly is a so far neglected 
causal variable that should be included as it has contributed positively towards improving 
the models’ qualities in predicting the equity risk premium. 
 
Yet, the work to include habit-persistence into the utility function is more than just 
technical dexterity. It is a good example of how financial economists proceed in their 
ways of “doing” science within their research programme in their quest to improve 
predictability of phenomena under investigation. Nevertheless, many observers have 
criticised the profession of becoming too mathematical. Robert M. Solow: 
 
“Many outside observers and some critics from within the profession have interpreted this 
development as a sweeping victory for “formalism” in economics. The intended implication is that 
economics has lost touch with everyday life, that it has become more self-involved and less 
relevant to social concerns as it became more formal (and more mathematical).” (Solow 1997, p. 
42).  
 
Solow here makes the claim that no distinction is drawn between formalism and 
mathematics. He wants this line to be drawn. By doing so, he does not deny that 
practicing economists have increasingly turned to mathematical models when analysing 
an increasingly larger set of data, but it has not lost touch with reality: 
 
“A good model makes the right strategic simplifications. (...) Economic models are usually stated 
mathematically, but they do not have to be. (...) But mathematics turns out to be a very efficient 
way to express the structure of a simplified model and it is, of course, a marvellous tool for 
discovering the implications of a particular model. That is probably why outsiders tend to think of 
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model-building as just more formalism. That is a mistake. The mere use of mathematics does not 
constitute formalism.” (Solow 1997, p. 46).  
 
He continues by stating that mathematical models, often, focus on: ...one or two causal or 
conditioning factors, exclude everything else, and hope to understand how just these 
aspects of reality interact.” (Solow 1997, p. 43). Solow’s description of a mathematical 
model particularly well portrays my own understanding of what Cochrane’s “M” in 
CCAPM represents. 
 
If mathematics does not constitute “formalism”, what does? Solow explains: 
 
“If “formalist economics” means anything, it must mean economic theory constructed more or less 
after the model of Euclid’s geometry. One starts with a few axioms, as close to “self-evident” as 
they can be – although this is harder to do when the subject matter is more complicated than points 
and lines in a plane – and tries to work out all the logical implications of those axioms.” (Solow 
1997, p. 42).  
 
Here, we are told that formalism is related to axiomatic systems and deductions. In 
Chapter Three, section 3.2.3, I show that Cochrane applies this methodological strategy. 
Solow seems to imply that this is the turf of natural sciences and cautions against its use 
in the social sciences. Solow thus argues first that mainstream economics has become 
more mathematical and second that many mistake mathematics for “formalism”. 
 
Let me make three points. First, I do not think there is much of a difference between the 
mathematical model’s “one or two causal” factors and the “self-evident axioms” Solow 
makes references to in these quotes. Consider, for example, Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s axioms of rationality. They may be considered to be both “causal factors” 
and “self-evident” axioms. The axioms are considered to be valid starting points for both 
formal “deductions” and mathematical “derivations”. This is also the approach Cochrane 
takes when he sets out with the triad of temperaments. But Cochrane does more. He 
applies what Lakatos calls the positive heuristic of the research programme and 
establishes a new argument. i.e. the “surplus consumption ratio” as an auxiliary, belt, 
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assumption and integrates it into the stochastic discount factor (SDF). In this way, 
Cochrane augments the function, creates a specific analytical case, and compares its 
predictive success against the real situation data. Cochrane is thus following good 
financial economic practice. He makes the right “strategic simplifications” and uses 
mathematics as a “marvellous tool” as Solow sees it, to derive and discover. The 
distinction Solow draws between mathematical and formal economics might, therefore, 
not be as clear cut as he wants it to be in the case of Cochrane’s elaborations. 
 
More importantly, and this is my second point, Solow cautions against the use of 
formalism in economics. He claims that: 
 
“To the extent that economists have the ambition to behave like physicists, they face two 
dangerous pitfalls. The first is the temptation to believe that the laws of economics are like the 
laws of physics: exactly the same everywhere on earth and at every moment... (and second) 
...there is a tendency to undervalue keen observation and shrewd generalization... (and that) 
...there is a lot to be said in favor of staring at the piece of reality you are studying and asking, just 
what is going on here? Economists who are enamored of the physics style seems to bypass that 
stage, to their disadvantage.” (Solow 1997, p. 56).  
 
Solow seems to advice his fellow practitioners to take a less formalistic view of 
economics and engage more with reality as they observe it. Therefore, observation and 
causalities become more prominent than axioms and deductions which are perceived to 
be “formalistic, abstract, and negligent of the real world”. On my second point, Cochrane 
is a multiuser of the various tools that Solow discusses. Cochrane, as we know, takes a 
top down “formal” approach, enriches and extends it with mathematical derivations and 
takes the results to the empirical situations. It seems, therefore, that Cochrane’s tool-box 
is both large and versatile as he uses all available means to reach the goal of providing 
knowledge for use. On this point, Cochrane would have been supported by Lakatos who 
promotes positive heuristic that contributes to progressive the empirical and the 
theoretical reach of a research programme. 
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Third, and finally, Solow is keenly aware of the pitfalls when working at a low, empirical 
data level. He even characterizes data as “expensive” and theory as “cheap”. With this 
suggestion, Solow suggests that theory outruns the data: 
 
“In economics, model-builders’ busywork is to refine their ideas to ask questions to which the 
available data cannot give an answer. Econometric theorists invent methods to estimate parameters 
about which the data has no information”. (Solow 1997, p. 57). 
 
Despite this warning and having dismissed “formalism”, Solow does not see any real 
competing alternative to progress in the field of economics. I cannot find that Cochrane 
has a clear view on Solow’s final advice. On one hand, we have heard in Chapter Four, 
section 1.2.2, that Cochrane considers “theory” to lag behind the work done on asset 
pricing models. In contrast to Solow’s view, Cochrane argues that it is the theory that is 
“expensive” because it cannot provide a robust underpinning of his stories. On the other 
hand, Cochrane’s parameter estimates and calibrations can hardly tell us that asset prices 
are “efficient” in the sense that they are generated through processes that involve the 
representative triad of temperaments plus habit. In this sense, therefore, Cochrane indeed 
has embarked upon a trip against which Solow warns. 
  
In the end, Solow cautions against both formalism and too much “data-mining”. Instead, 
he endorses curiosity through observing the real world around us and the development of 
small scale mathematical models with only a limited number of causal influences. 
Cochrane, as I have just shown, traverses across all these dimensions and is an avid user 
of the available tools from fundamental principles to analytically convenient special cases 
that may also represent useful empirical situations.  
 
I think Cartwright would enjoy Cochrane’s versatility. But it has to be channelled in the 
“right” way. It involves drawing on three interconnected building blocks, i.e. 
fundamental principles, bridge principles, and auxiliary assumptions (see Chapter Four, 
section 4.4.3). Earlier, I explained that many philosophers of science believe economists 
have only a few fundamental principles and that they are used as premises for theorizing. 
In particular, I pointed towards two popular references; rationality and equilibrium 
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principles. Given the scarcity of such fundamental principles, economists, therefore, draw 
on a host of assumptions that in reality are very concrete concepts. Cochrane uses, for 
example, every-day terms such as financial markets, consumption, companies, investors, 
stocks, prices, returns, interest rates, risk premia, etc. Cartwright calls these references 
“socio-economic quantities”. Cartwright suggests there are good reasons why economic 
and financial models for that matter have these characteristics: 
 
“If you have just a few principles, you will need a lot of extra assumptions from somewhere else 
in order to derive new results that are not already transparent in the principles.” (Cartwright 2007, 
p.228).  
 
In Cochrane’s context, for example, the result of the triad of temperaments plus the habit-
persistence argument in the enhanced version of the CCAPM cannot be judged without a 
particular setting, i.e. that of financial markets and assets. These concrete concepts, 
therefore, increase the “range” of the derived consequences. Cartwright argues that what 
might happen in such models is problematic: 
 
“The problem is that we often do not know by looking at them that the specific derivations made 
in our models depend on the details of the situation other than just the mechanism itself operating 
on accord with our general principles. (...) We know that the results obtain because we know that 
they follow deductively given the formal relations of all the factors that figure in an essential way 
in the proof. But the whole point (...) is that the background factors should not matter to what 
happens. We are supposed to be isolating the effects of the features or process under investigation 
acting on its own, not effects that depend in a crucial way on the background.” (Cartwright 2007, 
pp. 231). 
 
What Cartwright here refers to as “general principles” and the “details of the situation” or 
the “background factors” are, I believe, respectively akin to CCAPM’s fundamental, 
core, principles and the auxiliary, belt, assumptions. The challenge for Cochrane is thus 
to distinguish the effects that these two broad sets, i.e. principles and assumptions have, 
individually, on the model-based results in relation to their empirical exposure. How 
much rationality, self-interest and risk aversion are there, for example, in the equity risk 
premium, and how much of the premium can be allocated to other aspects of the specific 
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situation and background factors such as consumption habit, the Joneses, almost perfect 
foresight, and the representative investor’s eternal life?    
 
I see two ways for Cochrane to proceed from here. In my first option, he continues to 
develop the CCAPM as before by searching for new and innovative additions to an 
existing framework as we have seen in the extension of the utility function towards 
habitual consumption. There is, for example, a growing literature that investigates how 
investor’s behaviour influence asset prices, i.e. behaviour finance. This direction of 
research might result in a larger set of auxiliary, belt, assumptions and, possibly, to better 
point-forecasts towards ever increasing specific analytically convenient special cases. 
Adhering to the negative heuristic with respect to the fundamental, core, principles, this 
first option will increase the model’s exposure towards the “background factors” that 
Cartwright discusses. In fact, if Cochrane seeks improved point-forecasts, he should 
include any facts concerning the targeted situation that makes a difference.  
 
The first option, I believe, would still protect the fundamental, core, principles. But there 
might be limits to what can be achieved. We recall that Cochrane feels “theory lags 
behind”. This might give rise to Cochrane’s view that:  
 
“No model has yet been able to account for the equity risk premium with low risk aversion, and 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) offer some reasons why this is unlikely ever to be achieved.” 
(Cochrane 2008, p. 266).  
 
On one hand, this view is hard to reconcile with other statements in which Cochrane 
expresses the opinion that he indeed seeks a resolution to the risk premium puzzle. On the 
other hand, he seems to allude to the difficulties of working within the confines of the 
current research programme. 57 
57 In a recent contribution, Cochrane (2011a) first states that “in fact, many economic events should be 
unforecastable, and their unforecastability is a sign that the markets and our theories about them are 
working well”. The he continues arguing for “getting the big picture of cause and effect right” when 
explaining a phenomena. The big picture Cochrane alludes to focuses on “one analytical tool”, keeping 
“analysis simple and elegant”, applying “simple and compelling logic”, and “stick to a few core principles 
because (…) nobody really know the detailed answers”. He contrasts this strategy with one that foresees a 
“wide assortment of analytical tools”, mixing “information from diverse sources” such as “economics, 
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In my second option, Cochrane could opt for establishing what Cartwright alludes to as 
claims about tendencies. This second option does not prevent him from augmenting the 
existing theory and model. It merely tones down the programmes ambitions with respect 
to deliver point forecasts. The discussion of these two options will take place later in 
section 4.3. 
 
Let me conclude. I see reverse-engineering as a mainstream activity. Nonetheless, 
mathematical dexterity and innovative auxiliary, belt, assumptions should not leave 
formalism too far behind. Cochrane seems to agree: “In general, empirical success varies 
inversely with theoretical purity.” (Cochrane 1999, p. 40). This makes my point. In which 
direction should the consumption based research programme then be taken? It can 
continue its elaboration to accommodate the data with the inclusion of an increasingly 
larger pool of auxiliary, belt, assumptions. Or the research programme can be re-directed 
towards what Cartwright (1999) calls tendency claims (see section 4.3 for a discussion). 
 
3. Justifying CCAPM and the empirical tests 
Earlier I showed how financial economists, like Cochrane, sought answers to a long 
standing research question in finance, i.e. the equity risk premium puzzle. We recall that 
the standard CCAPM and even the enhanced version including the external habit-
persistence formation could not fully explain this puzzle. In the next sections I, first, 
review why Cochrane still believes that the CCAPM, despite its empirical weaknesses, is 
the correct starting point for exploring the statistical behaviour of asset prices. Second, I 
review Cochrane’s suggestions on how the asset pricing research effort should be 
evaluated, i.e. what is the “litmus-test”. Third, and finally, I ask which parts of the 
research project is compared with the real situation data. 
 
political, sociological, psychological” perspectives. Cochrane’s analysis, I think, mirrors preference for a 
few fundamental core principles at the detriment of an extensive application of auxiliary, belt, assumptions 
to accommodate the “analytically convenient special cases”.  
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3.1 The CCAPM is the correct starting point 
From previous chapters we know that fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions combine to establish the central pricing formula, as well as the analytically 
convenient special cases. These cases are detailed mathematical models that define highly 
specific financial market cases. Only a few of these idealized and even fictional cases can 
be considered to be useful empirical representations. And when they are, they do not tell 
us much. In Chapter Four section 4.2, I discussed this in detail. Ultimately, however, the 
habit-persistent extended CCAPM does not deliver statistically successful results. 
Knowledge for use to the various stakeholders is, therefore, lacking. The model’s results 
are too dependent upon the “background” situations established by the auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions and are, as a consequence, not useful in situations different from those 
detailed and specified by the analytical cases. In this respect I referred to their lack of 
horizontal portability (see Chapter Four, section 3.1.5). 
 
Under these circumstances, we could expect that CCAPM’s modelling effort is at least 
questioned if not abandoned. Questioned it was as we saw in the reverse-engineering 
reaction. Abandoned it has, so far, not been. Cochrane, therefore, leaves no doubt. The 
CCAPM is the correct starting point – there is no substitute. Why is that? I think the main 
answer can be sought in his commitment to the fundamental, core, principles as I 
developed them in Chapter Three, section 2. In other words, Cochrane seeks to stay 
within what Lakatos referred to as the research programme and its heuristic in which the 
triad of temperament remains a protected element and the myriad of auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions progress the programme. I identify three reasons for this mind-set. 
 
First, Cochrane rejects the factor-based, “relative” approach taken by fellow financial 
economists such as Sharpe (1963, 1964) as well as Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996). (see Chapter Two, section 1.3). Cochrane makes his criticisms on three counts; 
how the explanatory factors are chosen, what they proxy for, and the achieved 
predictability against real situation data. It goes without saying that he believes his own 
version of CCAPM is able to hold its own and withstand this type of criticism. In fact, 
Cochrane believes that all this research effort can be subsumed under his, more general, 
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asset pricing theory. By now, however, we know that this is not defendable as I showed 
in Chapter Three, section 3. 
 
Cochrane’s criticism thus starts with the chosen “explanatory” factors. He says it is too 
easy to assign one or more factors such as the market portfolio in CAPM or the value and 
growth portfolios provided by Fama and French to a pricing model. He states: “By 
blindly including right-hand variables, one can produce models with arbitrarily good 
statistical measures of fit. But this kind of model is typically unstable out of sample or 
otherwise useless for explanation and forecasting.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 125). Next, 
Cochrane asserts that these types of statistical models do not explain where the factors 
come from in the first place and what they represent: “...one should always ask of a factor 
model, “what is the compelling economic story that restricts the range of factors used?” 
(Cochrane 2005, p.125). Not the movement of nearby assets, indices or portfolios, 
therefore, but underlying microeconomic set-ups and macroeconomic events influence 
the average returns, volatilities and co-movements. Cochrane, however, assures us that 
this is accounted for in his version of the CCAPM.  
 
Fama and French were aware of these shortcomings. Fama (1991) had prior to 
Cochrane’s critique anticipated some weakness in his framework with respect to how 
factors were “discovered”. Financial economists should be mindful not to go out with a 
“fishing licence” when searching for explanatory variables. Having made the factor 
choices, which are motivated by empirical experience, Fama continues by telling us that 
it leaves: “...one hungry for economic insight about how the factors relate to uncertainties 
about consumption and portfolio opportunities...” (Fama 1991, p. 1594). Fama thus 
played the ball back into Cochrane’s court. 
 
Cochrane finally also criticizes the factor models because of their insufficient ability to 
predict real situation data. He thus echoes earlier studies, which have shown that both the 
single- and multi-factor models have failed to produce robust statistical evidence for their 
claims. Nonetheless, Cochrane claims as we know that the results have improved to the 
extent that they are now on the verge of “statistical significance”. However, we also 
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know that he is critical of the empirical performance of his own research effort: 
“Unfortunately, this specification of the consumption-based model does not work very 
well.” (Cochrane 2005, p.43). But he quickly adds: “To understand the market premium, 
there is no substitute for economic models such as the consumption based model outlined 
above ...” (Cochrane 1997, p. 16). 
 
My second point for why Cochrane sees no alternatives to his own version of the 
CCAPM is that it should be considered the “missing” middleware that connects the real 
economy with financial markets. Cochrane thus portrays financial market activities as the 
crucial intersection between the two. The same cannot be said regarding the relative, 
factor based research programme. In fact, it was not Fama and French’s intention that it 
should fill the gap that Cochrane alludes to. Their goal was to predict time series of 
returns with other times series of returns. Nevertheless, Cochrane lets us know that 
something is wrong with this interface: 
 
 “Understanding the marginal value of wealth that drives asset markets is most obviously 
important for macroeconomics. The centrepiece of dynamic macroeconomics is the equation of 
savings to investment, the equation of marginal rates of substitution to marginal rates of 
transformation, and the allocation of consumption and investments across time and states of 
nature. Asset markets are the mechanism that does all this equating. (...) In fact the first stab at this 
piece of economics is a disaster in the way first made precise by the “equity premium” puzzle. (...) 
Clearly, finance has a lot to say about macroeconomic and it says that something is desperately 
wrong with most macroeconomic models.” (Cochrane 2008, p. 242).  
 
So far, main-stream macro economists have chosen to ignore Cochrane’s criticism and 
insights from the consumption based capital asset pricing research project. Of late, 
however, following the eruption of the global financial market and sovereign crisis in 
2007, voices of concerns have been raised in this direction (Borio 2012). Nonetheless, 
Cochrane, as a financial economist, is adamant with respect to the “M” in CCAPM: 
“Something like the consumption-based model – investors’ first order conditions for 
savings and portfolio choice – has to be the starting point.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 455). As 
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above, we are again told that the correct starting point for asset pricing research is the 
consumption based pricing approach. 
 
Third, as we have discovered, when Cochrane meets challenges with respect to 
statistically insignificant predictive results, he goes back to the drawing board and 
modifies his story based CCAPM from a theoretical and empirical point of view. The 
standard CCAPM has thus been overhauled in several reverse-engineering steps to make 
it comply with the real situations: “...these models are truly drastic modifications; they 
fundamentally change the description of the sources of risk that commands a premium in 
asset markets.” (Cochrane 1997, p. 13). This approach made us conclude that this is how 
models are built by the profession of financial economists. It is supported by John Stuart 
Mill as shown in Chapter Three, section 3.2.3, and by Lakatos, as referenced in Chapter 
Three, section 3. Cochrane, in other words, shows us how science is practiced. We also 
found that the fundamental, core, principles were left almost unchallenged in the reverse- 
engineering step. Most modification took place in the set of auxiliary, belt, assumptions.  
 
I think the practice of reverse-engineering reveals two interesting points: First, it 
indicates Cochrane’s thinking with respect to his world-view. It shows his ontological 
commitment both to the domain of finance and to the underlying order of things in that 
very domain. Cochrane tells us that this order can indeed be described in mathematical 
models that work only with a few main causes. If the first trial fails to predict the real 
situations, the auxiliary, belt, assumption, are reviewed and adjusted. Predictive failure 
should energize the scientist to go beyond his starting point of reviewing just a limited 
number of forces in isolation. New causes should be “added in” so that empirical tests 
may be run again. When, for example, the traditional CCAPM was unable to justify the 
large equity risk premium, the new habit-persistent CCAPM was developed. This, I think, 
is a good example of how scientific explorations have evolved in the field of finance. 
Nonetheless, it leaves us somewhat unguided in the “discovery phase” of the causes that 
would be “added” to the existing framework when encountering problems and its 
methodological basis. This commitment is certainly difficult to uphold in the light of the 
poor empirical results delivered from the enhanced CCAPM.  
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 Secondly, Cochrane’s research effort also exposes the readers to a belief that the more 
specific asset pricing theories become and the more specific the models of analytical 
cases and their extensions towards the real situations are, eventually, a scientific “break-
through” with respect to an adequate level of knowledge for use can be expected. Given 
the underlying complexities and richness encountered in the social and economic life of 
individuals, Cochrane’s effort is certainly ambitious. Can it be, we may ask, that the 
complexities are too high for his research project to be successful? Can it be that the real 
situations do not give rise to a theoretical description? If the answer is “yes” or even 
“may be”, one conclusion is that Cochrane’s asset pricing research approach is reaching 
self-imposed limits and, in the end, adds little to what informed investors, public policy 
makers and fellow academics already know, or can know. Empirical results, thus far, 
seem to support the possibility of answering the questions in this stylized way. Such a 
conclusion certainly would question the role of offering knowledge for use and giving 
policy advice stemming from this type of research. Additionally, it would give weight to 
my suggestion that Cochrane might want to redirect his focus away from point-forecasts 
of very specific financial market situations to a more general view of model-based 
tendency claims (see section 4.3 later).  
 
But hold on. Before we continue exploring the topics just raised, we still have a few other 
open questions to answer. First, what are the criteria used to judge the qualities of the 
CCAPM? Or to quote Alexander Rosenberg what is the “litmus-test”? (Rosenberg 1992). 
Second, what is actually being tested against the empirical situations? The CCAPM as a 
whole, its fundamental “core” principles, the specific “belt” assumptions, the central 
pricing formula, the convenient analytical cases category one, the analytical cases 
category two, i.e. the useful empirical cases, their functional forms - or even something 
else? Answering these questions are the topics for the next two paragraphs. Let us start 
with the first, i.e. the benchmark against which progress can be measured, i.e. the 
“litmus-test”.  
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3.2 The “litmus-test” 
Cochrane has written both theoretical and practical texts on finance and economics and 
their interconnectivity. These combinations are meant to advance the understanding of 
such matters and guide decision makers – be it investors, public policy makers, or fellow 
academics. A central theme has been the ability to predict the prices and returns on 
financial market assets. From Cochrane’s many publications, we can extract both his 
disappointments and encouragements. He tells us that the standard CCAPM “does not 
work very well”; but that single- and multi-factor models seem to “perform better”; that 
“daily, weekly, and monthly stock returns are close to unpredictable”; but that specific 
financial and economic variables “can, in fact, predict substantial amounts of stock return 
variation”. Many of his research papers are also forward looking and advice-centric. 
Here, are a few titles: “Where is the market going – uncertain facts and novel theories.” 
(1997), “New facts in finance.” (1999), “Portfolio advise for a multifactor world.” 
(1999a), and, finally, “Explaining the Poor Performance of Consumption-Based Asset 
Pricing Models.” (Campbell and Cochrane 2000). 
 
Based upon these title-samples and findings in previous chapters of this thesis, we can 
comfortably conclude that forward looking analysis, continued improvement in predictive 
success of the theories and models, and, in the end, specific policy advise count towards 
how success – or failure – of his project should be judged. This is also reflected in 
Cochrane’s efforts to explain away the equity risk premium, i.e. he cares about empirical 
confrontations and their evaluation. His effort boils down to finding and integrating the 
“right” explanatory variables into the analytical cases. They are thought of as stable and 
reliable causes that underlie and explain the surfacing pricing data. If these model 
adjustments can be adequately accounted for in the utility function, better prediction of 
future price and return levels could be expected. 
 
Predictability, as we have seen, is also one of the main items on Lakatos’ (1978) agenda, 
as it gauges the progression or degeneration of a scientific research programme. Research 
programmes are therefore not theoretical exercises. Lakatos saw them brought to the 
empirical situations and tested against the available data, i.e. they must be falsifiable. In 
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cases in which the predictions do not meet the required standards, the programme’s “hard 
core” is left unchallenged while the “protective belt” is adjusted in order to get the 
programme back on track again. We recall from Chapter Three, section 3.3, that Lakatos 
referred to this practice as the negative and the positive heuristic. Should these changes 
result in improved predictions, Lakatos tells us that the programme is theoretically and 
empirically “progressive”. The changes enable the programme to expand in a positive 
way, i.e. it contains “excess empirical content” and “this excess empirical content is well 
corroborated”. But changes to the protective, belt, assumptions can also harm the 
research programme. In these cases, the programme “degenerates”. This is often the 
situation when the “belt” just accommodates new assumptions in an ad-hoc manner 
whenever predictions fails – Lakatos explains. 
 
Against this background, we can conclude that Cochrane’s research programme seeks 
progression along the lines that Lakatos suggests. The benchmark used to measure this 
success is thus the quality of the predictions. Rosenberg reminds us: “...I held that long-
term improvement in predictive success is a necessary accomplishment of any discipline 
that claims to provide knowledge, and especially to provide guidance to policy. (...) 
Hereafter I shall assume most economists share the commitment to improvement in 
predictive adequacy as a necessary condition for the certification and expansion of 
economic knowledge.” (Rosenberg 1994, p. 56). This statement, I think, is highly 
relevant to Cochrane’s own effort. His “litmus test”, to borrow Rosenberg’s terminology, 
is predictability. Successful predictions, therefore, it is taken as a basis for generating 
knowledge for use. But what is tested?  
 
3.3 What is “tested”? 
Cochrane, as I pointed out earlier, is not overly explicit in the way he distinguishes 
between theories and models. He is in good company with most fellow financial 
economists. It might be, I concluded, that it does not matter to him because he uses the 
terms interchangeably. However, when it comes to choosing between different models, 
but also theories, Cochrane seems to become more specific and, even, a bit picky. We 
have been told, for example, that, despite its empirical inadequacies, “something like” the 
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CCAPM and not Fama and French’s multi-factor portfolio models is the correct starting 
point. Cochrane gets even more concrete by saying: “...when evaluating a specific 
model...” (Cochrane 2005, p. 304). From this, we can extract that Cochrane has a 
preference for a certain type of model and that it is the model that is brought to the 
empirical road-test. The model’s claims are compared with the real situation data, and 
even if it does not perform well, it should not be rejected. 
 
Nonetheless, by preferring CCAPM over the multi-factor models, Cochrane, implicitly, 
also chooses a specific theoretical framework - one that is supported by his programme’s 
fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, assumptions. This contrasts to the 
factor-based pricing models which do not use the same principles and assumptions. We 
may ask, therefore, whether it is the theories and not the model that are being compared 
with the real situation data. Here is the answer: “Statistical testing is one of many 
questions we ask in evaluating theories...” (Cochrane 2005, p. 305). Surprisingly, 
Cochrane here focuses on the testability of a theory. Analogue to what I said above on 
models, it is the theory that is brought to the empirical road-test and tested against data. 
Even if does not perform well,  it should not be rejected.  
 
This is confusing. We are here confronted with a situation in which Cochrane lets both 
models and theories be subject to “evaluations”, i.e. “litmus-tests”. In earlier chapters of 
this thesis, I concluded that there is a difference between the two. For the purpose of the 
discussion here, recall that Cochrane told us that the analytical cases are derived from the 
central asset pricing formula. Within this hierarchy of detailed analytically special cases, 
we find a few that represent the empirical situation. I indicated that the risk free interest 
rate is such a case. Other analytical cases do not represent well. My favoured example is 
the utility function with its risk aversion and subjective discount factor.  
 
My conclusion is that the complex of fundamental, core, principles and the specific, belt, 
assumptions in one form or the other are represented in these analytical cases. Following 
the HD account I introduced in Chapter Four, section 4.3, I suggest, therefore, that the 
analytical cases are used as a basis for making explicit predictions concerning financial 
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market prices, valuations and returns. Since these predictions, or claims, are deduced 
from various hypotheses as reflected in the fundamental principles and supported by 
various background situations, they contain theory, empirical concepts, as well as the  
structural relations within the model. As a consequence, it is particularly difficult to say 
decisively which part of the asset pricing research programme that is being compared 
with the real situations.  
 
In the previous Chapter Four, section 3.2, we recall that Hausman suggested that the 
point of a model lies in the “...conceptual explorations in providing the conceptual means 
for making claims that can be tested and can be said to be true or false.” (Hausman 1992, 
p. 78). I think Hausman is telling us something right. At the end, it is the claims that a 
model makes that are tested against the real situations. These claims are, for example, 
regarding realized stock returns, interest rates, and the size of the equity risk premium. 
No claims, however, related to the rationality of the investor or his/her self-centeredness 
are made. These are assumed to be installed a priory. 
 
In the end, I think we can follow Lakatos idea, i.e. it is the research programme as a 
whole that is brought forward to the empirical situations and not its individual elements. 
In this set-up, models are assembled with the help of the core and the belt. Then the 
claims of the model are tested against the real situation data. If these claims are false, the 
research programme is modified in accordance with the programme’s heuristic by 
protecting the core and altering the belt. Then a new empirical test is run in the hope to 
achieve a better result. If this should be the case, the programme can be characterized as 
progressive. The models and the theories are thus tested directly while the research 
programme is tested indirectly.   
 
4. CCAPM, the challenges and a possible solution 
Having established Cochrane’s belief that the CCAPM is the right starting point and that 
its theory and model supported predictions are simultaneously tested against the real 
situations, I can continue my discussion. The topic I now want to address is related to the 
main challenges Cochrane’s research programme encounters when taken to the data. In 
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the following three sections, I address the challenges one at a time. The first points 
towards the realisticness or realisticness of the assumptions underlying Cochrane’s 
analytical cases. The second questions whether satisfactory predictive results are too 
difficult to achieve because the world is not as “ordered” as Cochrane wants it to be. 
Third, and finally, I ask whether the model-based predictions are claims about tendencies 
and not as Cochrane presents them, point-forecasts. When discussing these three points, I 
let my discussion be informed, primarily, by Milton Friedman and Nancy Cartwright. 
 
4.1 Idealizations, fictions and unrealistic assumptions 
My concern here is related to the tension between model-world and the real-world. The 
model-person, for example, is troubled with his/her first order related decision related to 
his/her preferences for risky assets that come with a an uncertain, contingent, future pay 
out. In contrast, the real individual has other interests. He/she is a family person. There 
are many of them. Their lives are lived in several socio-economic spheres. Most of their 
activities unfold outside the domain of the financial markets. They might be engaged in 
social and cultural networks. They do not only care about consumption and investments. 
They do not buy Arrow-Securities but stocks in companies like Google and Caterpillar. 
And they do not know the expected statistical distribution of future economic events and 
payoffs. Now, how can Cochrane reconcile these two worlds? The problem he faces is 
twofold; first, he knows that the model-world is constructed upon idealized and fictitious 
assumptions, and, second, he knows that he has not been able to make accurate 
predictions concerning actual values in the real situations, i.e. point-forecasts with this 
specific type of model view.  
 
My focus in this section is, therefore, on the ideal and fictional assumptions that 
Cochrane uses and their role in the development of the consumption based asset pricing 
model. These assumptions change or distort some particular features of a concrete object. 
Near to perfect foresight, first order condition, equilibrium situation, and eternal life 
spans are my favoured examples. Such idealizations and fictions are thus different from 
an abstraction. An abstraction emerges with its relevant features intact for the task at 
hand after irrelevant features have been subtracted. The triad of temperaments are thus an 
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example of an abstraction. Fictions, therefore, depart from the truth while abstractions 
retain their truth-value. I argue that idealized and fictitious assumptions create unrealistic 
pictures of the real situations they seek to explain and predict.  
 
Does Cochrane care about whether his asset pricing assumptions are realistic or 
unrealistic? As far as I can see, he makes no explicit references to answer this question. 
Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that this topic is on Cochrane’s mind: 
 
 ”We can use the theory positively, to try to understand why prices or returns are what they are. If 
the world does not obey to a model’s predictions, we can decide that the model needs 
improvement. However, we can also decide that the world is wrong, that some assets are “mis-
priced”, and present trading opportunities for the shrewd investor. This latter use of asset pricing 
theory accounts for much of its popularity and practical application.” (Cochrane 2005, p. xiii).  
 
Besides using the terms “theory” and “model” as if they are the same, Cochrane in this 
quote, confirms “predictability” is the litmus-test according to which a model shall be 
judged. This practice of developing theories and models to support the advancement of 
scientific knowledge puts Cochrane firmly within the standard framework of other 
scientific endeavours and the consumption based research programme. His view, 
however, that the world might be wrong is adventurous. One consequence thereof would 
be, for example, that the observed historical equity risk premium may be regarded as 
wrong while the modified CCAPM including habit-persistency is right despite its 
unrealistic assumptions. If this view is upheld, all statistically rejected asset pricing 
models are right because none of them “did away with” the equity risk premium. In fact, 
the shrewd investor could feel inclined to follow the advice of a model that predicts a 
zero, or even negative, equity premium. This investor’s portfolio would contain stocks in 
the anticipation that all other market participants would, sooner or later, discover the 
under-valued asset class and flock in and bid the equity prices up. This would earn the 
initial investors a healthy holding period return. Many investors, however, have suffered 
considerable financial pain because they fell in love with their idea that markets are 
“wrong” and would correct from an undervalued price level and return to the “right” 
price.  
260 
 
 I think, therefore, Cochrane would be better off dismissing his own suggestion that the 
pricing model built on unrealistic assumptions could be right and the market, i.e. the 
empirical observations are wrong. And, with little doubt, I think he agrees. This would 
bring Cochrane back to the drawing board in order to ponder over why his model claims 
do not explain the real situations well. One insight might be that Cochrane decides that 
the model needs a different or an altered set of fundamental, core, principles and 
auxiliary, belt, assumptions than those currently put to work because they do not give 
good statistical results. A good example of Cochrane’s response to inadequacies of the 
CCAPM’s ability to make precise forecast concerning actual values was found in the way 
the habit-persistence argument was added to the power utility function. In this case, the 
fundamental, core, principles were left unchallenged and more realisticness was 
embedded in the central asset pricing formula. I think this added realisticness acts at two 
levels. First, habit-persistent driven consumption is in itself a realistic assumption. It is 
observable in the data and could be confirmed by introspection (we care about the 
Joneses’ don’t we?). In addition, it tells a good story. The second level of added 
realisticness is related to the asset pricing model itself. When a realistic assumption is 
included into its utility function, the whole model becomes more realistic. It, therefore, 
increases the completeness of the model. Since the predicted results modestly improves 
on the accuracy of empirical tests performed with the original CCAPM, the research 
programme has experienced both a “theoretically and empirically progression” – to use 
Lakatosian terms. 
 
Unrealistic assumptions are also a topic in a much referred to publication by Milton 
Friedman in 1953. Sixty years hence, this text remains remarkably influential when the 
topic of “method” is discussed amongst economists and philosophers of science alike. 58 
It will inform my discussion on the use of unrealistic assumptions in theories and their 
models. In the context of my analysis, I focus on a few particular aspects around the 
empirical model-claim tests and their assumptions. I am thus interested in how 
Cochrane’s research approach “fits” with a few central arguments found in Friedman.  
58 A good summary is Uskali Maeki’s The Methodology of Positive Economics (2009). 
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 According to Friedman, a scientific theory should be judged only by its predictive 
success within the particular domain in which it is intended to be used. At the time of 
writing in 1953, it can be assumed that Friedman honestly thought that such success 
could be achievable:  
 
“Viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged by its predictive power for 
the class of phenomena which it is intended to “explain”. Only factual evidence can show whether 
it is “right” or “wrong” or, better tentatively “accepted” as valid or “rejected”. As I shall argue at 
greater length below, the only relevant test is the validity of a hypothesis is a comparison of its 
predictions with experience. The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted...” 
(Friedman 1953, p. 8). 
 
Friedman tells us that theories, which also Cochrane believes to be a complete and 
integrated set of assumptions, are brought directly to the real situations: 
 
 “...the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is (...) whether they are 
sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only 
by seeing whether the theory works.” (Friedman 1953, p. 15).  
 
Unrealistic assumptions, which we can read as being “untrue”, are used in all sciences. In 
fact, Friedman claims that: “...to be important (...) a hypothesis must be descriptively 
false in its assumptions.” (Friedman 1953, p.14). The fact that unrealistic or even false 
assumptions are used to create these theories should not, according to this view, 
undermine our confidence in them.  
 
Friedman’s position is often referred to as “instrumentalism”. There are several 
interpretations of this influential “methodology” (Maeki 2009). According to one of these 
views, which I adopt for the purpose of the following discussion, theories are used as 
instruments or tools to develop testable hypothesis. Provided that such predictions are 
statistically successful, the individual assumptions underlying the theory were of little 
relevance. Theories, as a consequence, are judged by the quality of their predictions in 
their designated areas, and not by the realisticness of their assumptions. Solutions to 
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practical problems are, therefore, the main thrust – and not their “truth-value”. We also 
note that single assumptions are not the subject of comparison with the real situation data 
– theories are, and theoretical hypothesis should be rejected whenever the predictions 
were contradicted. 59 
 
According to this brief stylized view, we could interpret Friedman to advice Cochrane not 
to be overly concerned regarding his collection of unrealistic assumptions spanning from 
the representative investor’s near to perfect foresight via zero taxes and transaction costs, 
to immortality. As long as the original and the new habit-persistent CCAPM versions and 
it theories predict well in their designated areas, unrealistic assumptions can be 
considered secondary to the research project. They are in other words, “sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand”.  
 
In contrast to Friedman’s view, I think Cochrane should care about the assumptions he 
deploys. They also matter when the predictions are inaccurate relative to the real situation 
data. Cochrane seems to agree. He included habit-persistency in the original CCAPM in 
light of its predictive failures. I suggest however, that Cochrane’s idealized and fictional 
assumptions distorts the real situations and are unable to account for and capture the 
complexities of the realm in which he develops his theory. But this is deliberate Cochrane 
tells us. He needs to reduce complexity in order to make his theory manageable when 
making point-forecasts in the designated area. 
 
But Friedman’s instrumentalism and advice put Cochrane under pressure. What shall he 
do when the consumption based pricing model fails to give acceptable predictions related 
to the real situations? Should Cochrane’s asset pricing research programme be rejected 
based upon its unsuccessful statistical test results at a particular level as exemplified by 
the equity risk premium puzzle?  
 
59 Of course, it is challenging to test an assumption by its own. Consider, for example, Cochrane’s notion of 
the first order condition. This assumption does to emit a predictive implication on its own but is 
interconnected with several other assumptions.  
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As we know from section 3.1 earlier in this chapter, Cochrane clearly believes in the 
merits of the consumption based asset pricing research programme. It is the only and the 
correct starting point for any research into the behaviour of asset prices and their 
behaviour. To Cochrane, a failure to make accurate point-forecasts in specific situations 
is not deemed as a failure of the whole research programme.  It is, therefore, not the 
programme that is under review, but more the analytically convenient special cases that 
were fitted out to address a specific case. We recall the following statement: 
 
“Unfortunately, this specification of the consumption based model does not work very well. (...) 
As you can see, the model is not hopeless – there is some correlation between sample average 
returns and the consumption based model predictions. But the model does not do very well.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p.43).  
 
Taking this view, i.e. comparing the accuracy of the claims made by the analytical cases 
and even see them unsuccessful, leaves Cochrane undisturbed with respect to a request to 
abandon the consumption based asset pricing programme on the grounds of rejected 
claims. A failure in a part of the programme is even to be expected, Mill told us. And I 
think he is right. An isolated failed empirical test should, as a consequence, not question, 
in a serious way, the whole. I, therefore, believe Cochrane could, on one hand, follow 
Mill’s and Lakatos’ advice and continue to explore innovations to the theoretical 
structure that can bring more statistical success home when the analytical cases do not 
perform well in a first empirical test-run. He has already demonstrated how this can be 
done with regards to the adoption of the habit-persistence argument. Nevertheless, on the 
other hand, Cochrane might want to tone down the dominance of CCAPM’s point-
forecasting abilities as we saw, for example, in the study of the equity risk premium 
puzzle. I will have more to say about this topic in the upcoming section 4.3. 
 
In sum, Cochrane tells us that a progressive asset pricing research programme rests on 
underlying theories concerning ideal and fictitious assumptions with respect to the 
investor, the markets and the assets. He also tells us that the consumption based asset 
pricing programme should be evaluated by the statistical success of its model-based 
predictions. I argue that such assumptions are unrealistic because they distort their real 
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situation counterparts. Friedman, however, tells Cochrane not to worry because every 
theory uses unrealistic assumptions. What matters is that the predictions do well within 
the designated area. But the problem is that Cochrane’s idealized and fictional 
analytically convenient special cases do not perform well when confronted with the real 
situations – as was demonstrated with the equity premium puzzle case.  
 
In light of the predictive deficiencies, I think Cochrane’s option number one, as pointed 
out earlier in section 2.5, is to try even harder within his chosen a priori mathematical 
deductive methodological approach, relying on a few fundamental, core, principles, and 
continue to adjust the auxiliary assumptions situated in the “belt”, to improve the point-
forecasting abilities of his analytical cases. The second option, I think, is to argue that the 
model-based claims are not what they are perceived to be, i.e. point-forecasts of asset 
price behaviour as shown, for example, in the historical equity risk premium puzzle case. 
The first option is the topic for the next section 4.2, and thinking about the second option 
is the topic in section 4.3.  
 
4.2 A complex socio-economic world 
Cochrane has thus far defended his version of the CCAPM as the best alternative when 
exploring asset price behaviour, accepted that several of his assumptions are unrealistic, 
and advocated that such assumptions should not stand in the way of scientific progress. 
All these components are, however, questioned by the fact that neither the original nor 
the new, habit-persistent CCAPM, so far, have rendered statistically significant results in 
their designated areas. Let me first let Mill remind us before I turn to a modern date 
writer who points to similar topics: 
 
“We cannot try forms of governments and systems of national policy on a diminutive scale in 
laboratories, shaping our experiments as we think they may most conducive to the advancement of 
knowledge. We, therefore, study nature under circumstances of great disadvantage in these 
sciences; (...); in circumstances, moreover, of great complexity, and never perfectly known to us; 
and with far greater part of the process concealed from our observation.” (Mill 1874, E5, V51). 
 
Can it, therefore, be that John Dupré is right when stating: 
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“In short, the failure of economics to predict future phenomena might reflect not merely the 
inability of economists to take account of the numerous factors impinging on economic reality, but 
rather the inherent unpredictability of the phenomena concerned.” (Dupré 1993, p. 8).  
 
This is a radically different view than those encountered earlier in Mill, Lakatos, 
Friedman and Cochrane. Dupré here questions whether there is, at all, an underlying 
order in the social realm in general, and economics in particular, that renders itself to 
investigations along the lines economists proceed.  
 
Dupré suggests that economists may respond to his challenges in two ways. Either they 
reveal themselves as “empirical optimists” or “metaphysicists”. Dupré immediately 
rejects the latter in his short text mentioned above and refers to his book The Disorder of 
Things (1993a), in which he argues against such a response. I will not discuss Dupré’s 
elaborations on metaphysics here, but move on to his views related to “empirical 
optimism”. He tells us that we can certainly try to improve model specifications and hope 
for more accuracy in empirical test results. This effort, however, can best be 
characterized, as Dupré calls them, “blind faith” and “forlorn hope”. Given the relevance 
of these comments, let me explore “empirical optimism” in the context of Cochrane’s 
asset pricing research approach.  
 
I claim that Cochrane is an empirical optimist. His research project starts out with the 
observation of phenomena in real situations. It is a fact that individuals buy and sell 
stocks in financial markets, and that the outcome of such interactions manifest itself in 
collectable asset prices. It is also a statistical fact that stocks, over a long time horizon, 
have returned more than investments in risk-less assets such as US Treasury Bills. It is 
also an observed fact that investors consume. From these various activities in and around 
financial markets, Cochrane pulls together stories which he makes explicit in asset 
pricing theories and models. As I have pointed out earlier, there is no doubt that 
Cochrane believes in his profession’s effort to uncover main mechanisms that generate 
the observable data. I exemplified this in my earlier discussions around the re-engineered 
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extensions of the utility function to incorporate the term habit-persistence as developed in 
the context of the Campbell-Cochrane (1999) enhanced CCAPM. 
 
Cochrane, of course, knows that the representative investor is a theoretical construct. He 
furnishes him/her with two main behavioural drivers, i.e. rationality and self-interest, and 
one counteractive, i.e. risk aversion. In this respect, Cochrane idealizes, deforms and even 
fictionalizes the real investor’s many sentiments. Cochrane’s approach, therefore, wants 
to capture the non-random, or systematic part of individual behavioural causes, and then 
explore, in a mathematical rigorous way, the consequences of the individual’s decisions. 
When those consequences are derived, the results are compared to the real situations. 
Implicitly, Cochrane assumes that the representative investor behaves like the real 
investor. The hypothesis is thus that the triad of temperaments plus habit-persistency 
explains the behaviour of an individual in a real situation. As we know, this hypothesis is 
rejected. Cochrane, I believe, is neither surprised nor disappointed. It was just a first 
approximation. More theoretical and modelling work in the form of reverse-engineering 
is thus needed and well supported by the heuristic of the research programme. 
 
But what does a first approximation exactly mean? In principle, it envisages a final 
grand-solution that can explain and predict all asset prices along these lines: “The 
consumption based model is, in principle, a complete answer to all assets pricing 
questions, but works poorly in practice.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 41). This ambition requires 
ontological and methodological commitments. And it seems that Cochrane is willing to 
sign on both counts. 
 
Cochrane thus demonstrates first, the ontological commitment towards the special 
domain of financial markets within the field of economics. Markets exist, they are 
ordered, asset prices are emitted from this isolated “world”, and they give the foundation 
for further exploration. Second, Cochrane also shows methodological commitment that 
follows a stylized HD account as I showed earlier in Chapter Four, section 4.3. This 
commitment, as we know, goes beyond the relative pricing models presented by financial 
economists like Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French encountered in Chapter Two, 
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section 1.3. Cochrane seeks as the NBER charter advises him, to “understand and 
measure the sources of aggregate or macroeconomic risk that drive asset prices” (see 
Chapter One, section 1.3). Despite these commitments, the CCAPM has not yet reached 
its zenith. This raises two main topics: If the first approximation from these commitments 
is wrong, how can Cochrane justify continuing within this particular framework, i.e. “try 
a bit harder”, and hope that the result will be absolutely or approximately right? Second, 
is the socio-economic world inherently unpredictable, as Dupré suggests, in the sense that 
it does not lend itself to the order Cochrane seeks to impose on it? 
 
Earlier I established Cochrane’s view that the CCAPM is the “correct” starting point for 
asset price research. This locks him into an ontological commitment that seems to imply 
“trying a bit harder” inside that paradigm would lead to a final break-through with respect 
to explaining and predicting the behaviour of stock prices. “Trying a bit harder”, 
however, does not always lead to better results.  
 
This is in particular the case if what so far has been done has not led to improvements. 
Can it be that Dupré is right after all?  Tony Lawson claims that, over the past fifty years, 
“contemporary orthodox economics” has made little progress. He identifies the main 
reason for this in the use of a deductive approach that practicing economists borrowed 
from the natural sciences:  
 
“According to deductivism (as I shall use the term here) to be able to explain something is to 
deduce it, or a statement of it, from a statement of initial and boundary conditions plus universal 
laws of the form “whenever event (type) x then event (type) y.” (Lawson 1994, p. 259).  
 
He continues: “Just as the persistent search for event regularities of a probabilistic kind 
characterizes econometrics, so the positing of strict constant conjunction is a condition of 
axiomatic-deductive “economic theory.” (Lawson 1994, p. 260). Lawson is not particular 
fond of what he here alludes to, i.e. deductive mathematical reasoning that presupposes a 
“constant conjunction” ontology. 60 He advocates a modelling approach that takes the 
60  “Constant conjunction” expresses a view that events co-occur, i.e. event regularities of the form 
“whenever event x then event y”. These event regularities are not necessarily “universal”. They can also be 
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causes as having real tendencies. I think Cochrane could subscribe to Lawson’s 
suggestions, and I will explain why in the upcoming section 4.3.                             
 
The problem Lawson has with the “orthodox economists”, and I think we can count 
Cochrane to that particular pool, is that they do not pay enough attention to the ontology 
of the phenomena they set out to research. There is little attention, Lawson claims, 
towards what the ontology of the “nature of social material” truly is. This limits our 
understanding of the phenomena under review, i.e. asset prices, and what kind of 
knowledge that can be extracted. His solution, therefore, is to take a “realist” stance. This 
approach would reveal that the social context is not founded upon “constant conjunction” 
regularities in the data, and an a priori reasoning supported by deductive mathematics. On 
the contrary. Lawson’s view implies an ontological commitment towards terms such as 
unobservable “structures”, “mechanisms”, “powers”, “tendencies”, “capacities”, etc.  
 
Again, as pointed out above, I think Cochrane’s modelling approach is not too different 
from what Lawson advocates. Certainly, I cannot find any commitment from Cochrane 
towards the concepts that Lawson mentions. Nonetheless, Cochrane does not just write 
down an abstract set of axioms and make deductions. Cochrane does “causal modelling”. 
He starts with agents of a certain type, i.e. representative investors and let the triad of 
temperament plus habit-persistence dictate their behaviour and actions. Then he adds in 
more causes to get more concrete and realistic models. Cochrane calls these more specific 
models analytically convenient cases. They aim at stretching themselves all the way to 
the real situations, i.e. their goal is to give empirically useful representations. Beside 
Lawson, as I showed in the previous Chapter Four, section 4.4.3, also Cartwright 
advocates this type of causal modelling. However, Lawson is not fond of the specific set 
of initial causes.  
 
In a more recent contribution, Lawson (2009) proves himself to remain sceptical towards 
the “orthodox” economics methodological approach. When analysing the current 
probabilistic. Most models applied to data in the socio-economic sphere are structured to account for 
probabilistic events.  
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economic and financial market dislocations, which I have mentioned elsewhere in my 
thesis, he claims: 
 
“For the most fundamental problems of recent years, I shall argue, is not so much the use of 
specific inappropriate models, but the emphasis on mathematical deductivist modelling per se. 
Such models can provide limited insight at best into the workings of the economy. Indeed I will 
suggest that the formalistic modelling endeavour mostly gets in the way of understanding.” 
(Lawson 2009, p. 760). 
 
Lawson thinks that this view is defendable, and I share his view: 
 
“...with a bit of reflection both on the nature of social reality, and also on the sorts of conditions 
that must hold for the mathematical method in question to have utility, we can not only better 
understand and explain the failings of the latter methods in the hands of mainstream economists, 
but also recognize that such methods are unlikely very often to provide insight no matter what 
substantive economic theories are used in their construction”. (Lawson 2009a, p. 126). 
 
Unfortunately, this is not the place and time to continue exploring these interesting views 
in any further detail. The point I want to make at this stage, however, is a crucial one. On 
one hand, the socio-economic context might be more complex than Cochrane’s central 
pricing formula and analytical cases can hope to reveal. Both Dupré and Lawson, albeit 
from different perspectives, point towards this possibility. There might, as a consequence, 
be some compelling arguments in favour of abandoning the “constant conjunction” view 
that many financial economists, including Cochrane, hold for a “realist” point of view. 
On the other hand, empirical optimism cannot in the case of Cochrane, stem from doing 
more of the same. Because such optimism is only warranted if Cochrane can show that 
his modelling efforts have improved. So far, however, this track-record is limited, to say 
the least. This result should play well into Lawson’s court and argue for Cochrane to 
move away from his ontological and methodological approach. 
 
The second topic I alluded to above besides “trying harder” within the contemporary 
orthodox economic paradigm is related to the “complexity” of the socio-economic world 
view. I showed earlier in Chapter Three section, 1.3.1, how Buchanan and Hendry, but 
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also Solow earlier in this chapter, argued for a simplification strategy when facing 
complexities. By now we also know that Dupré points towards the difficulties in doing 
science in such a world. Here, I want to address another view that pulls in Dupré 
direction. It is that of Cartwright. She also has a vision of the real world as we encounter. 
It is a “dappled world” she says, and claims: 
 
“This book supposes that, as appearances suggest, we live in a dappled world, a world rich in 
different things, with different natures, behaving in different ways (...). For all we know, most of 
what occurs in nature occur by hap, subject to no law at all. What happens is more like an outcome 
of negotiations between domains than the logical consequence of a system of order.” (Cartwright 
1999, p.1).  
 
She speaks of complexities, events and domains. Financial economists, I have argued, 
think along the same lines. Their strategy is to separate out the economic “domain” and 
explore the consequences of the representative investor’s character and directed 
behaviour. Within the confines of the financial market structure and with the support of 
financial assets, a partial equilibrium situation can be established. Although financial 
economists in their research effort do not underestimate the challenges arising from the 
complexities of the underlying real situations, they seem to believe “trying a bit harder” 
can help them understand and “control” such environments. And control leads to policy 
advice. As we have seen, Cochrane holds such a view. But what are the consequences?  
 
Cartwright gives advice: “My belief in the dappled world is based in large part of the 
failures of these two disciplines [physics and economics] to succeed in these aspirations. 
The disorder in nature is apparent.” (Cartwright 1999, p. 1). Cochrane’s strategy of 
simplification with respect to the investor, the markets and assets, seek to impose the 
order that Cartwright claims is not obvious. Dupré lends support by claiming that: 
 
“... the suggestion that the failures of economics derive not merely from excessively simplistic 
assumptions, crude theories of human nature, and so on, but rather from a fundamental mismatch 
between the kinds of phenomena with which economics is concerned, and widely held conception 
of what it is for an investigation of any realm of phenomena to be genuinely scientific.” (Dupré 
1993, p. 2).  
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 So far, Cochrane is the first to admit that his microeconomic based approach to asset 
pricing has not delivered on its promise to give knowledge for use. While he leaves 
ontology and methodology unquestioned, fellow economists and philosophers alike urge 
him to rethink. Can it be that Cartwright and Dupré are right? And if yes, how can 
Cochrane proceed?  
  
4.3 Point-forecasts or claims about tendencies? 
Cochrane’s research programme thrives on the idea that observable asset prices and their 
macroeconomic counterpart, i.e. consumption data co-vary. This covariance can be taken 
as a manifestation of some underlying socio-economic processes. Detecting such 
processes may, therefore, uncover the thus far hidden truth regarding the relationship 
between asset prices and investors’ behaviour. For this purpose, Cochrane develops a 
theoretical framework of ideal and fictional individuals, markets and assets in a separate 
realm. This theorizing and their concepts rest on unrealistic assumptions. They are made 
explicit in applied mathematical models. Deductive mathematical reasoning is thus used 
as the language to establish internally consistent models. These models are thus 
extensions of the theoretical framework – as Daniel M. Hausman maintains. (see Chapter 
Four, section 3.2). But at the same time, the consumption based asset pricing model is 
also meant to capture the perceived fundamental, non-random causes that act on people’s 
decisions and, ultimately, assets prices. As such, the models are also set up to account for 
real situations – as Milton Friedman states (see section 1.2.4).  
 
The idealized and fictional consumption based asset pricing model is, therefore, 
considered resembling the real situations in some significant ways. This importance is 
captured in the fundamental principles, i.e. triad of sentiments, i.e. rationality, self-
interest, risk aversion, plus, new, habit-persistency. From the triad plus habit proposition, 
the belt of auxiliary assumptions guides the theory towards very specific analytical cases 
that, unfortunately, do not make accurate predictions concerning actual values in the real 
situations they are asked to address. Apparently, stock prices, excess returns, and equity 
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risk premia are influenced by other causal factors as well. John Stuart Mill called them 
the “disturbing causes”:  
 
“When the principles of Political Economy are to be applied to a particular case, it is necessary to 
take into account all the individual circumstances of that case; not only examining to which of the 
sets of circumstances contemplated by the abstract science the circumstances of the case in 
question correspond, but likewise what other circumstances may exist in that case... (...) These 
[latter] circumstances have been called disturbing causes.” (Mill 1874, E5, V58).  
 
The socio-economic sphere is indeed “dappled”, “complex” and  prone to be “disturbed” 
by a multitude of interacting causes. On these points, I side with Cartwright, Dupré and 
Mill. Cochrane’s option to continue along his methodological path of deductive 
mathematical reasoning and “trying a bit harder”, therefore, seems to have come to an 
end. On this, I agree with Lawson. It is questionable, therefore, how helpful a research 
programme is when it relies on isolated, idealized and fictional elements and deductive 
reasoning when its aim is to target predictive accuracy in a specific designated area. 
Stakeholders should at least consider this question when seeking knowledge for use in, 
for example, a policy setting context.  
 
In this section, I continue discussing how Cochrane’s research programme can be 
interpreted in light of its lack of statistical success at the level of specific analytical cases, 
such as the one seeking to explain the equity risk premium puzzle – or stock market 
prices and their excess returns over the risk free interest rate for that matter. I am now 
pointing towards the second option that I brought up at the end of section 4.1. There, I 
asserted that model-based claims should possibly not be viewed as point-forecasts of 
asset price behaviour. Can it be, I ask here, that point-forecasting stock prices, excess 
returns, risk premia etc. are overly ambitious? If yes, what is the alternative? I will start 
answering this question with a few arguments rendered in John Sutton’s fine little book 
Marshall’s Tendencies (2000), and put them in the context of Cochrane’s asset pricing 
model. The philosophical discussion will, again, be informed by Cartwright’s suggestions 
towards the end of this section. 
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In Sutton’s discussion of Alfred Marshall’s analysis of tendencies, he makes references to 
the natural phenomena of tides observable in some coastal areas:  
 
“The tides are affected by two different influences. The primary influence lies in the gravitational 
pull of the moon and the sun, and this contribution can be modelled with great accuracy, but the 
tides are also affected by meteorological factors, and these are notoriously difficult to predict.” 
(Sutton 2000, p. 5).  
 
Now, Sutton goes on to argue that a similar set-up has been used by economists to 
explain economic phenomena. I would add that financial economists such as Cochrane as 
well as Fama and French are no exception. First, economists seek to capture the primary 
causes of observed phenomena and make them “explicit” in a model-based theoretical 
framework. When predictions fail to confirm the workings of the empirical situations, 
they, next, add in secondary influences whenever necessary to improve the predictions.  
 
Tides, it turned out, were easier to forecast than the behaviour of economic agents. In 
both cases, however, the grand idea was to develop a complete and deterministic model-
based upon a few justifiable fundamental principles plus some auxiliary influences. 
Sutton reminds us that when using probabilistic models, we would often refer to the 
systematic part of an equation, on one hand, and its error term on the other. While the 
systematic part as captured in the fundamental principles was considered to be truthful 
representations of the real situations, the error term would address the non-systematic 
influences. With hindsight, this framework is not particularly impressive. Yet, it carries a 
strong ontological commitment towards the world being an ordered place that can be 
explained in a simplistic way. And not only that. The belief, which is still widely held, 
and also shared by Cochrane, is that fundamental, core, principles and auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions exist, can be identified, and measured. We certainly encountered a good 
example of this attitude in Cochrane when he added the habit-persistency argument to the 
power utility function.  
 
I would not argue against the possibility that such ideal assumptions reflect real situations 
and mirror properties and relationships. My scepticism is directed towards the 
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identification and measurement aspects. Consider again the analytical case of risk 
correction that Cochrane argues is a main component of investors’ fear when buying 
stocks (see Chapter Four, section 3). Risk aversion is certainly something to which we 
can relate. Financial economists, however, have chosen to consider it as a main causal 
factor behind investor’s behaviour. But how can it be identified, measured and 
transported across various situations and through times? What about the entirely opposite 
sentiment of greed? How is greed related to risk aversion? What are their relative 
strengths in influencing behaviour, and, ultimately, stock prices? So far we have no 
conclusive answers to these fundamental questions. 
 
As we were exposed to in the previous section, Lawson suggests that “trying harder” 
within the confined field of so-called “orthodox economics” cannot be the right approach 
to answer the above questions. We might, therefore, need to lower our expectations with 
respect to coming up with a “complete” model of asset prices. Cochrane’s claim that his 
version of the CCAPM can, “in principle give a complete answer to all the questions of 
the theory of valuation” might, as a consequence, be overstretched – in particular in light 
of the predictive failures so far. While awaiting the results of such “orthodox economics” 
and “empirical optimism”, we might ask them, in the mean-time, to consider reviewing 
their model-based claims. We might even ask whether they consider these claims to be of 
the “right kind”, i.e. such that give knowledge for use by the various stakeholders. 
 
Yet, while scientific progress in tides forecasting has been steady, little progress has been 
made in the field of economics. Can it be, Sutton asks, that: “...the most we can expect of 
economic analysis is that it captures the “tendencies” induced by changes in this or that 
factor?” (Sutton 2000, p. 4). This question points towards the subtitle to his book, i.e.  
“what can economists know?” In some areas of mathematical deductive modelling, 
Sutton argues, a lot can be learned. He points, for example, towards Black and Scholes 
“option pricing model”. 61  
61 This model does not involve any theory of the investor, and it does not need any of the fundamental core 
principles such as those in use by the CCAPM to back out a particular asset price. In fact the model 
calculates the option price given the price and price volatility of the nearby assets, i.e. the underlying 
security, and other given variables such a risk free interest rate and investment horizon. My point, 
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 In other areas of economics and finance, less can be learned from such standard models 
because the underlying reality does not give away its secrets to the mathematical 
structure imposed upon it. In such situations, an alternative approach is required. Sutton 
argues, therefore, in defence of a “pluralistic approach”. It implies putting less emphasis 
on the standard paradigm of orthodox economics, such as rationality, when analysing 
social phenomena. In some ways, the pluralistic approach echoes Lawson, who argues 
that empirical regularities in the economic-sphere are too few and too far apart to be of 
help in developing knowledge for use. What economists can hope to know is, therefore, 
more limited than what Cochrane aims for. 
 
But Cochrane seems to prefer working within the deductive tradition by focusing on a 
“one analytical tool”, keeping “analysis simple and elegant” applying “simple and 
compelling logic”. Nonetheless, as we saw earlier in section 2.5, footnote 57, some 
moderation has crept into his thinking. Those statements are certainly interesting in the 
context of our discussion. Here is a broader representation of Cochrane’s more recent 
views.  
 
Referring to a debate which reflects on the merits of unconditional and conditional 
forecasting in economics and finance, Cochrane argues pro “hedgehogs” and against 
‘foxes”: 62  
 
“Milton Friedman was a hedgehog. And he got the big picture of cause and effects right in a way 
that foxes around him completely missed. Take just one example, his 1968 American Economic 
Association presidential speech, in which he said that continued inflation would not bring 
unemployment down, but would lead to stagflation. He used simple, compelling logic, from one 
intellectual foundation. He ignored big computer models, statistical correlations, and all the 
therefore, is that very little can be learned about the derived option price because we are not given access to 
why, for example, the stock price behaves as it does.  
62 Cochrane says that unconditional forecasting is using “historical correlations to guess what comes next 
with no need of structural understanding” while conditional forecasting predicts “the answers to questions 
such as “if we pass a trillion dollar stimulus, how much more GDP will we get next year?”, and “if we tax 
the rich, how much less will they work?”. Cochrane is advocating the latter, conditional, forecasting 
strategy, because “here we are trying to predict the effects of a policy, how much will the future change if a 
policy is enacted”. 
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muddle around him. And he was right. (...) Good hedgehogs stick to a few core principles because 
they know that nobody really knows detailed answers. Principles matter. They produce wiser 
conditional forecasts. (...) [while foxes used] “...a wide assortment of analytical tools, sought out 
information from diverse sources, were comfortable with complexity and uncertainty, and were 
much less sure of themselves...they frequently shifted intellectual gears (...) People who use a wide 
range of analytical tools, mixed economics, political, sociological, psychological, Marxist-radical 
and other perspectives end up hopelessly muddled.” (Cochrane 2011a).   
 
This statement challenges some of Cochrane’s earlier references to what he presented as 
the classical cases in finance and how they can be approaches in the context of the 
analytically convenient special cases and their empirically useful representations. In those 
cases brought to us in a fox-like manner, I found how a myriad of auxiliary, belt, 
assumptions were tagged onto the fundamental, core, principles in order to derive, 
mathematically, the outcomes. Now we learn that Cochrane prefers the hedgehog’s big 
idea of sticking with a “few core principles” rather than the foxes’ “hopelessly muddled” 
strategy.  
 
I think Cochrane is wise enough to choose his “horses for courses” and that both 
approaches are, in different situations and for different purposes, warranted. My focus is, 
therefore, on a related topic. I ask what he can learn from being a hedgehog focusing on 
the “big picture” of “core principles”. My point is that he can apply them to identify 
tendencies in the real situations. Tendencies, in this respect, can be related to his 
statement that “economics is pretty good at such structural forecasting. (...) At least we 
know the signs and general effects. Assigning numbers is a lot harder”.  But how can he 
use “the general effects”? I suggest that Cochrane can see them as claims regarding 
tendencies – as Sutton discusses in the context of Marshall. Such tendency claims are not 
applied to find out what happens in very particular circumstances because of Mill’s 
disturbing causes. But they will get the “sign” right. Let me address my suggestions in 
the following paragraphs of this section. 
 
We have been exposed to claims about tendencies earlier in my thesis in the context of 
Maeki, Mill, Cartwright and Lawson. Take, for example, Mill:  
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 “Doubtless, a man often asserts of an entire class what is only true of part of it; but his error 
generally consists, not in making too wide an assertion, but in making the wrong kind of assertion: 
he predicated an actual result, when he should have predicated a tendency to the result – a power 
acting with a certain intensity in that direction.” (Mill 1874, E5, V75).  
 
In the previous section 4.2, Mill reminds us about the “great complexity” found in the 
Political Economy and that their underlying processes are “concealed from observations”. 
Cartwright, Lawson, but also Dupré, we recall, painted a similar picture of the modern 
socio-economic world. But Mill’s main concern in the above extract is what we can hope 
to find in such complex situations and what kind of inferences we can make. His answer 
is that we should concentrate on identifying and extracting “powers” from the real 
situations, and from there, use them to make claims about tendencies.  
 
I also sense that such tendency claims might be portable across a wider range of 
situations. Can it be that Cochrane is well advised to reconsider his research project in 
light of Sutton’s and here, Mill’s suggestions? Instead of insisting on particular point-
forecasts in a designated area, should Cochrane rather say that the CCAPM research 
programme aims at making claims about tendencies in the real situations? Can it be that 
the triad of temperaments previously used in the original CCAPM plus the habit-
persistence in the new CCAPM points him in exactly that direction? Can it be, should 
Cochrane choose to pursue this suggestion, that such effort remains within the research 
programme’s heuristic and, in addition, leads to theoretical and empirical progress? Let 
me explore tendencies in more detail before I seek answers to those questions. 
 
What makes a tendency claim? Cartwright gives guidance: 
 
“I suggest that it [the “law” of electron-electron repulsion] says that electrons – because they are 
electrons – have the capacity of the given strength to repel other electrons, where for nice 
situations we have some rules for how to calculate the results that occur when this capacity 
operates jointly with others, and where in messier situations we are entitled at least to claim (...) 
the electron might cause a second to move away. What better alternatives are available?” 
(Cartwright 2008, p. 135).  
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 Cartwright here points towards the “capacity” that are inherent in the electron to produce 
certain effects. 63  The electron  carries this effect-generating ability across various 
situations, i.e. both within “nice” and “messier” situations. They are, therefore, not 
context dependent, but can be seen as something enduring throughout. In the former nice 
setting, the precise effects of such capacities can be calculated. In the latter messy setting, 
this is not easily done. Yet, in both situations the electron still has the “capacity of the 
given strength”. However, there are situations in which a capacity exists but is 
counteracted, i.e. it may completely fail to manifest itself because it is suppressed by 
other causal factors at work in that particular situation. But, at least in one particular way 
this is not a problem, Cartwright assures us: 
 
“To assert (...) that aspirins relieve headaches is to claim that aspirins, by virtue of being aspirins, 
have the capacity to make headache disappear. (...) Once the capacity exhibits itself, its existence 
can no longer be doubted.” (Cartwright 1989, p. 136).  
 
Capacities, therefore, are real:  
 
“Capacities are at work in nature, if harnessed properly they can be used to produce regular 
patterns of events. (...) What makes things happen in nature is the operation of capacities.” 
(Cartwright 1989, p. 36).  
 
Tendencies, as we have seen by Mill, are also real. They can be captured, and their 
existence in different situations can be tested. Cartwright now suggests that such 
tendencies can be found applying a so-called “Galilean experiment”: 
 
“Galileo’s experiments aimed to establish what I have been calling a tendency claim. They were 
not designed to tell us how any particular falling body will move in the vicinity of the earth; nor to 
establish a regularity about how bodies of a certain kind will move. Rather, the experiments were 
designed to find out what contribution the motion due to the pull of the earth will make, with the 
63 Cartwright’s use of the term “capacities” is almost identical to Mill’s use of “tendencies”. (Cartwright 
1989, p.224). I take this at face value and will use the terms interchangeably.  
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assumption that the contribution is stable across all the different kinds of situations falling bodies 
will go into.” (Cartwright 2007, p. 224). 
  
Cartwright’s suggestion is important for at least two reasons. First, she informs about the 
purpose of the Galilean experiment. It was neither used to make suggestions with respect 
to a particular case, nor aimed at making a regularity claim. The experiment, and this is 
the important second point, established a tendency claim, i.e. it found out what the stable 
contributions from one single cause, in this case the pull of the earth, is on the falling 
body. Galileo conducted the experiment by eliminating, as far as possible, all other 
disturbing causes so that he could measure the effect of gravitational pull in isolation. 
 
Now, can we find traces of capacities or tendencies in Cochrane’s writing? I think the 
answer is “yes, but”. Again consider the fundamental, core, principle that portrays the 
representative investor as rational, self-interested, risk averse and habit-persistent. Mill 
tells us, and I agree, that such character traits are engraved in the “whole man”. He/she 
thus “carries” the “triad plus habit” with him/her as he/she proceeds from one choice 
situation to another – be it to the stock exchange or to the grocery store. Some of these 
situations might be as Cartwright suggests, “nicer” than others. I suggest that such “nice” 
situations are few and far apart in the financial market situations given inherent 
complexities as described by Buchanan’s “interdependencies” and Hendry’s “evolutions” 
in Chapter Three, section 1.3.1. Since economic choice situations may be considered to 
be “messier”, it is important as Cartwright suggests, to isolate situations of particular 
interest and figure out the result when only one or a few causes are allowed to be present. 
 
In the context of Cochrane’s consumption based asset pricing model, Cochrane has not 
isolated a single cause, but wrapped three of them together, and then added a fourth. I 
referred to them earlier as the “triad of temperaments plus habit”. He could claim that 
financial market phenomena are governed by causal factors with stable capacities. Let 
me, therefore, explore what the consequences for Cochrane’s research programme are, if 
we think of Cochrane’s fundamental, core, principles as being able to reveal capacities or 
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tendencies of these four factors wrapped together in the real situations in the way Mill 
and Cartwright propose. 
 
First, I have, so far, given the analytically convenient special cases and their empirical 
usefulness a lot of attention. These cases carry both fundamental, core, principles and 
auxiliary, belt, assumptions within them. They are thus established using neo-classical 
economic theory, but they are also enriched with assumptions borrowed from outside the 
pure financial market context, and even from every-day concepts. Furthermore, in the 
real situations towards which specific claims are made, there are many unaccounted for 
“disturbing causes” that also influence the particular outcome. As a consequence, the 
model-based claims are not representations of the real situations. They make claims about 
the model-world. This can be taken as a good reason for re-directing the discussion away 
from point-forecasts for a real situation setting towards making tendency claims about 
them. It can be argued that such claims are more relevant for the stakeholders than what 
is today’s failed practice, i.e. point-forecasts.  
 
For example, let us assume, for now, that analytical cases and their predictions 
predominantly are carried by the fundamental, core, principles and that the triad plus 
habit have the capacity to generate effects, i.e. movements in stock prices, stock market 
returns, equity risk premia, etc. One can then make statements such as “whenever the 
triad plus habit operate unimpeded, stock prices will rise”. Consider next the risk 
aversion’s role in this statement. Cochrane claims it is an inherent stable human capacity 
in choice making situations with uncertain outcomes. 64  Risk aversion can have the 
capacity, in other words, to pull or push stock prices, stock returns or equity risk premia 
up or down across a wide range of situations, in different countries, and during different 
time periods. This capacity, however, does not say anything regarding the actual 
behaviour of stock prices, stock returns or equity premia because of the influence of 
“disturbing causes”. In this sense, the triad plus habit never operate unimpeded. But, as 
Cochrane argues, getting the “sign” right, i.e. the directional pull or push, is easier than 
64 Julian Reiss makes a similar case with respect to the growth of money in an economy. An increase in the 
supply of money thus has the capacity to raise the general level of prices. (Reiss 2008). 
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finding the exact “number” associated with its strength. In fact, this outcome was 
achieved with respect to the risk aversion parameter in the context of the equity risk 
premium puzzle (see Chapter Two, section 6.2). The risk aversion value is expected to 
have realization values between 0 and 2, but the predictions point towards a much higher 
number.  
 
Nonetheless, Cochrane could argue that risk aversion is present in the investor’s decision 
making processes but not to the degree that conforms to the real situations he targets 
because they are “dappled” and “messy”. This argues for the acceptance of making 
tendency claims in a financial market context. Such claims do not increase the statistical 
success of the consumption based capital asset pricing effort. It merely acknowledges the 
complexity of the subject matter and adjusts the expectations towards a more realistic 
view. Additionally, it would enhance the potential of “knowledge for use” that I see as a 
crucial outcome of this research programme. 
 
Second, following Lawson, who I introduced earlier in section 4.2, the acceptance of 
tendency claims establishes an alternative way of seeing the asset pricing research 
programme than what Cochrane has portrayed. Cochrane, or to an even higher degree, 
Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, have namely so far been searching for the 
“constant conjunction” or the “regularities” in the data. The classic topic of “risk 
correction”, in which an investor requires a mark-up, i.e. a risk premium for entering into 
a risky investment, is a case in point. We recall Cochrane’s statement “an asset whose 
payoff covaries positively with the discount factor has its price raised and vice versa” 
(see Chapter Four, section 2.1). A reference to data-covariance is a clear indication of his 
“constant conjunction” view. However, I have already objected to this orthodoxy. In this 
context, Mill resonates well: What Cochrane should have predicted is not “an actual 
result” but “a tendency to the result”. However, we can also use the constant conjunction 
view positively and claim, as Cartwright does, that regularities in data might originate 
from underlying causal capacities. It is thus the task of the scientific project to uncover 
such capacities. If this search is successful, the consumption based asset pricing 
programme could claim continued theoretical and empirical progression. As a 
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consequence, embracing tendency claims would not hinder the positive development of 
the research programme. In fact, Cartwright claims: “...knowledge of capacities is more 
basic in that it is more embracing and more widely useful than knowledge about 
regularities.” (Cartwright 1999, p. 77). 
 
Third, we are told that tendency claims are not made regarding particular outcomes but 
related to what a model’s main causes tend to generate as effects. Should the triad plus 
habit be able to support claims concerning tendencies in the real financial market 
situations, such claims should also be detectable in a range of situations. Tendency 
claims, therefore, should be horizontally portable from one situation to another (see 
Chapter Four, section 3.1.5). Cartwright points out: “I take it that a causal structure is a 
specific arrangement of features of the world - causes - that act together to produce 
different effects. We are supposed to imagine experimenting on the various causes in the 
structure to see how a given variation in a particular cause affects the effect. What do 
capacities do beyond that? They articulate what the given cause contributes across all 
possible causal structures, where this will in general be different from the effects 
produced in any one causal structure by varying the cause.” (Cartwright 2008, p. 135). 
With this intervention, Cartwright argues that capacities are a more fundamental category 
than causes. They exercise their presence across “all possible causal structures”. This can 
be taken to support the view that investors are, for example, rational, self-interested and 
risk averse across all possible structures. However, their intensity may vary and even be 
completely counteracted by other causes.  
 
Fourth, if the triad plus habit principle can be used for making tendency claims about real 
situations across time and places, then the point-forecast focus of the programme can be 
toned down. This ontological and methodological innovation to the consumption based 
capital asset pricing endeavour, I believe, is well within the boundaries of a Lakatosian 
research programme. It uses positive heuristic to encounter the lack of success when 
point-forecasting and supports the programme’s theoretical and empirical progress. With 
this I do not intend to assert, as I referred to above, that the effort of improving point 
forecasting should be halted. As I believe in the importance of predictions as a litmus test 
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for measuring empirical progress, this should still be a main focus of Cochrane’s research 
programme. As a consequence, predictive quality and tendency claims may go hand in 
hand. When, for example, risk aversion turned out to be a positive, albeit too large, the 
direction has the right sign. What I want to see is a “confidence interval” around this 
parameter value that would alert its users about “danger ahead” when applied. In this 
sense, theoretical and empirical progress is still the goal and, as we have seen in the triad 
plus habit innovation, achievable.  
 
Can we wholeheartedly embrace the concept of tendency claim? A few words of caution 
are appropriate. Earlier, I showed how Cartwright advocates the virtues of the “Galilean 
experiment” in which only a few dominant causes are isolated in order to analyse their 
effects in a particular situation. “Details of the situation” and the “background factors”, 
Cartwright suggests, should be eliminated as much as possible. Only then is the 
experiment “shielded”, and its effects can be traced back to the isolated causes. If we 
have good reason to think those causes have stable tendencies (as with gravity, and as is 
presupposed for the triad plus habit in Cochrane’s use of his models) we will be enabled 
to identify what the canonical effect or contribution is of those causal factors with stable 
tendencies. If this can be established, the findings can be made, horizontally, portable to 
other situations, as claims about contributions that will occur. Cochrane’s version of the 
CCAPM research programme has not entered that league yet. He has so far focused upon 
specific and granular analytical convenient cases. His auxiliary belt, therefore, carries the 
“details of the situations”. Without these details, there is little to do for the triad plus habit 
proposition. As a consequence, it is almost impossible to find out what happens when the 
triad and habit proposition acts on its own. In fact, triad plus habit do not produce 
anything if left alone. 
  
Next, we do not yet have a full understanding of how to identify the contributions from 
the “triad of temperaments plus habit”, the auxiliary, belt, assumptions, and the disturbing 
causes which operate in the real situations that the model seeks to explain and forecast. In 
other words, if it is the web of causes, i.e. core and belt, that produce the model’s result, 
which difference, then, does the triad plus habit make? To answer this question, we need 
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to say, first, that such financial market capacities exist, i.e. make an epistemic statement, 
and, second, have a method that can identify, extract and allocate these capacities to their 
respective causal factors. Financial economists can, of course, commit to the first 
requirement, but will be at loss in giving complete answers to the second. Financial 
market situations are too complex, unstable, and interconnected. Creating a clean 
experimental zone in which causal contributions can be allocated to principles, 
assumptions, and the disturbing causes have not been achieved.   
 
Additionally, I have often highlighted Cochrane’s preference for the “theory heavy” 
approach taken to understand asset prices and their behaviour. Fama and French’s 
“factor-modelling” stand in contrast to this neo-classical methodology. Can it be, I ask, 
that the triad plus habit principles stand in the way of further progress? Can we use them 
to learn about financial markets so to make tendency claims, or even point-forecasts? It is 
certainly the case that Cochrane “works with theory” from an a priori starting point and 
then derives consequences that he believes to be useful for empirical representation. But 
is a theory-heavy approach a good starting point for establishing knowledge for use in 
relation to activities in complex financial situations? Lawson’s “trying harder” analogy 
comes to mind. And if Lawson is right, is Cochrane’s orthodox methodology, at all, able 
to explain the phenomena and establish claims about tendencies? Maybe Cochrane 
should give even more weight to the findings of the factor-based, relative research effort 
than he initially envisaged.  
 
And, as a final word of caution, I wonder how we can be sure that the financial market 
situations and their manifestations, i.e. prices, excess returns, equity risk premia, carry in 
them processes that can be captured and used by financial economists to render 
knowledge for use by their stakeholders. It is certainly true that their methods, be it 
visible in structural equations or time series analysis or the H-D approach, so far, have 
not been able to establish acceptable point-forecasts. Do we have any reasons to believe 
that such or other innovative methods can extract causal factors with stable capacities? 
My answer here is tentative; not being able to establish tendencies is not evidence good 
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enough that they do not exist, and that they cannot be discovered. But such a discussion 
might take us into the field of metaphysics that Giere (2008) warns against. 
 
In sum, I argue that Cochrane’s current methodological approach is possibly too orthodox 
and might not be appropriate for what he wants to explain. When encountering 
anomalies, Cochrane swings between stories, theories, models and tests and indicates a 
high degree of flexibility with respect to reverse-engineering at a deep level inside his 
applied mathematical model. In this respect, he uses the opportunities Lakatos has offered 
in the “protective belt” to their fullest in order to back out highly specific point-forecasts. 
Cochrane thus portrays himself as a “fox”. Yet, more focus on ontology and methodology 
along the lines that Mill, Sutton and Lawson just suggested might be more beneficial, i.e. 
become a true “hedgehog” using the triad of temperaments plus habit as the few and main 
“principles”. Where Cochrane seeks unique outcomes and even precise point-forecast 
concerning stock prices, expected excess returns and equity risk premia, he might be 
better advised to treat his model-based predictions as claims about tendencies instead. 
Nevertheless, a shift in focus would let Cochrane continue using “predictive success” as a 
litmus test when evaluating the outcome of his asset pricing research programme – 
drawing on the advice given by the positive and negative heuristic. And it will not hinder 
the theoretical progression of his distinct research programme. The programme can thus 
progress both theoretically and empirically. What this shift in focus brings is, however, 
not an improved predictability but a humble delivery of knowledge for use.  
 
5. Statistical philosophy - a way out? 
So far we have found that Cochrane is adamant with respect to the importance of using 
the consumption based asset pricing approach in developing a better understanding of 
financial market activities and establishing links upwards to macro-events and 
downwards to investors’ behaviour. We are told investors’ first-order condition for 
savings and portfolio choice is the “correct starting point” in an exercise aimed at 
providing knowledge for use. Earlier I argued that the assumptions are simplified, ideal, 
fictional and unrealistic. They are used to establish an isolated, non-complex, socio-
economic model world. It cannot be expected, therefore, that such theories and their 
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models represent the real situations well. Nonetheless, the fundamental, core, principles 
and auxiliary, belt, assumption form the foundation for the “litmus test” when measuring 
predictive success, i.e. scientific progress. As we recall, this aspiration found its outlet in 
what Cochrane referred to as reverse-engineering at a deep technical level inside the 
utility function while still keeping the character of the rational, self-interested and risk 
averse investor in-tact and unchallenged. This approach, I commented, is well within the 
heuristics of the consumption based asset pricing programme. 
 
However, we sensed Cochrane’s preference not to focus too intensively on the statistical 
quality of the predictions when extending the analytical cases towards the real situations. 
This is understandable. Both his original and the new habit-persistent CCAPM are 
rejected due to the lack of predictive success in the pursuit of explanation in the specific 
case of the stock prices, excess returns and the equity risk premium puzzle. But if the 
litmus test is not the sole criteria what else should we focus on? I already pointed towards 
three areas of considerations; More realistic assumptions can be added, the socio-
economic reality might be too complex for what his asset pricing model seeks to capture, 
and tendency claims might be a better alternative than point-forecasts when explaining 
real situations. As far as I can judge, Cochrane does not consider these suggestions. 
Instead, he presents his own solution. In the next sections, I analyse Cochrane’s 
stimulating suggestions. 
 
5.1 De-emphasizing predictability 
In the middle of his book on Asset Prising (2005), Cochrane positions a paragraph 
denoted “Statistical Philosophy”. It seems somewhat misplaced but gives valuable 
insights to Cochrane’s thinking around the topic of theory and model assessment. Below, 
a long quote sets the scene: 
 
“Statistical testing is one of many questions we ask in evaluating theories, and usually not the 
most important one. (...) Think of the kind of questions people ask when presented with a theory 
and accompanying empirical work. They usually start by thinking hard about the theory itself. 
What is the central part of the model or explanation? Is it internally consistent? Do the 
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assumptions make sense? Then, when we get to the empirical work, how were the numbers 
produced? Are the data definitions sensible? Are the concepts in the data decent proxies for the 
concepts in the model? (...) Are the model predictions robust to the inevitable simplifications? (...) 
How much fishing around for functional forms, data definitions, proxies, and innumerable other 
specification issues, did the authors do in order to produce good results? Finally, someone in the 
back of the room might raise his hand and ask, “if the data were generated by a draw of i.i.d. 
normal random variables over and over again, how often would you come up with a number this 
big or bigger?” This is an interesting and important check on the overall believability of the result. 
But it is not necessarily the first check, and certainly not the last and decisive check. Many models 
are kept that have economically interesting but statistically rejectable results, and many more 
models are quickly forgotten that have strong statistics but just do not tell as clean a story.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 305). 
 
From this extract, we understand that many questions may be asked towards achieving a 
better understanding of  what a theory and its models are, and what they are used for. The 
questions can be allocated to two different categories. In the first category, we find 
questions related to the theory itself while the second accommodate those related to the 
empirical tests and achieved results. 
 
Cochrane thus wants us to ask whether the mathematical structure and the story are 
consistent and make intuitive sense. This topic was also addressed by Gibbard and Varian 
(1978) as I pointed out in Chapter Four, section 1.2.2. Furthermore, Cochrane wants to 
be challenged on how he operationalizes and measures concepts used in asset pricing 
research. I have discussed the main topics earlier in my thesis. I found that Cochrane’s 
applied mathematical model, i.e. the “M” in CCAPM and the more detailed and specific 
analytical cases are well supported by a set of assumptions, ranging across a few 
fundamental, core, principles to more numerous auxiliary, belt, assumptions. I now turn 
to the latter part of the long Cochrane quote that I introduced. 
 
At the very end of that insert, Cochrane sums it all up by de-emphasizing the value of 
empirical tests. Statistical results should not be the “last and decisive” check. He tells us 
that history is full of examples where statistically rejected models continue to “live-on”. 
We recall, for example, that Sharpe’s single-factor CAPM was superseded by Fama and 
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French’s multi-factor “style” models. The reason for this, Cochrane claims, was that they 
presented the readers with a more “interesting” and “clean story” (see Chapter Two, 
section 1.3). This statement certainly reduces the relative importance of the widely used 
litmus test of predictability relative to the other above mentioned criteria. Cochrane thus 
suggests that it is possible to achieve scientific progress by not only relying on the 
quantitative results of statistical accuracy as measured by standard statistical tests, but 
also from reviewing the results against the back-drop of qualitative criteria.  
 
Cochrane even claims:  
 
“The classical theory of hypothesis testing, its Bayesian alternative, or the underlying hypothesis-
testing view of the philosophy of science are miserable descriptions of the way science in general 
and economics in particular proceeds...” (Cochrane 2005, p. 305). 
 
He doubles up: 
 
“Fifty years ago, the reigning philosophy of science focused on the idea that scientists provide 
rejectable hypothesis. This idea runs through philosophical writings exemplified by Popper 
(1959), classical statistical decision theory, and mirrored in economics by Friedman (1953).” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 306).  
 
Cochrane’s own idea of scientific progress, he admits, is closer to those of Kuhn (1970) 
and McCloskey (1998). The advantage of their work, Cochrane claims, is that these 
authors circle in on what genuinely goes on in the economic “laboratory”; much rhetoric, 
a lot of convincing and little focus on “the largest t-statistics”. 
 
Cochrane here highlights a possible disconnect between what the scientific method 
“prescribes”, and what financial economists truly do back home. He certainly seems to 
advocate less focus on the value of statistical measures. Given what we so far have read 
with respect to his asset pricing research approach this is somewhat puzzling. It certainly 
does not square up to his euphoric statements I alluded to earlier of how asset pricing 
research efforts are on the verge of achieving “predictive successes”.  
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 De-emphasizing predictions do not go down well in some quarters. We recall that 
Rosenberg (1994) was unyielding with respect to this defining characteristic of a 
progressive science: 
 
“For the purpose of this book, I stipulate the following implication of the economists’ commitment 
to an empirical epistemology; a scientific discipline should be expected to show a long-term 
pattern of improvements in the proportion of correct predictions and their precision.” (Rosenberg 
1994, p. 18). 
 
We recall that Rosenberg does not believe that this “long-term improvement” has been 
evidenced in the part of economics that he reviews, i.e. micro-economics. The predictive 
ability of economics has been too weak. But Rosenberg is in particular intrigued by the 
apparent immunity of economics against persistent empirical evidence of rejections. 
Rosenberg argues that this failure can be traced back to the choice theory as found inside 
the standard microeconomic based utility theory. From his point of view, this choice 
theory is nothing more than advanced “folk psychology”, and this is certainly neither a 
necessary nor sufficient basis for any science. Following this rather negative assessment, 
what is Rosenberg’s suggestion to economists: 
 
“If we are to apply, test and improve the explanations we make with the hypothesis that agents 
engage in rational choice, we need to measure the “initial conditions” to which we apply this 
hypothesis. Especially, if we want to improve our predictions, we need to improve our 
measurements of the states of the agent to which we apply the theory in order to secure predictions 
about behaviour.” (Rosenberg 1994, p. 124).  
 
Rosenberg continues: 
 
“We cannot expect the theory’s predictions and explanations of choices of individuals to exceed 
the precision and accuracy of the common sense explanations and predictions with which we have 
all been familiar since prehistory.” (Rosenberg 1994, p. 129).  
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The core of the argument thus goes towards improving our understanding of choice, and 
the conditions under which they are formed and taken. If this cannot be achieved, 
scientific explorations on the basis of this orthodoxy cannot be expected to render a better 
outcome than what any informed layman would be able to suggest. 
 
In this context, I think Cochrane could formulate a good reply to Rosenberg’s first 
suggestion. He could argue that we have augmented our understanding of the “initial 
choice” conditions because of the inclusion of the habit-persistency argument related to 
“keeping up with the Joneses” in the investor’s utility function. The adoption of this 
external benchmark intuitively makes sense. Nonetheless, it is more difficult to address 
Rosenberg’s suggestion that such enhancement might be classified as advanced “folk 
psychology” and nothing more. Rosenberg is not overly explicit in drawing the line 
between the “psychology” and more scientifically founded elaborations. But it could be 
that he believes that a rational choice model is not in any ways superior to or even 
necessary as long as we use some “common sense and understanding”. In the end, 
Rosenberg argues, predictive success is the ultimate benchmark for scientific progress. 
However, this advice takes us towards accepting Friedman’s instrumentalism – a view I 
oppose on grounds given above in section 4.1. In the following, I do not intend to address 
the relatively rich literature which has formed on instrumentalism beyond what I have 
already mentioned there.  
 
Rosenberg finds that economics cannot be characterized as an empirical science because 
such sciences thrive on predictive success based upon theoretical progress. Towards the 
end of his book Economics – Mathematical Politics Or Science Of Diminishing Returns 
(1994), Rosenberg concludes that economics is rather a form of mathematical politics. 
Space does not permit a proper analysis, so we have to leave it as suggested.  
 
Hausman (1992) and Lawson (2009), also point towards the lack of predictive success 
within the standard neo-classical paradigm of economics. Hausman, however, and in 
contrast to Rosenberg, sees the merits of continuing with a set of a priori fundamental 
principles that have been established inductively as articulated in most micro-economic 
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supported theories of the consumer. When their predictions fail, Hausman suggests in the 
spirit of Mill, to ask economists to try again within the same framework. Lawson, we 
know by now, resists this view. He argues for a shift away from the orthodox neo-
classical microeconomic principles that hitherto have, unsuccessfully, been applied to the 
complex socio-economic topics that do not easily surrender to the efforts made by the 
profession. Hausman, like Maeki, following Mill and Cartwright, but in contrast to 
Rosenberg, argues that economics is an empirical science – but inexact. Hausman, 
furthermore, is of the opinion that economists use models for conceptual explorations 
from which claims can be made. I have argued earlier that Cochrane’s asset pricing 
research programme goes further than mere explorations (Chapter Four, section 3.2) 
 
What do Rosenberg and Hausman’s suggestions mean for Cochrane’s research effort? 
Cochrane certainly could argue that the asset pricing research programme is a branch of 
the scientific project aimed at understanding human action in a societal context. His only 
support for this argument, so far, has been predictive success. It is clear that Cochrane has 
not provided sufficient evidence that would allow him to defend this proposition. Hence, 
as long as this support is lacking, it is difficult to accept Cochrane’s claim that the 
consumption based asset pricing research programme is part of the “scientific project”.  
 
If Cochrane reformulates the success criteria to be “scientific progress” rather than 
“predictive success”, I think he stands a better chance of attracting listeners. He could, for 
example, point to developments from single- to multi-factor pricing models and to the 
integration of habits into the standard CCAPM. Nonetheless, this shift in emphasis from 
predictive success to scientific progress would be opposed by the Lakatosian view of 
measuring a programmes’ progress both on theoretical and empirical merits. The point to 
stress here is the way this progress has been achieved – namely through predictive 
failures. In this sense, progressive sciences thrive on mistakes as Mill, Lakatos and 
Hausman suggest it should.  
 
In sum, I think Cochrane suggestions of including the external benchmark of habitual 
consumption has improved our understanding of investor’s choice situations or “initial 
292 
 
conditions” as Rosenberg calls them. Nonetheless, despite this theoretical progress, there 
is only modest predictive progress to confirm that the investor carries habitual persistence 
across time and states in a way that makes the argument “visible” in the asset prices. 
Nonetheless, I think we can qualify Cochrane’s effort as a Lakatosian progress.  
 
5.2 Interesting and clean stories? 
Nonetheless, let me return to the broader question related to the evaluation of theories. I 
do not intend to discuss whether Cochrane’s list of assessment criteria given in the long 
extract above is complete and accurate but rather turn to his last assertion that models 
may continue to live on despite having been statistically rejected. The intriguing part of 
the claim is that the survivors rather tell an “interesting” and “clean story” than showing 
“statistical significance” through high “t-statistics”. Cochrane takes the lead when 
claiming: 
 
“..., I can think of no case in which the application of a clever statistical model to wring the last 
ounce of efficiency out of a data set, changing t-statistics from 1.5 to 2.5, substantially changed the 
way people think about an issue.” (Cochrane 2005, pp. 304). 
 
Additionally, Cochrane tells us that Fama and French’s model has replaced Sharpe’s 
CAPM. Why? He claims that the innovative character of the multi-factor model changed 
the way people think about asset pricing. Intuitively it makes sense that many factors 
influence asset price level and behaviour, and that these factors, possibly, originate in the 
properties of a company, i.e. their “size” and “valuation” as Fama and French suggest. 
The two authors’ effort and explanations were, as Cochrane tells us, more “persuasive”, 
“interesting”, “sensible” and “coherent” to the discerning reader. As a consequence, 
Cochrane explains, a “cleaner” story emerged. Cochrane even goes as far as to claim that: 
“...these papers [referring to Fama and French research] made clear what stylized and 
robust facts in the data drive the results, and why those facts are economically sensible.” 
(Cochrane 2005, p. 304). Cochrane concludes: “It seems that “it takes a model to beat a 
model,” not a rejection.” (Cochrane 2005, p. 304). 
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I have highlighted some of the words that Cochrane uses to create a second metric, 
besides “predictive success”, to be used when evaluating model-based claims. 
Nonetheless, developing “persuasive” and “interesting” stories to back up the 
mathematical structure of the asset pricing model, is not always a good thing. Cochrane 
reminds us: “In general, empirical success varies inversely with theoretical purity.” 
(Cochrane 1999a, p. 40). This statement clearly draws our attention towards a trade-off. 
However, Cochrane fails to tell us where the borders lie between “empirical success” and 
the “purity of stories”. This was also a topic earlier in Chapter Four, section 4.4.1 where 
I discussed Cochrane’s stories in some detail. Striking the right balance, therefore, 
becomes challenging as it might be based upon a pure subjective judgement. My 
concerns are, as a consequence, also related to model selection. It is not obvious how two 
theories and their models can be compared along the criteria of “persuasiveness”, 
“sensibility”, and “interesting”. And from that judge which model is the “cleanest”. It 
almost sounds like asking a panel of experts to decide on the basis of some quantitative 
and qualitative score-cards. Model selection is surely different. Or is it? Let us continue 
our explorations.  
 
Cochrane seems to be willing to consider story-telling as a basis for model competition. 
First, he gives credit to Mehra and Prescott who presented us with the equity risk 
premium puzzle: “In finance as elsewhere, identifying, marketing and packaging the 
insight, and leaving a structure that others can play with, are justly important 
contributions.” (Cochrane 2006, p. 24). I think the most significant part of this statement 
is certainly the latter, i.e. leaving a legacy that contributes to bringing the whole financial 
market research new impetus. Yet, I cannot resist pointing towards the first part in the 
context of my discussion here. Cochrane even emphasises: “...a researcher who wants his 
ideas to be convincing, as well as right, should do well to study how ideas have in the 
past convinced people,..” (Cochrane 2005, p. 306). I think this could rather be taken as 
practical advice to his upcoming PhD students than giving clear directions with respect to 
model selection. Nonetheless, if Cochrane wants to see both theoretical and empirical 
progress in the consumption based research programme, and use “predictive success” as a 
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“litmus test”, I think he is well advised to go back to the quantifiable evidence rather than 
consulting expert score cards. 
 
In the end, I think it is sensible to evaluate a theory and its models along the lines 
Cochrane initially suggests, i.e. statistical tests of model-based claims. However, as we 
have seen, Cochrane lets such criteria fade as increasingly more evidence is collected 
against accepting the claims emitted from the original and new, habit-persistency 
enhanced versions of the CCAPM. Despite the legitimate reverse-engineering effort, 
Cochrane drifts away from answering the statistical challenges up front. Instead, 
“interesting” and “clean stories” are introduced as new criteria for measuring “scientific 
progress”.  
 
Cochrane’s suggestion to complement the quantitative model choice measures with other 
more qualitative and subjective criteria must be rejected on methodological grounds. The 
discussion on tendencies might give Cochrane a pretext to argue that although the 
CCAPM fails both general and the specific equity risk premium puzzle tests, it is right in 
claiming, first, that it has captured tendencies that are active in real situations, and, 
secondly, that the “cleaner” the stories are the better they get. However, Cartwright warns 
us about “messy” situations. So how can clean stories be told about messy situations? 
Needless to say, Cochrane’s efforts to justify a continued use of consumption based asset 
pricing model is a far cry from what we see in the scientific practices of other disciplines.  
 
In the next section, I draw main conclusions. 
 
6. Main conclusions 
First; the consumption based asset pricing model, i.e. the model “M” in CCAPM, is an 
applied mathematical model. It has been given a dual role; it is used for theorizing, i.e. 
“conceptual explorations” and for econometric analysis, i.e. fitting theories to the data.  
Second; in its first role, the model “M” is developed in a “process of isolation” which 
establishes “simplified”, “idealized” and even “fictional” versions of the investor, the 
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financial markets and the financial assets. This a priori starting point is used to deduce 
more granular models referred to as “analytically convenient special cases”.  
Third; in its second role, the model “M” extends its analytically convenient special cases 
towards the real situations. I draw on the much debated “equity risk premium puzzle” to 
demonstrate the model’s inability to develop what is referred to as “empirically useful 
representations”. Given this inadequacy, Cochrane suggests incorporating “habit 
persistency” as a new argument into the model’s mathematical utility function.  
Fourth; I argue that the consumption based capital asset pricing effort, in Imre Lakatos’ 
sense, is a “research programme” that uses a few fundamental, “hard core”, principles, a 
large flexible set of auxiliary, “protective belt”, assumptions, methodological decision 
rules in the form of “positive and negative heuristic”, and an established form of 
assessing whether the research programme is “progressive” or “degenerating”. 
Cochrane’s “habit-persistency” argument is thus well within the heuristic of the 
programme, it modestly improves the programme’s predictability and contributes to its 
progression.  
Fifth; although the analytical convenient special cases are to some extent de-idealized and 
de-fictionalized versions of their a priori starting point, they remain tools for theorizing 
and find few methodologically sound and valid bridges to the real situations they target. 
As a consequence, I do not expect the CCAPM research programme to progress by the 
construction of even more granular, lower-level models as they are too dependent upon 
the auxiliary, belt assumptions. Hence, these cases lack horizontal portability to situations 
different from those they are meant to represent.  
Sixth; given the research programme’s modest level of epistemic value, it’s advocates are 
well advised to move away from the model-based “point-forecasts” approach towards 
one that makes “tendency claims” with respect to empirical situations. This re-direction 
replaces Cochrane’s own suggestion to reduce the importance of standard statistical tests 
when evaluating the model-based claims, and, in addition, offer a sounder foundation for 
emitting knowledge for use to the various stakeholders. 
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